GHSA-8MV7-9C27-98VC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 23:26 – Updated: 2026-07-20 23:26Summary
In the composable astro/hono pipeline, the security.checkOrigin protection is only installed by the middleware() primitive. The actions() and pages() primitives each dispatch to user code independently, so a pipeline that mounts either primitive before (or without) middleware() will bypass the origin check for those requests.
Details
security.checkOrigin (default: true) is intended to reject cross-site POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE form submissions. In the classic pipeline (astro() all-in-one), the check always runs because Astro injects a virtual middleware module even when the user has no src/middleware.ts. In the composable astro/hono pipeline, the user assembles primitives manually. The check is only installed inside middleware() — so:
- Mounting
actions()beforemiddleware()allows cross-origin form-encoded action requests to execute before the gate runs. Theexamples/advanced-routingexample and the Cloudflarehonodocs shipped this order. - Omitting
middleware()entirely (reasonable for apps with no custom middleware) silently dropscheckOriginprotection for all on-demand endpoints and pages dispatched throughpages().
The attack is a blind write-only CSRF: the attacker can trigger a state-mutating action or endpoint handler using the victim's cookies, but cannot read the cross-origin response body.
Affected versions
Astro >= 7.0.0 when using the composable astro/hono pipeline with either:
- actions() mounted before middleware(), or
- pages() used without middleware()
The default (non-composable) pipeline is not affected.
Fix
The origin check is now applied at each dispatch sink (ActionHandler.handle and PagesHandler.handleWithErrorFallback), gated on manifest.checkOrigin, using the same predicate as the middleware. The check is order-independent and a no-op when middleware() has already run.
Fix: https://github.com/withastro/astro/pull/17250
Workaround
Ensure middleware() is mounted before both actions() and pages() in the composable pipeline, and that it is always included even when no custom middleware logic is needed:
app.use(middleware());
app.use(actions());
app.use(pages());
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "astro"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.0.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-20T23:26:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nIn the composable `astro/hono` pipeline, the `security.checkOrigin` protection is only installed by the `middleware()` primitive. The `actions()` and `pages()` primitives each dispatch to user code independently, so a pipeline that mounts either primitive before (or without) `middleware()` will bypass the origin check for those requests.\n\n## Details\n\n`security.checkOrigin` (default: `true`) is intended to reject cross-site `POST`/`PUT`/`PATCH`/`DELETE` form submissions. In the classic pipeline (`astro()` all-in-one), the check always runs because Astro injects a virtual middleware module even when the user has no `src/middleware.ts`. In the composable `astro/hono` pipeline, the user assembles primitives manually. The check is only installed inside `middleware()` \u2014 so:\n\n- Mounting `actions()` before `middleware()` allows cross-origin form-encoded action requests to execute before the gate runs. The `examples/advanced-routing` example and the Cloudflare `hono` docs shipped this order.\n- Omitting `middleware()` entirely (reasonable for apps with no custom middleware) silently drops `checkOrigin` protection for all on-demand endpoints and pages dispatched through `pages()`.\n\nThe attack is a blind write-only CSRF: the attacker can trigger a state-mutating action or endpoint handler using the victim\u0027s cookies, but cannot read the cross-origin response body.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nAstro `\u003e= 7.0.0` when using the composable `astro/hono` pipeline with either:\n- `actions()` mounted before `middleware()`, or\n- `pages()` used without `middleware()`\n\nThe default (non-composable) pipeline is not affected.\n\n## Fix\n\nThe origin check is now applied at each dispatch sink (`ActionHandler.handle` and `PagesHandler.handleWithErrorFallback`), gated on `manifest.checkOrigin`, using the same predicate as the middleware. The check is order-independent and a no-op when `middleware()` has already run.\n\nFix: https://github.com/withastro/astro/pull/17250\n\n## Workaround\n\nEnsure `middleware()` is mounted before both `actions()` and `pages()` in the composable pipeline, and that it is always included even when no custom middleware logic is needed:\n\n```ts\napp.use(middleware());\napp.use(actions());\napp.use(pages());\n```",
"id": "GHSA-8mv7-9c27-98vc",
"modified": "2026-07-20T23:26:27Z",
"published": "2026-07-20T23:26:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories/GHSA-8mv7-9c27-98vc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/pull/17250"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/commit/0b30b35f864310bee8485c952d1877e82e2b9b1a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/releases/tag/astro@7.0.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Astro: composable `astro/hono` pipeline bypasses `security.checkOrigin` when `middleware()` is absent or misordered"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.