Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE-924
AllowedImproper Enforcement of Message Integrity During Transmission in a Communication Channel
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product establishes a communication channel with an endpoint and receives a message from that endpoint, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the message was not modified during transmission.
52 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-WGJ3-G943-V8WV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-12 18:30 – Updated: 2024-11-12 18:30
VLAI
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-43450"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-924"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-12T18:15:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Windows DNS Spoofing Vulnerability",
"id": "GHSA-wgj3-g943-v8wv",
"modified": "2024-11-12T18:30:58Z",
"published": "2024-11-12T18:30:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43450"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-43450"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XHJW-7VH5-QXQM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-08 17:33 – Updated: 2024-11-12 21:13
VLAI
Summary
LibOSDP RMAC revert to the beginning of the session
Details
- Issues:
- SCS_14 is allowed on encrypted connection (osdp_phy.c)
- No validation for RMAC_I is only in response to osdp_SCRYPT (osdp_cp.c)
- Couldn't find anything specific in the OSDP specifications indicating it is forbidden, I'm gussing it shouldn't be allowed according from the secure connection initialization flow (let me know if you think there is spec-rela ted change that should be done)
- Attack:
- Once RMAC_I message can be sent during a session, attacker with MITM access to the communication may intercept the original RMAC_I reply and save it.
- While the session continues, the attacker will record all of the replies and save them, till capturing the message to be replied (can be detected by ID, length or time based on inspection of visual activity next to the reade r)
- Once attacker captures a session with the message to be replayed, he stops reseting the connection and waits for signal to perform the replay to of the PD to CP message (ex: by signaling remotly to the MIMT device or setting a specific timing).
- in order to replay, the attacker will craft a specific RMAC_I message in the proper seq of the execution, which will result in reverting the RMAC to the begining of the session.
- At that phase - attacker can replay all the messages from the begining of the session.
Impact
Replay attack
Patches
This issue has been fixed in 298576d9214b48214092eebdd892ec77be085e5a
Severity
5.1 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "libosdp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-52288"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-924"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-03-08T17:33:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-11T20:15:20Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "- Issues:\n - SCS_14 is allowed on encrypted connection (osdp_phy.c)\n - No validation for RMAC_I is only in response to osdp_SCRYPT (osdp_cp.c)\n - Couldn\u0027t find anything specific in the OSDP specifications indicating it is forbidden, I\u0027m gussing it shouldn\u0027t be allowed according from the secure connection initialization flow (let me know if you think there is spec-rela\nted change that should be done)\n- Attack:\n - Once RMAC_I message can be sent during a session, attacker with MITM access to the communication may intercept the original RMAC_I reply and save it.\n - While the session continues, the attacker will record all of the replies and save them, till capturing the message to be replied (can be detected by ID, length or time based on inspection of visual activity next to the reade\nr)\n - Once attacker captures a session with the message to be replayed, he stops reseting the connection and waits for signal to perform the replay to of the PD to CP message (ex: by signaling remotly to the MIMT device or setting\n a specific timing).\n - in order to replay, the attacker will craft a specific RMAC_I message in the proper seq of the execution, which will result in reverting the RMAC to the begining of the session.\n - At that phase - attacker can replay all the messages from the begining of the session.\n\n### Impact\nReplay attack\n\n### Patches\nThis issue has been fixed in 298576d9214b48214092eebdd892ec77be085e5a\n",
"id": "GHSA-xhjw-7vh5-qxqm",
"modified": "2024-11-12T21:13:28Z",
"published": "2024-03-08T17:33:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/goToMain/libosdp/security/advisories/GHSA-xhjw-7vh5-qxqm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-52288"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/goToMain/libosdp/commit/298576d9214b48214092eebdd892ec77be085e5a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/goToMain/libosdp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "LibOSDP RMAC revert to the beginning of the session"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.