CWE-280
AllowedImproper Handling of Insufficient Permissions or Privileges
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product does not handle or incorrectly handles when it has insufficient privileges to access resources or functionality as specified by their permissions. This may cause it to follow unexpected code paths that may leave the product in an invalid state.
276 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-C4MR-889M-VGF6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 20:19 – Updated: 2026-06-08 19:55Impact
A CMS user without the ability to edit a page could still access the history report for the page, potentially resulting in disclosure of sensitive information.
Patches
Patched versions have been released as Wagtail 7.0.7 and 7.3.2. The new 7.4 LTS feature release also incorporates this fix.
Workarounds
No workaround is available.
Acknowledgements
Wagtail thanks Seoyoung Kang @seoyoung-kang who is from AhnLab and also an independent security researcher for reporting this issue.
For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Visit Wagtail's support channels
- Send an email to security@wagtail.org (view the security policy for more information).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "wagtail"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.0.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "wagtail"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.1"
},
{
"fixed": "7.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44198"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-280"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-08T20:19:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T16:17:35Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nA CMS user without the ability to edit a page could still access the history report for the page, potentially resulting in disclosure of sensitive information.\n\n### Patches\nPatched versions have been released as Wagtail 7.0.7 and 7.3.2. The new 7.4 LTS feature release also incorporates this fix.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround is available.\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nWagtail thanks Seoyoung Kang @seoyoung-kang who is from AhnLab and also an independent security researcher for reporting this issue.\n\n### For more information\nIf there are any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n* Visit Wagtail\u0027s [support channels](https://docs.wagtail.org/en/stable/support.html)\n* Send an email to [security@wagtail.org](mailto:security@wagtail.org) (view the [security policy](https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail/security/policy) for more information).",
"id": "GHSA-c4mr-889m-vgf6",
"modified": "2026-06-08T19:55:31Z",
"published": "2026-05-08T20:19:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail/security/advisories/GHSA-c4mr-889m-vgf6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44198"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/wagtail/PYSEC-2026-147.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Wagtail has improper permission handling when viewing page history"
}
GHSA-C6WJ-9VCJ-75PJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 20:17 – Updated: 2026-06-08 19:53Impact
A CMS user without the ability to edit a page could access revisions of the page through the revision compare view if they knew the primary key of two revisions. This could potentially result in disclosure of sensitive information.
Patches
Patched versions have been released as Wagtail 7.0.7 and 7.3.2. The new 7.4 LTS feature release also incorporates this fix.
Workarounds
No workaround is available.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Seoyoung Kang @seoyoung-kang from AhnLab and an independent security researcher for reporting this issue.
For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Visit Wagtail's support channels
- Send an email to security@wagtail.org (view the security policy for more information).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "wagtail"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.0.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "wagtail"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.1"
},
{
"fixed": "7.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44197"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-280"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-08T20:17:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T16:17:34Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nA CMS user without the ability to edit a page could access revisions of the page through the revision compare view if they knew the primary key of two revisions. This could potentially result in disclosure of sensitive information.\n\n### Patches\n\nPatched versions have been released as Wagtail 7.0.7 and 7.3.2. The new 7.4 LTS feature release also incorporates this fix.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround is available.\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nMany thanks to Seoyoung Kang @seoyoung-kang from AhnLab and an independent security researcher for reporting this issue.\n\n### For more information\nIf there are any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n* Visit Wagtail\u0027s [support channels](https://docs.wagtail.org/en/stable/support.html)\n* Send an email to [security@wagtail.org](mailto:security@wagtail.org) (view the [security policy](https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail/security/policy) for more information).",
"id": "GHSA-c6wj-9vcj-75pj",
"modified": "2026-06-08T19:53:10Z",
"published": "2026-05-08T20:17:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail/security/advisories/GHSA-c6wj-9vcj-75pj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44197"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/wagtail/PYSEC-2026-146.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Wagtail has improper permission handling when comparing revisions"
}
GHSA-C8P4-5648-86R9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-17 18:30 – Updated: 2025-11-17 21:31Software installed and run as a non-privileged user may conduct improper GPU system calls to gain write permissions to memory buffers exported as read-only.
This is caused by improper handling of the memory protections for the buffer resource.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-58410"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-280"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-17T17:15:48Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Software installed and run as a non-privileged user may conduct improper GPU system calls to gain write permissions to memory buffers exported as read-only.\n\nThis is caused by improper handling of the memory protections for the buffer resource.",
"id": "GHSA-c8p4-5648-86r9",
"modified": "2025-11-17T21:31:23Z",
"published": "2025-11-17T18:30:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58410"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.imaginationtech.com/gpu-driver-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CR9C-4PG9-32J3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-17 18:33 – Updated: 2024-12-17 18:33An improper handling of insufficient permissions or privileges affects HCL BigFix Inventory. An attacker having access via a read-only account can possibly change certain configuration parameters by crafting a specific REST API call.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-42194"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-280"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-17T18:15:23Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "An improper handling of insufficient permissions or privileges affects HCL BigFix Inventory. An attacker having access via a read-only account can possibly change certain configuration parameters by crafting a specific REST API call.",
"id": "GHSA-cr9c-4pg9-32j3",
"modified": "2024-12-17T18:33:50Z",
"published": "2024-12-17T18:33:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42194"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://https://support.hcl-software.com/csm?id=kb_article\u0026sysparm_article=KB0118212"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CWWG-GRJW-CMP5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-20 15:32 – Updated: 2024-08-03 21:30An issue was discovered in Elspec G5 digital fault recorder versions 1.1.4.15 and before. The SQLite database file has weak permissions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-22077"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-280"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-20T05:15:45Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Elspec G5 digital fault recorder versions 1.1.4.15 and before. The SQLite database file has weak permissions.",
"id": "GHSA-cwwg-grjw-cmp5",
"modified": "2024-08-03T21:30:33Z",
"published": "2024-03-20T15:32:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-22077"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.elspec-ltd.com/support/security-advisories"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F553-27VH-GF4H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-02 12:32 – Updated: 2025-07-02 12:32The target device exposes a service on a specific TCP port with a configured endpoint. The access to that endpoint is granted using a Basic Authentication method. The endpoint accepts also the PUT method and it is possible to write files on the target device file system. Files are written as root. Using Postman it is possible to perform a Directory Traversal attack and write files into any location of the device file system. Similarly to the PUT method, it is possible to leverage the same mechanism to read any file from the file system by using the GET method.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-27025"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-280"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-02T10:15:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The target device exposes a service on a specific TCP port with a configured\n endpoint. The access to that endpoint is granted using a Basic Authentication\n method. The endpoint accepts also the PUT method and it is possible to \nwrite files on the target device file system. Files are written as root.\n Using Postman it is possible to perform a Directory Traversal attack \nand write files into any location of the device file system. Similarly to the PUT method, it is possible to leverage the \nsame mechanism to read any file from the file system by using the GET \nmethod.",
"id": "GHSA-f553-27vh-gf4h",
"modified": "2025-07-02T12:32:12Z",
"published": "2025-07-02T12:32:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27025"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/CVE-2025-27025"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cvcn.gov.it/cvcn/cve/CVE-2025-27025"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FJ8V-HJWV-QM88
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-21 20:40 – Updated: 2026-07-21 20:40Summary
GetActionsUserRepoPermission (models/perm/access/repo_permission.go) decides whether an Actions
task token may access a target repo. Its cross-repo branches each enforce a fork-PR discriminator —
except the collaborative-owner branch, which is missing the !task.IsForkPullRequest guard that
its sibling has. As a result, when a private repo B lists owner A as a collaborative owner, an
attacker-controlled fork pull-request workflow whose base repo is owned by A is granted code-read
on B — i.e. the fork's YAML can clone a third private repository it has no rights to.
Details
// models/perm/access/repo_permission.go (v1.26.2), in GetActionsUserRepoPermission
if checkSameOwnerCrossRepoAccess(ctx, taskRepo, repo, task.IsForkPullRequest) { // passes isForkPR -> denies forks
return maxPerm, nil
}
...
if taskRepo.IsPrivate { // <-- NO IsForkPullRequest check here
actionsUnit := repo.MustGetUnit(ctx, unit.TypeActions)
if actionsUnit.ActionsConfig().IsCollaborativeOwner(taskRepo.OwnerID) {
return maxPerm, nil // grants code-read to target repo B
}
}
The sibling same-owner path correctly denies fork PRs:
func checkSameOwnerCrossRepoAccess(ctx, taskRepo, targetRepo, isForkPR bool) bool {
if isForkPR {
return false // Fork PRs are never allowed cross-repo access to other private repositories.
}
...
}
taskRepo = the repo whose workflow is running (the PR's base repo A); repo = the target being
cloned (B). IsCollaborativeOwner(taskRepo.OwnerID) asks "does target B's Actions config trust A's
owner for cross-repo read?" When B trusts ownerA, the branch returns maxPerm (code-read) even when
task.IsForkPullRequest is true — i.e. when the executing YAML is the fork's, not A's.
Every sibling enforces the fork-PR discriminator; except for this branch:
checkSameOwnerCrossRepoAccess denies forks; ComputeTaskTokenPermissions
(models/actions/token_permissions.go) only clamps the token ceiling to read-only for fork/cross-repo
(its own comment notes the access decision is in GetActionsUserRepoPermission, so it does not
neutralize the gap — it just makes the leak read-only); secrets (models/secret/secret.go) and the
approval gate (services/actions/notifier_helper.go) both correctly key on IsForkPullRequest.
Reachability — the runner clones target repo B over git-HTTP with the task token:
routers/web/repo/githttp.go → GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, repoB, ActionsUser) →
GetActionsUserRepoPermission(ctx, repoB, actionsUser, taskID) with IsForkPullRequest == true →
collaborative-owner branch returns code-read → p.CanAccess(Read, code) passes → private clone of B
succeeds. (CheckRepoScopedToken in githttp is a no-op for the Actions token.)
PoC
Setup: private base repo A (usera/repoA), private third repo
B (userb/repoB) with a planted SECRET.txt, B's Actions config trusting usera as a collaborative
owner, and a genuine running fork-PR task token (token_hash computed with Gitea's own HashToken)
presented as HTTP Basic. Requesting GET /userb/repoB.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack:
| Condition (same fork-PR token) | HTTP | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| anonymous (no token) | 401 | auth required |
| token, A public, B trusts A | 404 | branch gated on taskRepo.IsPrivate ⇒ A public skips it |
| token, A private, B has no collab-owner config | 404 | no trust ⇒ denied |
| token, A private, B trusts A (collab-owner) | 200 | git clone of private B succeeds |
| config removed / restored | 404 / 200 | deterministic |
In the 200 case, git clone of private repo B succeeded and yielded its SECRET.txt — the full source
of a third private repo the fork-PR author has no rights to.
Impact
Read-only confidentiality breach: discloses the full source of a third private repository (B) to an untrusted external fork-PR author. Read-only, not write/RCE.
Preconditions (honest):
1. B is deliberately configured with a collaborative owner — but that is exactly the feature's intended
use, so realistic for any deployment using it.
2. The fork PR's base repo A is itself private (the branch is gated on taskRepo.IsPrivate). Forking a
private A already requires read on A, so this is a normal internal-contributor situation, not a
weakening — the escalation is "read A (granted) → read a different private repo B (never granted)."
3. The fork-PR workflow must actually run — most realistically via an attacker who had one earlier PR
approved (the "approved before" path in ifNeedApproval), after which fork PRs auto-run.
Suggested remediation
Add the same fork-PR guard the sibling path has (one line):
if taskRepo.IsPrivate && !task.IsForkPullRequest {
actionsUnit := repo.MustGetUnit(ctx, unit.TypeActions)
if actionsUnit.ActionsConfig().IsCollaborativeOwner(taskRepo.OwnerID) {
return maxPerm, nil
}
}
This flips Vuln_ForkPR_LeaksThirdPrivateRepo to PASS, keeps Control_NonFork_Allowed PASS
(legitimate collaborative-owner sharing still works), and leaves the existing
TestGetActionsUserRepoPermission suite all green.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "gitea.dev"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.27.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-58416"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-280",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T20:40:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`GetActionsUserRepoPermission` (`models/perm/access/repo_permission.go`) decides whether an Actions\ntask token may access a target repo. Its cross-repo branches each enforce a fork-PR discriminator \u2014\n**except the collaborative-owner branch**, which is missing the `!task.IsForkPullRequest` guard that\nits sibling has. As a result, when a private repo **B** lists owner **A** as a collaborative owner, an\n**attacker-controlled fork pull-request** workflow whose base repo is owned by A is granted code-read\non B \u2014 i.e. the fork\u0027s YAML can clone a third private repository it has no rights to.\n\n### Details\n\n```go\n// models/perm/access/repo_permission.go (v1.26.2), in GetActionsUserRepoPermission\nif checkSameOwnerCrossRepoAccess(ctx, taskRepo, repo, task.IsForkPullRequest) { // passes isForkPR -\u003e denies forks\n return maxPerm, nil\n}\n...\nif taskRepo.IsPrivate { // \u003c-- NO IsForkPullRequest check here\n actionsUnit := repo.MustGetUnit(ctx, unit.TypeActions)\n if actionsUnit.ActionsConfig().IsCollaborativeOwner(taskRepo.OwnerID) {\n return maxPerm, nil // grants code-read to target repo B\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe sibling same-owner path correctly denies fork PRs:\n\n```go\nfunc checkSameOwnerCrossRepoAccess(ctx, taskRepo, targetRepo, isForkPR bool) bool {\n if isForkPR {\n return false // Fork PRs are never allowed cross-repo access to other private repositories.\n }\n ...\n}\n```\n\n`taskRepo` = the repo whose workflow is running (the PR\u0027s base repo A); `repo` = the target being\ncloned (B). `IsCollaborativeOwner(taskRepo.OwnerID)` asks \"does target B\u0027s Actions config trust A\u0027s\nowner for cross-repo read?\" When B trusts ownerA, the branch returns `maxPerm` (code-read) **even when\n`task.IsForkPullRequest` is true** \u2014 i.e. when the executing YAML is the fork\u0027s, not A\u0027s.\n\nEvery sibling enforces the fork-PR discriminator; except for this branch:\n`checkSameOwnerCrossRepoAccess` denies forks; `ComputeTaskTokenPermissions`\n(`models/actions/token_permissions.go`) only clamps the token *ceiling* to read-only for fork/cross-repo\n(its own comment notes the access *decision* is in `GetActionsUserRepoPermission`, so it does not\nneutralize the gap \u2014 it just makes the leak read-only); secrets (`models/secret/secret.go`) and the\napproval gate (`services/actions/notifier_helper.go`) both correctly key on `IsForkPullRequest`.\n\n**Reachability** \u2014 the runner clones target repo B over git-HTTP with the task token:\n`routers/web/repo/githttp.go` \u2192 `GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, repoB, ActionsUser)` \u2192\n`GetActionsUserRepoPermission(ctx, repoB, actionsUser, taskID)` with `IsForkPullRequest == true` \u2192\ncollaborative-owner branch returns code-read \u2192 `p.CanAccess(Read, code)` passes \u2192 private clone of B\nsucceeds. (`CheckRepoScopedToken` in githttp is a no-op for the Actions token.)\n\n### PoC\n\nSetup: private base repo A (`usera/repoA`), private third repo\nB (`userb/repoB`) with a planted `SECRET.txt`, B\u0027s Actions config trusting `usera` as a collaborative\nowner, and a genuine running fork-PR task token (`token_hash` computed with Gitea\u0027s own `HashToken`)\npresented as HTTP Basic. Requesting `GET /userb/repoB.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack`:\n\n| Condition (same fork-PR token) | HTTP | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| anonymous (no token) | 401 | auth required |\n| token, A **public**, B trusts A | 404 | branch gated on `taskRepo.IsPrivate` \u21d2 A public skips it |\n| token, A private, B has **no** collab-owner config | 404 | no trust \u21d2 denied |\n| **token, A private, B trusts A (collab-owner)** | **200** | **`git clone` of private B succeeds** |\n| config removed / restored | 404 / 200 | deterministic |\n\nIn the 200 case, `git clone` of private repo B succeeded and yielded its `SECRET.txt` \u2014 the full source\nof a third private repo the fork-PR author has no rights to.\n\n### Impact\n\nRead-only confidentiality breach: discloses the full source of a *third* private repository (B) to an\nuntrusted external fork-PR author. Read-only, not write/RCE.\n\nPreconditions (honest):\n1. B is deliberately configured with a collaborative owner \u2014 but that is exactly the feature\u0027s intended\n use, so realistic for any deployment using it.\n2. The fork PR\u0027s base repo A is itself private (the branch is gated on `taskRepo.IsPrivate`). Forking a\n private A already requires read on A, so this is a normal internal-contributor situation, not a\n weakening \u2014 the escalation is \"read A (granted) \u2192 read a *different* private repo B (never granted).\"\n3. The fork-PR workflow must actually run \u2014 most realistically via an attacker who had one earlier PR\n approved (the \"approved before\" path in `ifNeedApproval`), after which fork PRs auto-run.\n\n### Suggested remediation\n\nAdd the same fork-PR guard the sibling path has (one line):\n\n```go\nif taskRepo.IsPrivate \u0026\u0026 !task.IsForkPullRequest {\n actionsUnit := repo.MustGetUnit(ctx, unit.TypeActions)\n if actionsUnit.ActionsConfig().IsCollaborativeOwner(taskRepo.OwnerID) {\n return maxPerm, nil\n }\n}\n```\n\nThis flips `Vuln_ForkPR_LeaksThirdPrivateRepo` to PASS, keeps `Control_NonFork_Allowed` PASS\n(legitimate collaborative-owner sharing still works), and leaves the existing\n`TestGetActionsUserRepoPermission` suite all green.",
"id": "GHSA-fj8v-hjwv-qm88",
"modified": "2026-07-21T20:40:03Z",
"published": "2026-07-21T20:40:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-fj8v-hjwv-qm88"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38214"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/1d43b736b5a16c5f80cfdcd9a9448a9c983ddaa0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Gitea: Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard)"
}
GHSA-G5HP-GQMX-38HJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-08 09:33 – Updated: 2024-06-08 09:33The Salon booking system plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access and modification of data due to a missing capability check on several functions hooked into admin_init in all versions up to, and including, 9.9. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with subscriber access or higher to modify plugin settings and view discount codes intended for other users.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-4468"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-280",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-08T08:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Salon booking system plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access and modification of data due to a missing capability check on several functions hooked into admin_init in all versions up to, and including, 9.9. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with subscriber access or higher to modify plugin settings and view discount codes intended for other users.",
"id": "GHSA-g5hp-gqmx-38hj",
"modified": "2024-06-08T09:33:26Z",
"published": "2024-06-08T09:33:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4468"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/salon-booking-system/trunk/src/SLB_Discount/Admin/ExportDiscountsCsv.php#L10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/salon-booking-system/trunk/src/SLB_Discount/Admin/ExportDiscountsCsv.php#L16"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/salon-booking-system/trunk/src/SLB_Discount/Admin/ExportDiscountsCsv.php#L7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/salon-booking-system/trunk/src/SLN/Admin/Tools.php#L12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/salon-booking-system/trunk/src/SLN/Admin/Tools.php#L16"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/salon-booking-system/trunk/src/SLN/Admin/Tools.php#L231"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3098413/salon-booking-system/trunk/src/SLB_Discount/Admin/ExportDiscountsCsv.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3098413/salon-booking-system/trunk/src/SLN/Admin/Tools.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/8b73f864-68b5-4ba8-93a3-37f2564cc240?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G6JF-R72Q-JG8C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-17 15:31 – Updated: 2024-10-17 15:31Dell SupportAssist for Business PCs version 3.4.0 contains a local Authentication Bypass vulnerability that allows locally authenticated non-admin users to gain temporary privilege within the SupportAssist User Interface on their respective PC. The Run as Admin temporary privilege feature enables IT/System Administrators to perform driver scans and Dell-recommended driver installations without requiring them to log out of the local non-admin user session. However, the granted privilege is limited solely to the SupportAssist User Interface and automatically expires after 15 minutes.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-39249"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-280"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-14T08:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "\nDell SupportAssist for Business PCs version 3.4.0 contains a local Authentication Bypass vulnerability that allows locally authenticated non-admin users to gain temporary privilege within the SupportAssist User Interface on their respective PC. The Run as Admin temporary privilege feature enables IT/System Administrators to perform driver scans and Dell-recommended driver installations without requiring them to log out of the local non-admin user session. However, the granted privilege is limited solely to the SupportAssist User Interface and automatically expires after 15 minutes.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-g6jf-r72q-jg8c",
"modified": "2024-10-17T15:31:07Z",
"published": "2024-10-17T15:31:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-39249"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000216574/security-update-for-dell-supportassist-for-business-pcs-vulnerability"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G76J-4CXX-23H9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-20 00:00 – Updated: 2022-06-20 22:48Vulnerability in the MySQL Connectors product of Oracle MySQL (component: Connector/J). Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.27 and prior. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Connectors. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of MySQL Connectors. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.6 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.0.27"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "mysql:mysql-connector-java"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.28"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-21363"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-280"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-06-20T22:48:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-01-19T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the MySQL Connectors product of Oracle MySQL (component: Connector/J). Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.27 and prior. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Connectors. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of MySQL Connectors. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.6 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).",
"id": "GHSA-g76j-4cxx-23h9",
"modified": "2022-06-20T22:48:44Z",
"published": "2022-01-20T00:00:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-21363"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2022.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Improper Handling of Insufficient Permissions or Privileges in MySQL Connectors Java"
}
Mitigation MIT-46
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
- Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
Mitigation
Always check to see if you have successfully accessed a resource or system functionality, and use proper error handling if it is unsuccessful. Do this even when you are operating in a highly privileged mode, because errors or environmental conditions might still cause a failure. For example, environments with highly granular permissions/privilege models, such as Windows or Linux capabilities, can cause unexpected failures.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.