Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-755

Discouraged

Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not handle or incorrectly handles an exceptional condition.

685 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-FPW6-HRG5-Q5X5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 21:34 – Updated: 2026-05-07 21:34
VLAI
Summary
ech0's acess tokens with expiry=never cannot be revoked: logout panics, delete does not blacklist JTI
Details

Summary

Access tokens created with the "never expire" option have no exp JWT claim. Three independent revocation mechanisms fail for this token type. Logout at internal/handler/auth/auth.go:154 and :163 dereferences claims.ExpiresAt.Time, panicking on the nil field so the token never hits the blacklist. RevokeToken at internal/repository/auth/auth.go:45-50 skips when remainTTL <= 0. The admin's "Delete token" panel action at internal/service/setting/access_token_service.go:183-185 removes the database record but does not call RevokeToken to blacklist the JTI. Once a never-expire token leaks, the JWT stays cryptographically valid until the admin rotates the signing key across the entire instance.

Details

Creation path at internal/util/jwt/jwt.go:103-105:

// expiry = 0 表示永不过期
if expiry > 0 {
    claims.ExpiresAt = jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().UTC().Add(time.Duration(expiry) * time.Second))
}

For NEVER_EXPIRY, expiry = 0 and the conditional skips. The resulting JWT has no exp claim. The middleware at internal/middleware/auth.go accepts it; the jwt/v5 parser does not require exp by default.

Failure mode 1, logout panic at internal/handler/auth/auth.go:163:

// Refresh-token revocation at line 154 (safe in practice: refresh tokens always have exp).
// Access-token revocation, same pattern, at line 163 (the bug):
if claims, err := jwtUtil.ParseToken(authHeader[7:]); err == nil && claims.ID != "" {
    remaining := time.Until(claims.ExpiresAt.Time)  // nil deref when ExpiresAt is nil
    h.authService.RevokeToken(claims.ID, remaining)
}

For a never-expire access token, claims.ExpiresAt is nil. claims.ExpiresAt.Time panics. Gin's Recovery middleware catches it and returns HTTP 500; the JTI never reaches RevokeToken. Line 154 shares the same pattern against refresh tokens, but refresh tokens are always issued with an expiry so the nil dereference does not fire there in practice.

Failure mode 2, RevokeToken skip at internal/repository/auth/auth.go:45-50:

func (authRepository *AuthRepository) RevokeToken(jti string, remainTTL time.Duration) {
    if jti == "" || remainTTL <= 0 {
        return
    }
    authRepository.cache.SetWithTTL(fmt.Sprintf("%s%s", blacklistPrefix, jti), true, 1, remainTTL)
}

Even if the logout path were patched to handle nil ExpiresAt, a caller computing remainTTL = 0 would still skip the blacklist write.

Failure mode 3, admin delete at internal/service/setting/access_token_service.go:183-185:

return settingService.transactor.Run(ctx, func(txCtx context.Context) error {
    return settingService.settingRepository.DeleteAccessTokenByID(txCtx, id)
})

Deletion removes the token's metadata row from the database. No call to RevokeToken, no write to the JTI blacklist. The JWT continues to validate because the signature is still authentic and the middleware does not consult the metadata table.

The only way to invalidate a compromised never-expire token is to rotate JWT_SECRET, which invalidates every token for every user across the whole instance.

Proof of Concept

Default install. Admin creates a never-expire access token; its revocation pathways all fail:

import requests, base64, json
TARGET = "http://localhost:8300"

owner = requests.post(f"{TARGET}/api/login",
                      json={"username": "owner", "password": "owner-pw"}
                     ).json()["data"]["access_token"]

# 1) Create a never-expire access token.
r = requests.post(f"{TARGET}/api/access-tokens",
                  headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {owner}",
                           "content-type": "application/json"},
                  json={"name": "poc-irrevocable",
                        "expiry": "never",
                        "scopes": ["profile:read"],
                        "audience": "cli"})
tok = r.json()["data"]
pad = lambda s: s + "=" * (-len(s) % 4)
payload = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(pad(tok.split(".")[1])))
print(f"  exp claim: {payload.get('exp')}  (None = never expires)")
print(f"  jti: {payload['jti']}")

# 2) Confirm it works.
r = requests.get(f"{TARGET}/api/user", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {tok}"})
print(f"  token -> /api/user: HTTP {r.status_code}")

# 3) Failure mode #1 — logout panics on nil ExpiresAt.
r = requests.post(f"{TARGET}/api/auth/logout",
                  headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {tok}"})
print(f"  logout: HTTP {r.status_code} (500 = Recovery middleware caught the panic)")

# 4) Failure mode #3 — admin delete does not blacklist the JTI.
listed = requests.get(f"{TARGET}/api/access-tokens",
                      headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {owner}"}).json()["data"]
poc_row = next(t for t in listed if t["name"] == "poc-irrevocable")
r = requests.delete(f"{TARGET}/api/access-tokens/{poc_row['id']}",
                    headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {owner}"})
print(f"  admin delete: HTTP {r.status_code} {r.text}")

# 5) Token should now be invalid if delete blacklisted. Test it.
r = requests.get(f"{TARGET}/api/user", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {tok}"})
print(f"  after delete, token -> /api/user: HTTP {r.status_code}")
print(f"  response body: {r.text[:150]}")

Observed on v4.5.6 in the test container:

exp claim: None  (None = never expires)
jti: 019daf86-6354-7c2d-9ff1-180de87667b3
token -> /api/user: HTTP 200
logout: HTTP 500 (500 = Recovery middleware caught the panic)
admin delete: HTTP 200 {"code":1,"msg":"删除访问令牌成功","data":null}
after delete, token -> /api/user: HTTP 200
response body: {"code":1,"msg":"获取用户信息成功","data":{"id":"019daf76-b5d2-7778-a90a-e943872b2946","username":"owner","email":"owner@test.local","is_admin":true,"is_owner":true,...}}

After the admin "deleted" the token, the same JWT string still returns the owner's profile data. The token stays valid with no path to invalidate it short of rotating JWT_SECRET.

Impact

The "never expire" option is intended for CLI and integration use cases where rotating tokens is expensive. When one of those tokens leaks (configuration file committed to a public repo, developer laptop compromised, log file uploaded by mistake), the admin has no remediation that does not nuke every other user's session.

A compromised token gives the attacker:

  • Perpetual authenticated access at whatever scopes the token holds until the JWT secret is rotated.
  • Admin's "revoke" UI button lies. The token row disappears from the panel but the bearer keeps working. The admin believes they mitigated the incident.
  • Instance-wide blast radius on proper revocation. The only working fix (rotate JWT_SECRET) forces every user to log in again and invalidates every other access token. Security incidents force operators into an all-or-nothing choice.

Precondition: token theft. A stolen token is the standard threat model for any long-lived credential; the point of revocation is that stolen credentials can be invalidated. Ech0 currently has no working path to do that for the "never expire" class.

Recommended Fix

Three coordinated changes, matching the three failure modes:

  1. Replace "never expire" with a very long expiry (for example 10 years) so every token has a finite exp claim. This removes the conditional at jwt.go:103 entirely:
if expiry == model.NEVER_EXPIRY {
    expiry = int64((10 * 365 * 24 * time.Hour).Seconds())
}
claims.ExpiresAt = jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().UTC().Add(time.Duration(expiry) * time.Second))
  1. If the "never expire" semantics must be preserved, make logout handle nil ExpiresAt explicitly:
if claims, err := jwtUtil.ParseToken(authHeader[7:]); err == nil && claims.ID != "" {
    var remaining time.Duration
    if claims.ExpiresAt != nil {
        remaining = time.Until(claims.ExpiresAt.Time)
    } else {
        remaining = 365 * 24 * time.Hour
    }
    h.authService.RevokeToken(claims.ID, remaining)
}

And accept non-positive TTLs in RevokeToken by substituting a long default.

  1. Blacklist the JTI when admin deletes an access token:
tok, err := settingService.settingRepository.GetAccessTokenByID(ctx, id)
if err != nil {
    return err
}
if tok.JTI != "" {
    settingService.authRepo.RevokeToken(tok.JTI, 365*24*time.Hour)
}
return settingService.transactor.Run(ctx, func(txCtx context.Context) error {
    return settingService.settingRepository.DeleteAccessTokenByID(txCtx, id)
})

Any two of the three changes close the gap; all three together make the revocation semantics match the admin's mental model.

Found by aisafe.io

Severity
7.4 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/lin-snow/Ech0"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.8-0.20260503041146-eab62379c795"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-613",
      "CWE-755"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T21:34:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAccess tokens created with the \"never expire\" option have no `exp` JWT claim. Three independent revocation mechanisms fail for this token type. Logout at `internal/handler/auth/auth.go:154` and `:163` dereferences `claims.ExpiresAt.Time`, panicking on the nil field so the token never hits the blacklist. `RevokeToken` at `internal/repository/auth/auth.go:45-50` skips when `remainTTL \u003c= 0`. The admin\u0027s \"Delete token\" panel action at `internal/service/setting/access_token_service.go:183-185` removes the database record but does not call `RevokeToken` to blacklist the JTI. Once a never-expire token leaks, the JWT stays cryptographically valid until the admin rotates the signing key across the entire instance.\n\n## Details\n\nCreation path at `internal/util/jwt/jwt.go:103-105`:\n\n```go\n// expiry = 0 \u8868\u793a\u6c38\u4e0d\u8fc7\u671f\nif expiry \u003e 0 {\n    claims.ExpiresAt = jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().UTC().Add(time.Duration(expiry) * time.Second))\n}\n```\n\nFor `NEVER_EXPIRY`, `expiry = 0` and the conditional skips. The resulting JWT has no `exp` claim. The middleware at `internal/middleware/auth.go` accepts it; the `jwt/v5` parser does not require `exp` by default.\n\nFailure mode 1, logout panic at `internal/handler/auth/auth.go:163`:\n\n```go\n// Refresh-token revocation at line 154 (safe in practice: refresh tokens always have exp).\n// Access-token revocation, same pattern, at line 163 (the bug):\nif claims, err := jwtUtil.ParseToken(authHeader[7:]); err == nil \u0026\u0026 claims.ID != \"\" {\n    remaining := time.Until(claims.ExpiresAt.Time)  // nil deref when ExpiresAt is nil\n    h.authService.RevokeToken(claims.ID, remaining)\n}\n```\n\nFor a never-expire access token, `claims.ExpiresAt` is nil. `claims.ExpiresAt.Time` panics. Gin\u0027s Recovery middleware catches it and returns HTTP 500; the JTI never reaches `RevokeToken`. Line 154 shares the same pattern against refresh tokens, but refresh tokens are always issued with an expiry so the nil dereference does not fire there in practice.\n\nFailure mode 2, `RevokeToken` skip at `internal/repository/auth/auth.go:45-50`:\n\n```go\nfunc (authRepository *AuthRepository) RevokeToken(jti string, remainTTL time.Duration) {\n    if jti == \"\" || remainTTL \u003c= 0 {\n        return\n    }\n    authRepository.cache.SetWithTTL(fmt.Sprintf(\"%s%s\", blacklistPrefix, jti), true, 1, remainTTL)\n}\n```\n\nEven if the logout path were patched to handle nil `ExpiresAt`, a caller computing `remainTTL = 0` would still skip the blacklist write.\n\nFailure mode 3, admin delete at `internal/service/setting/access_token_service.go:183-185`:\n\n```go\nreturn settingService.transactor.Run(ctx, func(txCtx context.Context) error {\n    return settingService.settingRepository.DeleteAccessTokenByID(txCtx, id)\n})\n```\n\nDeletion removes the token\u0027s metadata row from the database. No call to `RevokeToken`, no write to the JTI blacklist. The JWT continues to validate because the signature is still authentic and the middleware does not consult the metadata table.\n\nThe only way to invalidate a compromised never-expire token is to rotate `JWT_SECRET`, which invalidates every token for every user across the whole instance.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nDefault install. Admin creates a never-expire access token; its revocation pathways all fail:\n\n```python\nimport requests, base64, json\nTARGET = \"http://localhost:8300\"\n\nowner = requests.post(f\"{TARGET}/api/login\",\n                      json={\"username\": \"owner\", \"password\": \"owner-pw\"}\n                     ).json()[\"data\"][\"access_token\"]\n\n# 1) Create a never-expire access token.\nr = requests.post(f\"{TARGET}/api/access-tokens\",\n                  headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {owner}\",\n                           \"content-type\": \"application/json\"},\n                  json={\"name\": \"poc-irrevocable\",\n                        \"expiry\": \"never\",\n                        \"scopes\": [\"profile:read\"],\n                        \"audience\": \"cli\"})\ntok = r.json()[\"data\"]\npad = lambda s: s + \"=\" * (-len(s) % 4)\npayload = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(pad(tok.split(\".\")[1])))\nprint(f\"  exp claim: {payload.get(\u0027exp\u0027)}  (None = never expires)\")\nprint(f\"  jti: {payload[\u0027jti\u0027]}\")\n\n# 2) Confirm it works.\nr = requests.get(f\"{TARGET}/api/user\", headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {tok}\"})\nprint(f\"  token -\u003e /api/user: HTTP {r.status_code}\")\n\n# 3) Failure mode #1 \u2014 logout panics on nil ExpiresAt.\nr = requests.post(f\"{TARGET}/api/auth/logout\",\n                  headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {tok}\"})\nprint(f\"  logout: HTTP {r.status_code} (500 = Recovery middleware caught the panic)\")\n\n# 4) Failure mode #3 \u2014 admin delete does not blacklist the JTI.\nlisted = requests.get(f\"{TARGET}/api/access-tokens\",\n                      headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {owner}\"}).json()[\"data\"]\npoc_row = next(t for t in listed if t[\"name\"] == \"poc-irrevocable\")\nr = requests.delete(f\"{TARGET}/api/access-tokens/{poc_row[\u0027id\u0027]}\",\n                    headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {owner}\"})\nprint(f\"  admin delete: HTTP {r.status_code} {r.text}\")\n\n# 5) Token should now be invalid if delete blacklisted. Test it.\nr = requests.get(f\"{TARGET}/api/user\", headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {tok}\"})\nprint(f\"  after delete, token -\u003e /api/user: HTTP {r.status_code}\")\nprint(f\"  response body: {r.text[:150]}\")\n```\n\nObserved on v4.5.6 in the test container:\n\n```\nexp claim: None  (None = never expires)\njti: 019daf86-6354-7c2d-9ff1-180de87667b3\ntoken -\u003e /api/user: HTTP 200\nlogout: HTTP 500 (500 = Recovery middleware caught the panic)\nadmin delete: HTTP 200 {\"code\":1,\"msg\":\"\u5220\u9664\u8bbf\u95ee\u4ee4\u724c\u6210\u529f\",\"data\":null}\nafter delete, token -\u003e /api/user: HTTP 200\nresponse body: {\"code\":1,\"msg\":\"\u83b7\u53d6\u7528\u6237\u4fe1\u606f\u6210\u529f\",\"data\":{\"id\":\"019daf76-b5d2-7778-a90a-e943872b2946\",\"username\":\"owner\",\"email\":\"owner@test.local\",\"is_admin\":true,\"is_owner\":true,...}}\n```\n\nAfter the admin \"deleted\" the token, the same JWT string still returns the owner\u0027s profile data. The token stays valid with no path to invalidate it short of rotating `JWT_SECRET`.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe \"never expire\" option is intended for CLI and integration use cases where rotating tokens is expensive. When one of those tokens leaks (configuration file committed to a public repo, developer laptop compromised, log file uploaded by mistake), the admin has no remediation that does not nuke every other user\u0027s session.\n\nA compromised token gives the attacker:\n\n- **Perpetual authenticated access** at whatever scopes the token holds until the JWT secret is rotated.\n- **Admin\u0027s \"revoke\" UI button lies.** The token row disappears from the panel but the bearer keeps working. The admin believes they mitigated the incident.\n- **Instance-wide blast radius on proper revocation.** The only working fix (rotate JWT_SECRET) forces every user to log in again and invalidates every other access token. Security incidents force operators into an all-or-nothing choice.\n\nPrecondition: token theft. A stolen token is the standard threat model for any long-lived credential; the point of revocation is that stolen credentials can be invalidated. Ech0 currently has no working path to do that for the \"never expire\" class.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nThree coordinated changes, matching the three failure modes:\n\n1. Replace \"never expire\" with a very long expiry (for example 10 years) so every token has a finite `exp` claim. This removes the conditional at `jwt.go:103` entirely:\n\n```go\nif expiry == model.NEVER_EXPIRY {\n    expiry = int64((10 * 365 * 24 * time.Hour).Seconds())\n}\nclaims.ExpiresAt = jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().UTC().Add(time.Duration(expiry) * time.Second))\n```\n\n2. If the \"never expire\" semantics must be preserved, make logout handle nil `ExpiresAt` explicitly:\n\n```go\nif claims, err := jwtUtil.ParseToken(authHeader[7:]); err == nil \u0026\u0026 claims.ID != \"\" {\n    var remaining time.Duration\n    if claims.ExpiresAt != nil {\n        remaining = time.Until(claims.ExpiresAt.Time)\n    } else {\n        remaining = 365 * 24 * time.Hour\n    }\n    h.authService.RevokeToken(claims.ID, remaining)\n}\n```\n\nAnd accept non-positive TTLs in `RevokeToken` by substituting a long default.\n\n3. Blacklist the JTI when admin deletes an access token:\n\n```go\ntok, err := settingService.settingRepository.GetAccessTokenByID(ctx, id)\nif err != nil {\n    return err\n}\nif tok.JTI != \"\" {\n    settingService.authRepo.RevokeToken(tok.JTI, 365*24*time.Hour)\n}\nreturn settingService.transactor.Run(ctx, func(txCtx context.Context) error {\n    return settingService.settingRepository.DeleteAccessTokenByID(txCtx, id)\n})\n```\n\nAny two of the three changes close the gap; all three together make the revocation semantics match the admin\u0027s mental model.\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*",
  "id": "GHSA-fpw6-hrg5-q5x5",
  "modified": "2026-05-07T21:34:01Z",
  "published": "2026-05-07T21:34:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/security/advisories/GHSA-fpw6-hrg5-q5x5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/commit/eab62379c795c3f4850a9ca938ae3f27d7171541"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ech0\u0027s acess tokens with expiry=never cannot be revoked: logout panics, delete does not blacklist JTI"
}

GHSA-FQRH-W8R3-22Q6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-11 19:00 – Updated: 2022-10-14 12:00
VLAI
Details

lock order inversion in transitive grant copy handling As part of XSA-226 a missing cleanup call was inserted on an error handling path. While doing so, locking requirements were not paid attention to. As a result two cooperating guests granting each other transitive grants can cause locks to be acquired nested within one another, but in respectively opposite order. With suitable timing between the involved grant copy operations this may result in the locking up of a CPU.

Severity
5.6 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-33748"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-755"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-10-11T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "lock order inversion in transitive grant copy handling As part of XSA-226 a missing cleanup call was inserted on an error handling path. While doing so, locking requirements were not paid attention to. As a result two cooperating guests granting each other transitive grants can cause locks to be acquired nested within one another, but in respectively opposite order. With suitable timing between the involved grant copy operations this may result in the locking up of a CPU.",
  "id": "GHSA-fqrh-w8r3-22q6",
  "modified": "2022-10-14T12:00:17Z",
  "published": "2022-10-11T19:00:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-33748"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/TJOMUNGW6VTK5CZZRLWLVVEOUPEQBRHI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/XWSC77GS5NATI3TT7FMVPULUPXR635XQ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/YZVXG7OOOXCX6VIPEMLFDPIPUTFAYWPE"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/TJOMUNGW6VTK5CZZRLWLVVEOUPEQBRHI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/XWSC77GS5NATI3TT7FMVPULUPXR635XQ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/YZVXG7OOOXCX6VIPEMLFDPIPUTFAYWPE"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202402-07"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2022/dsa-5272"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-411.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/10/11/2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-411.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FRVG-XJJ8-2W58

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-10 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 08:29
VLAI
Details

When IPSec is configured on a Virtual Server, undisclosed traffic can cause TMM to terminate. 

Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-41085"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-755"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-10T13:15:21Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "\nWhen IPSec is configured on a Virtual Server, undisclosed traffic can cause TMM to terminate.\u00a0\n\nNote: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.\n\n\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-frvg-xjj8-2w58",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T08:29:08Z",
  "published": "2023-10-10T15:30:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41085"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000132420"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FVC9-Q887-5P2H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 18:30 – Updated: 2026-06-30 03:36
VLAI
Details

Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in .NET Framework allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-23666"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-366",
      "CWE-755"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-14T18:16:44Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization (\u0027race condition\u0027) in .NET Framework allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network.",
  "id": "GHSA-fvc9-q887-5p2h",
  "modified": "2026-06-30T03:36:16Z",
  "published": "2026-04-14T18:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23666"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-23666"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2458271"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-23666"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-23666.json"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FWHH-8J4M-VVW8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-04 00:01 – Updated: 2022-01-13 00:01
VLAI
Details

Possible denial of service due to improper handling of debug register trap from user applications in Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-30283"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-755"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-01-03T08:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Possible denial of service due to improper handling of debug register trap from user applications in Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile",
  "id": "GHSA-fwhh-8j4m-vvw8",
  "modified": "2022-01-13T00:01:43Z",
  "published": "2022-01-04T00:01:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-30283"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.qualcomm.com/company/product-security/bulletins/december-2021-bulletin"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-G2V8-RP7F-83RH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:16 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:16
VLAI
Details

Assuming a shell privilege is gained, an improper exception handling for multi_sim_bar_hide_by_meadia_full value in SystemUI prior to SMR Oct-2021 Release 1 allows an attacker to cause a permanent denial of service in user device before factory reset.

Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-25473"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-755"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-10-06T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Assuming a shell privilege is gained, an improper exception handling for multi_sim_bar_hide_by_meadia_full value in SystemUI prior to SMR Oct-2021 Release 1 allows an attacker to cause a permanent denial of service in user device before factory reset.",
  "id": "GHSA-g2v8-rp7f-83rh",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:16:44Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:16:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-25473"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb?year=2021\u0026month=10"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-G2WC-3MQ6-J4GX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:05 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:05
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the web management interface of Cisco Wireless LAN Controller (WLC) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition on an affected device. The vulnerability is due to a missing internal handler for the specific request. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by accessing a specific hidden URL on the GUI web management interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a reload of the device, resulting in a DoS condition. This vulnerability affects only the Cisco Wireless LAN Controller 8.3.102.0 release. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvb48198.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-3832"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-755"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-04-06T18:59:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the web management interface of Cisco Wireless LAN Controller (WLC) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition on an affected device. The vulnerability is due to a missing internal handler for the specific request. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by accessing a specific hidden URL on the GUI web management interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a reload of the device, resulting in a DoS condition. This vulnerability affects only the Cisco Wireless LAN Controller 8.3.102.0 release. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvb48198.",
  "id": "GHSA-g2wc-3mq6-j4gx",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:05:20Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:05:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-3832"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20170405-wlc3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/97421"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1038184"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-G5VG-RVQ4-MQ5P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-17 18:31 – Updated: 2024-04-29 21:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/buddy: Fix alloc_range() error handling code

Few users have observed display corruption when they boot the machine to KDE Plasma or playing games. We have root caused the problem that whenever alloc_range() couldn't find the required memory blocks the function was returning SUCCESS in some of the corner cases.

The right approach would be if the total allocated size is less than the required size, the function should return -ENOSPC.

Severity
3.3 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-26911"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-755"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-17T16:15:07Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/buddy: Fix alloc_range() error handling code\n\nFew users have observed display corruption when they boot\nthe machine to KDE Plasma or playing games. We have root\ncaused the problem that whenever alloc_range() couldn\u0027t\nfind the required memory blocks the function was returning\nSUCCESS in some of the corner cases.\n\nThe right approach would be if the total allocated size\nis less than the required size, the function should\nreturn -ENOSPC.",
  "id": "GHSA-g5vg-rvq4-mq5p",
  "modified": "2024-04-29T21:30:34Z",
  "published": "2024-04-17T18:31:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-26911"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4b59c3fada06e5e8010ef7700689c71986e667a2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8746c6c9dfa31d269c65dd52ab42fde0720b7d91"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-G9FC-WQ66-MPCR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-19 15:30 – Updated: 2024-08-27 21:31
VLAI
Details

TypedArrays can be fallible and lacked proper exception handling. This could lead to abuse in other APIs which expect TypedArrays to always succeed. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 121.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-6866"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-755"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-12-19T14:15:07Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "TypedArrays can be fallible and lacked proper exception handling. This could lead to abuse in other APIs which expect TypedArrays to always succeed. This vulnerability affects Firefox \u003c 121.",
  "id": "GHSA-g9fc-wq66-mpcr",
  "modified": "2024-08-27T21:31:10Z",
  "published": "2023-12-19T15:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6866"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1849037"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202401-10"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2023-56"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-G9PF-X8FH-M47V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-11-19 00:00 – Updated: 2024-02-27 18:51
VLAI
Details

In apusys, there is a possible memory corruption due to incorrect error handling. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS05670521; Issue ID: ALPS05670521.

Severity
6.7 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-0668"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-755"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-11-18T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In apusys, there is a possible memory corruption due to incorrect error handling. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS05670521; Issue ID: ALPS05670521.",
  "id": "GHSA-g9pf-x8fh-m47v",
  "modified": "2024-02-27T18:51:12Z",
  "published": "2021-11-19T00:00:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-0668"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://corp.mediatek.com/product-security-bulletin/November-2021"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.

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