CVE-2026-42810 (GCVE-0-2026-42810)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-04 16:48 – Updated: 2026-05-04 18:33
VLAI?
Title
Apache Polaris: could broaden vended S3 credentials through wildcard-bearing namespace or table names
Summary
Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it
later builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those
same characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns
and
`s3:prefix` conditions.
In S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as
ordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table
can match the storage path of a different table.
In private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary-
credential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for
crafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other
tables' S3 locations.
The confirmed behavior includes:
- reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);
- listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);
- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating
and
deleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix.
A control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same
cross-table access.
A least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker
principal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the
minimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table
(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that
setup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the
attacker
could still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use
those credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.
In Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which
data files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table
version
to read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful
confidentiality
problem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited
to
disclosure.
Severity ?
9.9 (Critical)
Assigner
References
| URL | Tags | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache Polaris |
Affected:
0 , < 1.4.1
(semver)
|
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-05-04T17:37:04.202Z",
"orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"shortName": "CVE"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/02/11"
}
],
"title": "CVE Program Container"
},
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-42810",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-05-04T18:32:53.859435Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-05-04T18:33:09.056Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Apache Polaris",
"vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.4.1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cspan style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\"\u003eApache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it\nlater builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those\nsame characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns\nand\n`s3:prefix` conditions.\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as\nordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table\ncan match the storage path of a different table.\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris\u0027 AWS S3 temporary-\ncredential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for\ncrafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other\ntables\u0027 S3 locations.\n\u003cbr\u003e\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\n\u003cbr\u003e\n- reading another table\u0027s metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\n\u003cbr\u003e- listing another table\u0027s exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\n\u003cbr\u003e- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating\nand\ndeleting an object under another table\u0027s exact S3 table prefix.\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same\ncross-table access.\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\n\u003cspan style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\"\u003eA least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker\nprincipal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the\nminimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table\n(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`).\u003c/span\u003e In that\nsetup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the\nattacker\ncould still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use\nthose credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which\ndata files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table\nversion\nto read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful\nconfidentiality\nproblem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited\nto\ndisclosure.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it\nlater builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those\nsame characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns\nand\n`s3:prefix` conditions.\n\n\n\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as\nordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table\ncan match the storage path of a different table.\n\n\n\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris\u0027 AWS S3 temporary-\ncredential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for\ncrafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other\ntables\u0027 S3 locations.\n\n\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\n\n\n- reading another table\u0027s metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\n\n- listing another table\u0027s exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\n\n- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating\nand\ndeleting an object under another table\u0027s exact S3 table prefix.\n\n\n\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same\ncross-table access.\n\n\n\nA least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker\nprincipal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the\nminimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table\n(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that\nsetup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the\nattacker\ncould still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use\nthose credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\n\n\n\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which\ndata files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table\nversion\nto read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful\nconfidentiality\nproblem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited\nto\ndisclosure."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"text": "important"
},
"type": "Textual description of severity"
}
},
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 9.4,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
},
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.9,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-116",
"description": "CWE-116 Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-20",
"description": "CWE-20 Improper Input Validation",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-05-04T16:48:49.754Z",
"orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
"shortName": "apache"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory"
],
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/gg3qq9sqg4hdjmprqy46p40xmln61dm9"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "INTERNAL"
},
"title": "Apache Polaris: could broaden vended S3 credentials through wildcard-bearing namespace or table names",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 0.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
"assignerShortName": "apache",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-42810",
"datePublished": "2026-05-04T16:48:49.754Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-04-30T14:22:36.663Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-05-04T18:33:09.056Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-42810\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"security@apache.org\",\"published\":\"2026-05-04T17:16:26.493\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-05-04T18:16:32.683\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Received\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it\\nlater builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those\\nsame characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns\\nand\\n`s3:prefix` conditions.\\n\\n\\n\\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as\\nordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table\\ncan match the storage path of a different table.\\n\\n\\n\\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris\u0027 AWS S3 temporary-\\ncredential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for\\ncrafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other\\ntables\u0027 S3 locations.\\n\\n\\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\\n\\n\\n- reading another table\u0027s metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\\n\\n- listing another table\u0027s exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\\n\\n- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating\\nand\\ndeleting an object under another table\u0027s exact S3 table prefix.\\n\\n\\n\\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same\\ncross-table access.\\n\\n\\n\\nA least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker\\nprincipal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the\\nminimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table\\n(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that\\nsetup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the\\nattacker\\ncould still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use\\nthose credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\\n\\n\\n\\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which\\ndata files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table\\nversion\\nto read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful\\nconfidentiality\\nproblem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited\\nto\\ndisclosure.\"}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV40\":[{\"source\":\"security@apache.org\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"4.0\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X\",\"baseScore\":9.4,\"baseSeverity\":\"CRITICAL\",\"attackVector\":\"NETWORK\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"attackRequirements\":\"NONE\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"LOW\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"vulnConfidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"vulnIntegrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"vulnAvailabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"subConfidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"subIntegrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"subAvailabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"exploitMaturity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"confidentialityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"integrityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"availabilityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackVector\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackComplexity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackRequirements\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedPrivilegesRequired\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedUserInteraction\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Safety\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Automatable\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Recovery\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"valueDensity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"vulnerabilityResponseEffort\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"providerUrgency\":\"NOT_DEFINED\"}}],\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"security@apache.org\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H\",\"baseScore\":9.9,\"baseSeverity\":\"CRITICAL\",\"attackVector\":\"NETWORK\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"LOW\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"CHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"integrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":3.1,\"impactScore\":6.0}]},\"weaknesses\":[{\"source\":\"security@apache.org\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-20\"},{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-116\"}]}],\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://lists.apache.org/thread/gg3qq9sqg4hdjmprqy46p40xmln61dm9\",\"source\":\"security@apache.org\"},{\"url\":\"http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/02/11\",\"source\":\"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108\"}]}}",
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CVE Program Container\", \"references\": [{\"url\": \"http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/02/11\"}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108\", \"shortName\": \"CVE\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-05-04T17:37:04.202Z\"}}, {\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2026-42810\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"none\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"no\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"total\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2026-05-04T18:32:53.859435Z\"}}}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-05-04T18:33:03.574Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"Apache Polaris: could broaden vended S3 credentials through wildcard-bearing namespace or table names\", \"source\": {\"discovery\": \"INTERNAL\"}, \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"Textual description of severity\", \"content\": {\"text\": \"important\"}}}, {\"format\": \"CVSS\", \"cvssV4_0\": {\"Safety\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"version\": \"4.0\", \"Recovery\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"baseScore\": 9.4, \"Automatable\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"attackVector\": \"NETWORK\", \"baseSeverity\": \"CRITICAL\", \"valueDensity\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H\", \"providerUrgency\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackRequirements\": \"NONE\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"LOW\", \"subIntegrityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"vulnIntegrityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"subAvailabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"vulnAvailabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"subConfidentialityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"vulnConfidentialityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"vulnerabilityResponseEffort\": \"NOT_DEFINED\"}, \"scenarios\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"GENERAL\"}]}, {\"format\": \"CVSS\", \"cvssV3_1\": {\"scope\": \"CHANGED\", \"version\": \"3.1\", \"baseScore\": 9.9, \"attackVector\": \"NETWORK\", \"baseSeverity\": \"CRITICAL\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H\", \"integrityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"LOW\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"HIGH\"}, \"scenarios\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"GENERAL\"}]}], \"affected\": [{\"vendor\": \"Apache Software Foundation\", \"product\": \"Apache Polaris\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"0\", \"lessThan\": \"1.4.1\", \"versionType\": \"semver\"}], \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\"}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://lists.apache.org/thread/gg3qq9sqg4hdjmprqy46p40xmln61dm9\", \"tags\": [\"vendor-advisory\"]}], \"x_generator\": {\"engine\": \"Vulnogram 0.2.0\"}, \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it\\nlater builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those\\nsame characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns\\nand\\n`s3:prefix` conditions.\\n\\n\\n\\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as\\nordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table\\ncan match the storage path of a different table.\\n\\n\\n\\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris\u0027 AWS S3 temporary-\\ncredential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for\\ncrafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other\\ntables\u0027 S3 locations.\\n\\n\\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\\n\\n\\n- reading another table\u0027s metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\\n\\n- listing another table\u0027s exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\\n\\n- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating\\nand\\ndeleting an object under another table\u0027s exact S3 table prefix.\\n\\n\\n\\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same\\ncross-table access.\\n\\n\\n\\nA least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker\\nprincipal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the\\nminimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table\\n(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that\\nsetup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the\\nattacker\\ncould still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use\\nthose credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\\n\\n\\n\\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which\\ndata files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table\\nversion\\nto read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful\\nconfidentiality\\nproblem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited\\nto\\ndisclosure.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cspan style=\\\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\\\"\u003eApache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it\\nlater builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those\\nsame characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns\\nand\\n`s3:prefix` conditions.\\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as\\nordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table\\ncan match the storage path of a different table.\\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris\u0027 AWS S3 temporary-\\ncredential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for\\ncrafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other\\ntables\u0027 S3 locations.\\n\u003cbr\u003e\\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\\n\u003cbr\u003e\\n- reading another table\u0027s metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\\n\u003cbr\u003e- listing another table\u0027s exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\\n\u003cbr\u003e- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating\\nand\\ndeleting an object under another table\u0027s exact S3 table prefix.\\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same\\ncross-table access.\\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\\n\u003cspan style=\\\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\\\"\u003eA least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker\\nprincipal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the\\nminimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table\\n(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`).\u003c/span\u003e In that\\nsetup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the\\nattacker\\ncould still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use\\nthose credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which\\ndata files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table\\nversion\\nto read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful\\nconfidentiality\\nproblem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited\\nto\\ndisclosure.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-116\", \"description\": \"CWE-116 Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output\"}]}, {\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-20\", \"description\": \"CWE-20 Improper Input Validation\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09\", \"shortName\": \"apache\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-05-04T16:48:49.754Z\"}}}",
"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-42810\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-05-04T18:33:09.056Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-04-30T14:22:36.663Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-05-04T16:48:49.754Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"apache\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…