CWE-354

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-22442"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-354"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-08-02T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "There is an Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value Vulnerability in Huawei Smartphone.Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause the system to reset.",
  "id": "GHSA-q36w-wxgm-w8f4",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:09:32Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:09:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22442"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2021/6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "pnpm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "11.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "11.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "pnpm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.34.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50021"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-354"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T22:53:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T18:16:39Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\npnpm\u0027s tarball extraction worker skips integrity verification when the `integrity` field is absent from the lockfile resolution. If an attacker can both modify `pnpm-lock.yaml` to remove the `integrity:` field and cause the referenced registry URL to serve altered package content, `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` can install the altered package without an integrity error. npm\u0027s `npm ci` enforces integrity by default; pnpm\u0027s behavior of silently skipping verification is a pnpm-specific fail-open gap.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\nThe `addTarballToStore` function in `worker/src/start.ts` (lines 189-204) checks `if (integrity)` before verifying the tarball hash. The `TarballResolution` type declares `integrity` as optional (`integrity?: string`). When the lockfile omits the `integrity` field, the guard evaluates to `false`, skipping hash verification entirely. The worker then computes a new hash from the unverified content and stores it as legitimate.\n\n```typescript\n// worker/src/start.ts:189-204\nfunction addTarballToStore ({ buffer, storeDir, integrity, ... }: TarballExtractMessage) {\n  if (integrity) {           // false when integrity is undefined\n    const { algorithm, hexDigest } = parseIntegrity(integrity)\n    const calculatedHash = crypto.hash(algorithm, buffer, \u0027hex\u0027)\n    if (calculatedHash !== hexDigest) {\n      return { status: \u0027error\u0027, error: { type: \u0027integrity_validation_failed\u0027, ... } }\n    }\n  }\n  return {\n    status: \u0027success\u0027,\n    value: { integrity: integrity ?? calcIntegrity(buffer) },\n  }\n}\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\nbash autofyn_audit/exploits/vuln1_integrity_bypass/exploit.sh\n# Publishes a package, generates lockfile, republishes tampered version,\n# strips integrity field, re-runs install --frozen-lockfile.\n# Result: PASS -- tampered package installed without integrity error.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nSupply chain compromise in environments where an attacker can both alter the lockfile and cause the referenced registry URL to serve altered package content. The `--frozen-lockfile` flag does not fail closed when the integrity field is missing.\n\n## Suggested Remediation\n\nRequire an `integrity` field for remote tarball resolutions. Change the `if (integrity)` guard to fail when integrity is absent for non-local packages. When `--frozen-lockfile` is active, reject lockfile entries that lack integrity for remote packages.\n\n---\n\n\u003e Discovered by [AutoFyn](https://github.com/SignalPilot-Labs/AutoFyn)\n\u003e Full audit report: [audit_report.md](https://github.com/tempcollab/pnpm/blob/main/autofyn_audit/audit_report.md)\n\u003e Exploit script: [exploit.sh](https://github.com/tempcollab/pnpm/blob/main/autofyn_audit/exploits/vuln1_integrity_bypass/exploit.sh)",
  "id": "GHSA-q6j5-fjx5-2mc3",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T22:53:01Z",
  "published": "2026-06-26T22:53:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-q6j5-fjx5-2mc3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50021"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pnpm Has an Integrity Check Bypass via Missing Lockfile Integrity Field"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-13496"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-354"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-11-04T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "One Identity Cloud Access Manager before 8.1.4 Hotfix 1 allows OTP bypass via vectors involving a man in the middle, the One Identity Defender product, and replacing a failed SAML response with a successful SAML response.",
  "id": "GHSA-q8jc-hpcv-jmxw",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T02:37:58Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:00:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-13496"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FurqanKhan1/CVE-2019-13496"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.oneidentity.com/cloud-access-manager/kb/311391/cloud-access-manager-8-1-4-hotfix-1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-1879"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-354"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-03-20T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "There is an improper integrity checking vulnerability on some huawei products. The software of the affected product has an improper integrity check which may allow an attacker with high privilege to make malicious modifications.Affected product versions include:HEGE-560 versions 1.0.1.21(SP3);HEGE-570 versions 1.0.1.22(SP3);OSCA-550 versions 1.0.1.21(SP3);OSCA-550A versions 1.0.1.21(SP3);OSCA-550AX versions 1.0.1.21(SP3);OSCA-550X versions 1.0.1.21(SP3).",
  "id": "GHSA-qm3c-x5c3-g2g4",
  "modified": "2023-02-03T21:30:30Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:12:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1879"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-advisories/huawei-sa-20200311-01-integrity-en"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-advisories/huawei-sa-20200415-02-dos-en"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-38956"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-354"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-09-20T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An exploitable firmware downgrade vulnerability was discovered on the Netgear WPN824EXT WiFi Range Extender. An attacker can conduct a MITM attack to replace the user-uploaded firmware image with an original old firmware image. This affects Firmware 1.1.1_1.1.9 and earlier.",
  "id": "GHSA-qrm9-295f-xg65",
  "modified": "2025-05-28T18:32:59Z",
  "published": "2022-09-21T00:00:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-38956"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackmd.io/%40eupX2KdkT6iNpqJUWk9p4A/SyAnOSd1s"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackmd.io/@eupX2KdkT6iNpqJUWk9p4A/SyAnOSd1s"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.netgear.com/about/security"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-5504"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-354"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T23:17:01Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A padding oracle exists in wolfSSL\u0027s PKCS7 CBC decryption that could allow an attacker to recover plaintext through repeated decryption queries with modified ciphertext. In previous versions of wolfSSL the interior padding bytes are not validated.",
  "id": "GHSA-qvjw-73xm-jw34",
  "modified": "2026-04-29T15:30:35Z",
  "published": "2026-04-10T00:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5504"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/pull/10088"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "simplesamlphp/xml-security"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "simplesamlphp/xml-security"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.13.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32600"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-354"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-13T20:44:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-16T14:19:38Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nXML nodes encrypted with either aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, or aes-256-gcm lack validation of the authentication tag length.\nAn attacker can use this to brute-force an authentication tag, recover the [GHASH key](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galois/Counter_Mode#:~:text=%29%20is%20the-,hash%20key,-%2C%20a%20string%20of), and decrypt the encrypted nodes.\nIt also allows to forge arbitrary ciphertexts without knowing the encryption key.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen decrypting with either aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, or aes-256-gcm [here](https://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs/blob/2bdfd742624d739dfadbd415f00181b4a77aaf07/src/XMLSecurityKey.php#L467-L479), the $authTag is set from a substr(), but never has its length validated (it should be validated with something like strlen($authTag) == self::AUTHTAG_LENGTH).\nFor that reason, a shorter than expected data blob will allow for the $authTag to have as short a tag as only one byte (see [PHP\u0027s documentation](https://www.php.net/manual/en/function.openssl-decrypt.php#:~:text=The%20length%20of%20the%20tag%20is%20not%20checked%20by%20the%20function.%20It%20is%20the%20caller%27s%20responsibility%20to%20ensure%20that%20the%20length%20of%20the%20tag%20matches%20the%20length%20of%20the%20tag%20retrieved%20when%20openssl_encrypt()%20has%20been%20called.%20Otherwise%20the%20decryption%20may%20succeed%20if%20the%20given%20tag%20only%20matches%20the%20start%20of%20the%20proper%20tag.)).\n\nSee this example:\n\n```php\nfunction test($data) {\n    $ivSize = 12;\n    $tagSize = 16;\n\n    $iv = substr($data, 0, $ivSize);\n    $data = substr($data, $ivSize);\n    $offset = 0 - $tagSize;\n    $tag = substr($data, $offset);\n    $ct = substr($data, 0, $offset);\n\n    echo \u0027IV: \"\u0027 . $iv . \u0027\"\u0027 . PHP_EOL;\n    echo \u0027Tag: \"\u0027 . $tag . \u0027\"\u0027 . PHP_EOL;\n    echo \u0027CT: \"\u0027 . $ct . \u0027\"\u0027 . PHP_EOL;\n}\n\n/* Outputs:\nphp \u003e test(\u0027myNonceNoncet\u0027);\nIV: \"myNonceNonce\"\nTag: \"t\"\nCT: \"\"\nphp \u003e test(\u0027myNonceNonceta\u0027);\nIV: \"myNonceNonce\"\nTag: \"ta\"\nCT: \"\"\nphp \u003e test(\u0027myNonceNoncetag\u0027);\nIV: \"myNonceNonce\"\nTag: \"tag\"\nCT: \"\"\n*/\n```\n\nWith a legit ciphertext in hand, this is enough to recover the [GHASH key](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galois/Counter_Mode#:~:text=%29%20is%20the-,hash%20key,-%2C%20a%20string%20of).\nWith that key, any authenticated tags can be computed offline which allows for decryption of the ciphertext and forgery of arbitrary ciphertexts.\nPoC\n\n1. Setup a server expecting XML with an encrypted assertion\n  -  Run this php script [poc.php](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24426600/poc.php.txt) with php -S 127.0.0.1:8888 (taken from [this saml test case](https://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs/blob/69fd63080bc47a8d51bc101c30b7cb756862d1d6/tests/saml/saml-decrypt.phpt#L62))\n\n  - The script expects this private key: [sp-private-key.pem.](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24426620/sp-private-key.pem.txt)\n\n2. Create an XML document with an encrypted assertion (encrypted with aes-256-gcm)\n\nHere is the SAMLResponse used in the video below: [saml_response.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24426638/saml_response.txt)\n\nNote: The steps from 3 to 6 are implemented in this exploit script: [nonce_reuse_with_fmt_val_oracle.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24426645/nonce_reuse_with_fmt_val_oracle.py).\nYou can run the script with sage -python nonce_reuse_with_fmt_val_oracle.py -s \u0027url-encoded_and_base64-encoded_samlresponse\u0027\n\n3. Take the content of the \u003cxenc:CipherValue\u003e node and apply the following modifications\n\n- Base64-decode the content\n\n- Take the first 12 bytes and save them as the nonce\n\n- Take the last 16 bytes and save them as the tag\n\n- Now brute-force the tag of an empty ciphertext\n\n  - Loop through all 256 possible byte values (let\u0027s call that byte_tag_attempt)\n\n  - Concatenate together the nonce and the byte_tag_attempt\n\n  - Base64-encode the result\n\n  - Replace the content of the \u003cxenc:CipherValue\u003e node with this result\n\n  - On http errors 500, we learn that the tag is valid\n\n  - Do the same for the next byte of the tag until all 16 bytes have been brute-forced\n\n4. With this new tag and the empty ciphertext, compute the [GHASH key](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galois/Counter_Mode#:~:text=%29%20is%20the-,hash%20key,-%2C%20a%20string%20of) (the way to do this has been described in this [blog post](https://frereit.de/aes_gcm/))\n\n5. Use this [GHASH key](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galois/Counter_Mode#:~:text=%29%20is%20the-,hash%20key,-%2C%20a%20string%20of) to compute authentication tags offline for arbitrary ciphertexts\n\n6. Decryption is done by observing XML parsing errors that occur after modifying the ciphertext, those can be seen as http errors 500\n\nhttps://private-user-images.githubusercontent.com/20672053/531768743-2f6e4a7e-4384-4350-b423-7ddd77aa9152.webm?jwt=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJnaXRodWIuY29tIiwiYXVkIjoicmF3LmdpdGh1YnVzZXJjb250ZW50LmNvbSIsImtleSI6ImtleTUiLCJleHAiOjE3NzMzMTQ3MjEsIm5iZiI6MTc3MzMxNDQyMSwicGF0aCI6Ii8yMDY3MjA1My81MzE3Njg3NDMtMmY2ZTRhN2UtNDM4NC00MzUwLWI0MjMtN2RkZDc3YWE5MTUyLndlYm0_WC1BbXotQWxnb3JpdGhtPUFXUzQtSE1BQy1TSEEyNTYmWC1BbXotQ3JlZGVudGlhbD1BS0lBVkNPRFlMU0E1M1BRSzRaQSUyRjIwMjYwMzEyJTJGdXMtZWFzdC0xJTJGczMlMkZhd3M0X3JlcXVlc3QmWC1BbXotRGF0ZT0yMDI2MDMxMlQxMTIwMjFaJlgtQW16LUV4cGlyZXM9MzAwJlgtQW16LVNpZ25hdHVyZT0zNDRhZThlYTY5OWNmNGZmMmNmOGJhYTNkNzAwMjNiMTVhMDMxOTIzMGRkN2Y3OGU3NTI3NmFkMWE2OTgwMDFhJlgtQW16LVNpZ25lZEhlYWRlcnM9aG9zdCJ9.X9UVe9qpwX1YQYo34WmUI84KA0a28FKd4SGy15GEVMU\n\n### Impact\n\nThe general impact is:\n\nXML nodes encrypted with AES-GCM can be decrypted by observing parsing differences\nXML nodes encrypted with AES-GCM can be modified to decrypt to an arbitrary value\nThe GCM internal [GHASH key](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galois/Counter_Mode#:~:text=%29%20is%20the-,hash%20key,-%2C%20a%20string%20of) can be recovered\n\nIn cases where the encryption key is embedded in the XML and is encrypted with the Service Provider\u0027s public key (like often done with SAML), the last two items don\u0027t have a big impact.\nThis is because:\n\nWith the Service Provider\u0027s public key, an arbitrary ciphertext can be created with a known symmetric key\nThe symmetric keys are generated on the fly every time the IdP creates a new SAMLResponse\n\nIn any case, secrets that are embedded in the XML, whether coming from an IdP, or from another scheme, can be decrypted.\n\nImportant: If static symmetric keys are used, as the [GHASH key](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galois/Counter_Mode#:~:text=%29%20is%20the-,hash%20key,-%2C%20a%20string%20of) could have leaked, you must rotate those keys.\n\n### References\nFor additional information on the issue, you can refer to this [blog post](https://sideni.xyz/posts/exploiting_openssl_api/) about the OpenSSL issue and how it can be exploited.",
  "id": "GHSA-r353-4845-pr5p",
  "modified": "2026-03-16T22:01:35Z",
  "published": "2026-03-13T20:44:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/simplesamlphp/xml-security/security/advisories/GHSA-r353-4845-pr5p"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32600"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/simplesamlphp/xml-security/commit/cad6d57cf0a5a0b7e0cc4e4a5b18752e56eb1520"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/simplesamlphp/xml-security/commit/fdc12449e959c610943f9fd428e95e3832d74c25"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/simplesamlphp/xml-security"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "simplesamlphp/xml-security: Missing AES-GCM Authentication Tag Validation on Encrypted Nodes Allows for Unauthorized Decryption"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-33193"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-354"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-25T18:15:50Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "NVIDIA DGX Spark GB10 contains a vulnerability in SROOT firmware, where an attacker could cause improper validation of integrity. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to information disclosure.",
  "id": "GHSA-r59w-m3rq-r7x9",
  "modified": "2025-11-25T18:32:22Z",
  "published": "2025-11-25T18:32:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-33193"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5720"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-33193"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-45191"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-354"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-02-08T00:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered on Microchip RN4870 1.43 devices. An attacker within BLE radio range can cause a denial of service by sending a pair confirm message with wrong values.",
  "id": "GHSA-rcw3-69hq-m8x4",
  "modified": "2023-02-16T18:30:26Z",
  "published": "2023-02-08T00:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-45191"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.microchip.com/en-us/support/product-change-notification"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "vllm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.7.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-25183"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-354"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-06T20:00:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-07T20:15:34Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nMaliciously constructed prompts can lead to hash collisions, resulting in prefix cache reuse, which can interfere with subsequent responses and cause unintended behavior.\n\n### Details\n\nvLLM\u0027s prefix caching makes use of Python\u0027s built-in hash() function. As of Python 3.12, the behavior of hash(None) has changed to be a predictable constant value. This makes it more feasible that someone could try exploit hash collisions.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe impact of a collision would be using cache that was generated using different content. Given knowledge of prompts in use and predictable hashing behavior, someone could intentionally populate the cache using a prompt known to collide with another prompt in use. \n\n### Solution\n\nWe address this problem by initializing hashes in vllm with a value that is no longer constant and predictable. It will be different each time vllm runs. This restores behavior we got in Python versions prior to 3.12.\n\nUsing a hashing algorithm that is less prone to collision (like sha256, for example) would be the best way to avoid the possibility of a collision. However, it would have an impact to both performance and memory footprint. Hash collisions may still occur, though they are no longer straight forward to predict.\n\nTo give an idea of the likelihood of a collision, for randomly generated hash values (assuming the hash generation built into Python is uniformly distributed), with a cache capacity of 50,000 messages and an average prompt length of 300, a collision will occur on average once every 1 trillion requests.\n\n### References\n\n* https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/12621\n* https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/432117cd1f59c76d97da2eaff55a7d758301dbc7\n* https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/99541",
  "id": "GHSA-rm76-4mrf-v9r8",
  "modified": "2025-07-02T14:20:34Z",
  "published": "2025-02-06T20:00:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-rm76-4mrf-v9r8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25183"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/99541"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/12621"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/432117cd1f59c76d97da2eaff55a7d758301dbc7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/73b35cca7f3745d07d439c197768b25d88b6ab7f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/vllm/PYSEC-2025-62.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "vLLM uses Python 3.12 built-in hash() which leads to predictable hash collisions in prefix cache"
}