Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-64320 (GCVE-0-2026-64320)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-25 08:49 – Updated: 2026-07-27 04:59

Title

nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page() validates only the dword alignment of the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo). The 64-bit offset is then added to a small kzalloc'd buffer that holds the discovery log page and the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which memcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound check: u64 offset = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req->cmd); /* 64-bit host */ size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req->cmd); /* 32-bit host */ ... if (offset & 0x3) { ... } /* only check */ ... alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req); buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL); ... status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len); The Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed() returns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call is reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach the nvmet target. With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker requesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next slab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an empirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81 canonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response). Pointing the offset at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel memcpy and crashes (or panics, on panic_on_oops=1) the target host instead. The attacker-controlled source-side offset pattern "nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + ATTACKER_OFFSET, ...)" is unique to nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page in the entire nvmet codebase: every other Get Log Page handler in admin-cmd.c either ignores lpo (and silently starts every response at offset 0) or tracks a local destination offset with a fixed source pointer. Validate the host-supplied offset against the log page size, cap the copy length to what is actually available, and zero-fill any remainder of the host transfer buffer. The zero-fill matches the existing short-response pattern in nvmet_execute_get_log_changed_ns() (admin-cmd.c) and prevents leaking transport SGL contents when the host asks for more bytes than the log page contains.

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H

Assigner

Linux

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33b974eb626154ae9…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56c021a0869260d04…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a29b316b9bbfd269f…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/53cd102a7a56079b1…

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
Linux	Linux	Affected: a07b4970f464f13640e28e16dad6cfa33647cc99 , < 33b974eb626154ae9348f2bac7de84cb2a3d9dd4 (git) Affected: a07b4970f464f13640e28e16dad6cfa33647cc99 , < 56c021a0869260d04c4b65d1471936aaf9177114 (git) Affected: a07b4970f464f13640e28e16dad6cfa33647cc99 , < a29b316b9bbfd269f323ab4ba9906a894025680f (git) Affected: a07b4970f464f13640e28e16dad6cfa33647cc99 , < 53cd102a7a56079b11b897835bd9b94c14e6322c (git)
Linux	Linux	Affected: 4.8 Unaffected: 0 , < 4.8 (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.96 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.39 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.1.4 , ≤ 7.1.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2-rc1 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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The 64-bit offset is then\\nadded to a small kzalloc\u0027d buffer that holds the discovery log page\\nand the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which\\nmemcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound\\ncheck:\\n\\n    u64 offset      = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req-\u003ecmd);  /* 64-bit host */\\n    size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req-\u003ecmd);     /* 32-bit host */\\n    ...\\n    if (offset \u0026 0x3) { ... }                               /* only check */\\n    ...\\n    alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req);\\n    buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL);\\n    ...\\n    status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len);\\n\\nThe Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed()\\nreturns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call\\nis reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach\\nthe nvmet target.  With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker\\nrequesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next\\nslab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an\\nempirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81\\ncanonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response).  Pointing the\\noffset at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel memcpy and\\ncrashes (or panics, on panic_on_oops=1) the target host instead.\\n\\nThe attacker-controlled source-side offset pattern\\n\\\"nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + ATTACKER_OFFSET, ...)\\\" is unique\\nto nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page in the entire nvmet codebase: every\\nother Get Log Page handler in admin-cmd.c either ignores lpo (and\\nsilently starts every response at offset 0) or tracks a local\\ndestination offset with a fixed source pointer.\\n\\nValidate the host-supplied offset against the log page size, cap the\\ncopy length to what is actually available, and zero-fill any remainder\\nof the host transfer buffer.  The zero-fill matches the existing\\nshort-response pattern in nvmet_execute_get_log_changed_ns()\\n(admin-cmd.c) and prevents leaking transport SGL contents when the\\nhost asks for more bytes than the log page contains.\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"programFiles\":[\"drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"a07b4970f464f13640e28e16dad6cfa33647cc99\",\"lessThan\":\"33b974eb626154ae9348f2bac7de84cb2a3d9dd4\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"a07b4970f464f13640e28e16dad6cfa33647cc99\",\"lessThan\":\"56c021a0869260d04c4b65d1471936aaf9177114\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"a07b4970f464f13640e28e16dad6cfa33647cc99\",\"lessThan\":\"a29b316b9bbfd269f323ab4ba9906a894025680f\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"a07b4970f464f13640e28e16dad6cfa33647cc99\",\"lessThan\":\"53cd102a7a56079b11b897835bd9b94c14e6322c\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]},{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"affected\",\"programFiles\":[\"drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"4.8\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"0\",\"lessThan\":\"4.8\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.12.96\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.12.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.18.39\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.18.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"7.1.4\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"7.1.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"7.2-rc1\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"*\",\"versionType\":\"original_commit_for_fix\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H\",\"baseScore\":9.1,\"baseSeverity\":\"CRITICAL\",\"attackVector\":\"NETWORK\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"NONE\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"integrityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":3.9,\"impactScore\":5.2}]},\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33b974eb626154ae9348f2bac7de84cb2a3d9dd4\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/53cd102a7a56079b11b897835bd9b94c14e6322c\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56c021a0869260d04c4b65d1471936aaf9177114\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a29b316b9bbfd269f323ab4ba9906a894025680f\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"}]}}",
    "suse_vex": {
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      "current_release_date": "2026-07-25T16:45:47Z",
      "cve": "CVE-2026-64320",
      "id": "CVE-2026-64320",
      "initial_release_date": "2026-07-25T16:45:47Z",
      "source": "SUSE CSAF VEX",
      "status": "interim",
      "title": "SUSE CVE CVE-2026-64320",
      "url": "https://ftp.suse.com/pub/projects/security/csaf-vex/cve-2026-64320.json",
      "version": "2"
    }
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}

GHSA-QW96-J6M6-F3QH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-25 12:31

Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page

nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page() validates only the dword alignment of the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo). The 64-bit offset is then added to a small kzalloc'd buffer that holds the discovery log page and the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which memcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound check:

u64 offset      = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req->cmd);  /* 64-bit host */
size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req->cmd);     /* 32-bit host */
...
if (offset & 0x3) { ... }                               /* only check */
...
alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req);
buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL);
...
status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len);

The Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed() returns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call is reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach the nvmet target. With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker requesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next slab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an empirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81 canonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response). Pointing the offset at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel memcpy and crashes (or panics, on panic_on_oops=1) the target host instead.

The attacker-controlled source-side offset pattern "nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + ATTACKER_OFFSET, ...)" is unique to nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page in the entire nvmet codebase: every other Get Log Page handler in admin-cmd.c either ignores lpo (and silently starts every response at offset 0) or tracks a local destination offset with a fixed source pointer.

Validate the host-supplied offset against the log page size, cap the copy length to what is actually available, and zero-fill any remainder of the host transfer buffer. The zero-fill matches the existing short-response pattern in nvmet_execute_get_log_changed_ns() (admin-cmd.c) and prevents leaking transport SGL contents when the host asks for more bytes than the log page contains.

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64320"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:13Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page\n\nnvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page() validates only the dword alignment\nof the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo).  The 64-bit offset is then\nadded to a small kzalloc\u0027d buffer that holds the discovery log page\nand the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which\nmemcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound\ncheck:\n\n    u64 offset      = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req-\u003ecmd);  /* 64-bit host */\n    size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req-\u003ecmd);     /* 32-bit host */\n    ...\n    if (offset \u0026 0x3) { ... }                               /* only check */\n    ...\n    alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req);\n    buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL);\n    ...\n    status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len);\n\nThe Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed()\nreturns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call\nis reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach\nthe nvmet target.  With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker\nrequesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next\nslab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an\nempirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81\ncanonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response).  Pointing the\noffset at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel memcpy and\ncrashes (or panics, on panic_on_oops=1) the target host instead.\n\nThe attacker-controlled source-side offset pattern\n\"nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + ATTACKER_OFFSET, ...)\" is unique\nto nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page in the entire nvmet codebase: every\nother Get Log Page handler in admin-cmd.c either ignores lpo (and\nsilently starts every response at offset 0) or tracks a local\ndestination offset with a fixed source pointer.\n\nValidate the host-supplied offset against the log page size, cap the\ncopy length to what is actually available, and zero-fill any remainder\nof the host transfer buffer.  The zero-fill matches the existing\nshort-response pattern in nvmet_execute_get_log_changed_ns()\n(admin-cmd.c) and prevents leaking transport SGL contents when the\nhost asks for more bytes than the log page contains.",
  "id": "GHSA-qw96-j6m6-f3qh",
  "modified": "2026-07-25T12:31:31Z",
  "published": "2026-07-25T12:31:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64320"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33b974eb626154ae9348f2bac7de84cb2a3d9dd4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/53cd102a7a56079b11b897835bd9b94c14e6322c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56c021a0869260d04c4b65d1471936aaf9177114"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a29b316b9bbfd269f323ab4ba9906a894025680f"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-64320 (GCVE-0-2026-64320)

GHSA-QW96-J6M6-F3QH

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature