CVE-2026-73541 (GCVE-0-2026-73541)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-19 17:20 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:47
VLAI
Title
Tempo fee sponsorship in mpp bounds each transaction but not aggregate exposure, allowing concurrent sponsor-wallet drain
Summary
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty. MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy enforces its ceilings (max_gas, max_fee_per_gas, max_priority_fee_per_gas, the worst-case gas_limit * max_fee_per_gas <= max_total_fee budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. reserve_hash_atomic/2 is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times max_total_fee, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period. This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-19 18:45 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Assigner
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
ZenHive mpp Affected: 0.2.0 , < 0.12.0 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
ZenHive mpp Affected: d29d54e507918db00a5b65d90136b73166c017d7 , < ddc46868fba57ccebb567c04709812b466123076 (git)
    cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
Date Public
2026-08-02 00:00
Show details on NVD website

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Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times max_total_fee, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period.\\n\\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0.\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"ZenHive\",\"product\":\"mpp\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"collectionURL\":\"https://repo.hex.pm\",\"packageName\":\"mpp\",\"cpes\":[\"cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\"],\"modules\":[\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027\",\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027\"],\"programFiles\":[\"lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex\",\"lib/mpp/methods/tempo.ex\"],\"programRoutines\":[{\"name\":\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027:validate/3\"},{\"name\":\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027:verify/2\"}],\"repo\":\"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp\",\"packageURL\":\"pkg:hex/mpp\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"0.2.0\",\"lessThan\":\"0.12.0\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]},{\"vendor\":\"ZenHive\",\"product\":\"mpp\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"collectionURL\":\"https://github.com\",\"packageName\":\"zenhive/mpp\",\"cpes\":[\"cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\"],\"modules\":[\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027\",\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027\"],\"programFiles\":[\"lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex\",\"lib/mpp/methods/tempo.ex\"],\"programRoutines\":[{\"name\":\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027:validate/3\"},{\"name\":\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027:verify/2\"}],\"repo\":\"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp\",\"packageURL\":\"pkg:github/zenhive/mpp\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"d29d54e507918db00a5b65d90136b73166c017d7\",\"lessThan\":\"ddc46868fba57ccebb567c04709812b466123076\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV40\":[{\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"4.0\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X\",\"baseScore\":8.3,\"baseSeverity\":\"HIGH\",\"attackVector\":\"NETWORK\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"attackRequirements\":\"PRESENT\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"NONE\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"vulnConfidentialityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"vulnIntegrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"vulnAvailabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"subConfidentialityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"subIntegrityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"subAvailabilityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"exploitMaturity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"confidentialityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"integrityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"availabilityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackVector\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackComplexity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackRequirements\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedPrivilegesRequired\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedUserInteraction\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Safety\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Automatable\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Recovery\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"valueDensity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"vulnerabilityResponseEffort\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"providerUrgency\":\"NOT_DEFINED\"}}],\"ssvcV203\":[{\"source\":\"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\",\"ssvcData\":{\"timestamp\":\"2026-08-19T18:45:45.477502Z\",\"id\":\"CVE-2026-73541\",\"options\":[{\"exploitation\":\"none\"},{\"automatable\":\"no\"},{\"technicalImpact\":\"total\"}],\"role\":\"CISA Coordinator\",\"version\":\"2.0.3\"}}]},\"weaknesses\":[{\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-770\"}]}],\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-73541.html\",\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/ddc46868fba57ccebb567c04709812b466123076\",\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-j4j7-7xpr-c7cr\",\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\"},{\"url\":\"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-73541\",\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\"}]}}",
    "vulnrichment": {
      "containers": "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2026-73541\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"none\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"no\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"total\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2026-08-19T18:45:45.477502Z\"}}}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-19T18:46:46.063Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"Tempo fee sponsorship in mpp bounds each transaction but not aggregate exposure, allowing concurrent sponsor-wallet drain\", \"source\": {\"discovery\": \"EXTERNAL\"}, \"credits\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"finder\", \"value\": \"E.FU\"}, {\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"remediation developer\", \"value\": \"E.FU\"}, {\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"analyst\", \"value\": \"Jonatan M\\u00e4nnchen / EEF\"}], \"impacts\": [{\"capecId\": \"CAPEC-130\", \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CAPEC-130 Excessive Allocation\"}]}], \"metrics\": [{\"format\": \"CVSS\", \"cvssV4_0\": {\"Safety\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"version\": \"4.0\", \"Recovery\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"baseScore\": 8.3, \"Automatable\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"attackVector\": \"NETWORK\", \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"valueDensity\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N\", \"providerUrgency\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackRequirements\": \"PRESENT\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"NONE\", \"subIntegrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnIntegrityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"subAvailabilityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnAvailabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"subConfidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnConfidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnerabilityResponseEffort\": \"NOT_DEFINED\"}, \"scenarios\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"GENERAL\"}]}], \"affected\": [{\"cpes\": [\"cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\"], \"repo\": \"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp\", \"vendor\": \"ZenHive\", \"modules\": [\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027\", \"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027\"], \"product\": \"mpp\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"0.2.0\", \"lessThan\": \"0.12.0\", \"versionType\": \"semver\"}], \"packageURL\": \"pkg:hex/mpp\", \"packageName\": \"mpp\", \"programFiles\": [\"lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex\", \"lib/mpp/methods/tempo.ex\"], \"collectionURL\": \"https://repo.hex.pm\", \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\", \"programRoutines\": [{\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027:validate/3\"}, {\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027:verify/2\"}]}, {\"cpes\": [\"cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\"], \"repo\": \"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp\", \"vendor\": \"ZenHive\", \"modules\": [\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027\", \"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027\"], \"product\": \"mpp\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"d29d54e507918db00a5b65d90136b73166c017d7\", \"lessThan\": \"ddc46868fba57ccebb567c04709812b466123076\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}], \"packageURL\": \"pkg:github/zenhive/mpp\", \"packageName\": \"zenhive/mpp\", \"programFiles\": [\"lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex\", \"lib/mpp/methods/tempo.ex\"], \"collectionURL\": \"https://github.com\", \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\", \"programRoutines\": [{\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027:validate/3\"}, {\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027:verify/2\"}]}], \"datePublic\": \"2026-08-02T00:00:00.000Z\", \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-j4j7-7xpr-c7cr\", \"tags\": [\"vendor-advisory\", \"related\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-73541.html\", \"tags\": [\"related\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-73541\", \"tags\": [\"related\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/ddc46868fba57ccebb567c04709812b466123076\", \"tags\": [\"patch\"]}], \"workarounds\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Disable Tempo fee sponsorship by setting \\\"fee_payer\\\" =\u003e false (the default), so the client pays its own gas and the sponsor wallet is never committed. Where sponsorship must stay enabled, lowering max_total_fee and max_validity_window_seconds reduces the exposure each concurrent request can commit and how long it stays outstanding, without bounding the aggregate.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eDisable Tempo fee sponsorship by setting \u003ccode\u003e\\\"fee_payer\\\" =\u0026gt; false\u003c/code\u003e (the default), so the client pays its own gas and the sponsor wallet is never committed. Where sponsorship must stay enabled, lowering \u003ccode\u003emax_total_fee\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003emax_validity_window_seconds\u003c/code\u003e reduces the exposure each concurrent request can commit and how long it stays outstanding, without bounding the aggregate.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"Disable Tempo fee sponsorship by setting `\\\"fee_payer\\\" =\u003e false` (the default), so the client pays its own gas and the sponsor wallet is never committed. Where sponsorship must stay enabled, lowering `max_total_fee` and `max_validity_window_seconds` reduces the exposure each concurrent request can commit and how long it stays outstanding, without bounding the aggregate.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty.\\n\\nMPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy enforces its ceilings (max_gas, max_fee_per_gas, max_priority_fee_per_gas, the worst-case gas_limit * max_fee_per_gas \u003c= max_total_fee budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. reserve_hash_atomic/2 is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times max_total_fee, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period.\\n\\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ccode\u003eMPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u003c/code\u003e enforces its ceilings (\u003ccode\u003emax_gas\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003emax_fee_per_gas\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003emax_priority_fee_per_gas\u003c/code\u003e, the worst-case \u003ccode\u003egas_limit * max_fee_per_gas \u0026lt;= max_total_fee\u003c/code\u003e budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. \u003ccode\u003ereserve_hash_atomic/2\u003c/code\u003e is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times \u003ccode\u003emax_total_fee\u003c/code\u003e, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty.\\n\\n`MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy` enforces its ceilings (`max_gas`, `max_fee_per_gas`, `max_priority_fee_per_gas`, the worst-case `gas_limit * max_fee_per_gas \u003c= max_total_fee` budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. `reserve_hash_atomic/2` is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times `max_total_fee`, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period.\\n\\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-770\", \"description\": \"CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\"}]}], \"configurations\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Only deployments that enable Tempo server-side fee sponsorship are affected, through \\\"fee_payer\\\" =\u003e true in method_config with either local co-signing (fee_payer_private_key) or hosted sponsorship (fee_payer_url). Sponsorship is disabled by default.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eOnly deployments that enable Tempo server-side fee sponsorship are affected, through \u003ccode\u003e\\\"fee_payer\\\" =\u0026gt; true\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003emethod_config\u003c/code\u003e with either local co-signing (\u003ccode\u003efee_payer_private_key\u003c/code\u003e) or hosted sponsorship (\u003ccode\u003efee_payer_url\u003c/code\u003e). Sponsorship is disabled by default.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"Only deployments that enable Tempo server-side fee sponsorship are affected, through `\\\"fee_payer\\\" =\u003e true` in `method_config` with either local co-signing (`fee_payer_private_key`) or hosted sponsorship (`fee_payer_url`). Sponsorship is disabled by default.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"cpeApplicability\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"negate\": false, \"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"0.12.0\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"0.2.0\"}], \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": \"AND\"}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"shortName\": \"EEF\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-19T17:20:00.286Z\"}}}",
      "cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-73541\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-19T18:47:04.542Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-08-18T10:00:02.140Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-08-19T17:20:00.286Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"EEF\"}",
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }
  }
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

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