Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-863

Allowed-with-Review

Incorrect Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

5548 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-RX9X-86VG-H4CR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-19 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:01
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in Delta RM 1.2. The /risque/risque/workflow/reset endpoint is lacking access controls, and it is possible for an unprivileged user to reopen a risk with a POST request, using the risqueID parameter to identify the risk to be re-opened.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-44836"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-01-18T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in Delta RM 1.2. The /risque/risque/workflow/reset endpoint is lacking access controls, and it is possible for an unprivileged user to reopen a risk with a POST request, using the risqueID parameter to identify the risk to be re-opened.",
  "id": "GHSA-rx9x-86vg-h4cr",
  "modified": "2022-07-13T00:01:49Z",
  "published": "2022-01-19T00:00:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44836"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gist.github.com/rntcruz23/01af412813c63d6e0cc41c26f52893be"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.deltarm.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RXF6-WJH4-JFJ6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-23 00:08 – Updated: 2026-06-26 21:28
VLAI
Summary
Nezha Monitoring: RoleMember can fire other users' cron tasks via AlertRule.FailTriggerTasks (no ownership check)
Details

Summary

createAlertRule and createService (and their update* siblings) accept FailTriggerTasks []uint64 and RecoverTriggerTasks []uint64 — IDs of cron tasks to fire when the alert/service trips. The validation function only validates the alert's Rules.Ignore server map; it never checks that the cron task IDs in FailTriggerTasks / RecoverTriggerTasks belong to the caller.

When the alert fires, singleton.CronShared.SendTriggerTasks(taskIDs, triggerServer) (service/singleton/crontask.go:113-127) looks up those task IDs in the global cron registry and executes them via CronTrigger. For non-AlertTrigger cover modes, CronTrigger fans the command out to every server in ServerShared.Range with no ownership check.

Net effect: a RoleMember can attach their alert rule (or service monitor) to another user's cron task ID — including admin's crons. When the alert trips, the admin's cron command runs across every server (or every server in its allow/deny list).

This is the same fanout/auth-bypass class as NEZHA-002 (cron creation), but reachable by a different code path: even if /cron writes are restricted to admin, this /alert-rule and /service writes are member-reachable and let a member invoke pre-existing admin crons.

Affected versions

Commit 50dc8e660326b9f22990898142c58b7a5312b42a and earlier on master.

Reachability chain

  1. POST /api/v1/alert-rule (or POST /api/v1/service) is commonHandler-gated — any authenticated user.
  2. createAlertRule / createService accepts FailTriggerTasks and RecoverTriggerTasks from the request body without validating ownership.
  3. validateRule (cmd/dashboard/controller/alertrule.go:169-196) only checks rule.Ignore server IDs — not the trigger task IDs.
  4. validateServers (cmd/dashboard/controller/service.go:543-549) only checks the service's SkipServers map — not the trigger task IDs.
  5. When the alert/service trips: service/singleton/alertsentinel.go:170, 180 and service/singleton/servicesentinel.go:747, 750 call CronShared.SendTriggerTasks(...).
  6. SendTriggerTasks (service/singleton/crontask.go:113-127) iterates the requested task IDs against c.list and calls CronTrigger(c, triggerServer)() for each — no ownership check.
  7. CronTrigger then fans the cron's Command to every connected agent (per Cover rules).

Code locations

// cmd/dashboard/controller/alertrule.go:47-77
func createAlertRule(c *gin.Context) (uint64, error) {
    var arf model.AlertRuleForm
    var r model.AlertRule
    if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&arf); err != nil { return 0, err }
    uid := getUid(c)
    r.UserID = uid
    r.Name = arf.Name
    r.Rules = arf.Rules
    r.FailTriggerTasks = arf.FailTriggerTasks       // <-- attacker-controlled task IDs
    r.RecoverTriggerTasks = arf.RecoverTriggerTasks // <-- ditto
    r.NotificationGroupID = arf.NotificationGroupID
    enable := arf.Enable
    r.TriggerMode = arf.TriggerMode
    r.Enable = &enable

    if err := validateRule(c, &r); err != nil { return 0, err }   // only checks rule.Ignore servers
    ...
}

// cmd/dashboard/controller/alertrule.go:169-196
func validateRule(c *gin.Context, r *model.AlertRule) error {
    if len(r.Rules) > 0 {
        for _, rule := range r.Rules {
            if !singleton.ServerShared.CheckPermission(c, maps.Keys(rule.Ignore)) {
                return singleton.Localizer.ErrorT("permission denied")
            }
            // ... duration/cycle validation only
        }
    }
    // BUG: no check on r.FailTriggerTasks or r.RecoverTriggerTasks ownership.
    return nil
}

// service/singleton/crontask.go:113-127
func (c *CronClass) SendTriggerTasks(taskIDs []uint64, triggerServer uint64) {
    c.listMu.RLock()
    var cronLists []*model.Cron
    for _, taskID := range taskIDs {
        if c, ok := c.list[taskID]; ok {                 // <-- looks up ANY cron in global state
            cronLists = append(cronLists, c)
        }
    }
    c.listMu.RUnlock()
    // BUG: no ownership check between alert.UserID and cron.UserID before invoking.
    for _, c := range cronLists {
        go CronTrigger(c, triggerServer)()
    }
}

// service/singleton/crontask.go:138-181 — CronTrigger
return func() {
    if cr.Cover == model.CronCoverAlertTrigger {
        // alert-only: only sends to triggerServer (the member's server, when alert was triggered by it)
        if s, ok := ServerShared.Get(triggerServer[0]); ok && s.TaskStream != nil {
            s.TaskStream.Send(&pb.Task{Id: cr.ID, Data: cr.Command, Type: model.TaskTypeCommand})
        }
        return
    }
    // For Cover=CronCoverAll or CronCoverIgnoreAll: fan out to every server.
    for _, s := range ServerShared.Range {
        if cr.Cover == model.CronCoverAll && crIgnoreMap[s.ID] { continue }
        if cr.Cover == model.CronCoverIgnoreAll && !crIgnoreMap[s.ID] { continue }
        if s.TaskStream != nil {
            s.TaskStream.Send(&pb.Task{Id: cr.ID, Data: cr.Command, Type: model.TaskTypeCommand})
        }
    }
}

PoC

Pre-conditions: attacker has RoleMember credentials. Admin has at least one pre-existing cron with Cover=CronCoverAll or Cover=CronCoverIgnoreAll (i.e., a "run on all servers" maintenance cron — common in monitoring deployments).

Step 1: Enumerate admin cron IDs by ID-guessing. Try IDs 1..N; create AlertRule referencing each, see if the alert handler accepts.

Step 2: Create an alert rule referencing the admin's cron and pointed at an offline-trigger condition on the member's own server.

TOKEN=$(curl -sX POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d '{"username":"member","password":"hunter2"}' \
    http://nezha.example.com/api/v1/login | jq -r .token)

curl -sX POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d '{"name":"trip","rules":[{"type":"offline","duration":3,"min":1.0,"cover":"member-server-id"}],"fail_trigger_tasks":[1,2,3,4,5],"recover_trigger_tasks":[],"notification_group_id":0,"trigger_mode":0,"enable":true}' \
    http://nezha.example.com/api/v1/alert-rule

Step 3: Stop the agent on the member's own server (or unplug it). The alert trips after duration seconds. SendTriggerTasks([1,2,3,4,5], member-server-id) runs.

Step 4: For each cron ID in the list, if that cron exists in the global registry and has Cover=CronCoverAll/IgnoreAll, its Command runs on every server.

The same chain works via POST /api/v1/service (service-monitor with fail_trigger_tasks).

Composability with NEZHA-002

If NEZHA-002 is unfixed, this chain is redundant — the member already has direct cron-create access. With NEZHA-002 fixed, this still gives the member a means to invoke any pre-existing admin cron with the member's chosen trigger condition. The fix surface is also independent (alertrule/service write paths, not /cron writes).

Suggested fix

In validateRule (and validateServers):

if !singleton.CronShared.CheckPermission(c, slices.Values(r.FailTriggerTasks)) {
    return singleton.Localizer.ErrorT("permission denied")
}
if !singleton.CronShared.CheckPermission(c, slices.Values(r.RecoverTriggerTasks)) {
    return singleton.Localizer.ErrorT("permission denied")
}

Defense-in-depth in SendTriggerTasks: enforce that task.UserID == alert.UserID || alertOwnerIsAdmin || taskOwnerIsAdmin.

Severity

  • PR:L because RoleMember credentials needed.
  • AC:H because attacker has to ID-guess admin cron IDs and have an alert-trip vector. (For a deployment where the attacker has visibility into max cron ID via UI hints or the id-query echo, AC drops to L.)
  • S:C because the cron command runs on every connected agent (different trust zone).
  • Auth: authenticated RoleMember.

Reproduction environment

  • Tested against: nezhahq/nezha master @ 50dc8e660326b9f22990898142c58b7a5312b42a.
  • Code locations:
  • cmd/dashboard/controller/alertrule.go:47-77 (createAlertRule), 91-131 (updateAlertRule), 169-196 (validateRule)
  • cmd/dashboard/controller/service.go:404-445 (createService), 459-509 (updateService), 543-549 (validateServers)
  • service/singleton/crontask.go:113-127 (SendTriggerTasks), 133-181 (CronTrigger)
  • service/singleton/alertsentinel.go:170, 180 (alert-fire callsite)
  • service/singleton/servicesentinel.go:742-750 (service-fire callsite)

Reporter

Eddie Ran. Filed via reporter API. Companion to NEZHA-001/002 — same auth-bypass class but a different write path.

Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/nezhahq/nezha"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.4.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.14.15-0.20260517022419-d7526351cf97"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47120"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-23T00:08:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-12T22:16:51Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`createAlertRule` and `createService` (and their `update*` siblings) accept `FailTriggerTasks []uint64` and `RecoverTriggerTasks []uint64` \u2014 IDs of cron tasks to fire when the alert/service trips. The validation function only validates the alert\u0027s `Rules.Ignore` server map; it never checks that the cron task IDs in `FailTriggerTasks` / `RecoverTriggerTasks` belong to the caller.\n\nWhen the alert fires, `singleton.CronShared.SendTriggerTasks(taskIDs, triggerServer)` (`service/singleton/crontask.go:113-127`) looks up those task IDs in the global cron registry and executes them via `CronTrigger`. For non-`AlertTrigger` cover modes, `CronTrigger` fans the command out to every server in `ServerShared.Range` with no ownership check.\n\nNet effect: a `RoleMember` can attach their alert rule (or service monitor) to **another user\u0027s** cron task ID \u2014 including admin\u0027s crons. When the alert trips, the admin\u0027s cron command runs across every server (or every server in its allow/deny list).\n\nThis is the same fanout/auth-bypass class as `NEZHA-002` (cron creation), but reachable by a different code path: even if `/cron` writes are restricted to admin, this `/alert-rule` and `/service` writes are member-reachable and let a member invoke pre-existing admin crons.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nCommit `50dc8e660326b9f22990898142c58b7a5312b42a` and earlier on `master`.\n\n## Reachability chain\n\n1. `POST /api/v1/alert-rule` (or `POST /api/v1/service`) is `commonHandler`-gated \u2014 any authenticated user.\n2. `createAlertRule` / `createService` accepts `FailTriggerTasks` and `RecoverTriggerTasks` from the request body without validating ownership.\n3. `validateRule` (`cmd/dashboard/controller/alertrule.go:169-196`) only checks `rule.Ignore` server IDs \u2014 not the trigger task IDs.\n4. `validateServers` (`cmd/dashboard/controller/service.go:543-549`) only checks the service\u0027s `SkipServers` map \u2014 not the trigger task IDs.\n5. When the alert/service trips: `service/singleton/alertsentinel.go:170, 180` and `service/singleton/servicesentinel.go:747, 750` call `CronShared.SendTriggerTasks(...)`.\n6. `SendTriggerTasks` (`service/singleton/crontask.go:113-127`) iterates the requested task IDs against `c.list` and calls `CronTrigger(c, triggerServer)()` for each \u2014 no ownership check.\n7. `CronTrigger` then fans the cron\u0027s `Command` to every connected agent (per `Cover` rules).\n\n## Code locations\n\n```go\n// cmd/dashboard/controller/alertrule.go:47-77\nfunc createAlertRule(c *gin.Context) (uint64, error) {\n    var arf model.AlertRuleForm\n    var r model.AlertRule\n    if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(\u0026arf); err != nil { return 0, err }\n    uid := getUid(c)\n    r.UserID = uid\n    r.Name = arf.Name\n    r.Rules = arf.Rules\n    r.FailTriggerTasks = arf.FailTriggerTasks       // \u003c-- attacker-controlled task IDs\n    r.RecoverTriggerTasks = arf.RecoverTriggerTasks // \u003c-- ditto\n    r.NotificationGroupID = arf.NotificationGroupID\n    enable := arf.Enable\n    r.TriggerMode = arf.TriggerMode\n    r.Enable = \u0026enable\n\n    if err := validateRule(c, \u0026r); err != nil { return 0, err }   // only checks rule.Ignore servers\n    ...\n}\n```\n\n```go\n// cmd/dashboard/controller/alertrule.go:169-196\nfunc validateRule(c *gin.Context, r *model.AlertRule) error {\n    if len(r.Rules) \u003e 0 {\n        for _, rule := range r.Rules {\n            if !singleton.ServerShared.CheckPermission(c, maps.Keys(rule.Ignore)) {\n                return singleton.Localizer.ErrorT(\"permission denied\")\n            }\n            // ... duration/cycle validation only\n        }\n    }\n    // BUG: no check on r.FailTriggerTasks or r.RecoverTriggerTasks ownership.\n    return nil\n}\n```\n\n```go\n// service/singleton/crontask.go:113-127\nfunc (c *CronClass) SendTriggerTasks(taskIDs []uint64, triggerServer uint64) {\n    c.listMu.RLock()\n    var cronLists []*model.Cron\n    for _, taskID := range taskIDs {\n        if c, ok := c.list[taskID]; ok {                 // \u003c-- looks up ANY cron in global state\n            cronLists = append(cronLists, c)\n        }\n    }\n    c.listMu.RUnlock()\n    // BUG: no ownership check between alert.UserID and cron.UserID before invoking.\n    for _, c := range cronLists {\n        go CronTrigger(c, triggerServer)()\n    }\n}\n```\n\n```go\n// service/singleton/crontask.go:138-181 \u2014 CronTrigger\nreturn func() {\n    if cr.Cover == model.CronCoverAlertTrigger {\n        // alert-only: only sends to triggerServer (the member\u0027s server, when alert was triggered by it)\n        if s, ok := ServerShared.Get(triggerServer[0]); ok \u0026\u0026 s.TaskStream != nil {\n            s.TaskStream.Send(\u0026pb.Task{Id: cr.ID, Data: cr.Command, Type: model.TaskTypeCommand})\n        }\n        return\n    }\n    // For Cover=CronCoverAll or CronCoverIgnoreAll: fan out to every server.\n    for _, s := range ServerShared.Range {\n        if cr.Cover == model.CronCoverAll \u0026\u0026 crIgnoreMap[s.ID] { continue }\n        if cr.Cover == model.CronCoverIgnoreAll \u0026\u0026 !crIgnoreMap[s.ID] { continue }\n        if s.TaskStream != nil {\n            s.TaskStream.Send(\u0026pb.Task{Id: cr.ID, Data: cr.Command, Type: model.TaskTypeCommand})\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\n## PoC\n\nPre-conditions: attacker has `RoleMember` credentials. Admin has at least one pre-existing cron with `Cover=CronCoverAll` or `Cover=CronCoverIgnoreAll` (i.e., a \"run on all servers\" maintenance cron \u2014 common in monitoring deployments).\n\nStep 1: Enumerate admin cron IDs by ID-guessing. Try IDs 1..N; create AlertRule referencing each, see if the alert handler accepts.\n\nStep 2: Create an alert rule referencing the admin\u0027s cron and pointed at an offline-trigger condition on the member\u0027s own server.\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(curl -sX POST -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n    -d \u0027{\"username\":\"member\",\"password\":\"hunter2\"}\u0027 \\\n    http://nezha.example.com/api/v1/login | jq -r .token)\n\ncurl -sX POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n    -d \u0027{\"name\":\"trip\",\"rules\":[{\"type\":\"offline\",\"duration\":3,\"min\":1.0,\"cover\":\"member-server-id\"}],\"fail_trigger_tasks\":[1,2,3,4,5],\"recover_trigger_tasks\":[],\"notification_group_id\":0,\"trigger_mode\":0,\"enable\":true}\u0027 \\\n    http://nezha.example.com/api/v1/alert-rule\n```\n\nStep 3: Stop the agent on the member\u0027s own server (or unplug it). The alert trips after `duration` seconds. `SendTriggerTasks([1,2,3,4,5], member-server-id)` runs.\n\nStep 4: For each cron ID in the list, if that cron exists in the global registry and has `Cover=CronCoverAll/IgnoreAll`, its `Command` runs on every server.\n\nThe same chain works via `POST /api/v1/service` (service-monitor with `fail_trigger_tasks`).\n\n## Composability with NEZHA-002\n\nIf `NEZHA-002` is unfixed, this chain is redundant \u2014 the member already has direct cron-create access. With `NEZHA-002` fixed, this still gives the member a means to invoke any **pre-existing** admin cron with the member\u0027s chosen trigger condition. The fix surface is also independent (alertrule/service write paths, not /cron writes).\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nIn `validateRule` (and `validateServers`):\n\n```go\nif !singleton.CronShared.CheckPermission(c, slices.Values(r.FailTriggerTasks)) {\n    return singleton.Localizer.ErrorT(\"permission denied\")\n}\nif !singleton.CronShared.CheckPermission(c, slices.Values(r.RecoverTriggerTasks)) {\n    return singleton.Localizer.ErrorT(\"permission denied\")\n}\n```\n\nDefense-in-depth in `SendTriggerTasks`: enforce that `task.UserID == alert.UserID || alertOwnerIsAdmin || taskOwnerIsAdmin`.\n\n## Severity\n\n  - PR:L because RoleMember credentials needed.\n  - AC:H because attacker has to ID-guess admin cron IDs and have an alert-trip vector. (For a deployment where the attacker has visibility into max cron ID via UI hints or the `id`-query echo, AC drops to L.)\n  - S:C because the cron command runs on every connected agent (different trust zone).\n- **Auth:** authenticated `RoleMember`.\n\n## Reproduction environment\n\n- Tested against: `nezhahq/nezha` master @ `50dc8e660326b9f22990898142c58b7a5312b42a`.\n- Code locations:\n  - `cmd/dashboard/controller/alertrule.go:47-77` (createAlertRule), 91-131 (updateAlertRule), 169-196 (validateRule)\n  - `cmd/dashboard/controller/service.go:404-445` (createService), 459-509 (updateService), 543-549 (validateServers)\n  - `service/singleton/crontask.go:113-127` (SendTriggerTasks), 133-181 (CronTrigger)\n  - `service/singleton/alertsentinel.go:170, 180` (alert-fire callsite)\n  - `service/singleton/servicesentinel.go:742-750` (service-fire callsite)\n\n## Reporter\n\nEddie Ran. Filed via reporter API. Companion to NEZHA-001/002 \u2014 same auth-bypass class but a different write path.",
  "id": "GHSA-rxf6-wjh4-jfj6",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T21:28:31Z",
  "published": "2026-05-23T00:08:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha/security/advisories/GHSA-rxf6-wjh4-jfj6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47120"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nezha Monitoring: RoleMember can fire other users\u0027 cron tasks via AlertRule.FailTriggerTasks (no ownership check)"
}

GHSA-RXHM-9GMQ-9482

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-04 12:31 – Updated: 2024-12-04 12:31
VLAI
Details

Incorrect authorization vulnerability in Alert.Setting webapi component in Synology Surveillance Station before 9.2.0-11289 and 9.2.0-9289 allows remote authenticated users to to perform limited actions on the alerting function via unspecified vectors.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-52943"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-12-04T07:15:04Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Incorrect authorization vulnerability in Alert.Setting webapi component in Synology Surveillance Station before 9.2.0-11289 and 9.2.0-9289 allows remote authenticated users to to perform limited actions on the alerting function via unspecified vectors.",
  "id": "GHSA-rxhm-9gmq-9482",
  "modified": "2024-12-04T12:31:44Z",
  "published": "2024-12-04T12:31:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52943"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_04"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RXP7-W842-WJMH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-23 21:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:18
VLAI
Details

The permission system implemented and enforced by the GarminOS TVM component in CIQ API version 1.0.0 through 4.1.7 can be bypassed entirely. A malicious application with specially crafted code and data sections could access restricted CIQ modules, call their functions and disclose sensitive data such as user profile information and GPS coordinates, among others.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-23299"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-23T20:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The permission system implemented and enforced by the GarminOS TVM component in CIQ API version 1.0.0 through 4.1.7 can be bypassed entirely. A malicious application with specially crafted code and data sections could access restricted CIQ modules, call their functions and disclose sensitive data such as user profile information and GPS coordinates, among others.",
  "id": "GHSA-rxp7-w842-wjmh",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T04:18:58Z",
  "published": "2023-05-23T21:30:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23299"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://developer.garmin.com/connect-iq/core-topics/manifest-and-permissions"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/anvilsecure/garmin-ciq-app-research/blob/main/advisories/CVE-2023-23299.md"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RXWH-3M8P-2QQ5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-20 12:32
VLAI
Details

An incorrect authorization vulnerability exists in gaizhenbiao/chuanhuchatgpt version git c91dbfc. The vulnerability allows any user to restart the server at will, leading to a complete loss of availability. The issue arises because the function responsible for restarting the server is not properly guarded by an admin check.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-9159"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An incorrect authorization vulnerability exists in gaizhenbiao/chuanhuchatgpt version git c91dbfc. The vulnerability allows any user to restart the server at will, leading to a complete loss of availability. The issue arises because the function responsible for restarting the server is not properly guarded by an admin check.",
  "id": "GHSA-rxwh-3m8p-2qq5",
  "modified": "2025-03-20T12:32:50Z",
  "published": "2025-03-20T12:32:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9159"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/ab0f8fbb-c17a-45a7-8dab-7d4c8b90490a"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V259-CWPG-PHF4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-17 03:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:01
VLAI
Details

There is a permission and access control vulnerability in some ZTE mobile phones. Due to improper access control, applications in mobile phone could monitor the touch event.

Severity
4.7 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-25647"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-08-17T03:15:09Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "\n\n\nThere is a permission and access control vulnerability in some ZTE mobile phones. Due to improper access control, applications in mobile phone could\u00a0monitor\u00a0the touch\u00a0event.\n\n\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-v259-cwpg-phf4",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T07:01:00Z",
  "published": "2023-08-17T03:30:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25647"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.zte.com.cn/support/news/LoopholeInfoDetail.aspx?newsId=1032264"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V25C-8349-V2Q3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-15 00:00 – Updated: 2022-06-29 22:03
VLAI
Summary
Incorrect Authorization in thinkcmf
Details

thinkcmf v5.1.7 has an unauthorized vulnerability. The attacker can modify the password of the administrator account with id 1 through the background user management group permissions. The use condition is that the background user management group authority is required.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.1.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "thinkcmf/thinkcmf"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-40616"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-06-29T22:03:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-06-14T10:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "thinkcmf v5.1.7 has an unauthorized vulnerability. The attacker can modify the password of the administrator account with id 1 through the background user management group permissions. The use condition is that the background user management group authority is required.",
  "id": "GHSA-v25c-8349-v2q3",
  "modified": "2022-06-29T22:03:36Z",
  "published": "2022-06-15T00:00:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40616"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thinkcmf/thinkcmf/issues/722"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/thinkcmf/thinkcmf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Incorrect Authorization in thinkcmf"
}

GHSA-V27J-88V5-QWRQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-07 15:30 – Updated: 2026-04-07 15:30
VLAI
Details

An issue that allowed administrators to create and update users outside of their authorized organization scope has been resolved. This is an instance of CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, and has an estimated CVSS score of CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N (5.8 Medium). This issue was fixed in version 4.0.260203.0 of the runZero Platform.

Severity
5.8 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-5378"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T15:17:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue that allowed administrators to create and update users outside of their authorized organization scope has been resolved. This is an instance of CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, and has an estimated CVSS score of CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N (5.8 Medium). This issue was fixed in version 4.0.260203.0 of the runZero Platform.",
  "id": "GHSA-v27j-88v5-qwrq",
  "modified": "2026-04-07T15:30:52Z",
  "published": "2026-04-07T15:30:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5378"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://help.runzero.com/docs/release-notes/#402602030"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.runzero.com/advisories/runzero-platform-user-creation-leak-cve-2026-5378"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V2H4-8467-FM2M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-15 21:30 – Updated: 2024-10-15 21:30
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability in the Oracle Sourcing product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: Auctions). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.13. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Sourcing. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized creation, deletion or modification access to critical data or all Oracle Sourcing accessible data as well as unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle Sourcing accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.1 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-21279"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-15T20:15:20Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Sourcing product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: Auctions).  Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.13. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Sourcing.  Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in  unauthorized creation, deletion or modification access to critical data or all Oracle Sourcing accessible data as well as  unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle Sourcing accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.1 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts).  CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).",
  "id": "GHSA-v2h4-8467-fm2m",
  "modified": "2024-10-15T21:30:39Z",
  "published": "2024-10-15T21:30:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21279"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuoct2024.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V2M8-9547-V9WG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:36 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:36
VLAI
Details

In updateIncomingFileConfirmNotification of BluetoothOppNotification.java, there is a possible permissions bypass. This could lead to local escalation of privilege allowing an attacker with physical possession of the device to transfer files to it over Bluetooth, with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-11Android ID: A-160691486

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-0473"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-12-15T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In updateIncomingFileConfirmNotification of BluetoothOppNotification.java, there is a possible permissions bypass. This could lead to local escalation of privilege allowing an attacker with physical possession of the device to transfer files to it over Bluetooth, with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-11Android ID: A-160691486",
  "id": "GHSA-v2m8-9547-v9wg",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:36:24Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:36:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0473"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/pixel/2020-12-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.

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