Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-693

Discouraged

Protection Mechanism Failure

Abstraction: Pillar · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.

979 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-GQMF-56H7-RRPF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 14:26 – Updated: 2026-06-18 14:26
VLAI
Summary
npm PraisonAI SandboxExecutor network-isolated mode does not block non-proxy-aware network clients
Details

Summary

The published npm package praisonai exports a TypeScript SandboxExecutor with a network-isolated mode. The CLI lists that mode as:

network-isolated  No network access (proxy blocked)

The implementation does not create a network namespace, firewall rule, socket filter, or proxy-enforced execution boundary. It only injects proxy environment variables into the child process:

http_proxy: 'http://localhost:0',
https_proxy: 'http://localhost:0',
HTTP_PROXY: 'http://localhost:0',
HTTPS_PROXY: 'http://localhost:0',
no_proxy: '',
NO_PROXY: ''

Clients that do not explicitly honor those proxy variables continue to use the host network stack. A local-only PoV shows that, inside mode: "network-isolated", a proxy-aware Node invocation is stopped, while a plain Node HTTP client reaches a loopback HTTP server from the same sandboxed command environment.

This is a network-isolation protection failure in an exported npm API and CLI mode. It is not a generic claim that every PraisonAI sandbox backend is affected.

Technical Details

src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts declares the mode:

export type SandboxMode = 'disabled' | 'basic' | 'strict' | 'network-isolated';

SandboxExecutor.spawn() starts the command through the host shell and passes only the environment returned by buildEnv():

const proc = spawn('sh', ['-c', command], {
  cwd: this.config.cwd,
  env,
  timeout: this.config.timeout,
  stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe']
});

For network-isolated, buildEnv() does not apply an OS-level network restriction. It only sets proxy variables:

case 'network-isolated':
  // No network access (requires additional OS-level setup)
  return {
    ...baseEnv,
    http_proxy: 'http://localhost:0',
    https_proxy: 'http://localhost:0',
    HTTP_PROXY: 'http://localhost:0',
    HTTPS_PROXY: 'http://localhost:0',
    no_proxy: '',
    NO_PROXY: ''
  };

The CLI mode listing presents this as no network access:

'network-isolated': 'No network access (proxy blocked)'

That creates a false boundary. Proxy variables affect only clients that choose to read and honor them. Other clients can still open sockets directly from the child process.

Why This Is Not Intended Behavior

The vulnerable behavior is not "commands can run." The issue is that a mode named network-isolated and displayed to users as "No network access" still allows direct socket access.

The source comment says network-isolated requires additional OS-level setup, which is consistent with the finding: proxy variables alone are not a network isolation mechanism. The exported npm API and CLI mode do not provide such setup or warn callers that this mode is only a best-effort proxy hint.

If the intended behavior is merely "set proxy variables for cooperative clients," the mode name and CLI description should be changed so users do not rely on it as a security boundary.

PoV

Run from a local reproduction checkout:

node poc/pov_poc.js 1.7.1

The PoV:

  1. Installs npm:praisonai@1.7.1 into a temporary project.
  2. Starts a harmless HTTP server bound to 127.0.0.1 on a random local port.
  3. Creates new SandboxExecutor({ mode: "network-isolated" }).
  4. Confirms the child environment contains the proxy variables.
  5. Runs node --use-env-proxy client.js as a proxy-aware control. It fails and does not reach the server.
  6. Runs node client.js without proxy opt-in. It reaches the server and prints the marker.

Observed output summary from evidence/pov-npm-1.7.1.json:

{
  "version": "1.7.1",
  "mode": "network-isolated",
  "control": {
    "localServerBoundToLoopback": true,
    "proxyVariablesSet": true,
    "proxyAwareClientStopped": true,
    "requestReachedLoopbackServer": true
  },
  "observed": {
    "proxyAwareRun": {
      "success": false,
      "stdout": "",
      "exitCode": 2
    },
    "netRun": {
      "success": true,
      "stdout": "BODY=poc\n",
      "exitCode": 0
    },
    "loopbackHitCount": 1
  },
  "vulnerable": true
}

The PoV is local-only. It does not contact any external host after npm package installation, and it does not use cloud metadata or destructive commands.

PoC

The PoV section above contains the local reproduction command, input, and decisive output.

Impact

Applications often use sandbox network controls to prevent prompt-injected, user-supplied, or model-generated commands from exfiltrating secrets or reaching internal services. A caller who relies on network-isolated mode for that boundary can still get network egress by using any client that ignores proxy environment variables or by using direct socket APIs.

Depending on the hosting environment, this can allow:

  • exfiltration from commands that can read local files, process output, or inherited environment variables;
  • access to localhost or internal network services reachable from the PraisonAI host;
  • requests to cloud metadata or service endpoints if the host network permits them; and
  • bypass of application policy that allows command execution only under a no-network assumption.

This report does not claim that npm PraisonAI exposes this as an unauthenticated network service by default. It is a library-level isolation bypass in an exported TypeScript API and CLI mode.

Severity

Suggested severity: High.

Rationale:

  • AV: common use is a network-facing application or agent service that accepts user or prompt-controlled work and executes it through the sandbox.
  • AC: a single command using a non-proxy-aware network client is sufficient.
  • PR: conservative scoring assumes the attacker can submit prompts or work items to the application using PraisonAI.
  • UN: no additional operator interaction is required once the command is executed.
  • S: impact is scored against the PraisonAI-hosting process and its network privileges.
  • C: network egress can allow data exfiltration from the sandboxed command context.
  • I/A: reachable internal services can receive attacker-controlled requests, with impact depending on deployment.

If maintainers score only local CLI use, AV:L may be appropriate. If a deployment exposes this through unauthenticated agent endpoints, PR:N may be appropriate.

Suggested Fix

Do not represent proxy environment variables as network isolation.

Recommended:

  1. For a true network-isolated mode, run commands inside an execution boundary with OS-enforced network denial, such as a network namespace, firewall rule, sandbox profile, container, VM, or platform-specific socket filter.
  2. Add regression tests that start a loopback server and verify that direct socket clients, Node http.get, Python sockets, curl, and other common clients cannot connect under network-isolated.
  3. If only proxy hints are intended, rename the mode to something like proxy-blocked, document that it is not a security boundary, and keep "network-isolated" unavailable until OS-level enforcement exists.
  4. Consider default-deny egress with explicit allowlists for destinations that must remain reachable from sandboxed commands.

Affected Package/Versions

  • Repository: MervinPraison/PraisonAI
  • Ecosystem: npm
  • Package: praisonai
  • Component: TypeScript CLI feature SandboxExecutor
  • Latest npm package validated: 1.7.1
  • Current origin/main validated: 1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e
  • src/praisonai-ts/package.json at origin/main: praisonai 1.7.1

Suggested affected range:

npm:praisonai >= 1.2.3, <= 1.7.1

Selected version sweep:

  • 1.0.0: package main cannot be required in the selected test environment.
  • 1.0.19, 1.1.0, 1.2.0, 1.2.1, 1.2.2: SandboxExecutor is not exported.
  • 1.2.3: vulnerable.
  • 1.2.4: vulnerable.
  • 1.3.0: vulnerable.
  • 1.3.6: vulnerable.
  • 1.4.0: vulnerable.
  • 1.5.0: vulnerable.
  • 1.5.4: vulnerable.
  • 1.6.0: vulnerable.
  • 1.7.0: vulnerable.
  • 1.7.1: vulnerable.

Advisory History

Visible PraisonAI advisories and prior submissions were checked. The closest related findings are distinct:

  • GHSA-r4f2-3m54-pp7q covers PyPI SubprocessSandbox shell=True and blocklist bypass.
  • GHSA-6jcq-6546-qrrw covers Python Sandlock fallback to unrestricted subprocess execution when native Landlock is unavailable.
  • GHSA-vmmj-pfw7-fjwp covers npm codeMode host-process new Function sandbox escape.
  • GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833 covers npm SandboxExecutor allowedCommands bypass through shell chaining.

This report is narrower and distinct: npm TypeScript SandboxExecutor network-isolated mode advertises no network access but enforces only proxy environment variables, so non-proxy-aware clients keep network access without needing shell chaining or a disallowed executable.

Severity
7.6 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.7.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "praisonai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.2.3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-653",
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T14:26:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe published npm package `praisonai` exports a TypeScript `SandboxExecutor` with a `network-isolated` mode. The CLI lists that mode as:\n\n```text\nnetwork-isolated  No network access (proxy blocked)\n```\n\nThe implementation does not create a network namespace, firewall rule, socket filter, or proxy-enforced execution boundary. It only injects proxy environment variables into the child process:\n\n```ts\nhttp_proxy: \u0027http://localhost:0\u0027,\nhttps_proxy: \u0027http://localhost:0\u0027,\nHTTP_PROXY: \u0027http://localhost:0\u0027,\nHTTPS_PROXY: \u0027http://localhost:0\u0027,\nno_proxy: \u0027\u0027,\nNO_PROXY: \u0027\u0027\n```\n\nClients that do not explicitly honor those proxy variables continue to use the host network stack. A local-only PoV shows that, inside `mode: \"network-isolated\"`, a proxy-aware Node invocation is stopped, while a plain Node HTTP client reaches a loopback HTTP server from the same sandboxed command environment.\n\nThis is a network-isolation protection failure in an exported npm API and CLI mode. It is not a generic claim that every PraisonAI sandbox backend is affected.\n\n## Technical Details\n\n`src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts` declares the mode:\n\n```ts\nexport type SandboxMode = \u0027disabled\u0027 | \u0027basic\u0027 | \u0027strict\u0027 | \u0027network-isolated\u0027;\n```\n\n`SandboxExecutor.spawn()` starts the command through the host shell and passes only the environment returned by `buildEnv()`:\n\n```ts\nconst proc = spawn(\u0027sh\u0027, [\u0027-c\u0027, command], {\n  cwd: this.config.cwd,\n  env,\n  timeout: this.config.timeout,\n  stdio: [\u0027pipe\u0027, \u0027pipe\u0027, \u0027pipe\u0027]\n});\n```\n\nFor `network-isolated`, `buildEnv()` does not apply an OS-level network restriction. It only sets proxy variables:\n\n```ts\ncase \u0027network-isolated\u0027:\n  // No network access (requires additional OS-level setup)\n  return {\n    ...baseEnv,\n    http_proxy: \u0027http://localhost:0\u0027,\n    https_proxy: \u0027http://localhost:0\u0027,\n    HTTP_PROXY: \u0027http://localhost:0\u0027,\n    HTTPS_PROXY: \u0027http://localhost:0\u0027,\n    no_proxy: \u0027\u0027,\n    NO_PROXY: \u0027\u0027\n  };\n```\n\nThe CLI mode listing presents this as no network access:\n\n```ts\n\u0027network-isolated\u0027: \u0027No network access (proxy blocked)\u0027\n```\n\nThat creates a false boundary. Proxy variables affect only clients that choose to read and honor them. Other clients can still open sockets directly from the child process.\n\n### Why This Is Not Intended Behavior\n\nThe vulnerable behavior is not \"commands can run.\" The issue is that a mode named `network-isolated` and displayed to users as \"No network access\" still allows direct socket access.\n\nThe source comment says `network-isolated` requires additional OS-level setup, which is consistent with the finding: proxy variables alone are not a network isolation mechanism. The exported npm API and CLI mode do not provide such setup or warn callers that this mode is only a best-effort proxy hint.\n\nIf the intended behavior is merely \"set proxy variables for cooperative clients,\" the mode name and CLI description should be changed so users do not rely on it as a security boundary.\n\n## PoV\n\nRun from a local reproduction checkout:\n\n```bash\nnode poc/pov_poc.js 1.7.1\n```\n\nThe PoV:\n\n1. Installs `npm:praisonai@1.7.1` into a temporary project.\n2. Starts a harmless HTTP server bound to `127.0.0.1` on a random local port.\n3. Creates `new SandboxExecutor({ mode: \"network-isolated\" })`.\n4. Confirms the child environment contains the proxy variables.\n5. Runs `node --use-env-proxy client.js` as a proxy-aware control. It fails and does not reach the server.\n6. Runs `node client.js` without proxy opt-in. It reaches the server and prints the marker.\n\nObserved output summary from `evidence/pov-npm-1.7.1.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"version\": \"1.7.1\",\n  \"mode\": \"network-isolated\",\n  \"control\": {\n    \"localServerBoundToLoopback\": true,\n    \"proxyVariablesSet\": true,\n    \"proxyAwareClientStopped\": true,\n    \"requestReachedLoopbackServer\": true\n  },\n  \"observed\": {\n    \"proxyAwareRun\": {\n      \"success\": false,\n      \"stdout\": \"\",\n      \"exitCode\": 2\n    },\n    \"netRun\": {\n      \"success\": true,\n      \"stdout\": \"BODY=poc\\n\",\n      \"exitCode\": 0\n    },\n    \"loopbackHitCount\": 1\n  },\n  \"vulnerable\": true\n}\n```\n\nThe PoV is local-only. It does not contact any external host after npm package installation, and it does not use cloud metadata or destructive commands.\n\n## PoC\n\nThe PoV section above contains the local reproduction command, input, and decisive output.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications often use sandbox network controls to prevent prompt-injected, user-supplied, or model-generated commands from exfiltrating secrets or reaching internal services. A caller who relies on `network-isolated` mode for that boundary can still get network egress by using any client that ignores proxy environment variables or by using direct socket APIs.\n\nDepending on the hosting environment, this can allow:\n\n- exfiltration from commands that can read local files, process output, or inherited environment variables;\n- access to localhost or internal network services reachable from the PraisonAI host;\n- requests to cloud metadata or service endpoints if the host network permits them; and\n- bypass of application policy that allows command execution only under a no-network assumption.\n\nThis report does not claim that npm PraisonAI exposes this as an unauthenticated network service by default. It is a library-level isolation bypass in an exported TypeScript API and CLI mode.\n\n### Severity\n\nSuggested severity: High.\n\nRationale:\n\n- `AV`: common use is a network-facing application or agent service that accepts user or prompt-controlled work and executes it through the sandbox.\n- `AC`: a single command using a non-proxy-aware network client is sufficient.\n- `PR`: conservative scoring assumes the attacker can submit prompts or work items to the application using PraisonAI.\n- `UN`: no additional operator interaction is required once the command is executed.\n- `S`: impact is scored against the PraisonAI-hosting process and its network privileges.\n- `C`: network egress can allow data exfiltration from the sandboxed command context.\n- `I/A`: reachable internal services can receive attacker-controlled requests, with impact depending on deployment.\n\nIf maintainers score only local CLI use, `AV:L` may be appropriate. If a deployment exposes this through unauthenticated agent endpoints, `PR:N` may be appropriate.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nDo not represent proxy environment variables as network isolation.\n\nRecommended:\n\n1. For a true `network-isolated` mode, run commands inside an execution boundary with OS-enforced network denial, such as a network namespace, firewall rule, sandbox profile, container, VM, or platform-specific socket filter.\n2. Add regression tests that start a loopback server and verify that direct socket clients, Node `http.get`, Python sockets, `curl`, and other common clients cannot connect under `network-isolated`.\n3. If only proxy hints are intended, rename the mode to something like `proxy-blocked`, document that it is not a security boundary, and keep \"network-isolated\" unavailable until OS-level enforcement exists.\n4. Consider default-deny egress with explicit allowlists for destinations that must remain reachable from sandboxed commands.\n\n## Affected Package/Versions\n\n- Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n- Ecosystem: `npm`\n- Package: `praisonai`\n- Component: TypeScript CLI feature `SandboxExecutor`\n- Latest npm package validated: `1.7.1`\n- Current `origin/main` validated: `1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e`\n- `src/praisonai-ts/package.json` at `origin/main`: `praisonai` `1.7.1`\n\nSuggested affected range:\n\n```text\nnpm:praisonai \u003e= 1.2.3, \u003c= 1.7.1\n```\n\nSelected version sweep:\n\n- `1.0.0`: package main cannot be required in the selected test environment.\n- `1.0.19`, `1.1.0`, `1.2.0`, `1.2.1`, `1.2.2`: `SandboxExecutor` is not exported.\n- `1.2.3`: vulnerable.\n- `1.2.4`: vulnerable.\n- `1.3.0`: vulnerable.\n- `1.3.6`: vulnerable.\n- `1.4.0`: vulnerable.\n- `1.5.0`: vulnerable.\n- `1.5.4`: vulnerable.\n- `1.6.0`: vulnerable.\n- `1.7.0`: vulnerable.\n- `1.7.1`: vulnerable.\n\n## Advisory History\n\nVisible PraisonAI advisories and prior submissions were checked. The closest related findings are distinct:\n\n- `GHSA-r4f2-3m54-pp7q` covers PyPI `SubprocessSandbox` `shell=True` and blocklist bypass.\n- `GHSA-6jcq-6546-qrrw` covers Python Sandlock fallback to unrestricted subprocess execution when native Landlock is unavailable.\n- `GHSA-vmmj-pfw7-fjwp` covers npm `codeMode` host-process `new Function` sandbox escape.\n- `GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833` covers npm `SandboxExecutor` `allowedCommands` bypass through shell chaining.\n\nThis report is narrower and distinct: npm TypeScript `SandboxExecutor` `network-isolated` mode advertises no network access but enforces only proxy environment variables, so non-proxy-aware clients keep network access without needing shell chaining or a disallowed executable.",
  "id": "GHSA-gqmf-56h7-rrpf",
  "modified": "2026-06-18T14:26:28Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T14:26:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-gqmf-56h7-rrpf"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "npm PraisonAI SandboxExecutor network-isolated mode does not block non-proxy-aware network clients"
}

GHSA-GRJ5-JJM8-H35P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-04 16:29 – Updated: 2026-05-08 01:25
VLAI
Summary
VM2 Sandbox Breakout Through __lookupGetter__
Details

Summary

VM2 suffers from a sandbox breakout vulnerability. This allows attackers to write code which can escape from the VM2 sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the host system.

Details

The __lookupGetter__ method allows to read the getter of an object. It is special in VM2 since it will switch between the host and sandbox version of the method when passed to the other context. This allows to access getters on an object in the host context if the method is called from the host context which can be achieved by using the host apply method which can be accessed through Buffer.apply. Afterwards, this function can be used to call the host version of __lookupGetter__ with Buffer and __proto__ resulting in the prototype lookup method from the host context. With this method the hosts Function.prototype object can be retrieved and the host Function acquired through the constructor property which allows to create and run code in the host context. This issue was attempted to be fixed with https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/4b009c2d4b1131c01810c1205e641d614c322a29/lib/bridge.js#L427. However, this can be circumvented by using Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor to get the constructor property.

PoC

The following code demonstrates this issue by acquiring the host process object and executing touch pwned.

const {VM} = require("vm2");
const vm = new VM();
vm.run(`
const g = ({}).__lookupGetter__;
const a = Buffer.apply;
const p = a.apply(g, [Buffer, ['__proto__']]);
Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(p.call(a),'constructor').value('return process')().mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch pwned');
`);

Impact

Attackers can perform Remote Code Execution under the assumption that arbitrary code can be executed inside the context of a vm2 sandbox.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.10.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "vm2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.11.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-24118"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-04T16:29:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-04T17:16:21Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nVM2 suffers from a sandbox breakout vulnerability. This allows attackers to write code which can escape from the VM2 sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the host system.\n\n### Details\n\nThe `__lookupGetter__` method allows to read the getter of an object. It is special in VM2 since it will switch between the host and sandbox version of the method when passed to the other context.\nThis allows to access getters on an object in the host context if the method is called from the host context which can be achieved by using the host `apply` method which can be accessed through `Buffer.apply`.\nAfterwards, this function can be used to call the host version of `__lookupGetter__` with `Buffer` and `__proto__` resulting in the prototype lookup method from the host context.\nWith this method the hosts `Function.prototype` object can be retrieved and the host `Function` acquired through the `constructor` property which allows to create and run code in the host context.\nThis issue was attempted to be fixed with https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/4b009c2d4b1131c01810c1205e641d614c322a29/lib/bridge.js#L427. However, this can be circumvented by using `Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor` to get the `constructor` property.\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following code demonstrates this issue by acquiring the host process object and executing `touch pwned`.\n\n```js\nconst {VM} = require(\"vm2\");\nconst vm = new VM();\nvm.run(`\nconst g = ({}).__lookupGetter__;\nconst a = Buffer.apply;\nconst p = a.apply(g, [Buffer, [\u0027__proto__\u0027]]);\nObject.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(p.call(a),\u0027constructor\u0027).value(\u0027return process\u0027)().mainModule.require(\u0027child_process\u0027).execSync(\u0027touch pwned\u0027);\n`);\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAttackers can perform Remote Code Execution under the assumption that arbitrary code can be executed inside the context of a vm2 sandbox.",
  "id": "GHSA-grj5-jjm8-h35p",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T01:25:03Z",
  "published": "2026-05-04T16:29:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-grj5-jjm8-h35p"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24118"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/2b5f3e3a060d9088f5e1cdd585d683d491f990a3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/f9b700b1c7d9ef2df416666cb24e0b659140cc74"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "VM2 Sandbox Breakout Through __lookupGetter__"
}

GHSA-GV89-2PC5-VF6W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-03 00:01 – Updated: 2022-04-10 00:01
VLAI
Details

Philips Vue PACS versions 12.2.x.x and prior does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-27497"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-04-01T23:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Philips Vue PACS versions 12.2.x.x and prior does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.",
  "id": "GHSA-gv89-2pc5-vf6w",
  "modified": "2022-04-10T00:01:05Z",
  "published": "2022-04-03T00:01:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27497"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsma-21-187-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.philips.com/productsecurity"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GVC5-FJQH-5H22

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-05 18:34 – Updated: 2024-07-09 18:30
VLAI
Details

An issue in Eskooly Free Online School management Software v.3.0 and before allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges via the HTTP Response Header Settings component.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-27713"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-05T17:15:11Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue in Eskooly Free Online School management Software v.3.0 and before allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges via the HTTP Response Header Settings component.",
  "id": "GHSA-gvc5-fjqh-5h22",
  "modified": "2024-07-09T18:30:43Z",
  "published": "2024-07-05T18:34:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27713"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.be-hacktive.com/eskooly-cve/cve-2024-27713-protection-mechanism-failure-in-eskooly-web-product-less-than-v3.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GW3G-78VP-6J8F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 22:28 – Updated: 2022-08-07 00:00
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability has been identified in SICAM A8000 CP-8000 (All versions < V16), SICAM A8000 CP-8021 (All versions < V16), SICAM A8000 CP-8022 (All versions < V16). A web server misconfiguration of the affected device can cause insecure ciphers usage by a user´s browser. An attacker in a privileged position could decrypt the communication and compromise confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted information.

Severity
7.3 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-28396"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327",
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-12-14T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability has been identified in SICAM A8000 CP-8000 (All versions \u003c V16), SICAM A8000 CP-8021 (All versions \u003c V16), SICAM A8000 CP-8022 (All versions \u003c V16). A web server misconfiguration of the affected device can cause insecure ciphers usage by a user\u00b4s browser. An attacker in a privileged position could decrypt the communication and compromise confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted information.",
  "id": "GHSA-gw3g-78vp-6j8f",
  "modified": "2022-08-07T00:00:29Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T22:28:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28396"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-415783.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-21-062"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GW5P-HRXR-924M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 18:30 – Updated: 2026-04-14 18:30
VLAI
Details

Protection mechanism failure in Windows Shell allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature over a network.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32225"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-14T18:17:30Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Protection mechanism failure in Windows Shell allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature over a network.",
  "id": "GHSA-gw5p-hrxr-924m",
  "modified": "2026-04-14T18:30:42Z",
  "published": "2026-04-14T18:30:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32225"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-32225"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GX55-F84R-V3R7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-30 18:19 – Updated: 2026-06-30 18:19
VLAI
Summary
Fission Environment CRD podspec passthrough enables hostPID/hostNetwork/privileged pods, node escape
Details

Summary

Fission's Environment CRD exposes spec.runtime.podSpec and spec.builder.podSpec, which are merged into the Kubernetes pod specs for runtime and builder pods. The merge logic propagated hostNetwork, hostPID, hostIPC, container privileged, and serviceAccountName from the user-supplied podspec with no filtering, and Environment.Validate performed no security-relevant checks on these fields.

Details

A namespace user with create/update on environments.fission.io could produce privileged, host-network, hostPID pods in the Fission function or builder namespace. Because the Helm chart created the fission-function and fission-builder namespaces with no pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce labels, Kubernetes Pod Security Admission did not catch the escape either.

From a host-network privileged pod with hostPID, the attacker could nsenter into the host, read cloud-metadata credentials, access the container-runtime socket, pivot to other namespaces, and fully compromise the node.

Impact

environments.fission.io create/update RBAC is escalated to node compromise — host filesystem and network access on the scheduling node, and from there potential cluster-wide takeover.

Fix

Fixed in #3391 and released in v1.24.0. Denylist at admission (the primary defence) plus belt-and-braces at the merge layer.

Admission denylist (pkg/apis/core/v1/podspec_safety.go::ValidatePodSpecSafety), called from Environment.Validate for both Runtime.PodSpec and Builder.PodSpec:

  • pod-level: HostNetwork, HostPID, HostIPC, ServiceAccountName / DeprecatedServiceAccount override, hostPath volumes;
  • per-container: SecurityContext.Privileged=true, SecurityContext.AllowPrivilegeEscalation=true, dangerous capabilities (SYS_ADMIN, NET_ADMIN, SYS_PTRACE, SYS_MODULE, DAC_READ_SEARCH, DAC_OVERRIDE).

Update-bypass closed: the Environment validating-webhook marker is extended from verbs=create to verbs=create;update (chart and envtest manifests aligned).

Merge-layer belt-and-braces (pkg/executor/util/merge.go): even if admission is bypassed (failurePolicy=Ignore or stale pre-webhook objects), the denylisted pod-level fields are stripped and per-container dangerous settings are sanitized before the merge (with SecurityContext deep-copied first so cached informer objects are not mutated). Legitimate operator hardening via the chart's pod-level securityContext (fsGroup, runAsNonRoot, runAsUser) still flows through.

Behavioural change

Environments that explicitly set any denylisted field are now rejected at admission. There is no legitimate Fission use case — these primitives exist for cluster operators, not Environment authors.

This is the same root cause and fix as GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7.

Severity
9.9 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.23.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/fission/fission"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.24.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50564"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-30T18:19:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T18:17:12Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nFission\u0027s `Environment` CRD exposes `spec.runtime.podSpec` and `spec.builder.podSpec`, which are merged into the Kubernetes pod specs for runtime and builder pods. The merge logic propagated `hostNetwork`, `hostPID`, `hostIPC`, container\n `privileged`, and `serviceAccountName` from the user-supplied podspec with no filtering, and `Environment.Validate` performed no security-relevant checks on these fields.\n\n### Details\n\nA namespace user with `create`/`update` on `environments.fission.io` could produce privileged, host-network, hostPID pods in the Fission function or builder namespace. Because the Helm chart created the `fission-function` and\n`fission-builder` namespaces with no `pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce` labels, Kubernetes Pod Security Admission did not catch the escape either.\n\nFrom a host-network privileged pod with hostPID, the attacker could `nsenter` into the host, read cloud-metadata credentials, access the container-runtime socket, pivot to other namespaces, and fully compromise the node.\n\n### Impact\n\n`environments.fission.io` create/update RBAC is escalated to node compromise \u2014 host filesystem and network access on the scheduling node, and from there potential cluster-wide takeover.\n\n### Fix\n\nFixed in [#3391](https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3391) and released in [v1.24.0](https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.24.0). Denylist at admission (the primary defence) plus belt-and-braces at the merge layer.\n\n**Admission denylist** (`pkg/apis/core/v1/podspec_safety.go::ValidatePodSpecSafety`), called from `Environment.Validate` for both `Runtime.PodSpec` and `Builder.PodSpec`:\n\n- pod-level: `HostNetwork`, `HostPID`, `HostIPC`, `ServiceAccountName` / `DeprecatedServiceAccount` override, hostPath volumes;\n- per-container: `SecurityContext.Privileged=true`, `SecurityContext.AllowPrivilegeEscalation=true`, dangerous capabilities (`SYS_ADMIN`, `NET_ADMIN`, `SYS_PTRACE`, `SYS_MODULE`, `DAC_READ_SEARCH`, `DAC_OVERRIDE`).\n\n**Update-bypass closed:** the `Environment` validating-webhook marker is extended from `verbs=create` to `verbs=create;update` (chart and envtest manifests aligned).\n\n**Merge-layer belt-and-braces** (`pkg/executor/util/merge.go`): even if admission is bypassed (`failurePolicy=Ignore` or stale pre-webhook objects), the denylisted pod-level fields are stripped and per-container dangerous settings are\nsanitized before the merge (with `SecurityContext` deep-copied first so cached informer objects are not mutated). Legitimate operator hardening via the chart\u0027s pod-level `securityContext` (fsGroup, runAsNonRoot, runAsUser) still flows\nthrough.\n\n### Behavioural change\n\nEnvironments that explicitly set any denylisted field are now rejected at admission. There is no legitimate Fission use case \u2014 these primitives exist for cluster operators, not Environment authors.\n\nThis is the same root cause and fix as GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7.",
  "id": "GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7",
  "modified": "2026-06-30T18:19:32Z",
  "published": "2026-06-30T18:19:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/security/advisories/GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50564"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3391"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/commit/e484df8460bb4e8026e24210120602aa7f181f64"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.24.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Fission Environment CRD podspec passthrough enables hostPID/hostNetwork/privileged pods, node escape"
}

GHSA-GXH7-M3Q2-P9CQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-11 03:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:49
VLAI
Details

Protection mechanism failure for some Intel(R) Arc(TM) graphics cards A770 and A750 sold between October of 2022 and December of 2022 may allow a privileged user to potentially enable denial of service via local access.

Severity
4.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-41984"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-08-11T03:15:15Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Protection mechanism failure for some Intel(R) Arc(TM) graphics cards A770 and A750 sold between October of 2022 and December of 2022 may allow a privileged user to potentially enable denial of service via local access.",
  "id": "GHSA-gxh7-m3q2-p9cq",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T06:49:56Z",
  "published": "2023-08-11T03:30:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-41984"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00812.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GXM7-WVVQ-GM86

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-04 21:31 – Updated: 2025-09-05 18:31
VLAI
Details

In getCallingPackageName of CredentialStorage, there is a possible permission bypass due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-48531"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-04T19:15:39Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In getCallingPackageName of CredentialStorage, there is a possible permission bypass due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.",
  "id": "GHSA-gxm7-wvvq-gm86",
  "modified": "2025-09-05T18:31:19Z",
  "published": "2025-09-04T21:31:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48531"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/apps/Settings/+/cc1b1b5e493affcb1ef9c3543b10c89141f245c4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2025-09-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H2C2-GXR2-8XP4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:35 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:35
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the detection engine of Cisco Firepower System Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass configured file action policies if an Intelligent Application Bypass (IAB) with a drop percentage threshold is also configured. The vulnerability is due to incorrect counting of the percentage of dropped traffic. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending network traffic to a targeted device. An exploit could allow the attacker to bypass configured file action policies, and traffic that should be dropped could be allowed into the network. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvf86435.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-0254"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-04-19T20:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the detection engine of Cisco Firepower System Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass configured file action policies if an Intelligent Application Bypass (IAB) with a drop percentage threshold is also configured. The vulnerability is due to incorrect counting of the percentage of dropped traffic. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending network traffic to a targeted device. An exploit could allow the attacker to bypass configured file action policies, and traffic that should be dropped could be allowed into the network. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvf86435.",
  "id": "GHSA-h2c2-gxr2-8xp4",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:35:31Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:35:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0254"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180418-fss2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/103940"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs

In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.

CAPEC-107: Cross Site Tracing

Cross Site Tracing (XST) enables an adversary to steal the victim's session cookie and possibly other authentication credentials transmitted in the header of the HTTP request when the victim's browser communicates to a destination system's web server.

CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing

An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.

CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files

An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.

CAPEC-20: Encryption Brute Forcing

An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.

CAPEC-22: Exploiting Trust in Client

An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.

CAPEC-237: Escaping a Sandbox by Calling Code in Another Language

The attacker may submit malicious code of another language to obtain access to privileges that were not intentionally exposed by the sandbox, thus escaping the sandbox. For instance, Java code cannot perform unsafe operations, such as modifying arbitrary memory locations, due to restrictions placed on it by the Byte code Verifier and the JVM. If allowed, Java code can call directly into native C code, which may perform unsafe operations, such as call system calls and modify arbitrary memory locations on their behalf. To provide isolation, Java does not grant untrusted code with unmediated access to native C code. Instead, the sandboxed code is typically allowed to call some subset of the pre-existing native code that is part of standard libraries.

CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality

An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.

CAPEC-477: Signature Spoofing by Mixing Signed and Unsigned Content

An attacker exploits the underlying complexity of a data structure that allows for both signed and unsigned content, to cause unsigned data to be processed as though it were signed data.

CAPEC-480: Escaping Virtualization

An adversary gains access to an application, service, or device with the privileges of an authorized or privileged user by escaping the confines of a virtualized environment. The adversary is then able to access resources or execute unauthorized code within the host environment, generally with the privileges of the user running the virtualized process. Successfully executing an attack of this type is often the first step in executing more complex attacks.

CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry

SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.

CAPEC-57: Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive Data

This attack utilizes a REST(REpresentational State Transfer)-style applications' trust in the system resources and environment to obtain sensitive data once SSL is terminated.

CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction

This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.

CAPEC-65: Sniff Application Code

An adversary passively sniffs network communications and captures application code bound for an authorized client. Once obtained, they can use it as-is, or through reverse-engineering glean sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between the client and server. Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate with the server.

CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)

An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.

CAPEC-74: Manipulating State

The adversary modifies state information maintained by the target software or causes a state transition in hardware. If successful, the target will use this tainted state and execute in an unintended manner.

State management is an important function within a software application. User state maintained by the application can include usernames, payment information, browsing history as well as application-specific contents such as items in a shopping cart. Manipulating user state can be employed by an adversary to elevate privilege, conduct fraudulent transactions or otherwise modify the flow of the application to derive certain benefits.

If there is a hardware logic error in a finite state machine, the adversary can use this to put the system in an undefined state which could cause a denial of service or exposure of secure data.

CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing

An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.

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