CWE-681
AllowedIncorrect Conversion between Numeric Types
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
When converting from one data type to another, such as long to integer, data can be omitted or translated in a way that produces unexpected values. If the resulting values are used in a sensitive context, then dangerous behaviors may occur.
133 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-GMPM-XP43-F7G6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:27 – Updated: 2022-06-24 01:23An Integer signedness error in the JavaScript Interpreter in Facebook Hermes prior to commit 2c7af7ec481ceffd0d14ce2d7c045e475fd71dc6 allows attackers to cause a denial of service attack or a potential RCE via crafted JavaScript. Note that this is only exploitable if the application using Hermes permits evaluation of untrusted JavaScript. Hence, most React Native applications are not affected.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.4.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "hermes-engine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-1913"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-195",
"CWE-681"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-06-24T01:23:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-09-09T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An Integer signedness error in the JavaScript Interpreter in Facebook Hermes prior to commit 2c7af7ec481ceffd0d14ce2d7c045e475fd71dc6 allows attackers to cause a denial of service attack or a potential RCE via crafted JavaScript. Note that this is only exploitable if the application using Hermes permits evaluation of untrusted JavaScript. Hence, most React Native applications are not affected.",
"id": "GHSA-gmpm-xp43-f7g6",
"modified": "2022-06-24T01:23:39Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:27:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1913"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/facebook/hermes/commit/2c7af7ec481ceffd0d14ce2d7c045e475fd71dc6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.facebook.com/security/advisories/cve-2020-1913"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Signed to Unsigned Conversion Error in Facebook Hermes"
}
GHSA-H5QR-R3M8-3G2V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-12 03:33 – Updated: 2024-12-12 03:33Windows Resilient File System (ReFS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-49093"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-681"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-12T02:04:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Windows Resilient File System (ReFS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability",
"id": "GHSA-h5qr-r3m8-3g2v",
"modified": "2024-12-12T03:33:05Z",
"published": "2024-12-12T03:33:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49093"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-49093"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H6JH-7GV5-28VG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-08-25 14:43 – Updated: 2024-11-13 17:20Impact
The implementation of tf.raw_ops.StringNGrams is vulnerable to an integer overflow issue caused by converting a signed integer value to an unsigned one and then allocating memory based on this value.
import tensorflow as tf
tf.raw_ops.StringNGrams(
data=['',''],
data_splits=[0,2],
separator=' '*100,
ngram_widths=[-80,0,0,-60],
left_pad=' ',
right_pad=' ',
pad_width=100,
preserve_short_sequences=False)
The implementation calls reserve on a tstring with a value that sometimes can be negative if user supplies negative ngram_widths. The reserve method calls TF_TString_Reserve which has an unsigned long argument for the size of the buffer. Hence, the implicit conversion transforms the negative value to a large integer.
Patches
We have patched the issue in GitHub commit c283e542a3f422420cfdb332414543b62fc4e4a5.
The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.6.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.5.1, TensorFlow 2.4.3, and TensorFlow 2.3.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.
For more information
Please consult our security guide for more information regarding the security model and how to contact us with issues and questions.
Attribution
This vulnerability has been reported by members of the Aivul Team from Qihoo 360.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tensorflow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
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"fixed": "2.3.4"
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
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"versions": [
"2.5.0"
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"package": {
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"name": "tensorflow-cpu"
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"ranges": [
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"events": [
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"name": "tensorflow-cpu"
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"2.5.0"
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},
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"package": {
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"name": "tensorflow-gpu"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
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"fixed": "2.3.4"
}
],
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},
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"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tensorflow-gpu"
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"fixed": "2.4.3"
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]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tensorflow-gpu"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
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"introduced": "2.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.5.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"2.5.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-37646"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-681"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-23T19:25:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-12T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThe implementation of `tf.raw_ops.StringNGrams` is vulnerable to an integer overflow issue caused by converting a signed integer value to an unsigned one and then allocating memory based on this value.\n\n```python\nimport tensorflow as tf\n\ntf.raw_ops.StringNGrams(\n data=[\u0027\u0027,\u0027\u0027],\n data_splits=[0,2],\n separator=\u0027 \u0027*100,\n ngram_widths=[-80,0,0,-60],\n left_pad=\u0027 \u0027,\n right_pad=\u0027 \u0027,\n pad_width=100,\n preserve_short_sequences=False)\n```\n\nThe [implementation](https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/8d72537c6abf5a44103b57b9c2e22c14f5f49698/tensorflow/core/kernels/string_ngrams_op.cc#L184) calls `reserve` on a `tstring` with a value that sometimes can be negative if user supplies negative `ngram_widths`. The `reserve` method calls `TF_TString_Reserve` which has an `unsigned long` argument for the size of the buffer. Hence, the implicit conversion transforms the negative value to a large integer.\n\n### Patches\nWe have patched the issue in GitHub commit [c283e542a3f422420cfdb332414543b62fc4e4a5](https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/commit/c283e542a3f422420cfdb332414543b62fc4e4a5).\n\nThe fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.6.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.5.1, TensorFlow 2.4.3, and TensorFlow 2.3.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.\n\n### For more information\nPlease consult [our security guide](https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/master/SECURITY.md) for more information regarding the security model and how to contact us with issues and questions.\n\n### Attribution\nThis vulnerability has been reported by members of the Aivul Team from Qihoo 360.",
"id": "GHSA-h6jh-7gv5-28vg",
"modified": "2024-11-13T17:20:00Z",
"published": "2021-08-25T14:43:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/security/advisories/GHSA-h6jh-7gv5-28vg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-37646"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/commit/c283e542a3f422420cfdb332414543b62fc4e4a5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/tensorflow-cpu/PYSEC-2021-559.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/tensorflow-gpu/PYSEC-2021-757.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/tensorflow/PYSEC-2021-268.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Bad alloc in `StringNGrams` caused by integer conversion"
}
GHSA-HC92-9H3M-C39J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-08-25 20:55 – Updated: 2021-08-18 21:32An issue was discovered in the anymap crate through 0.12.1 for Rust. It violates soundness via conversion of a u8 to a u64.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "anymap"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.12.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-38187"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-681",
"CWE-704"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-18T21:32:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-08T06:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in the anymap crate through 0.12.1 for Rust. It violates soundness via conversion of a *u8 to a *u64.",
"id": "GHSA-hc92-9h3m-c39j",
"modified": "2021-08-18T21:32:29Z",
"published": "2021-08-25T20:55:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38187"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/chris-morgan/anymap/issues/37"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/chris-morgan/anymap"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2021-0065.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Incorrect cast in anymap"
}
GHSA-HVF9-XW27-729C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-28 15:30 – Updated: 2023-06-28 15:30A vulnerability in the hardware-based SSL/TLS cryptography functionality of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software for Cisco Firepower 2100 Series Appliances could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause an affected device to reload unexpectedly, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. This vulnerability is due to an implementation error within the cryptographic functions for SSL/TLS traffic processing when they are offloaded to the hardware. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted stream of SSL/TLS traffic to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause an unexpected error in the hardware-based cryptography engine, which could cause the device to reload.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-20006"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-681"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-06-28T15:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the hardware-based SSL/TLS cryptography functionality of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software for Cisco Firepower 2100 Series Appliances could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause an affected device to reload unexpectedly, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. This vulnerability is due to an implementation error within the cryptographic functions for SSL/TLS traffic processing when they are offloaded to the hardware. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted stream of SSL/TLS traffic to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause an unexpected error in the hardware-based cryptography engine, which could cause the device to reload.",
"id": "GHSA-hvf9-xw27-729c",
"modified": "2023-06-28T15:30:23Z",
"published": "2023-06-28T15:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-20006"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-ssl-dos-uu7mV5p6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JVW4-XFQP-Q5QH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:58 – Updated: 2024-02-08 03:32Integer overflow in the rtl_allocateMemory function in sal/rtl/source/alloc_global.c in the memory allocator in OpenOffice.org (OOo) 2.4.1, on 64-bit platforms, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted document, related to a "numeric truncation error," a different vulnerability than CVE-2008-2152.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-3282"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-681"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-08-29T18:41:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Integer overflow in the rtl_allocateMemory function in sal/rtl/source/alloc_global.c in the memory allocator in OpenOffice.org (OOo) 2.4.1, on 64-bit platforms, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted document, related to a \"numeric truncation error,\" a different vulnerability than CVE-2008-2152.",
"id": "GHSA-jvw4-xfqp-q5qh",
"modified": "2024-02-08T03:32:44Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:58:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-3282"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=455867"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=458056"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/44742"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A11345"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.redhat.com/archives/fedora-package-announce/2008-September/msg00120.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.redhat.com/archives/fedora-package-announce/2008-September/msg00494.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/31640"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/31646"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/31778"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securitytracker.com/id?1020764"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openoffice.org/issues/show_bug.cgi?id=92217"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2008-0835.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30866"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2008/2449"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M9W2-8782-2946
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-09 20:23 – Updated: 2026-04-24 21:03Impact
Wasmtime's Winch compiler contains a bug where a 64-bit table, part of the memory64 proposal of WebAssembly, incorrectly translated the table.size instruction. This bug could lead to disclosing data on the host's stack to WebAssembly guests. The host's stack can possibly contain sensitive data related to other host-originating operations which is not intended to be disclosed to guests.
This bug specifically arose from a mistake where the return value of table.size was statically typed as a 32-bit integer, as opposed to consulting the table's index type to see how large the returned register could be. When combined with details about Wnich's ABI, such as multi-value returns, this can be combined to read stack data from the host, within a guest. This information disclosure should not be possible in WebAssembly, violates spec semantics, and is a vulnerability in Wasmtime.
Patches
Wasmtime 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1 have been issued to fix this bug. Users are recommended to update to these patched versions of Wasmtime.
Workarounds
Users of Cranelift are not affected by this issue, but users of Winch have no workarounds other than disabling the Config::wasm_memory64 proposal.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "wasmtime"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "25.0.0"
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
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},
{
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"name": "wasmtime"
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},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "wasmtime"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
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"introduced": "43.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "43.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"43.0.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34945"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-681"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-09T20:23:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T19:16:24Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nWasmtime\u0027s Winch compiler contains a bug where a 64-bit table, part of the memory64 proposal of WebAssembly, incorrectly translated the `table.size` instruction. This bug could lead to disclosing data on the host\u0027s stack to WebAssembly guests. The host\u0027s stack can possibly contain sensitive data related to other host-originating operations which is not intended to be disclosed to guests.\n\nThis bug specifically arose from a mistake where the return value of `table.size` was statically typed as a 32-bit integer, as opposed to consulting the table\u0027s index type to see how large the returned register could be. When combined with details about Wnich\u0027s ABI, such as multi-value returns, this can be combined to read stack data from the host, within a guest. This information disclosure should not be possible in WebAssembly, violates spec semantics, and is a vulnerability in Wasmtime.\n\n### Patches\n\nWasmtime 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1 have been issued to fix this bug. Users are recommended to update to these patched versions of Wasmtime.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUsers of Cranelift are not affected by this issue, but users of Winch have no workarounds other than disabling the `Config::wasm_memory64` proposal.",
"id": "GHSA-m9w2-8782-2946",
"modified": "2026-04-24T21:03:32Z",
"published": "2026-04-09T20:23:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/security/advisories/GHSA-m9w2-8782-2946"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34945"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0086.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Wasmtime has host data leakage with 64-bit tables and Winch"
}
GHSA-MC57-H6J3-3HMV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-18 16:22 – Updated: 2026-06-09 10:32Integer Overflow in Avro Decoder
Summary
Several Avro decoder paths read attacker-controlled 64-bit values from the wire format and either narrowed them to platform-sized int before bounds-checking, or summed them with overflow-prone signed-int arithmetic. On 32-bit targets (GOARCH=386, arm, mips, wasm, etc.), the truncation paths can silently bypass byte-slice limits, select the wrong union branch, or hit the OCF negative-make panic via wrap. Three sub-issues are not 32-bit-specific: cumulative-size arithmetic overflow in arrayDecoder.Decode / mapDecoder.Decode / mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode (wraps at math.MaxInt64 on amd64 / arm64 and bypasses MaxSliceAllocSize / MaxMapAllocSize), math.MinInt negation in block-header handling, and make([]byte, size) with a negative size in OCF block reads — all three panic or bypass caps on any platform, giving an attacker a denial-of-service primitive there.
Exploitation requires only an untrusted Avro stream. No primitives reach beyond denial-of-service on current code paths; see the union-index discussion below for a caveat.
Description
Six call sites in the decoder accepted int64 values from the Avro wire format and converted to int before validation. On a 32-bit build any wire value with magnitude ≥ 2³¹ truncates and the post-conversion value bears no useful relationship to the original. A value of (1<<32) + 5 narrows to 5; 1<<32 narrows to 0; values just past MaxInt32 narrow to large negatives.
This is distinct from the existing Config.MaxSliceAllocSize, Config.MaxByteSliceSize, and the new Config.MaxMapAllocSize limits, because narrowing happens before the limit comparison — the limit sees the truncated value, not the original wire value, so the cap is bypassed.
Three further sub-issues are not 32-bit-specific:
arrayDecoder.Decode,mapDecoder.Decode, andmapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decodesummed attacker-controlled block lengths viasize += int(l)and then checkedsize > limit. On amd64 / arm64 the running total wraps atmath.MaxInt64; the post-wrap negative value passes the> limitcheck, and the decoder proceeds. Regression test:TestDecoder_ArrayMultiBlockExceedsMaxIntusesmath.MaxInt − 2for the second block's count and aMaxSliceAllocSizeof 13 to demonstrate this on amd64. The Avro block-count field is a signedlongon the wire, so block counts up tomath.MaxInt64are admissible — there is no implicit 2³¹ ceiling.ReadBlockHeader()returns the absolute value of negative block lengths; the negation is unsafe formath.MinInt, which on every platform panics on overflow.ocf/ocf.go readBlock()passes the decoded block size directly tomake([]byte, size). A negative wire value panics on every platform; on 32-bit, values> MaxInt32additionally panic via the narrowing path.
Affected components
| File | Function(s) | Bug class | Platforms |
|---|---|---|---|
reader.go |
ReadBlockHeader — narrowing |
Narrowing | 32-bit |
reader.go |
ReadBlockHeader — -math.MinInt |
Signed overflow (CWE-191) | all |
reader.go |
readBytes (via Reader.ReadBytes, Reader.ReadString) |
Narrowing | 32-bit |
reader_skip.go |
SkipString, SkipBytes (and OCF skip path) |
Narrowing | 32-bit |
codec_array.go |
arrayDecoder.Decode |
Cumulative-size arithmetic overflow (CWE-190) | all |
codec_map.go |
mapDecoder.Decode, mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode |
Cumulative-size arithmetic overflow (CWE-190) | all |
ocf/ocf.go |
skipToEnd, readBlock — narrowing |
Narrowing | 32-bit |
ocf/ocf.go |
readBlock — negative make([]byte, …) |
Unchecked-negative (CWE-1284) | all |
reader_generic.go |
union-type index decoding in Reader.ReadNext |
Narrowing, possible wrong-branch selection | 32-bit |
PR #9 (commit bed99b3) covered ReadBlockHeader, the cumulative checks in array/map codecs, and the skip helpers. The completeness pass (commit e1a570f) covered the union index, readBytes, and OCF readBlock, and added a 32-bit CI job.
Note: the typed-codec union decoder in codec_union.go (getUnionSchema → Reader.ReadInt) is not affected by the union-index narrowing — ReadInt returns int32, no narrowing occurs. The narrowing is specific to Reader.ReadNext in the generic decode path (reached via Unmarshal into any / map[string]any).
Technical details
-
Block-header narrowing and
MinIntnegation.ReadBlockHeader()returned wire-formatint64values through narrower operations; on 32-bit, large positives truncated. Negatingmath.MinIntto convert a negative block-count signal into a positive size is undefined-on-overflow, and on every platform-MinIntpanics on overflow when used in subsequent arithmetic. The fix reads into a*64-suffixed local, range-checks againstMinInt32/MaxInt32(orMinInt/MaxIntas appropriate), and narrows after validation. -
Cumulative array and map size overflow (all platforms).
arrayDecoder.Decode,mapDecoder.Decode, andmapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decodesummed attacker-controlled block lengths using overflow-prone addition; cumulative size could wrap before reaching the configured limit. On amd64 withMaxSliceAllocSize = 13, block 1 of 3 elements, block 2 ofmath.MaxInt − 2elements: the pre-fixsize += int(l)wraps tomath.MinInt, thenMinInt > 13is false, so the check passes and the decoder proceeds. The fix uses subtraction-safe comparisons (l > limit - sizerather thansize + l > limit), which is overflow-immune. -
Skip-length truncation.
SkipString,SkipBytes, and the OCF skip helper now route throughSkipNBytesInt64(), which keeps the length asint64and range-checks before any narrowing. -
Byte-slice length truncation. A wire-format length such as
(1<<32) + 5truncated to5inreadBytes(), slipping pastConfig.MaxByteSliceSizeon 32-bit. The fix reads the length asint64, compares againstMaxByteSliceSizebefore narrowing, and returns "value is too big" if exceeded. -
Union index narrowing (generic decode path only).
Reader.ReadNextdecoded the union index asint64and immediately cast toint. On 32-bit,1<<32narrowed to0and silently selectedtypes[0]despite the explicit upper-bound check immediately above. Iftypes[0]is the null branch (idiomatic for["null", T]nullable unions), the practical result is a null value where the producer encoded a non-null payload — a DoS-grade logic error. Iftypes[0]is a non-trivial schema, downstream bytes are parsed against the wrong schema and produce well-typed but semantically wrong values; treat this as the worst-case interpretation when assessing impact on your own deployment. The typed-codec union decoder (codec_union.gogetUnionSchema→Reader.ReadInt) is not affected. -
OCF block-size narrowing and negative
make.readBlock()passes the decodedint64size directly tomake([]byte, size). A negative wire value panics on every platform; a value> MaxInt32additionally panics via the 32-bit narrowing path. The fix validates the size is in[0, MaxByteSliceSize]before narrowing.
Fixed behavior
Both commits apply the same pattern across every site:
- Read the wire value into an
int64-typed local. - Range-check upper and lower bounds before narrowing.
- Compare cumulative limits using subtraction-safe arithmetic.
- Route skip operations through
SkipNBytesInt64(). - Return descriptive errors using the consistent
"value is too big"/"value is too small"wording. - Cast to
intonly after validation succeeds.
CI: a test-386 job runs the suite under GOARCH=386 with CGO_ENABLED=0 (-race is amd64/arm64-only). Three tests with untyped 2147483648 constants whose t.Skipf gates fire too late (the file fails to compile before any test runs) were split into sibling *_64bit_test.go files gated by //go:build amd64 || arm64 || ....
Affected versions
github.com/hamba/avro/v2— all versions up to and includingv2.31.0(repository is read-only upstream).github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2— all versions prior tov2.33.0.
Fixed versions
github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 v2.33.0 and later. There is no upstream fix for github.com/hamba/avro/v2 — module path is archived. Migrate to the fork as described under Mitigation.
Mitigation
Migrate from github.com/hamba/avro/v2 to github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 >= v2.33.0. The packages share the same API surface; replace the import path and run go mod tidy:
- import "github.com/hamba/avro/v2"
+ import "github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2"
For consumers that prefer the original import path, a replace directive in go.mod is supported:
replace github.com/hamba/avro/v2 => github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 v2.33.0
replace is honoured only for the main module of a build — transitive consumers must add their own replace, or migrate the import path directly.
No further configuration is required to benefit from the integer-narrowing fixes — the validation runs on the existing decode path.
If you cannot upgrade immediately:
- Do not decode untrusted Avro data on any platform — the cumulative-arithmetic overflow paths (
arrayDecoder.Decode,mapDecoder.Decode,mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode) are reachable on amd64 / arm64. The truncation paths on 32-bit cannot be mitigated by settingConfig.MaxByteSliceSizelower, because the truncated post-narrowing value is what the limit sees, not the original wire value. - For the cross-platform
math.MinIntand OCF negative-size panic paths, wrappingDecode/ OCF read calls in a goroutine withdefer recover()contains the crash, but is not a substitute for upgrading. The other narrowing paths return errors rather than panicking, sorecover()does nothing for them. - Isolate decoding workers so a crash is bounded.
Proof-of-concept inputs
- A
bytesorstringlength of(1<<32) + Nfor smallN, which narrows toNon 32-bit and bypassesConfig.MaxByteSliceSize. - A union index of
1<<32, which narrows to0on 32-bit and selectstypes[0]despite the upper-bound check. - An array or map encoded across multiple blocks whose cumulative element count wraps the signed
intrunning total before the limit check fires. Demonstrated on amd64 byTestDecoder_ArrayMultiBlockExceedsMaxInt:MaxSliceAllocSize = 13, block 1 of3, block 2 ofmath.MaxInt − 2. Wraps tomath.MinInt, check passes, decoder proceeds. - A block header whose absolute value is
math.MinInt, triggering the unsafe negation (cross-platform). - An OCF block size that is negative on the wire, causing
make([]byte, size)to panic (cross-platform); or a positive value> MaxInt32on 32-bit, same outcome via narrowing.
References
- Initial hardening PR: iskorotkov/avro#9
- Completeness pass PR: iskorotkov/avro#10
- Fix commits:
bed99b3,e1a570f - Release:
v2.33.0 - Security policy:
SECURITY.md - Related advisories on this fork:
GHSA-w8j3-pq8g-8m7w(CPU exhaustion — overlaps via the same large-block-count payload shape),GHSA-mx64-mj3q-7prj(unbounded map allocation) - Cross-module precedent on
hamba/avro:GO-2023-1930/CVE-2023-37475/GHSA-9x44-9pgq-cf45 - Upstream (read-only):
hamba/avro
Credits
- Discovery and initial fixes (PR #9, commit
bed99b3—ReadBlockHeader, cumulative array/map checks, skip helpers): Daniel Błażewicz (@klajok) - Completeness fixes (commit
e1a570f— union index,readBytes, OCFreadBlock, 32-bit CI coverage): Ivan Korotkov (@iskorotkov)
Timeline
- 2026-05-04 — Initial integer-overflow hardening (PR #9,
bed99b3) merged. - 2026-05-04 — Completeness pass (
e1a570f) merged; 32-bit CI job added. - 2026-05-06 —
v2.33.0tagged and released. - 2026-05-11 — Advisory published.
- 2026-05-15 — Advisory revised.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.33.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46384"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1284",
"CWE-190",
"CWE-191",
"CWE-681"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T16:22:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-29T20:16:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# Integer Overflow in Avro Decoder\n\n## Summary\n\nSeveral Avro decoder paths read attacker-controlled 64-bit values from the wire format and either narrowed them to platform-sized `int` before bounds-checking, or summed them with overflow-prone signed-`int` arithmetic. On 32-bit targets (`GOARCH=386`, `arm`, `mips`, `wasm`, etc.), the truncation paths can silently bypass byte-slice limits, select the wrong union branch, or hit the OCF negative-`make` panic via wrap. Three sub-issues are not 32-bit-specific: cumulative-size arithmetic overflow in `arrayDecoder.Decode` / `mapDecoder.Decode` / `mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode` (wraps at `math.MaxInt64` on amd64 / arm64 and bypasses `MaxSliceAllocSize` / `MaxMapAllocSize`), `math.MinInt` negation in block-header handling, and `make([]byte, size)` with a negative size in OCF block reads \u2014 all three panic or bypass caps on any platform, giving an attacker a denial-of-service primitive there.\n\nExploitation requires only an untrusted Avro stream. No primitives reach beyond denial-of-service on current code paths; see the union-index discussion below for a caveat.\n\n\n## Description\n\nSix call sites in the decoder accepted `int64` values from the Avro wire format and converted to `int` before validation. On a 32-bit build any wire value with magnitude `\u2265 2\u00b3\u00b9` truncates and the post-conversion value bears no useful relationship to the original. A value of `(1\u003c\u003c32) + 5` narrows to `5`; `1\u003c\u003c32` narrows to `0`; values just past `MaxInt32` narrow to large negatives.\n\nThis is distinct from the existing `Config.MaxSliceAllocSize`, `Config.MaxByteSliceSize`, and the new `Config.MaxMapAllocSize` limits, because narrowing happens *before* the limit comparison \u2014 the limit sees the truncated value, not the original wire value, so the cap is bypassed.\n\nThree further sub-issues are not 32-bit-specific:\n\n- `arrayDecoder.Decode`, `mapDecoder.Decode`, and `mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode` summed attacker-controlled block lengths via `size += int(l)` and then checked `size \u003e limit`. On amd64 / arm64 the running total wraps at `math.MaxInt64`; the post-wrap negative value passes the `\u003e limit` check, and the decoder proceeds. Regression test: `TestDecoder_ArrayMultiBlockExceedsMaxInt` uses `math.MaxInt \u2212 2` for the second block\u0027s count and a `MaxSliceAllocSize` of 13 to demonstrate this on amd64. The Avro block-count field is a signed `long` on the wire, so block counts up to `math.MaxInt64` are admissible \u2014 there is no implicit 2\u00b3\u00b9 ceiling.\n- `ReadBlockHeader()` returns the absolute value of negative block lengths; the negation is unsafe for `math.MinInt`, which on every platform panics on overflow.\n- `ocf/ocf.go readBlock()` passes the decoded block size directly to `make([]byte, size)`. A negative wire value panics on every platform; on 32-bit, values `\u003e MaxInt32` additionally panic via the narrowing path.\n\n## Affected components\n\n| File | Function(s) | Bug class | Platforms |\n|------|-------------|-----------|-----------|\n| `reader.go` | `ReadBlockHeader` \u2014 narrowing | Narrowing | 32-bit |\n| `reader.go` | `ReadBlockHeader` \u2014 `-math.MinInt` | Signed overflow (CWE-191) | all |\n| `reader.go` | `readBytes` (via `Reader.ReadBytes`, `Reader.ReadString`) | Narrowing | 32-bit |\n| `reader_skip.go` | `SkipString`, `SkipBytes` (and OCF skip path) | Narrowing | 32-bit |\n| `codec_array.go` | `arrayDecoder.Decode` | Cumulative-size arithmetic overflow (CWE-190) | all |\n| `codec_map.go` | `mapDecoder.Decode`, `mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode` | Cumulative-size arithmetic overflow (CWE-190) | all |\n| `ocf/ocf.go` | `skipToEnd`, `readBlock` \u2014 narrowing | Narrowing | 32-bit |\n| `ocf/ocf.go` | `readBlock` \u2014 negative `make([]byte, \u2026)` | Unchecked-negative (CWE-1284) | all |\n| `reader_generic.go` | union-type index decoding in `Reader.ReadNext` | Narrowing, possible wrong-branch selection | 32-bit |\n\nPR #9 (commit [`bed99b3`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/commit/bed99b315ec097a1a5eb7ae074ef57a91848c583)) covered `ReadBlockHeader`, the cumulative checks in array/map codecs, and the skip helpers. The completeness pass (commit [`e1a570f`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/commit/e1a570f9a8a4fe4b1bc2b4b1fb6d24e4a5f04358)) covered the union index, `readBytes`, and OCF `readBlock`, and added a 32-bit CI job.\n\nNote: the typed-codec union decoder in `codec_union.go` (`getUnionSchema` \u2192 `Reader.ReadInt`) is **not** affected by the union-index narrowing \u2014 `ReadInt` returns `int32`, no narrowing occurs. The narrowing is specific to `Reader.ReadNext` in the generic decode path (reached via `Unmarshal` into `any` / `map[string]any`).\n\n## Technical details\n\n1. **Block-header narrowing and `MinInt` negation.** `ReadBlockHeader()` returned wire-format `int64` values through narrower operations; on 32-bit, large positives truncated. Negating `math.MinInt` to convert a negative block-count signal into a positive size is undefined-on-overflow, and on every platform `-MinInt` panics on overflow when used in subsequent arithmetic. The fix reads into a `*64`-suffixed local, range-checks against `MinInt32`/`MaxInt32` (or `MinInt`/`MaxInt` as appropriate), and narrows after validation.\n\n2. **Cumulative array and map size overflow (all platforms).** `arrayDecoder.Decode`, `mapDecoder.Decode`, and `mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode` summed attacker-controlled block lengths using overflow-prone addition; cumulative size could wrap before reaching the configured limit. On amd64 with `MaxSliceAllocSize = 13`, block 1 of 3 elements, block 2 of `math.MaxInt \u2212 2` elements: the pre-fix `size += int(l)` wraps to `math.MinInt`, then `MinInt \u003e 13` is false, so the check passes and the decoder proceeds. The fix uses subtraction-safe comparisons (`l \u003e limit - size` rather than `size + l \u003e limit`), which is overflow-immune.\n\n3. **Skip-length truncation.** `SkipString`, `SkipBytes`, and the OCF skip helper now route through `SkipNBytesInt64()`, which keeps the length as `int64` and range-checks before any narrowing.\n\n4. **Byte-slice length truncation.** A wire-format length such as `(1\u003c\u003c32) + 5` truncated to `5` in `readBytes()`, slipping past `Config.MaxByteSliceSize` on 32-bit. The fix reads the length as `int64`, compares against `MaxByteSliceSize` before narrowing, and returns \"value is too big\" if exceeded.\n\n5. **Union index narrowing (generic decode path only).** `Reader.ReadNext` decoded the union index as `int64` and immediately cast to `int`. On 32-bit, `1\u003c\u003c32` narrowed to `0` and silently selected `types[0]` despite the explicit upper-bound check immediately above. If `types[0]` is the null branch (idiomatic for `[\"null\", T]` nullable unions), the practical result is a null value where the producer encoded a non-null payload \u2014 a DoS-grade logic error. If `types[0]` is a non-trivial schema, downstream bytes are parsed against the wrong schema and produce well-typed but semantically wrong values; treat this as the worst-case interpretation when assessing impact on your own deployment. The typed-codec union decoder (`codec_union.go` `getUnionSchema` \u2192 `Reader.ReadInt`) is not affected.\n\n6. **OCF block-size narrowing and negative `make`.** `readBlock()` passes the decoded `int64` size directly to `make([]byte, size)`. A negative wire value panics on every platform; a value `\u003e MaxInt32` additionally panics via the 32-bit narrowing path. The fix validates the size is in `[0, MaxByteSliceSize]` before narrowing.\n\n## Fixed behavior\n\nBoth commits apply the same pattern across every site:\n\n1. Read the wire value into an `int64`-typed local.\n2. Range-check upper and lower bounds before narrowing.\n3. Compare cumulative limits using subtraction-safe arithmetic.\n4. Route skip operations through `SkipNBytesInt64()`.\n5. Return descriptive errors using the consistent `\"value is too big\"` / `\"value is too small\"` wording.\n6. Cast to `int` only after validation succeeds.\n\nCI: a `test-386` job runs the suite under `GOARCH=386` with `CGO_ENABLED=0` (`-race` is amd64/arm64-only). Three tests with untyped `2147483648` constants whose `t.Skipf` gates fire too late (the file fails to compile before any test runs) were split into sibling `*_64bit_test.go` files gated by `//go:build amd64 || arm64 || ...`.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- `github.com/hamba/avro/v2` \u2014 all versions up to and including `v2.31.0` (repository is read-only upstream).\n- `github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2` \u2014 all versions prior to `v2.33.0`.\n\n## Fixed versions\n\n`github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2` `v2.33.0` and later. There is no upstream fix for `github.com/hamba/avro/v2` \u2014 module path is archived. Migrate to the fork as described under Mitigation.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nMigrate from `github.com/hamba/avro/v2` to `github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 \u003e= v2.33.0`. The packages share the same API surface; replace the import path and run `go mod tidy`:\n\n```diff\n- import \"github.com/hamba/avro/v2\"\n+ import \"github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2\"\n```\n\nFor consumers that prefer the original import path, a `replace` directive in `go.mod` is supported:\n\n```\nreplace github.com/hamba/avro/v2 =\u003e github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 v2.33.0\n```\n\n`replace` is honoured only for the **main** module of a build \u2014 transitive consumers must add their own `replace`, or migrate the import path directly.\n\nNo further configuration is required to benefit from the integer-narrowing fixes \u2014 the validation runs on the existing decode path.\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately:\n\n- Do not decode untrusted Avro data on any platform \u2014 the cumulative-arithmetic overflow paths (`arrayDecoder.Decode`, `mapDecoder.Decode`, `mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode`) are reachable on amd64 / arm64. The truncation paths on 32-bit cannot be mitigated by setting `Config.MaxByteSliceSize` lower, because the truncated post-narrowing value is what the limit sees, not the original wire value.\n- For the cross-platform `math.MinInt` and OCF negative-size panic paths, wrapping `Decode` / OCF read calls in a goroutine with `defer recover()` contains the crash, but is not a substitute for upgrading. The other narrowing paths return errors rather than panicking, so `recover()` does nothing for them.\n- Isolate decoding workers so a crash is bounded.\n\n## Proof-of-concept inputs\n\n- A `bytes` or `string` length of `(1\u003c\u003c32) + N` for small `N`, which narrows to `N` on 32-bit and bypasses `Config.MaxByteSliceSize`.\n- A union index of `1\u003c\u003c32`, which narrows to `0` on 32-bit and selects `types[0]` despite the upper-bound check.\n- An array or map encoded across multiple blocks whose cumulative element count wraps the signed `int` running total before the limit check fires. Demonstrated on amd64 by `TestDecoder_ArrayMultiBlockExceedsMaxInt`: `MaxSliceAllocSize = 13`, block 1 of `3`, block 2 of `math.MaxInt \u2212 2`. Wraps to `math.MinInt`, check passes, decoder proceeds.\n- A block header whose absolute value is `math.MinInt`, triggering the unsafe negation (cross-platform).\n- An OCF block size that is negative on the wire, causing `make([]byte, size)` to panic (cross-platform); or a positive value `\u003e MaxInt32` on 32-bit, same outcome via narrowing.\n\n## References\n\n- Initial hardening PR: [iskorotkov/avro#9](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/pull/9)\n- Completeness pass PR: [iskorotkov/avro#10](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/pull/10)\n- Fix commits: [`bed99b3`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/commit/bed99b315ec097a1a5eb7ae074ef57a91848c583), [`e1a570f`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/commit/e1a570f9a8a4fe4b1bc2b4b1fb6d24e4a5f04358)\n- Release: [`v2.33.0`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/releases/tag/v2.33.0)\n- Security policy: [`SECURITY.md`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/blob/main/SECURITY.md)\n- Related advisories on this fork: [`GHSA-w8j3-pq8g-8m7w`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/security/advisories/GHSA-w8j3-pq8g-8m7w) (CPU exhaustion \u2014 overlaps via the same large-block-count payload shape), [`GHSA-mx64-mj3q-7prj`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/security/advisories/GHSA-mx64-mj3q-7prj) (unbounded map allocation)\n- Cross-module precedent on `hamba/avro`: [`GO-2023-1930`](https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2023-1930) / `CVE-2023-37475` / `GHSA-9x44-9pgq-cf45`\n- Upstream (read-only): [`hamba/avro`](https://github.com/hamba/avro)\n\n## Credits\n\n- **Discovery and initial fixes** (PR #9, commit `bed99b3` \u2014 `ReadBlockHeader`, cumulative array/map checks, skip helpers): Daniel B\u0142a\u017cewicz ([@klajok](https://github.com/klajok))\n- **Completeness fixes** (commit `e1a570f` \u2014 union index, `readBytes`, OCF `readBlock`, 32-bit CI coverage): Ivan Korotkov ([@iskorotkov](https://github.com/iskorotkov))\n\n## Timeline\n\n- **2026-05-04** \u2014 Initial integer-overflow hardening (PR #9, `bed99b3`) merged.\n- **2026-05-04** \u2014 Completeness pass (`e1a570f`) merged; 32-bit CI job added.\n- **2026-05-06** \u2014 `v2.33.0` tagged and released.\n- **2026-05-11** \u2014 Advisory published.\n- **2026-05-15** \u2014 Advisory revised.",
"id": "GHSA-mc57-h6j3-3hmv",
"modified": "2026-06-09T10:32:44Z",
"published": "2026-05-18T16:22:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/security/advisories/GHSA-mc57-h6j3-3hmv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46384"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "iskorotkov/avro: Integer Overflow in Decoder"
}
GHSA-MWQ6-9RWW-WMJH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-19 00:00 – Updated: 2022-06-28 00:00A vulnerability was found in FFmpeg 2.0. It has been classified as problematic. Affected is an unknown function of the file libavcodec/dxtroy.c. The manipulation leads to integer coercion error. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-125012"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-681"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-06-18T07:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in FFmpeg 2.0. It has been classified as problematic. Affected is an unknown function of the file libavcodec/dxtroy.c. The manipulation leads to integer coercion error. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-mwq6-9rww-wmjh",
"modified": "2022-06-28T00:00:45Z",
"published": "2022-06-19T00:00:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-125012"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.12390"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://git.videolan.org/?p=ffmpeg.git;a=commit;h=a392bf657015c9a79a5a13adfbfb15086c1943b9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P9M7-CFXQ-C6RF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-06 00:00 – Updated: 2022-05-14 00:01On F5 BIG-IP 16.1.x versions prior to 16.1.2.2, 15.1.x versions prior to 15.1.5.1, 14.1.x versions prior to 14.1.4.6, 13.1.x versions prior to 13.1.5, and all versions of 12.1.x and 11.6.x, when an Internet Content Adaptation Protocol (ICAP) profile is configured on a virtual server, undisclosed traffic can cause an increase in Traffic Management Microkernel (TMM) memory resource utilization. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-27189"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-681"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-05T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "On F5 BIG-IP 16.1.x versions prior to 16.1.2.2, 15.1.x versions prior to 15.1.5.1, 14.1.x versions prior to 14.1.4.6, 13.1.x versions prior to 13.1.5, and all versions of 12.1.x and 11.6.x, when an Internet Content Adaptation Protocol (ICAP) profile is configured on a virtual server, undisclosed traffic can cause an increase in Traffic Management Microkernel (TMM) memory resource utilization. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated",
"id": "GHSA-p9m7-cfxq-c6rf",
"modified": "2022-05-14T00:01:23Z",
"published": "2022-05-06T00:00:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-27189"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K16187341"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Avoid making conversion between numeric types. Always check for the allowed ranges.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.