CWE-285
DiscouragedImproper Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
2305 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-GG53-WF5X-R3R6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-20 21:18 – Updated: 2022-09-20 21:18Impact
A bug in the security cache is storing rules associated to document Page1.Page2 and space Page1.Page2 in the same cache entry.
That means that it's possible to overwrite the rights of a space or a document by creating the page of the space with the same name and checking the right of the new one first so that they end up in the security cache and are used for the other too.
Patches
The problem has been patched in XWiki 12.10.11, 13.10.1, 13.4.6.
Workarounds
No workaround other than patching.
References
https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-14075 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-18983
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org * Email us at Security Mailing List
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-security"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "12.10.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-security"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "13.0"
},
{
"fixed": "13.4.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-security"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "13.10"
},
{
"fixed": "13.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-31167"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-09-20T21:18:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-07T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nA bug in the security cache is storing rules associated to document Page1.Page2 and space Page1.Page2 in the same cache entry.\n\nThat means that it\u0027s possible to overwrite the rights of a space or a document by creating the page of the space with the same name and checking the right of the new one first so that they end up in the security cache and are used for the other too.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe problem has been patched in XWiki 12.10.11, 13.10.1, 13.4.6.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround other than patching.\n\n### References\n\nhttps://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-14075\nhttps://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-18983\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [Jira XWiki.org](https://jira.xwiki.org)\n* Email us at [Security Mailing List](mailto:security@xwiki.org)",
"id": "GHSA-gg53-wf5x-r3r6",
"modified": "2022-09-20T21:18:43Z",
"published": "2022-09-20T21:18:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-gg53-wf5x-r3r6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31167"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-14075"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-18983"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "XWiki Platform Security Parent POM vulnerable to overwriting of security rules of a page with a final page having the same reference"
}
GHSA-GGF6-638M-VQMG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-15 03:34 – Updated: 2023-06-27 22:21Impact
Improper Authorization functions leads to non-privileged users running privileged API calls. If you have added users to your Netmaker platform who whould not have admin privileges, they could use their auth token to run admin-level functions via the API.
In addition, differing response codes based on function calls allowed non-users to potentially brute force the determination of names of networks on the system.
Patches
This problem has been patched in v0.15.1. To apply:
- docker-compose down
- docker pull gravitl/netmaker:v0.15.1
- docker-compose up -d
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Email us at info@netmaker.io This vulnerability was brought to our attention by @tweidinger
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/gravitl/netmaker"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.15.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-36110"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1220",
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-09-15T03:34:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-09T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nImproper Authorization functions leads to non-privileged users running privileged API calls. If you have added users to your Netmaker platform who whould not have admin privileges, they could use their auth token to run admin-level functions via the API.\n\nIn addition, differing response codes based on function calls allowed non-users to potentially brute force the determination of names of networks on the system.\n\n### Patches\nThis problem has been patched in v0.15.1. To apply:\n\n1. docker-compose down\n2. docker pull gravitl/netmaker:v0.15.1\n3. docker-compose up -d\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\nEmail us at [info@netmaker.io](mailto:info@netmaker.io)\nThis vulnerability was brought to our attention by @tweidinger",
"id": "GHSA-ggf6-638m-vqmg",
"modified": "2023-06-27T22:21:05Z",
"published": "2022-09-15T03:34:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gravitl/netmaker/security/advisories/GHSA-ggf6-638m-vqmg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36110"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gravitl/netmaker"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gravitl/netmaker/releases/tag/v0.15.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Netmaker vulnerable to Insufficient Granularity of Access Control"
}
GHSA-GGF6-W57C-2RJ4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-15 21:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 21:31The Transposh WordPress Translation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized setting changes by unauthenticated users in versions up to, and including, 1.0.8.1. This is due to insufficient validation of settings on the 'tp_translation' AJAX action which makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to bypass any restrictions and influence the data shown on the site. Please note this is a separate issue from CVE-2022-2461. Notes from the researcher: When installed Transposh comes with a set of pre-configured options, one of these is the "Who can translate" setting under the "Settings" tab. However, this option is largely ignored, if Transposh has enabled its "autotranslate" feature (it's enabled by default) and the HTTP POST parameter "sr0" is larger than 0. This is caused by a faulty validation in "wp/transposh_db.php."
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-2536"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-15T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Transposh WordPress Translation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized setting changes by unauthenticated users in versions up to, and including, 1.0.8.1. This is due to insufficient validation of settings on the \u0027tp_translation\u0027 AJAX action which makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to bypass any restrictions and influence the data shown on the site. Please note this is a separate issue from CVE-2022-2461. Notes from the researcher: When installed Transposh comes with a set of pre-configured options, one of these is the \"Who can translate\" setting under the \"Settings\" tab. However, this option is largely ignored, if Transposh has enabled its \"autotranslate\" feature (it\u0027s enabled by default) and the HTTP POST parameter \"sr0\" is larger than 0. This is caused by a faulty validation in \"wp/transposh_db.php.\"",
"id": "GHSA-ggf6-w57c-2rj4",
"modified": "2026-04-08T21:31:46Z",
"published": "2022-12-15T21:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2536"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MrTuxracer/advisories/blob/master/CVEs/CVE-2022-2536.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/168120/wptransposh1081-authz.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/transposh-translation-filter-for-wordpress/trunk/transposh.php?rev=2682425#L1989"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploitalert.com/view-details.html?id=38949"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.rcesecurity.com/2022/07/WordPress-Transposh-Exploiting-a-Blind-SQL-Injection-via-XSS"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c774b520-9d9f-4102-8564-49673d5ae1e6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c774b520-9d9f-4102-8564-49673d5ae1e6?source=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/vulnerability-advisories-continued/#CVE-2022-2536"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GGPM-9QFX-MHWG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-13 03:30 – Updated: 2024-07-26 21:37Lack of authentication in NPM's package @evershop/evershop before version 1.0.0-rc.9, allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via improper authorization in GraphQL endpoints.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@evershop/evershop"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.0-rc.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-46942"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-287"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-16T16:37:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-13T02:15:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Lack of authentication in NPM\u0027s package @evershop/evershop before version 1.0.0-rc.9, allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via improper authorization in GraphQL endpoints.",
"id": "GHSA-ggpm-9qfx-mhwg",
"modified": "2024-07-26T21:37:07Z",
"published": "2024-01-13T03:30:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46942"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/evershopcommerce/evershop/commit/6e16f046e0b95efa16431a5ea41c22215273e9dd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://advisory.checkmarx.net/advisory/CVE-2023-46942"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://devhub.checkmarx.com/cve-details/CVE-2023-46942"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://devhub.checkmarx.com/cve-details/Cx00cea2d5-d2c5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/evershopcommerce/evershop"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "EverShop vulnerable to improper authorization in GraphQL endpoints"
}
GHSA-GHM8-G3HR-5G26
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-13 18:38 – Updated: 2024-02-13 18:38Microsoft Outlook Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-21402"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-13T18:15:58Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Microsoft Outlook Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability",
"id": "GHSA-ghm8-g3hr-5g26",
"modified": "2024-02-13T18:38:24Z",
"published": "2024-02-13T18:38:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21402"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-21402"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GHRW-X6CV-MR95
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-27 15:30 – Updated: 2023-09-27 15:30Sensitive information disclosure and manipulation due to improper authorization. The following products are affected: Acronis Cyber Protect 15 (Linux, Windows) before build 35979.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-44154"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-639",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-27T15:19:37Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Sensitive information disclosure and manipulation due to improper authorization. The following products are affected: Acronis Cyber Protect 15 (Linux, Windows) before build 35979.",
"id": "GHSA-ghrw-x6cv-mr95",
"modified": "2023-09-27T15:30:39Z",
"published": "2023-09-27T15:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-44154"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security-advisory.acronis.com/advisories/SEC-2436"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GJ39-FCFM-V6W8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-12 00:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:02An improper authorization vulnerability exists in Rocket.Chat <6.0 that could allow a hacker to manipulate the rid parameter and change the updateMessage method that only checks whether the user is allowed to edit message in the target room.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-28325"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-287",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-11T22:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An improper authorization vulnerability exists in Rocket.Chat \u003c6.0 that could allow a hacker to manipulate the rid parameter and change the updateMessage method that only checks whether the user is allowed to edit message in the target room.",
"id": "GHSA-gj39-fcfm-v6w8",
"modified": "2024-04-04T04:02:58Z",
"published": "2023-05-12T00:30:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28325"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/1406479"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GJ93-84G5-MCJQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-14 12:35 – Updated: 2025-10-23 22:22Magento versions 2.4.7-p1, 2.4.6-p6, 2.4.5-p8, 2.4.4-p9 and earlier are affected by an Improper Authorization vulnerability that could result in a Security feature bypass. A low-privileged attacker could leverage this vulnerability to bypass security measures and disclose minor information. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/project-community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.4.7-beta1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.7-p2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.4.6-p1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.6-p7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.4.5-p1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.5-p9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.4-p10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"versions": [
"2.4.4"
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"versions": [
"2.4.5"
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"versions": [
"2.4.6"
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"versions": [
"2.4.7"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-39415"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-23T22:22:59Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-14T12:15:28Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Magento versions 2.4.7-p1, 2.4.6-p6, 2.4.5-p8, 2.4.4-p9 and earlier are affected by an Improper Authorization vulnerability that could result in a Security feature bypass. A low-privileged attacker could leverage this vulnerability to bypass security measures and disclose minor information. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction.",
"id": "GHSA-gj93-84g5-mcjq",
"modified": "2025-10-23T22:22:59Z",
"published": "2024-08-14T12:35:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39415"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/magento/magento2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/magento/apsb24-61.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Magento Improper Authorization Leading to Security feature bypass"
}
GHSA-GM54-M39W-GRJP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 20:21 – Updated: 2026-05-19 15:59Summary
A user can modify another user's model even if its visibility is set to Private.
The finding resulted from a penetration test for a customer. It is suspected that the root cause of the issue lies within the core of Open WebUI, which is why it is being reported as a security issue here. Tested on Open WebUI 0.5.4.
Details / PoC
The user Victim created a private model with the visibility set to private:
The user Attacker can edit this model using the following POST request:
POST /api/v1/models/model/update?id=aaabraaa HTTP/2
Host: domain.local
//Some headers removed
Te: trailers
{"id":"aaabraaa","base_model_id":"gpt-4o-POC","name":"testmodel","meta":{"profile_image_url":"/static/favicon.png","description":"","capabilities":{"vision":true,"usage":false,"citations":true},"suggestion_prompts":null,"tags":[],"toolIds":["test"]},"params":{},"user_id":"565c82e6-083f-42bb-bf0f-a4e214cfb9ad","access_control":{"read":{"group_ids":[],"user_ids":[]},"write":{"group_ids":[],"user_ids":[]}},"is_active":true,"updated_at":1737314575,"created_at":1737121281}
Request / Response
Impact
A user can modify another user's model even if its visibility is set to Private. By changing the access permissions during editing, unauthorized access can be gained.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "open-webui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45345"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T20:21:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T22:16:54Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA user can modify another user\u0027s model even if its visibility is set to `Private`.\nThe finding resulted from a penetration test for a customer. It is suspected that the root cause of the issue lies within the core of Open WebUI, which is why it is being reported as a security issue here. Tested on Open WebUI 0.5.4.\n\n### Details / PoC\nThe user `Victim` created a private model with the visibility set to `private`: \n\n\nThe user `Attacker` can edit this model using the following POST request:\n```\nPOST /api/v1/models/model/update?id=aaabraaa HTTP/2\nHost: domain.local\n//Some headers removed\nTe: trailers\n\n{\"id\":\"aaabraaa\",\"base_model_id\":\"gpt-4o-POC\",\"name\":\"testmodel\",\"meta\":{\"profile_image_url\":\"/static/favicon.png\",\"description\":\"\",\"capabilities\":{\"vision\":true,\"usage\":false,\"citations\":true},\"suggestion_prompts\":null,\"tags\":[],\"toolIds\":[\"test\"]},\"params\":{},\"user_id\":\"565c82e6-083f-42bb-bf0f-a4e214cfb9ad\",\"access_control\":{\"read\":{\"group_ids\":[],\"user_ids\":[]},\"write\":{\"group_ids\":[],\"user_ids\":[]}},\"is_active\":true,\"updated_at\":1737314575,\"created_at\":1737121281}\n```\nRequest / Response\n\n\n### Impact\nA user can modify another user\u0027s model even if its visibility is set to `Private`. By changing the access permissions during editing, unauthorized access can be gained.",
"id": "GHSA-gm54-m39w-grjp",
"modified": "2026-05-19T15:59:21Z",
"published": "2026-05-14T20:21:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-gm54-m39w-grjp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45345"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Open WebUI missing authorization check at the model update function - models from other users can be updated"
}
GHSA-GMMV-4CC5-WR9R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 15:33 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:45Summary
SiYuan publish-mode Reader can mutate Conf and SQL index via 8 ungated APIs
POST /api/graph/getGraph, POST /api/graph/getLocalGraph, POST /api/sync/setSyncInterval, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime, POST /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime, and POST /api/search/updateEmbedBlock are registered with model.CheckAuth only, omitting both model.CheckAdminRole and model.CheckReadonly. Each of them writes server-side state, including atomic rewrites of <workspace>/conf/conf.json via model.Conf.Save(). Any caller whose JWT passes CheckAuth, including a publish-service RoleReader (the role assigned to anonymous publish visitors) and a RoleEditor against a workspace where Editor.ReadOnly = true, can hit them. This is the same root-cause class as the patched GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 and GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x.
Details
Affected: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan, all tags up to and including v3.6.5 (HEAD 96dfe0be).
The router in kernel/api/router.go registers each endpoint below with model.CheckAuth only. Sibling endpoints in the same group are correctly gated, which makes the omission unambiguous:
kernel/api/router.go:87 /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:88 /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:89 /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:90 /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:188 /api/search/updateEmbedBlock CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:279 /api/sync/setSyncInterval CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:400 /api/graph/getGraph CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:401 /api/graph/getLocalGraph CheckAuth only
# Compare the gated siblings on adjacent lines:
kernel/api/router.go:278 /api/sync/setSyncEnable CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly
kernel/api/router.go:280 /api/sync/setSyncPerception CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly
kernel/api/router.go:281 /api/sync/setSyncGenerateConflictDoc CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly
kernel/api/router.go:398 /api/graph/resetGraph CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly
kernel/api/router.go:399 /api/graph/resetLocalGraph CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly
Per-handler evidence:
kernel/api/graph.go:53 getGraph. Despite the verb "get", the body unconditionally overwrites model.Conf.Graph.Global from caller-supplied JSON and persists the entire workspace conf.json:
graphConf, err := gulu.JSON.MarshalJSON(confArg)
...
global := conf.NewGlobalGraph()
gulu.JSON.UnmarshalJSON(graphConf, global)
model.Conf.Graph.Global = global // attacker-controlled write
model.Conf.Save() // atomic rewrite of conf.json
kernel/api/graph.go:106 getLocalGraph. Same pattern on model.Conf.Graph.Local. Note the legitimate writers resetGraph (graph.go:29) and resetLocalGraph (graph.go:41) only set the struct to its constructor default (NewGlobalGraph() / NewLocalGraph()), whereas getGraph / getLocalGraph accept the entire struct from the caller, so the unauthorized surface is strictly larger than the gated reset endpoints.
kernel/api/sync.go:597 setSyncInterval. Calls model.SetSyncInterval(int(interval)) (kernel/model/sync.go:394) which writes Conf.Sync.Interval, persists Conf.Save(), and reschedules the sync goroutine via planSyncAfter. The model layer clamps the interval to [30, 43200], but a Reader can still pin sync to either bound (30 s for battery and bandwidth pressure on every connected client, or 12 h to effectively suspend cloud sync without changing the UI toggle).
kernel/api/search.go:287 updateEmbedBlock. Calls model.UpdateEmbedBlock(id, content) (kernel/model/search.go:198), which validates only that the block type is BlockQueryEmbed and then forwards to updateEmbedBlockContent (kernel/model/index.go:342). That helper rewrites the SQL blocks row's content column for the given embed-block ID via sql.UpdateBlockContentQueue. There is no publish-access check, so any embed block ID anywhere in the workspace is writable. The SQL content column is what fullTextSearchBlock and getEmbedBlock read from, so a Reader can poison search results visible to other users.
kernel/api/storage.go:251,295,273,317 updateRecentDocViewTime / updateRecentDocCloseTime / updateRecentDocOpenTime / batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime. Each rewrites the workspace recent-docs JSON file under recentDocLock (kernel/model/storage.go:171,213 ...). A Reader can register any rootID (including IDs in publish-private notebooks) into the recent-docs list, manipulating the admin's recently-opened-documents UI and history.
The bugs have all existed since v3.6.5 (the active release tag) and the live master branch. Two adjacent advisories already patched the exact same shape: GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 (getTag writing Conf.Tag.Sort) and GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x (renderSprig missing CheckAdminRole + CheckReadonly). Both are listed by the maintainers as occurrences "the same root-cause class" that has to be patched per-occurrence, so this report enumerates the remaining occurrences in one pass.
PoC
Source-level reproduction. The same Docker compose lab the maintainers used for GHSA-6r88 works here:
# 1. Authenticate as any role with CheckAuth (admin used here for convenience;
# a publish-mode Reader JWT works equivalently).
curl -s -c /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/loginAuth \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"authCode":"audittest"}' >/dev/null
# 2. Read current Conf.Sync.Interval and Conf.Graph.Global from /api/system/getConf.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{}' \
| python3 -c "import json,sys;c=json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['conf'];\
print('Conf.Sync.Interval BEFORE =',c['sync']['interval']);\
print('Conf.Graph.Global.minRefs BEFORE =',c['graph']['global']['minRefs'])"
# 3. setSyncInterval as Reader.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/sync/setSyncInterval \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"interval":30}'
# 4. getGraph as Reader, supplying a custom graph config struct.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/graph/getGraph \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"k":"","conf":{"minRefs":99,"maxBlocks":1,"d3":{"linkWidth":99}}}'
# 5. Confirm in-memory and on-disk persistence.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{}' \
| python3 -c "import json,sys;c=json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['conf'];\
print('Conf.Sync.Interval AFTER =',c['sync']['interval']);\
print('Conf.Graph.Global.minRefs AFTER =',c['graph']['global']['minRefs'])"
docker exec siyuan-audit grep -oE '\"interval\":[0-9]+' /siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json
docker exec siyuan-audit grep -oE '\"minRefs\":[0-9]+' /siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json
# 6. updateEmbedBlock - rewrite SQL content for any embed block ID.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/search/updateEmbedBlock \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"id":"<embed-block-id>","content":"poisoned"}'
Source-level proof, no privileged token involved:
$ grep -nE 'ginServer\.Handle.*(getGraph|getLocalGraph|setSyncInterval|updateEmbedBlock|updateRecentDoc|batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime)' \
kernel/api/router.go \
| grep -vE 'CheckAdminRole|CheckReadonly'
kernel/api/router.go:87: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:88: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:89: ... /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:90: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:188: ... /api/search/updateEmbedBlock", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:279: ... /api/sync/setSyncInterval", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:400: ... /api/graph/getGraph", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:401: ... /api/graph/getLocalGraph", model.CheckAuth, ...
Standing up the publish-mode Reader path end-to-end was not done in this audit; the source-level diff against the gated siblings and the prior advisories' fix pattern are the same evidence the maintainers accepted for GHSA-fmh9-gpqh-g53g and GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 published 2026-05-08.
Impact
A publish-mode Reader (default for any anonymous publish visitor) and a publish-mode Editor against a Editor.ReadOnly = true workspace can:
- Atomically rewrite
<workspace>/conf/conf.jsonviaConf.Save()fromsetSyncInterval,getGraph,getLocalGraph.Conf.Save()rewrites the entire file, so a Reader racing with a legitimate admin save can revert unrelated configuration changes the admin made in the same window. - Set the cloud sync interval to either bound of the
[30, 43200]clamp. 30 s pins clients to the worst-case sync hammer, draining battery and bandwidth on every connected device. 43200 s effectively pauses cloud sync for the workspace without flipping the visible "Sync enabled" toggle, increasing the chance of data divergence between devices and decreasing the likelihood that a Reader-induced state corruption is caught quickly. - Overwrite
Conf.Graph.GlobalandConf.Graph.Localwith a caller-controlled struct, breaking graph rendering for the admin (extrememaxBlocks,minRefs,nodeSize, etc.). The reset endpoints at the same path are gated behind admin role specifically because the maintainers considered graph configuration a privileged setting. - Poison the SQL
blocks.contentcolumn for any embed-block ID viaupdateEmbedBlock. Search functions that read the SQL index (fullTextSearchBlock,getEmbedBlock) return the poisoned content to other users, so a Reader can plant content other users will see. - Manipulate the recent-documents list seen by the admin via the four
updateRecentDoc*writers, including registering IDs from publish-private notebooks (information disclosure plus UI manipulation).
The fix is a one-token edit per registration: add model.CheckAdminRole and model.CheckReadonly to each affected ginServer.Handle call, mirroring the gated siblings and the patches for GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 and GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260512140701-d7b77d945e0d"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45371"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-13T15:33:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T19:16:38Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nSiYuan publish-mode Reader can mutate Conf and SQL index via 8 ungated APIs\n\n`POST /api/graph/getGraph`, `POST /api/graph/getLocalGraph`, `POST /api/sync/setSyncInterval`, `POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime`, `POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime`, `POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime`, `POST /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime`, and `POST /api/search/updateEmbedBlock` are registered with `model.CheckAuth` only, omitting both `model.CheckAdminRole` and `model.CheckReadonly`. Each of them writes server-side state, including atomic rewrites of `\u003cworkspace\u003e/conf/conf.json` via `model.Conf.Save()`. Any caller whose JWT passes `CheckAuth`, including a publish-service `RoleReader` (the role assigned to anonymous publish visitors) and a `RoleEditor` against a workspace where `Editor.ReadOnly = true`, can hit them. This is the same root-cause class as the patched `GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2` and `GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x`.\n\n### Details\n\nAffected: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan, all tags up to and including v3.6.5 (HEAD `96dfe0be`).\n\nThe router in `kernel/api/router.go` registers each endpoint below with `model.CheckAuth` only. Sibling endpoints in the same group are correctly gated, which makes the omission unambiguous:\n\n```bash\nkernel/api/router.go:87 /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:88 /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:89 /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:90 /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:188 /api/search/updateEmbedBlock CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:279 /api/sync/setSyncInterval CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:400 /api/graph/getGraph CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:401 /api/graph/getLocalGraph CheckAuth only\n\n# Compare the gated siblings on adjacent lines:\nkernel/api/router.go:278 /api/sync/setSyncEnable CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly\nkernel/api/router.go:280 /api/sync/setSyncPerception CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly\nkernel/api/router.go:281 /api/sync/setSyncGenerateConflictDoc CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly\nkernel/api/router.go:398 /api/graph/resetGraph CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly\nkernel/api/router.go:399 /api/graph/resetLocalGraph CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly\n```\n\nPer-handler evidence:\n\n`kernel/api/graph.go:53` `getGraph`. Despite the verb \"get\", the body unconditionally overwrites `model.Conf.Graph.Global` from caller-supplied JSON and persists the entire workspace `conf.json`:\n\n```\ngraphConf, err := gulu.JSON.MarshalJSON(confArg)\n...\nglobal := conf.NewGlobalGraph()\ngulu.JSON.UnmarshalJSON(graphConf, global)\nmodel.Conf.Graph.Global = global // attacker-controlled write\nmodel.Conf.Save() // atomic rewrite of conf.json\n```\n\n`kernel/api/graph.go:106` `getLocalGraph`. Same pattern on `model.Conf.Graph.Local`. Note the legitimate writers `resetGraph` (`graph.go:29`) and `resetLocalGraph` (`graph.go:41`) only set the struct to its constructor default (`NewGlobalGraph()` / `NewLocalGraph()`), whereas `getGraph` / `getLocalGraph` accept the entire struct from the caller, so the unauthorized surface is strictly larger than the gated reset endpoints.\n\n`kernel/api/sync.go:597` `setSyncInterval`. Calls `model.SetSyncInterval(int(interval))` (`kernel/model/sync.go:394`) which writes `Conf.Sync.Interval`, persists `Conf.Save()`, and reschedules the sync goroutine via `planSyncAfter`. The model layer clamps the interval to `[30, 43200]`, but a Reader can still pin sync to either bound (30 s for battery and bandwidth pressure on every connected client, or 12 h to effectively suspend cloud sync without changing the UI toggle).\n\n`kernel/api/search.go:287` `updateEmbedBlock`. Calls `model.UpdateEmbedBlock(id, content)` (`kernel/model/search.go:198`), which validates only that the block type is `BlockQueryEmbed` and then forwards to `updateEmbedBlockContent` (`kernel/model/index.go:342`). That helper rewrites the SQL `blocks` row\u0027s `content` column for the given embed-block ID via `sql.UpdateBlockContentQueue`. There is no publish-access check, so any embed block ID anywhere in the workspace is writable. The SQL `content` column is what `fullTextSearchBlock` and `getEmbedBlock` read from, so a Reader can poison search results visible to other users.\n\n`kernel/api/storage.go:251,295,273,317` `updateRecentDocViewTime` / `updateRecentDocCloseTime` / `updateRecentDocOpenTime` / `batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime`. Each rewrites the workspace recent-docs JSON file under `recentDocLock` (`kernel/model/storage.go:171,213` ...). A Reader can register any `rootID` (including IDs in publish-private notebooks) into the recent-docs list, manipulating the admin\u0027s recently-opened-documents UI and history.\n\nThe bugs have all existed since v3.6.5 (the active release tag) and the live `master` branch. Two adjacent advisories already patched the exact same shape: `GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2` (`getTag` writing `Conf.Tag.Sort`) and `GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x` (`renderSprig` missing `CheckAdminRole + CheckReadonly`). Both are listed by the maintainers as occurrences \"the same root-cause class\" that has to be patched per-occurrence, so this report enumerates the remaining occurrences in one pass.\n\n### PoC\n\nSource-level reproduction. The same Docker compose lab the maintainers used for `GHSA-6r88` works here:\n\n```bash\n# 1. Authenticate as any role with CheckAuth (admin used here for convenience;\n# a publish-mode Reader JWT works equivalently).\ncurl -s -c /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/loginAuth \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"authCode\":\"audittest\"}\u0027 \u003e/dev/null\n\n# 2. Read current Conf.Sync.Interval and Conf.Graph.Global from /api/system/getConf.\ncurl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{}\u0027 \\\n | python3 -c \"import json,sys;c=json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027data\u0027][\u0027conf\u0027];\\\nprint(\u0027Conf.Sync.Interval BEFORE =\u0027,c[\u0027sync\u0027][\u0027interval\u0027]);\\\nprint(\u0027Conf.Graph.Global.minRefs BEFORE =\u0027,c[\u0027graph\u0027][\u0027global\u0027][\u0027minRefs\u0027])\"\n\n# 3. setSyncInterval as Reader.\ncurl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/sync/setSyncInterval \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"interval\":30}\u0027\n\n# 4. getGraph as Reader, supplying a custom graph config struct.\ncurl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/graph/getGraph \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"k\":\"\",\"conf\":{\"minRefs\":99,\"maxBlocks\":1,\"d3\":{\"linkWidth\":99}}}\u0027\n\n# 5. Confirm in-memory and on-disk persistence.\ncurl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{}\u0027 \\\n | python3 -c \"import json,sys;c=json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027data\u0027][\u0027conf\u0027];\\\nprint(\u0027Conf.Sync.Interval AFTER =\u0027,c[\u0027sync\u0027][\u0027interval\u0027]);\\\nprint(\u0027Conf.Graph.Global.minRefs AFTER =\u0027,c[\u0027graph\u0027][\u0027global\u0027][\u0027minRefs\u0027])\"\n\ndocker exec siyuan-audit grep -oE \u0027\\\"interval\\\":[0-9]+\u0027 /siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json\ndocker exec siyuan-audit grep -oE \u0027\\\"minRefs\\\":[0-9]+\u0027 /siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json\n\n# 6. updateEmbedBlock - rewrite SQL content for any embed block ID.\ncurl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/search/updateEmbedBlock \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"id\":\"\u003cembed-block-id\u003e\",\"content\":\"poisoned\"}\u0027\n```\n\nSource-level proof, no privileged token involved:\n\n```bash\n$ grep -nE \u0027ginServer\\.Handle.*(getGraph|getLocalGraph|setSyncInterval|updateEmbedBlock|updateRecentDoc|batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime)\u0027 \\\n kernel/api/router.go \\\n | grep -vE \u0027CheckAdminRole|CheckReadonly\u0027\nkernel/api/router.go:87: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:88: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:89: ... /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:90: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:188: ... /api/search/updateEmbedBlock\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:279: ... /api/sync/setSyncInterval\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:400: ... /api/graph/getGraph\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:401: ... /api/graph/getLocalGraph\", model.CheckAuth, ...\n```\n\nStanding up the publish-mode Reader path end-to-end was not done in this audit; the source-level diff against the gated siblings and the prior advisories\u0027 fix pattern are the same evidence the maintainers accepted for `GHSA-fmh9-gpqh-g53g` and `GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2` published 2026-05-08.\n\n### Impact\n\nA publish-mode Reader (default for any anonymous publish visitor) and a publish-mode Editor against a `Editor.ReadOnly = true` workspace can:\n\n1. Atomically rewrite `\u003cworkspace\u003e/conf/conf.json` via `Conf.Save()` from `setSyncInterval`, `getGraph`, `getLocalGraph`. `Conf.Save()` rewrites the entire file, so a Reader racing with a legitimate admin save can revert unrelated configuration changes the admin made in the same window.\n2. Set the cloud sync interval to either bound of the `[30, 43200]` clamp. 30 s pins clients to the worst-case sync hammer, draining battery and bandwidth on every connected device. 43200 s effectively pauses cloud sync for the workspace without flipping the visible \"Sync enabled\" toggle, increasing the chance of data divergence between devices and decreasing the likelihood that a Reader-induced state corruption is caught quickly.\n3. Overwrite `Conf.Graph.Global` and `Conf.Graph.Local` with a caller-controlled struct, breaking graph rendering for the admin (extreme `maxBlocks`, `minRefs`, `nodeSize`, etc.). The reset endpoints at the same path are gated behind admin role specifically because the maintainers considered graph configuration a privileged setting.\n4. Poison the SQL `blocks.content` column for any embed-block ID via `updateEmbedBlock`. Search functions that read the SQL index (`fullTextSearchBlock`, `getEmbedBlock`) return the poisoned content to other users, so a Reader can plant content other users will see.\n5. Manipulate the recent-documents list seen by the admin via the four `updateRecentDoc*` writers, including registering IDs from publish-private notebooks (information disclosure plus UI manipulation).\n\nThe fix is a one-token edit per registration: add `model.CheckAdminRole` and `model.CheckReadonly` to each affected `ginServer.Handle` call, mirroring the gated siblings and the patches for `GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2` and `GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x`.",
"id": "GHSA-gmmv-4cc5-wr9r",
"modified": "2026-05-15T23:45:43Z",
"published": "2026-05-13T15:33:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-gmmv-4cc5-wr9r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45371"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan publish-mode Reader can mutate Conf and SQL index via 8 ungated APIs"
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that you perform access control checks related to your business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that you apply to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor.
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.
CAPEC-104: Cross Zone Scripting
An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security.
CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing
An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.
CAPEC-39: Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens
In circumstances where an application holds important data client-side in tokens (cookies, URLs, data files, and so forth) that data can be manipulated. If client or server-side application components reinterpret that data as authentication tokens or data (such as store item pricing or wallet information) then even opaquely manipulating that data may bear fruit for an Attacker. In this pattern an attacker undermines the assumption that client side tokens have been adequately protected from tampering through use of encryption or obfuscation.
CAPEC-402: Bypassing ATA Password Security
An adversary exploits a weakness in ATA security on a drive to gain access to the information the drive contains without supplying the proper credentials. ATA Security is often employed to protect hard disk information from unauthorized access. The mechanism requires the user to type in a password before the BIOS is allowed access to drive contents. Some implementations of ATA security will accept the ATA command to update the password without the user having authenticated with the BIOS. This occurs because the security mechanism assumes the user has first authenticated via the BIOS prior to sending commands to the drive. Various methods exist for exploiting this flaw, the most common being installing the ATA protected drive into a system lacking ATA security features (a.k.a. hot swapping). Once the drive is installed into the new system the BIOS can be used to reset the drive password.
CAPEC-45: Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links
This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer overflows. An adversary can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link file such that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target software processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow internal buffers with insufficient bounds checking.
CAPEC-5: Blue Boxing
This type of attack against older telephone switches and trunks has been around for decades. A tone is sent by an adversary to impersonate a supervisor signal which has the effect of rerouting or usurping command of the line. While the US infrastructure proper may not contain widespread vulnerabilities to this type of attack, many companies are connected globally through call centers and business process outsourcing. These international systems may be operated in countries which have not upgraded Telco infrastructure and so are vulnerable to Blue boxing. Blue boxing is a result of failure on the part of the system to enforce strong authorization for administrative functions. While the infrastructure is different than standard current applications like web applications, there are historical lessons to be learned to upgrade the access control for administrative functions.
{'xhtml:b': 'This attack pattern is included in CAPEC for historical purposes.'}
CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry
SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-647: Collect Data from Registries
An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization to gather system-specific data and sensitive information within a registry (e.g., Windows Registry, Mac plist). These contain information about the system configuration, software, operating system, and security. The adversary can leverage information gathered in order to carry out further attacks.
CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)
An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-77: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables
This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.
CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing
An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.