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A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation-controller. The host_filter query parameter on the hosts list API is parsed into a raw Django ORM filter whose lookup path is validated only against a sensitive-field blocklist, with no authorization check on the database relations it traverses. Because job event and ad-hoc command output fields are not on that blocklist, an authenticated user holding only the Read role on an inventory can construct filters that traverse into the output of jobs they have no permission to view and use the returned host count as a boolean oracle. Using regular-expression lookups, the attacker can extract, character by character, the output (which routinely contains plaintext credentials, tokens, and command results) of jobs and ad-hoc commands belonging to other organizations, resulting in cross-tenant disclosure of job output

A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation-controller. The host_filter query parameter on the hosts list API is parsed into a raw Django ORM filter whose lookup path is validated only against a sensitive-field blocklist, with no authorization check on the database relations it traverses. Because job event and ad-hoc command output fields are not on that blocklist, an authenticated user holding only the Read role on an inventory can construct filters that traverse into the output of jobs they have no permission to view and use the returned host count as a boolean oracle. Using regular-expression lookups, the attacker can extract, character by character, the output (which routinely contains plaintext credentials, tokens, and command results) of jobs and ad-hoc commands belonging to other organizations, resulting in cross-tenant disclosure of job output

A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation-controller. The host_filter query parameter on the hosts list API is parsed into a raw Django ORM filter whose lookup path is validated only against a sensitive-field blocklist, with no authorization check on the database relations it traverses. Because job event and ad-hoc command output fields are not on that blocklist, an authenticated user holding only the Read role on an inventory can construct filters that traverse into the output of jobs they have no permission to view and use the returned host count as a boolean oracle. Using regular-expression lookups, the attacker can extract, character by character, the output (which routinely contains plaintext credentials, tokens, and command results) of jobs and ad-hoc commands belonging to other organizations, resulting in cross-tenant disclosure of job output

A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation-controller. The host_filter query parameter on the hosts list API is parsed into a raw Django ORM filter whose lookup path is validated only against a sensitive-field blocklist, with no authorization check on the database relations it traverses. Because job event and ad-hoc command output fields are not on that blocklist, an authenticated user holding only the Read role on an inventory can construct filters that traverse into the output of jobs they have no permission to view and use the returned host count as a boolean oracle. Using regular-expression lookups, the attacker can extract, character by character, the output (which routinely contains plaintext credentials, tokens, and command results) of jobs and ad-hoc commands belonging to other organizations, resulting in cross-tenant disclosure of job output