CWE-345
DiscouragedInsufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
939 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-G38M-R43W-P2Q7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-07 20:55 – Updated: 2026-07-07 20:55Am I affected?
Users are affected if all of the following are true:
- Their application uses
better-authat a version< 1.6.11on the stable line, or any currentnextpre-release. emailAndPassword.enabled: trueis set in their application'sbetterAuth({ ... })configuration.- At least one OAuth or SSO provider is configured (any built-in social provider, or
genericOAuth(...), or any provider via@better-auth/sso). account.accountLinking.disableImplicitLinkingis not set totrue.account.accountLinking.enabledis not set tofalse.
Setting either disableImplicitLinking: true or enabled: false closes the hole at the cost of breaking the standard "add another login method" UX. emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification: true does not mitigate, because the link-time emailVerified flip promotes the attacker's row to verified, after which the password login becomes usable.
Fix:
- Upgrade to
better-auth@1.6.11or later. - If developers cannot upgrade, see workarounds below.
Summary
The OAuth callback's auto-link gate in handleOAuthUserInfo admits an implicit account link whenever the provider asserts email_verified: true, without requiring the local user row's emailVerified to also be true. An attacker who pre-registers a victim's email through /sign-up/email (which writes a row with emailVerified: false) can have the victim's later OAuth identity bound to the attacker's user row, granting both a password login and the victim's OAuth identity on the same account. This is the pre-account-hijacking class — the same shape as Microsoft "nOAuth" (2023) and the Sign in with Apple JWT flaw (2020).
Details
The auto-link gate validates only the OAuth provider's userInfo.emailVerified claim. The local row's emailVerified field is never read. When no (accountId, providerId) match exists, the user lookup falls back to email, which surfaces any pre-registered row at that email.
A separate post-link step promotes the local emailVerified to true when the provider's claim is true and the local email matches the provider's email. This step is correct for legitimate first-time linking, but combined with the missing local-side check it becomes load-bearing for the takeover: after the link, the attacker's password row is treated as verified, defeating requireEmailVerification: true as a mitigation.
The fix adds the local-side ownership check to the gate: implicit linking now also rejects when dbUser.user.emailVerified is false. The same primitive lives in one-tap and inherits the same fix shape; the SSO domainVerified short-circuit follows separately as a hardening change.
Patches
Fixed in better-auth@1.6.11. Implicit linking now refuses to attach an OAuth identity to a local account whose emailVerified flag is false. The same gate change applies in the one-tap sign-in plugin, which previously had its own simpler linking path. The Google ID-token email_verified claim is also normalized through toBoolean so a string "false" is treated as falsy (some Google responses send the string, which the prior code treated as truthy).
The public surface for the new gate is account.accountLinking.requireLocalEmailVerified, defaulted to true. Applications whose users sign up through OAuth without ever verifying their email locally can opt out with account: { accountLinking: { requireLocalEmailVerified: false } } to retain the legacy permissive behavior. The option is marked @deprecated; the gate at each call site carries a FIXME pointing at the next-minor follow-up that drops the option and makes the check unconditional.
Test fixtures across the admin, oidc-provider, mcp, generic-oauth, last-login-method, and oauth-provider suites now pre-verify created users via a databaseHooks.user.create.before hook (or the disableTestUser opt-in on the oauth-provider RP fixture) so those suites continue to exercise their role and flow logic rather than tripping the new gate.
Workarounds
If developers cannot upgrade their applications immediately:
- Disable implicit linking: set
account.accountLinking.disableImplicitLinking: true. Forces all linking through the authenticated/link-socialendpoint where the user must already be signed in. - Disable linking entirely: set
account.accountLinking.enabled: false. Closes the hole but breaks the multi-login-method UX entirely.
emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification: true alone does not mitigate, because the link-time emailVerified flip promotes the attacker's row to verified.
Impact
- Account takeover via pre-account hijacking: the attacker holds a working password login plus the victim's OAuth identity on the same account, granting persistent access.
requireEmailVerification: truebypass: the attacker's password login becomes usable post-link.- Cross-flow reach: every OAuth and SSO sign-in path that calls
handleOAuthUserInfois affected (built-in social providers, generic-oauth, oauth-proxy, SSO OIDC, SSO SAML, one-tap).
Credit
Reported by @avrmeduard.
Resources
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "better-auth"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53516"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-07T20:55:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Am I affected?\n\nUsers are affected if all of the following are true:\n\n- Their application uses `better-auth` at a version `\u003c 1.6.11` on the stable line, or any current `next` pre-release.\n- `emailAndPassword.enabled: true` is set in their application\u0027s `betterAuth({ ... })` configuration.\n- At least one OAuth or SSO provider is configured (any built-in social provider, or `genericOAuth(...)`, or any provider via `@better-auth/sso`).\n- `account.accountLinking.disableImplicitLinking` is not set to `true`.\n- `account.accountLinking.enabled` is not set to `false`.\n\nSetting either `disableImplicitLinking: true` or `enabled: false` closes the hole at the cost of breaking the standard \"add another login method\" UX. `emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification: true` does not mitigate, because the link-time `emailVerified` flip promotes the attacker\u0027s row to verified, after which the password login becomes usable.\n\nFix:\n\n1. Upgrade to `better-auth@1.6.11` or later.\n2. If developers cannot upgrade, see workarounds below.\n\n### Summary\n\nThe OAuth callback\u0027s auto-link gate in `handleOAuthUserInfo` admits an implicit account link whenever the provider asserts `email_verified: true`, without requiring the local user row\u0027s `emailVerified` to also be `true`. An attacker who pre-registers a victim\u0027s email through `/sign-up/email` (which writes a row with `emailVerified: false`) can have the victim\u0027s later OAuth identity bound to the attacker\u0027s user row, granting both a password login and the victim\u0027s OAuth identity on the same account. This is the pre-account-hijacking class \u2014 the same shape as Microsoft \"nOAuth\" (2023) and the Sign in with Apple JWT flaw (2020).\n\n### Details\n\nThe auto-link gate validates only the OAuth provider\u0027s `userInfo.emailVerified` claim. The local row\u0027s `emailVerified` field is never read. When no `(accountId, providerId)` match exists, the user lookup falls back to email, which surfaces any pre-registered row at that email.\n\nA separate post-link step promotes the local `emailVerified` to `true` when the provider\u0027s claim is `true` and the local email matches the provider\u0027s email. This step is correct for legitimate first-time linking, but combined with the missing local-side check it becomes load-bearing for the takeover: after the link, the attacker\u0027s password row is treated as verified, defeating `requireEmailVerification: true` as a mitigation.\n\nThe fix adds the local-side ownership check to the gate: implicit linking now also rejects when `dbUser.user.emailVerified` is `false`. The same primitive lives in `one-tap` and inherits the same fix shape; the SSO `domainVerified` short-circuit follows separately as a hardening change.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `better-auth@1.6.11`. Implicit linking now refuses to attach an OAuth identity to a local account whose `emailVerified` flag is `false`. The same gate change applies in the `one-tap` sign-in plugin, which previously had its own simpler linking path. The Google ID-token `email_verified` claim is also normalized through `toBoolean` so a string `\"false\"` is treated as falsy (some Google responses send the string, which the prior code treated as truthy).\n\nThe public surface for the new gate is `account.accountLinking.requireLocalEmailVerified`, defaulted to `true`. Applications whose users sign up through OAuth without ever verifying their email locally can opt out with `account: { accountLinking: { requireLocalEmailVerified: false } }` to retain the legacy permissive behavior. The option is marked `@deprecated`; the gate at each call site carries a `FIXME` pointing at the next-minor follow-up that drops the option and makes the check unconditional.\n\nTest fixtures across the `admin`, `oidc-provider`, `mcp`, `generic-oauth`, `last-login-method`, and `oauth-provider` suites now pre-verify created users via a `databaseHooks.user.create.before` hook (or the `disableTestUser` opt-in on the oauth-provider RP fixture) so those suites continue to exercise their role and flow logic rather than tripping the new gate.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf developers cannot upgrade their applications immediately:\n\n- **Disable implicit linking**: set `account.accountLinking.disableImplicitLinking: true`. Forces all linking through the authenticated `/link-social` endpoint where the user must already be signed in.\n- **Disable linking entirely**: set `account.accountLinking.enabled: false`. Closes the hole but breaks the multi-login-method UX entirely.\n\n`emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification: true` alone does not mitigate, because the link-time `emailVerified` flip promotes the attacker\u0027s row to verified.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Account takeover via pre-account hijacking**: the attacker holds a working password login plus the victim\u0027s OAuth identity on the same account, granting persistent access.\n- **`requireEmailVerification: true` bypass**: the attacker\u0027s password login becomes usable post-link.\n- **Cross-flow reach**: every OAuth and SSO sign-in path that calls `handleOAuthUserInfo` is affected (built-in social providers, generic-oauth, oauth-proxy, SSO OIDC, SSO SAML, one-tap).\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by @avrmeduard.\n\n### Resources\n\n- [CWE-287: Improper Authentication](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html)\n- [CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/345.html)\n- [Sudhodanan \u0026 Paverd, Pre-hijacked accounts: an empirical study of security failures in user account creation on the web (USENIX Security 2022)](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity22/presentation/sudhodanan)",
"id": "GHSA-g38m-r43w-p2q7",
"modified": "2026-07-07T20:55:13Z",
"published": "2026-07-07T20:55:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-g38m-r43w-p2q7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/releases/tag/v1.6.11"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Better Auth has an account takeover issue via OAuth auto-link to unverified pre-registered email"
}
GHSA-G3QG-6746-3MG9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-20 18:08 – Updated: 2025-06-27 23:59Due to a missing constraint in the rv32im circuit, any 3-register RISC-V instruction (including remu and divu) in risc0-zkvm 2.0.0, 2.0.1, and 2.0.2 are vulnerable to an attack by a malicious prover. The main idea for the attack is to confuse the RISC-V virtual machine into treating the value of the rs1 register as the same as the rs2 register due to a lack of constraints in the rv32im circuit.
This vulnerability was reported by Christoph Hochrainer via our Hackenproof bug bounty. We have evaluated the severity of the vulnerability as “Critical,” and paid a bounty.
The fix for the circuit was implemented in zirgen/pull/238, and the update to risc0 was implemented in risc0/pull/3181. Impacted on-chain verifiers have already been disabled via the estop mechanism outlined in the Verifier Management Design.
Mitigation
We recommend all impacted users upgrade as soon as possible.
Rust applications using the risc0-zkvm crate at versions 2.0.0, 2.0.1, and 2.0.2 should upgrade to version 2.1.0.
Smart contract applications using the official RISC Zero Verifier Router do not need to take any action: zkVM version 2.1 is active on all official routers, and version 2.0 has been disabled.
Smart contract applications not using the verifier router should update their contracts to send verification calls to the 2.1 version of the verifier.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.0.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "risc0-zkvm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.0.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "risc0-circuit-rv32im"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-52484"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-20T18:08:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-20T18:15:28Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Due to a missing constraint in the rv32im circuit, any 3-register RISC-V instruction (including remu and divu) in risc0-zkvm 2.0.0, 2.0.1, and 2.0.2 are vulnerable to an attack by a malicious prover. The main idea for the attack is to confuse the RISC-V virtual machine into treating the value of the rs1 register as the same as the rs2 register due to a lack of constraints in the rv32im circuit.\n\nThis vulnerability was reported by Christoph Hochrainer via our Hackenproof bug bounty. We have evaluated the severity of the vulnerability as \u201cCritical,\u201d and paid a bounty. \n\nThe fix for the circuit was implemented in [zirgen/pull/238](https://github.com/risc0/zirgen/pull/238), and the update to risc0 was implemented in [risc0/pull/3181](https://github.com/risc0/risc0/pull/3181). Impacted on-chain verifiers have already been disabled via the estop mechanism outlined in the [Verifier Management Design](https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/blob/release-2.0/contracts/version-management-design.md#base-verifier-implementations). \n\n## Mitigation\nWe recommend all impacted users upgrade as soon as possible.\n\nRust applications using the risc0-zkvm crate at versions 2.0.0, 2.0.1, and 2.0.2 should upgrade to version 2.1.0.\n\nSmart contract applications using the official [RISC Zero Verifier Router](https://dev.risczero.com/api/blockchain-integration/contracts/verifier#verifier-router) do not need to take any action: zkVM version 2.1 is active on all official routers, and version 2.0 has been disabled.\n\nSmart contract applications not using the verifier router should update their contracts to send verification calls to the 2.1 version of the verifier.",
"id": "GHSA-g3qg-6746-3mg9",
"modified": "2025-06-27T23:59:02Z",
"published": "2025-06-20T18:08:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/security/advisories/GHSA-g3qg-6746-3mg9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52484"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/pull/3181"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/zirgen/pull/238"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/commit/006d86c363b16d2b2ac42d32d832a209ff8ab4c9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/commit/1873bbb8a56793edd1f6195242d184cf6cc5175d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/commit/67f2d81c638bff5f4fcfe11a084ebb34799b7a89"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/zirgen/commit/e0e2918302c93e956f73ca2e44aef2b861d8c3ae"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "zkVM Underconstrained Vulnerability"
}
GHSA-G3XQ-MFM7-V29H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-18 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-21 00:00The Emerson ControlWave 'Next Generation' RTUs through 2022-05-02 mishandle firmware integrity. They utilize the BSAP-IP protocol to transmit firmware updates. Firmware updates are supplied as CAB archive files containing a binary firmware image. In all cases, firmware images were found to have no authentication (in the form of firmware signing) and only relied on insecure checksums for regular integrity checks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-30262"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-17T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Emerson ControlWave \u0027Next Generation\u0027 RTUs through 2022-05-02 mishandle firmware integrity. They utilize the BSAP-IP protocol to transmit firmware updates. Firmware updates are supplied as CAB archive files containing a binary firmware image. In all cases, firmware images were found to have no authentication (in the form of firmware signing) and only relied on insecure checksums for regular integrity checks.",
"id": "GHSA-g3xq-mfm7-v29h",
"modified": "2022-08-21T00:00:26Z",
"published": "2022-08-18T00:00:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-30262"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-221-02"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.forescout.com/blog"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G4H5-9RRR-Q667
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-10 18:31 – Updated: 2024-04-04 08:30A insufficient verification of data authenticity vulnerability [CWE-345] in FortiAnalyzer version 7.4.0 and below 7.2.3 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to send messages to the syslog server of FortiAnalyzer via the knoweldge of an authorized device serial number.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-42782"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-10T17:15:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A insufficient verification of data authenticity vulnerability [CWE-345] in FortiAnalyzer version 7.4.0 and below 7.2.3 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to send messages to the syslog server of FortiAnalyzer via the knoweldge of an authorized device serial number.",
"id": "GHSA-g4h5-9rrr-q667",
"modified": "2024-04-04T08:30:25Z",
"published": "2023-10-10T18:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-42782"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-23-221"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G4VJ-CJJJ-V7HG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 23:42 – Updated: 2026-04-14 23:42Impact
This update adds validation of the package ID and version during package download, in addition to the existing package signature validation.
Patches
NuGet
The following NuGet.exe, NuGet.CommandLine, NuGet.Packaging, and NuGet.Protocol versions have been patched:
| Affected versions | Patched version |
|---|---|
| >= 4.9.0, <= 4.9.6 | 4.9.7 |
| >= 5.11.0, <= 5.11.6 | 5.11.7 |
| >= 6.8.0, <= 6.8.1 | 6.8.2 |
| >= 6.11.0, <= 6.11.1 | 6.11.2 |
| >= 6.12.0, <= 6.12.4 | 6.12.5 |
| >= 6.14.0, <= 6.14.2 | 6.14.3 |
| >= 7.0.0, <= 7.0.2 | 7.0.3 |
| 7.3.0 | 7.3.1 |
.NET SDK
- .NET 8.0.126 SDK
- .NET 8.0.420 SDK
- .NET 9.0.116 SDK
- .NET 9.0.313 SDK
- .NET 10.0.106 SDK
- .NET 10.0.202 SDK
Workarounds
N/A
References
https://github.com/NuGet/NuGetGallery/security/advisories/GHSA-9r3h-v4hx-rhfr
Credit
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.9.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Packaging"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.9.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.9.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.11.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Packaging"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.11.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.11.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.8.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Packaging"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.8.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.11.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Packaging"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.11.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.11.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.12.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Packaging"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.12.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.12.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.14.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Packaging"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.14.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.14.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.0.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Packaging"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Packaging"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"7.3.0"
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.9.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Protocol"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.9.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.9.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.11.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Protocol"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.11.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.11.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.8.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Protocol"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.8.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.11.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Protocol"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.11.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.11.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.12.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Protocol"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.12.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.12.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.14.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Protocol"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.14.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.14.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.0.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Protocol"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.Protocol"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"7.3.0"
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.9.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.CommandLine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.9.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.9.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.11.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.CommandLine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.11.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.11.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.8.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.CommandLine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.8.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.11.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.CommandLine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.11.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.11.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.12.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.CommandLine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.12.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.12.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.14.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.CommandLine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.14.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.14.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.0.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.CommandLine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "NuGet.CommandLine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"7.3.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T23:42:30Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThis update adds validation of the package ID and version during package download, in addition to the existing package signature validation.\n\n### Patches\n\n#### NuGet\n\nThe following NuGet.exe, NuGet.CommandLine, NuGet.Packaging, and NuGet.Protocol versions have been patched:\n\n|Affected versions|Patched version|\n|--|--|\n|\u003e= 4.9.0, \u003c= 4.9.6|4.9.7|\n|\u003e= 5.11.0, \u003c= 5.11.6|5.11.7|\n|\u003e= 6.8.0, \u003c= 6.8.1|6.8.2|\n|\u003e= 6.11.0, \u003c= 6.11.1|6.11.2|\n|\u003e= 6.12.0, \u003c= 6.12.4|6.12.5|\n|\u003e= 6.14.0, \u003c= 6.14.2|6.14.3|\n|\u003e= 7.0.0, \u003c= 7.0.2|7.0.3|\n|7.3.0|7.3.1|\n\n#### .NET SDK\n\n* .NET 8.0.126 SDK\n* .NET 8.0.420 SDK\n* .NET 9.0.116 SDK\n* .NET 9.0.313 SDK\n* .NET 10.0.106 SDK\n* .NET 10.0.202 SDK\n\n### Workarounds\nN/A\n\n### References\nhttps://github.com/NuGet/NuGetGallery/security/advisories/GHSA-9r3h-v4hx-rhfr\n\n### Credit\n[splitline](https://x.com/_splitline_) with [DEVCORE](https://devco.re/)",
"id": "GHSA-g4vj-cjjj-v7hg",
"modified": "2026-04-14T23:42:30Z",
"published": "2026-04-14T23:42:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/NuGet/NuGet.Client/security/advisories/GHSA-g4vj-cjjj-v7hg"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/NuGet/NuGetGallery/security/advisories/GHSA-9r3h-v4hx-rhfr"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/NuGet/NuGet.Client"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Defense in Depth update for NuGet Client"
}
GHSA-G5PH-F57V-MWJC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-18 17:25 – Updated: 2026-03-20 21:33Summary
The WhatsApp POST webhook handler (/notification/whatsapp/webhook) processes incoming status update events without verifying the Meta/WhatsApp X-Hub-Signature-256 HMAC signature, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to send forged webhook payloads that manipulate notification delivery status records, suppress alerts, and corrupt audit trails. The codebase already implements proper signature verification for Slack webhooks.
Details
Vulnerable code — App/FeatureSet/Notification/API/WhatsApp.ts lines 372-430:
router.post(
"/webhook",
async (req: ExpressRequest, res: ExpressResponse, next: NextFunction) => {
try {
const body: JSONObject = req.body as JSONObject;
// NO signature verification! No X-Hub-Signature-256 check!
if (
(body["object"] as string | undefined) !== "whatsapp_business_account"
) {
return Response.sendEmptySuccessResponse(req, res);
}
const entries: JSONArray | undefined = body["entry"] as JSONArray | undefined;
// ... processes entries and updates WhatsApp log status records
Compare with the Slack webhook which correctly validates signatures:
Common/Server/Middleware/SlackAuthorization.ts line 58:
const isValid = crypto.timingSafeEqual(
Buffer.from(computedSignature),
Buffer.from(slackSignature)
);
The WhatsApp GET webhook correctly validates the verify token — only the POST handler (which processes actual events) is missing signature verification.
No existing CVEs cover webhook signature verification issues in OneUptime. The closest is GHSA-cw6x-mw64-q6pv (WhatsApp Resend Verification Auth Bypass), which is about a different WhatsApp-related authorization issue.
PoC
Environment: OneUptime v10.0.23 via docker compose up (default configuration)
# Forge a delivery status update for any WhatsApp notification — no auth, no signature
curl -sv -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/notification/whatsapp/webhook \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"object": "whatsapp_business_account",
"entry": [{
"id": "FAKE_WABA_ID",
"changes": [{
"value": {
"messaging_product": "whatsapp",
"metadata": {
"display_phone_number": "+15550000000",
"phone_number_id": "FAKE_PHONE_ID"
},
"messages": [{
"from": "15551234567",
"id": "wamid.FAKE",
"timestamp": "1234567890",
"text": {"body": "INJECTED_MESSAGE"},
"type": "text"
}]
},
"field": "messages"
}]
}]
}'
Docker validation (oneuptime/app:release, APP_VERSION=10.0.23):
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{}
- Fake WhatsApp webhook payload accepted with HTTP 200
- No
X-Hub-Signature-256header provided — no signature verification at all - Attacker can inject arbitrary inbound WhatsApp messages and forge delivery status updates
Impact
Any unauthenticated remote attacker can forge WhatsApp webhook events:
- False delivery status: Mark undelivered WhatsApp notifications as "delivered", hiding delivery failures from administrators
- Alert suppression: Critical on-call notifications that failed to deliver appear successful, preventing escalation
- Log manipulation: WhatsApp notification logs updated with forged status data, corrupting audit trails
- Incident response disruption: During active incidents, forging "delivered" statuses prevents the system from retrying failed notification deliveries
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "oneuptime"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.34"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33143"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-18T17:25:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T21:17:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe WhatsApp POST webhook handler (`/notification/whatsapp/webhook`) processes incoming status update events without verifying the Meta/WhatsApp `X-Hub-Signature-256` HMAC signature, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to send forged webhook payloads that manipulate notification delivery status records, suppress alerts, and corrupt audit trails. The codebase already implements proper signature verification for Slack webhooks.\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable code \u2014 `App/FeatureSet/Notification/API/WhatsApp.ts` lines 372-430:**\n```typescript\nrouter.post(\n \"/webhook\",\n async (req: ExpressRequest, res: ExpressResponse, next: NextFunction) =\u003e {\n try {\n const body: JSONObject = req.body as JSONObject;\n // NO signature verification! No X-Hub-Signature-256 check!\n\n if (\n (body[\"object\"] as string | undefined) !== \"whatsapp_business_account\"\n ) {\n return Response.sendEmptySuccessResponse(req, res);\n }\n\n const entries: JSONArray | undefined = body[\"entry\"] as JSONArray | undefined;\n // ... processes entries and updates WhatsApp log status records\n```\n\nCompare with the Slack webhook which correctly validates signatures:\n\n**`Common/Server/Middleware/SlackAuthorization.ts` line 58:**\n```typescript\nconst isValid = crypto.timingSafeEqual(\n Buffer.from(computedSignature),\n Buffer.from(slackSignature)\n);\n```\n\nThe WhatsApp GET webhook correctly validates the verify token \u2014 only the POST handler (which processes actual events) is missing signature verification.\n\nNo existing CVEs cover webhook signature verification issues in OneUptime. The closest is GHSA-cw6x-mw64-q6pv (WhatsApp Resend Verification Auth Bypass), which is about a different WhatsApp-related authorization issue.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment:** OneUptime v10.0.23 via `docker compose up` (default configuration)\n\n```bash\n# Forge a delivery status update for any WhatsApp notification \u2014 no auth, no signature\ncurl -sv -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/notification/whatsapp/webhook \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"object\": \"whatsapp_business_account\",\n \"entry\": [{\n \"id\": \"FAKE_WABA_ID\",\n \"changes\": [{\n \"value\": {\n \"messaging_product\": \"whatsapp\",\n \"metadata\": {\n \"display_phone_number\": \"+15550000000\",\n \"phone_number_id\": \"FAKE_PHONE_ID\"\n },\n \"messages\": [{\n \"from\": \"15551234567\",\n \"id\": \"wamid.FAKE\",\n \"timestamp\": \"1234567890\",\n \"text\": {\"body\": \"INJECTED_MESSAGE\"},\n \"type\": \"text\"\n }]\n },\n \"field\": \"messages\"\n }]\n }]\n }\u0027\n```\n\n**Docker validation (oneuptime/app:release, APP_VERSION=10.0.23):**\n```\n\u003c HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n{}\n```\n\n- Fake WhatsApp webhook payload accepted with HTTP 200\n- No `X-Hub-Signature-256` header provided \u2014 no signature verification at all\n- Attacker can inject arbitrary inbound WhatsApp messages and forge delivery status updates\n\n### Impact\n\nAny unauthenticated remote attacker can forge WhatsApp webhook events:\n\n- **False delivery status:** Mark undelivered WhatsApp notifications as \"delivered\", hiding delivery failures from administrators\n- **Alert suppression:** Critical on-call notifications that failed to deliver appear successful, preventing escalation\n- **Log manipulation:** WhatsApp notification logs updated with forged status data, corrupting audit trails\n- **Incident response disruption:** During active incidents, forging \"delivered\" statuses prevents the system from retrying failed notification deliveries",
"id": "GHSA-g5ph-f57v-mwjc",
"modified": "2026-03-20T21:33:33Z",
"published": "2026-03-18T17:25:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/security/advisories/GHSA-g5ph-f57v-mwjc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33143"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OneUptime WhatsApp Webhook Missing Signature Verification"
}
GHSA-G8WQ-427W-WGQM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:37 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:37Siemens LOGO! Soft Comfort (All versions before V8.2) lacks integrity verification of software packages downloaded via an unprotected communication channel. This could allow a remote attacker to manipulate the software package while performing a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-12740"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-494"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-12-26T04:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Siemens LOGO! Soft Comfort (All versions before V8.2) lacks integrity verification of software packages downloaded via an unprotected communication channel. This could allow a remote attacker to manipulate the software package while performing a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack.",
"id": "GHSA-g8wq-427w-wgqm",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:37:44Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:37:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12740"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.siemens.com/cert/pool/cert/siemens_security_advisory_ssa-888929.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G962-2J28-3CG9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 20:52 – Updated: 2026-03-06 22:52Summary
When JWT authentication is configured using either:
authJwtPubKeyPath(local RSA public key), orauthJwtHmacSecret(HMAC secret),
the configured audience value (authJwtAud) is not enforced during token parsing.
As a result, validly signed JWT tokens with an incorrect aud claim are accepted for authentication.
This allows authentication using tokens intended for a different audience/service.
Details
Affected Code
File: jwt.go
Lines: 51–59, 144–157, 161–168
Current Behavior
Remote JWKS Mode (Correct):
return jwt.Parse(jwtToken, jwksVerifier.Keyfunc, jwt.WithAudience(cfg.AuthJwtAud))
Audience validation is enforced.
Local Public Key Mode (Vulnerable):
return jwt.Parse(jwtString, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { ... })
No jwt.WithAudience() option is provided.
HMAC Mode (Vulnerable):
return jwt.Parse(jwtString, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { ... })
No jwt.WithAudience() option is provided.
Why This Is Vulnerable: authJwtAud is ignored for authJwtPubKeyPath and authJwtHmacSecret modes, so wrong-audience tokens are accepted.
PoC
- Configure OliveTin
Use a minimal config with JWT local key authentication: ```yaml authJwtPubKeyPath: ./public.pem authJwtHeader: Authorization authJwtClaimUsername: sub authJwtAud: expected-audience
authRequireGuestsToLogin: true ```
- Generate a Wrong-Audience Token ```python python3 - <<EOF import jwt, datetime
with open("private.pem") as f: key = f.read()
token = jwt.encode( { "sub": "low", "aud": "wrong-audience", # intentionally wrong "exp": datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(minutes=30) }, key, algorithm="RS256" )
print(token)
EOF
``
This prints the$WRONG_AUD_TOKEN`.
-
Test Without Token (Baseline)
bash curl -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/WhoAmI \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{}'Expected response:HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized -
Test With Wrong-Audience Token
bash curl -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/WhoAmI \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $WRONG_AUD_TOKEN" \ -d '{}'Expected response:HTTP/1.1 200 OK {"authenticatedUser":"low","provider":"jwt","usergroup":"","acls":[],"sid":""}Authentication succeeds even though theaudclaim is incorrect.
Impact
An attacker who possesses a valid JWT signed by the configured key (or HMAC secret) but intended for a different audience can authenticate successfully.
This enables:
- Cross-service token reuse
- Authentication using tokens issued for other systems
- Trust boundary violation in multi-service environments
This is particularly severe when:
- OliveTin is deployed behind a centralized SSO provider
- The same signing key is reused across services
- Audience restrictions are relied upon for service isolation
This does not bypass ACL authorization. It is strictly an authentication validation flaw.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260304231339-e97d8ecbd8d6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30223"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T20:52:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-06T21:16:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nWhen JWT authentication is configured using either:\n\n- `authJwtPubKeyPath` (local RSA public key), or\n- `authJwtHmacSecret` (HMAC secret),\n\nthe configured audience value (`authJwtAud`) is not enforced during token parsing.\nAs a result, validly signed JWT tokens with an incorrect `aud` claim are accepted for authentication.\nThis allows authentication using tokens intended for a different audience/service.\n\n### Details\n\n**Affected Code**\n\nFile: `jwt.go`\nLines: 51\u201359, 144\u2013157, 161\u2013168\n\n**Current Behavior**\n\nRemote JWKS Mode (Correct):\n```go\nreturn jwt.Parse(jwtToken, jwksVerifier.Keyfunc, jwt.WithAudience(cfg.AuthJwtAud))\n```\nAudience validation is enforced.\n\nLocal Public Key Mode (Vulnerable):\n```go\nreturn jwt.Parse(jwtString, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { ... })\n```\nNo `jwt.WithAudience()` option is provided.\n\nHMAC Mode (Vulnerable):\n```go\nreturn jwt.Parse(jwtString, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { ... })\n```\nNo `jwt.WithAudience()` option is provided.\n\n**Why This Is Vulnerable:** `authJwtAud` is ignored for `authJwtPubKeyPath` and `authJwtHmacSecret` modes, so wrong-audience tokens are accepted.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. **Configure OliveTin**\n\n Use a minimal config with JWT local key authentication:\n ```yaml\n authJwtPubKeyPath: ./public.pem\n authJwtHeader: Authorization\n authJwtClaimUsername: sub\n authJwtAud: expected-audience\n\n authRequireGuestsToLogin: true\n ```\n\n2. **Generate a Wrong-Audience Token**\n ```python\n python3 - \u003c\u003cEOF\n import jwt, datetime\n\n with open(\"private.pem\") as f:\n key = f.read()\n\n token = jwt.encode(\n {\n \"sub\": \"low\",\n \"aud\": \"wrong-audience\", # intentionally wrong\n \"exp\": datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(minutes=30)\n },\n key,\n algorithm=\"RS256\"\n )\n\n print(token)\n EOF\n ```\n This prints the `$WRONG_AUD_TOKEN`.\n\n3. **Test Without Token (Baseline)**\n ```bash\n curl -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/WhoAmI \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{}\u0027\n ```\n Expected response:\n ```\n HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\n ```\n\n4. **Test With Wrong-Audience Token**\n ```bash\n curl -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/WhoAmI \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $WRONG_AUD_TOKEN\" \\\n -d \u0027{}\u0027\n ```\n Expected response:\n ```\n HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n {\"authenticatedUser\":\"low\",\"provider\":\"jwt\",\"usergroup\":\"\",\"acls\":[],\"sid\":\"\"}\n ```\n Authentication succeeds even though the `aud` claim is incorrect.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who possesses a valid JWT signed by the configured key (or HMAC secret) but intended for a different audience can authenticate successfully.\n\nThis enables:\n\n- Cross-service token reuse\n- Authentication using tokens issued for other systems\n- Trust boundary violation in multi-service environments\n\nThis is particularly severe when:\n\n- OliveTin is deployed behind a centralized SSO provider\n- The same signing key is reused across services\n- Audience restrictions are relied upon for service isolation\n\nThis does **not** bypass ACL authorization.\nIt is strictly an authentication validation flaw.",
"id": "GHSA-g962-2j28-3cg9",
"modified": "2026-03-06T22:52:10Z",
"published": "2026-03-05T20:52:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/security/advisories/GHSA-g962-2j28-3cg9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30223"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/commit/e97d8ecbd8d6ba468c418ca496fcd18f78131233"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/releases/tag/3000.11.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OliveTin has JWT Audience Validation Bypass in Local Key and HMAC Modes"
}
GHSA-G96C-X7RH-99R3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-06 20:51 – Updated: 2023-09-07 21:19Summary
Graylog utilises only one single source port for DNS queries.
Details
Graylog seems to bind a single socket for outgoing DNS queries. That socket is bound to a random port number which is not changed again. This goes against recommended practice since 2008, when Dan Kaminsky discovered how easy is to carry out DNS cache poisoning attacks. In order to prevent cache poisoning with spoofed DNS responses, it is necessary to maximise the uncertainty in the choice of a source port for a DNS query.
PoC
The attached figure shows the source ports distribution difference between Graylog configured to use a data adapter based on DNS queries and ISC Bind. The source port distribution of the DNS queries sent from Graylog to a recursive DNS name server running Bind (CLIENT_QUERY) are depicted in purple, while the queries sent from the recursive DNS server to the authoritatives (RESOLVER_QUERY) are plotted in green color. As it can be observed, in contrast to ISC Bind which presents a heterogeneous usage of source port, Graylog utilises a single source port.
Impact
Although unlikely in many setups, an external attacker could inject forged DNS responses into a Graylog's lookup table cache. In order to prevent this, it is at least recommendable to distribute the DNS queries through a pool of distinct sockets, each of them with a random source port and renew them periodically.
(Credit to Iratxe Niño from Fundación Sarenet and Borja Marcos from Sarenet)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.graylog2:graylog2-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.graylog2:graylog2-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-41045"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-06T20:51:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-31T18:15:09Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\nGraylog utilises only one single source port for DNS queries.\n\n### Details\nGraylog seems to bind a single socket for outgoing DNS queries. That socket is bound to a random port number which is not changed again. This goes against recommended practice since 2008, when Dan Kaminsky discovered how easy is to carry out DNS cache poisoning attacks. In order to prevent cache poisoning with spoofed DNS responses, it is necessary to maximise the uncertainty in the choice of a source port for a DNS query.\n\n\n### PoC \n\nThe attached figure shows the source ports distribution difference between Graylog configured to use a data adapter based on DNS queries and ISC Bind. The source port distribution of the DNS queries sent from Graylog to a recursive DNS name server running Bind (CLIENT_QUERY) are depicted in purple, while the queries sent from the recursive DNS server to the authoritatives (RESOLVER_QUERY) are plotted in green color. As it can be observed, in contrast to ISC Bind which presents a heterogeneous usage of source port, Graylog utilises a single source port.\n\n\n\n### Impact\nAlthough unlikely in many setups, an external attacker could inject forged DNS responses into a Graylog\u0027s lookup table cache. In order to prevent this, it is at least recommendable to distribute the DNS queries through a pool of distinct sockets, each of them with a random source port and renew them periodically.\n\n\n\n(Credit to Iratxe Ni\u00f1o from Fundaci\u00f3n Sarenet and Borja Marcos from Sarenet)",
"id": "GHSA-g96c-x7rh-99r3",
"modified": "2023-09-07T21:19:13Z",
"published": "2023-07-06T20:51:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Graylog2/graylog2-server/security/advisories/GHSA-g96c-x7rh-99r3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41045"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Graylog2/graylog2-server/commit/466af814523cffae9fbc7e77bab7472988f03c3e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Graylog2/graylog2-server/commit/a101f4f12180fd3dfa7d3345188a099877a3c327"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Graylog2/graylog2-server"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Graylog vulnerable to insecure source port usage for DNS queries"
}
GHSA-G973-978J-2C3P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-07-22 19:47 – Updated: 2022-02-08 21:02SheetJS Pro through 0.16.9 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted .xlsx document that is mishandled when read by xlsx.js.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "xlsx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.17.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.webjars.npm:xlsx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.17.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-32014"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-07-19T21:44:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-07-19T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "SheetJS Pro through 0.16.9 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted .xlsx document that is mishandled when read by xlsx.js.",
"id": "GHSA-g973-978j-2c3p",
"modified": "2022-02-08T21:02:26Z",
"published": "2021-07-22T19:47:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32014"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://floqast.com/engineering-blog/post/fuzzing-and-parsing-securely"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sheetjs.com/pro"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/xlsx/v/0.17.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2022.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Denial of Service in SheetJS Pro"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing
An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.
CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages
An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.
CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)
An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.