Andrea Leopardi

Mint HTTP/2 client buffers oversized frames up to 16 MiB before enforcing max_frame_size

HPACK-indexed cookie fields in Mint HTTP/2 responses bypass max_header_list_size and exhaust client memory

Unvalidated chunk-size line tail in Mint HTTP/1 client enables response smuggling against strict intermediaries on pooled connections

Quadratic chunk-size parsing in Mint.HTTP1.Parse allows CPU-exhaustion DoS

Unbounded HTTP/1 status-line and chunk-extension buffering in Mint causes memory-exhaustion DoS

Sign-tolerant HTTP/1 chunk-size parser in Mint enables response smuggling against strict intermediaries on pooled connections

Zero-length HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames bypass Mint's header-block byte-size cap and exhaust client memory

Unbounded HTTP/1 response-header and chunked-trailer accumulation in Mint causes memory-exhaustion DoS

mint buffers an entire chunked response chunk in memory in Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5

Unauthenticated denial-of-service via unbounded HPACK integer decoding in hpax