CWE-345
DiscouragedInsufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
941 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-848M-8QG2-WMRV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 15:33 – Updated: 2026-06-16 18:32Firefox for iOS used partial domain matching when attaching cookies to PDF requests, allowing a malicious site on a suffix domain to receive cookies belonging to the target site. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox for iOS 152.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53899"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-16T13:16:37Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Firefox for iOS used partial domain matching when attaching cookies to PDF requests, allowing a malicious site on a suffix domain to receive cookies belonging to the target site. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox for iOS 152.0.",
"id": "GHSA-848m-8qg2-wmrv",
"modified": "2026-06-16T18:32:37Z",
"published": "2026-06-16T15:33:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53899"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2042909"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-56"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-84XJ-78RW-RF33
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:12 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:01An Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in B. Braun SpaceCom2 prior to 012U000062 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to send the device malicious data that will be used in place of the correct data. This results in full system command access and execution because of the lack of cryptographic signatures on critical data sets.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-33885"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-25T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in B. Braun SpaceCom2 prior to 012U000062 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to send the device malicious data that will be used in place of the correct data. This results in full system command access and execution because of the lack of cryptographic signatures on critical data sets.",
"id": "GHSA-84xj-78rw-rf33",
"modified": "2022-07-13T00:01:26Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:12:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-33885"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.bbraunusa.com/en.htm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/enterprise/mcafee-enterprise-atr/mcafee-enterprise-atr-uncovers-vulnerabilities-in-globally-used-b-braun-infusion-pump"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8547-8823-M279
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-29 15:31 – Updated: 2025-07-29 15:31In HDP Server versions below 4.6.2.2978 on Linux, unauthorized access could occur via IP spoofing using the X-Forwarded-For header.
Since XFF is a client-controlled header, it could be spoofed, allowing unauthorized access if the spoofed IP matched a whitelisted range.
This vulnerability could be exploited to bypass IP restrictions, though valid user credentials would still be required for resource access.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-6504"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-29T13:15:28Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In HDP Server versions below 4.6.2.2978 on Linux, unauthorized access could occur via IP spoofing using the X-Forwarded-For header.\u00a0\n\nSince XFF is a client-controlled header, it could be spoofed, allowing unauthorized access if the spoofed IP matched a whitelisted range.\n\n\nThis vulnerability could be exploited to bypass IP restrictions, though valid user credentials would still be required for resource access.",
"id": "GHSA-8547-8823-m279",
"modified": "2025-07-29T15:31:49Z",
"published": "2025-07-29T15:31:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6504"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.progress.com/s/article/DataDirect-Hybrid-Data-Pipeline-Critical-Security-Product-Alert-Bulletin-July-2025---CVE-2025-6504"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8579-RGG5-PH2M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 13:52 – Updated: 2026-06-18 13:52DiscordApproval accepts unrelated channel messages as dangerous-tool approvals
Summary
praisonai.bots.DiscordApproval approves a pending dangerous tool call when it
sees any later non-bot message in the configured Discord channel whose text is
classified as approval, such as yes.
The decision is not bound to:
- a Discord reply to the approval message;
- a Discord thread created for that request;
- a Discord interaction/button callback for that request;
- an explicit approver user allowlist; or
- an approval nonce visible only to intended approvers.
As a result, any user who can post in the configured approval channel can
approve a pending high-risk tool call by sending yes after the approval
message appears. The same local PoV also shows that the Slack and Telegram
messaging approval backends have no explicit approver allowlist parameter, but
the primary report-grade issue is the Discord backend's unthreaded channel
cross-talk: the approving message does not need to be a reply or otherwise
request-bound.
Affected Product
- Repository:
MervinPraison/PraisonAI - Ecosystem:
pip - Package:
praisonai - Component: Python messaging approval backends
- Primary affected file:
src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/_discord_approval.py - Related sibling files:
src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/_slack_approval.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/bots/_telegram_approval.py- Latest PyPI version validated:
4.6.58 - Current
origin/mainvalidated:1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e - Current
origin/maintag validated:v4.6.58
Suggested affected range:
pip:praisonai >= 4.5.2, <= 4.6.58
Representative local sweep:
4.5.0 Discord approval backend not present
4.5.2 vulnerable
4.5.128 vulnerable
4.6.9 vulnerable
4.6.10 vulnerable
4.6.56 vulnerable
4.6.57 vulnerable
4.6.58 vulnerable
Root Cause
DiscordApproval.request_approval() posts an approval message to the configured
channel and records the returned message id.
_poll_for_response() then polls channel history with:
f"/channels/{channel_id}/messages?after={message_id}&limit=10"
For each later non-bot message, it reads content, classifies the text, and
returns ApprovalDecision(approved=True) when the text is approve/yes.
There is no check that the message is a Discord reply to the approval message,
belongs to a request-specific thread, came from an intended approver, or
contains a request-specific approval token.
Important source evidence from origin/main:
_discord_approval.pylines 57-73: constructor acceptstoken,channel_id,timeout, andpoll_interval; no approver allowlist._discord_approval.pyline 239: polls all messages after the approval message in the configured channel._discord_approval.pylines 252-265: skips bot messages, classifies the remaining text, and approves when the keyword isapprove.
The Slack and Telegram backends are better request-scoped than Discord:
- Slack uses
conversations.repliesfor the approval message thread. - Telegram checks the callback/reply message id.
However, both still lack an explicit approver identity parameter. They are included in the PoV and suggested fix because the authorization model should be consistent across all messaging approval backends.
Local PoV
Run against the latest local checkout:
python3 poc/pov_prai_cand_029_messaging_approval_channel_member_bypass.py \
--repo ../../artifacts/repos/praisonai-v4.6.58 \
--json
The PoV is local-only. It mocks Slack, Telegram, and Discord API helpers in-process and does not contact those services.
For Discord, the mock sequence is:
DiscordApprovalposts a criticalexecute_commandapproval request toD_APPROVAL_CHANNEL.- The mocked channel-history endpoint returns a later ordinary non-bot
channel message from
D_INTRUDERwith contentyes. DiscordApprovalreturnsapproved=Trueandapprover="D_INTRUDER".
Observed output from evidence/pov-v4.6.58.json:
{
"approval_from_unconfigured_channel_participant": {
"discord": true,
"slack": true,
"telegram": true
},
"backends": [
{
"backend": "discord",
"configured_channel_id": "D_APPROVAL_CHANNEL",
"decision_approved": true,
"decision_approver": "D_INTRUDER",
"decision_reason": "Approved via Discord by intruder",
"intruder_user": "D_INTRUDER"
}
],
"no_explicit_approver_allowlist_parameters": true,
"vulnerable": true
}
The command in the approval request is a harmless local sentinel:
touch /tmp/prai-cand-029. The PoV stops at the approval decision; it does not
execute the tool.
Why This Is Not Intended Behavior
This report does not claim that a deliberately private approval channel with only trusted approvers is unsafe by itself. The narrower issue is that the Discord backend treats an unrelated later channel message as the approval decision for a specific dangerous tool request.
PraisonAI's approval documentation describes approval as a safety control that
pauses before dangerous tools and asks a human or channel to allow or deny the
specific request. A random later yes in the channel is not evidence that an
intended approver reviewed that request.
The existing Slack and Telegram implementations already show request-binding patterns that Discord lacks:
- Slack scopes to replies for the approval message timestamp.
- Telegram checks the callback/reply
message_id.
The Discord backend should provide at least the same request binding and should also support explicit approver identity checks for deployments where channel membership is broader than approval authority.
Impact
If an application uses DiscordApproval for dangerous tools such as shell
commands, file writes, deletes, deployments, or other privileged operations, a
low-privileged Discord user with write access to the configured approval channel
can approve pending dangerous tool executions.
This can lead to code execution, file modification, deployment changes, or data access with the privileges of the PraisonAI process, depending on which tools the agent exposes behind approval.
The attacker does not need the LLM API key, shell access, repository access, or PraisonAI process access. They only need to be able to post an approval-looking message in the configured approval channel after the approval prompt appears.
Severity
Suggested severity: High.
Rationale:
AV: the attacker interacts through a networked Discord channel.AC: sendingyesafter an approval prompt is enough.PR: the attacker needs permission to post in the configured approval channel, but no approver-specific permission.UI: no separate victim interaction is needed after the prompt exists.S: the vulnerable approval backend and approved tool run in the PraisonAI application's security scope.C/I/A: approved dangerous tools can disclose, modify, or destroy data depending on the configured agent tools.
Remediation
Recommended fixes:
- For Discord, require approvals to be tied to the request, not merely any
later channel message. Use Discord interactions/buttons with opaque
server-side request ids, or require a Discord reply whose
message_reference.message_idmatches the approval message. - Add explicit approver identity configuration to all messaging approval
backends, for example
approver_user_idsorallowed_approvers. - Reject approvals from users outside the configured approver set, even if the message appears in the configured channel.
- Include a per-request nonce or opaque approval id in callbacks and verify it
server side before returning
ApprovalDecision(approved=True). - Add regression tests for Discord where:
- an unrelated later
yesin the channel is ignored; - a reply from a non-approver is ignored;
- a request-bound reply/callback from an allowed approver succeeds.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.58"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.5.2"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.59"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:52:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# DiscordApproval accepts unrelated channel messages as dangerous-tool approvals\n\n## Summary\n\n`praisonai.bots.DiscordApproval` approves a pending dangerous tool call when it\nsees any later non-bot message in the configured Discord channel whose text is\nclassified as approval, such as `yes`.\n\nThe decision is not bound to:\n\n- a Discord reply to the approval message;\n- a Discord thread created for that request;\n- a Discord interaction/button callback for that request;\n- an explicit approver user allowlist; or\n- an approval nonce visible only to intended approvers.\n\nAs a result, any user who can post in the configured approval channel can\napprove a pending high-risk tool call by sending `yes` after the approval\nmessage appears. The same local PoV also shows that the Slack and Telegram\nmessaging approval backends have no explicit approver allowlist parameter, but\nthe primary report-grade issue is the Discord backend\u0027s unthreaded channel\ncross-talk: the approving message does not need to be a reply or otherwise\nrequest-bound.\n\n## Affected Product\n\n- Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n- Ecosystem: `pip`\n- Package: `praisonai`\n- Component: Python messaging approval backends\n- Primary affected file: `src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/_discord_approval.py`\n- Related sibling files:\n - `src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/_slack_approval.py`\n - `src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/_telegram_approval.py`\n- Latest PyPI version validated: `4.6.58`\n- Current `origin/main` validated:\n `1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e`\n- Current `origin/main` tag validated: `v4.6.58`\n\nSuggested affected range:\n\n```text\npip:praisonai \u003e= 4.5.2, \u003c= 4.6.58\n```\n\nRepresentative local sweep:\n\n```text\n4.5.0 Discord approval backend not present\n4.5.2 vulnerable\n4.5.128 vulnerable\n4.6.9 vulnerable\n4.6.10 vulnerable\n4.6.56 vulnerable\n4.6.57 vulnerable\n4.6.58 vulnerable\n```\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`DiscordApproval.request_approval()` posts an approval message to the configured\nchannel and records the returned message id.\n\n`_poll_for_response()` then polls channel history with:\n\n```python\nf\"/channels/{channel_id}/messages?after={message_id}\u0026limit=10\"\n```\n\nFor each later non-bot message, it reads `content`, classifies the text, and\nreturns `ApprovalDecision(approved=True)` when the text is `approve`/`yes`.\nThere is no check that the message is a Discord reply to the approval message,\nbelongs to a request-specific thread, came from an intended approver, or\ncontains a request-specific approval token.\n\nImportant source evidence from `origin/main`:\n\n- `_discord_approval.py` lines 57-73: constructor accepts `token`,\n `channel_id`, `timeout`, and `poll_interval`; no approver allowlist.\n- `_discord_approval.py` line 239: polls all messages after the approval\n message in the configured channel.\n- `_discord_approval.py` lines 252-265: skips bot messages, classifies the\n remaining text, and approves when the keyword is `approve`.\n\nThe Slack and Telegram backends are better request-scoped than Discord:\n\n- Slack uses `conversations.replies` for the approval message thread.\n- Telegram checks the callback/reply message id.\n\nHowever, both still lack an explicit approver identity parameter. They are\nincluded in the PoV and suggested fix because the authorization model should be\nconsistent across all messaging approval backends.\n\n## Local PoV\n\nRun against the latest local checkout:\n\n```bash\npython3 poc/pov_prai_cand_029_messaging_approval_channel_member_bypass.py \\\n --repo ../../artifacts/repos/praisonai-v4.6.58 \\\n --json\n```\n\nThe PoV is local-only. It mocks Slack, Telegram, and Discord API helpers\nin-process and does not contact those services.\n\nFor Discord, the mock sequence is:\n\n1. `DiscordApproval` posts a critical `execute_command` approval request to\n `D_APPROVAL_CHANNEL`.\n2. The mocked channel-history endpoint returns a later ordinary non-bot\n channel message from `D_INTRUDER` with content `yes`.\n3. `DiscordApproval` returns `approved=True` and `approver=\"D_INTRUDER\"`.\n\nObserved output from `evidence/pov-v4.6.58.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n \"approval_from_unconfigured_channel_participant\": {\n \"discord\": true,\n \"slack\": true,\n \"telegram\": true\n },\n \"backends\": [\n {\n \"backend\": \"discord\",\n \"configured_channel_id\": \"D_APPROVAL_CHANNEL\",\n \"decision_approved\": true,\n \"decision_approver\": \"D_INTRUDER\",\n \"decision_reason\": \"Approved via Discord by intruder\",\n \"intruder_user\": \"D_INTRUDER\"\n }\n ],\n \"no_explicit_approver_allowlist_parameters\": true,\n \"vulnerable\": true\n}\n```\n\nThe command in the approval request is a harmless local sentinel:\n`touch /tmp/prai-cand-029`. The PoV stops at the approval decision; it does not\nexecute the tool.\n\n## Why This Is Not Intended Behavior\n\nThis report does not claim that a deliberately private approval channel with\nonly trusted approvers is unsafe by itself. The narrower issue is that the\nDiscord backend treats an unrelated later channel message as the approval\ndecision for a specific dangerous tool request.\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s approval documentation describes approval as a safety control that\npauses before dangerous tools and asks a human or channel to allow or deny the\nspecific request. A random later `yes` in the channel is not evidence that an\nintended approver reviewed that request.\n\nThe existing Slack and Telegram implementations already show request-binding\npatterns that Discord lacks:\n\n- Slack scopes to replies for the approval message timestamp.\n- Telegram checks the callback/reply `message_id`.\n\nThe Discord backend should provide at least the same request binding and should\nalso support explicit approver identity checks for deployments where channel\nmembership is broader than approval authority.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an application uses `DiscordApproval` for dangerous tools such as shell\ncommands, file writes, deletes, deployments, or other privileged operations, a\nlow-privileged Discord user with write access to the configured approval channel\ncan approve pending dangerous tool executions.\n\nThis can lead to code execution, file modification, deployment changes, or data\naccess with the privileges of the PraisonAI process, depending on which tools\nthe agent exposes behind approval.\n\nThe attacker does not need the LLM API key, shell access, repository access, or\nPraisonAI process access. They only need to be able to post an approval-looking\nmessage in the configured approval channel after the approval prompt appears.\n\n## Severity\n\nSuggested severity: High.\n\nRationale:\n\n- `AV`: the attacker interacts through a networked Discord channel.\n- `AC`: sending `yes` after an approval prompt is enough.\n- `PR`: the attacker needs permission to post in the configured approval\n channel, but no approver-specific permission.\n- `UI`: no separate victim interaction is needed after the prompt exists.\n- `S`: the vulnerable approval backend and approved tool run in the PraisonAI\n application\u0027s security scope.\n- `C/I/A`: approved dangerous tools can disclose, modify, or destroy data\n depending on the configured agent tools.\n\n## Remediation\n\nRecommended fixes:\n\n1. For Discord, require approvals to be tied to the request, not merely any\n later channel message. Use Discord interactions/buttons with opaque\n server-side request ids, or require a Discord reply whose\n `message_reference.message_id` matches the approval message.\n2. Add explicit approver identity configuration to all messaging approval\n backends, for example `approver_user_ids` or `allowed_approvers`.\n3. Reject approvals from users outside the configured approver set, even if the\n message appears in the configured channel.\n4. Include a per-request nonce or opaque approval id in callbacks and verify it\n server side before returning `ApprovalDecision(approved=True)`.\n5. Add regression tests for Discord where:\n - an unrelated later `yes` in the channel is ignored;\n - a reply from a non-approver is ignored;\n - a request-bound reply/callback from an allowed approver succeeds.",
"id": "GHSA-8579-rgg5-ph2m",
"modified": "2026-06-18T13:52:27Z",
"published": "2026-06-18T13:52:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-8579-rgg5-ph2m"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI DiscordApproval accepts unrelated channel messages as dangerous-tool approvals"
}
GHSA-86CJ-95QR-2P4F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-22 16:56 – Updated: 2025-08-22 16:56Summary
Using torch._dynamo.guards.GuardBuilder.get function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.
Details
The attack payload executes in the following steps:
First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch._dynamo.guards.GuardBuilder.get function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.
PoC
import types
import torch._dynamo.guards as guards
class EvilTorchDynamoGuardsGet:
def __reduce__(self):
fake_self = types.SimpleNamespace(scope={})
name = "__import__('os').system('whoami')"
return guards.GuardBuilder.get, (fake_self, name)
Impact
Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.
Corresponding
https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.0.27"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "picklescan"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.28"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-22T16:56:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nUsing torch._dynamo.guards.GuardBuilder.get function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.\n\n### Details\n\nThe attack payload executes in the following steps:\n\nFirst, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch._dynamo.guards.GuardBuilder.get function in reduce method\nThen when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn\u0027t dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.\n\n### PoC\n\n```\nimport types\nimport torch._dynamo.guards as guards\n\nclass EvilTorchDynamoGuardsGet:\n def __reduce__(self):\n fake_self = types.SimpleNamespace(scope={})\n name = \"__import__(\u0027os\u0027).system(\u0027whoami\u0027)\"\n return guards.GuardBuilder.get, (fake_self, name)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nWho is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models.\nWhat is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded.\nSupply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.\n\n### Corresponding\n\nhttps://github.com/FredericDT\nhttps://github.com/Qhaoduoyu",
"id": "GHSA-86cj-95qr-2p4f",
"modified": "2025-08-22T16:56:40Z",
"published": "2025-08-22T16:56:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-86cj-95qr-2p4f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/pull/47"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/7f994d62084fe43f1cffdef2f9bae6923344ef53"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/releases/tag/v0.0.28"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Picklescan missing detection when calling pytorch function torch._dynamo.guards.GuardBuilder.get"
}
GHSA-87G2-JPRQ-4CMC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-08 06:31 – Updated: 2026-03-16 15:30A vulnerability was determined in mkj Dropbear up to 2025.89. Impacted is the function unpackneg of the file src/curve25519.c of the component S Range Check. This manipulation causes improper verification of cryptographic signature. The attack can be initiated remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is considered difficult. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. Patch name: fdec3c90a15447bd538641d85e5a3e3ac981011d. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-3706"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-08T05:16:31Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was determined in mkj Dropbear up to 2025.89. Impacted is the function unpackneg of the file src/curve25519.c of the component S Range Check. This manipulation causes improper verification of cryptographic signature. The attack can be initiated remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is considered difficult. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. Patch name: fdec3c90a15447bd538641d85e5a3e3ac981011d. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch.",
"id": "GHSA-87g2-jprq-4cmc",
"modified": "2026-03-16T15:30:33Z",
"published": "2026-03-08T06:31:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3706"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/issues/406"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/issues/406#issue-3978907798"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/str4d/ed25519-java/issues/82#issue-727629226"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/pull/407"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/commit/fdec3c90a15447bd538641d85e5a3e3ac981011d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mkj/dropbear"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.349652"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.349652"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.765933"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-87GJ-V6H3-C8P3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-10 18:30 – Updated: 2026-02-10 18:30User interface (ui) misrepresentation of critical information in Microsoft Exchange Server allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-21527"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-10T18:16:35Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "User interface (ui) misrepresentation of critical information in Microsoft Exchange Server allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-87gj-v6h3-c8p3",
"modified": "2026-02-10T18:30:42Z",
"published": "2026-02-10T18:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21527"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-21527"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-87MM-QXM5-CP3F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-28 03:30 – Updated: 2022-12-29 00:34go-resolver's DNSSEC validation is not performed correctly. An attacker can cause this package to report successful validation for invalid, attacker-controlled records. The owner name of RRSIG RRs is not validated, permitting an attacker to present the RRSIG for an attacker-controlled domain in a response for any other domain.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/peterzen/goresolver"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-3346"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-12-29T00:34:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-28T03:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "go-resolver\u0027s DNSSEC validation is not performed correctly. An attacker can cause this package to report successful validation for invalid, attacker-controlled records. The owner name of RRSIG RRs is not validated, permitting an attacker to present the RRSIG for an attacker-controlled domain in a response for any other domain.",
"id": "GHSA-87mm-qxm5-cp3f",
"modified": "2022-12-29T00:34:38Z",
"published": "2022-12-28T03:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3346"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/peterzen/goresolver/issues/5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/peterzen/goresolver"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2022-0979"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "go-resolver vulnerable to attacker-controlled domains due to unvalidated RRSIG RRs"
}
GHSA-889R-WFHC-6G6C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-09 15:30 – Updated: 2026-02-09 15:30Crafted delegations or IP fragments can poison cached delegations in Recursor.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59024"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-09T15:16:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Crafted delegations or IP fragments can poison cached delegations in Recursor.",
"id": "GHSA-889r-wfhc-6g6c",
"modified": "2026-02-09T15:30:31Z",
"published": "2026-02-09T15:30:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59024"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.powerdns.com/recursor/security-advisories/powerdns-advisory-2025-06.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-88P8-MPRP-J235
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:41 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:41This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Foxit Studio Photo 3.6.6.922. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file. The specific flaw exists within the handling of CR2 files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in a memory corruption condition. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current process. Was ZDI-CAN-11230.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-17426"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-09T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Foxit Studio Photo 3.6.6.922. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file. The specific flaw exists within the handling of CR2 files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in a memory corruption condition. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current process. Was ZDI-CAN-11230.",
"id": "GHSA-88p8-mprp-j235",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:41:25Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:41:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-17426"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.foxitsoftware.com/support/security-bulletins.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-20-1337"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing
An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.
CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages
An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.
CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)
An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.