CVE-2026-65197 (GCVE-0-2026-65197)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-13 14:17 – Updated: 2026-10-13 14:17
VLAI
Title
H3C G3/G5 HDM Firmware Verification Key Replacement
Summary
H3C HDM Family-A verifies the RSA signature of a firmware image against a public key it reads from the mutable file `/conf/public.pem`. That file is writable by an authenticated Redfish client through the `UpdateService.UploadSignKey` action, which stores the uploaded body verbatim after validating only that the multipart filename ends in `.pem`. An administrator, or any account with `firmware-update` privilege, can therefore replace the trust anchor with their own key, sign a malicious image with the matching private key, and have it pass verification. Family-A has no hardware root-of-trust (no PFR) to catch the substituted key.  This was observed on H3C HDM Family-A G5 HDM 6.14.01. H3C HDM Family-A G3/G5 builds carrying the Redfish/DRE update tree appear to be affected. HDM2 uses a different update path and is not covered by this finding.
Severity
3.1 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
SSVC
Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: total
CNA · runZero (v2.0.3)
CWE
  • CWE-347 - Improper verification of cryptographic signature
Assigner
runZero CNA under the icscert root
CNA scorecard C 71/100 over 30 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
H3C HDM Family-A G5 Affected: 0 , ≤ 6.14.01 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Date Public
2026-10-13 14:00
Credits
HD Moore of runZero Tod Beardsley of runZero
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

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