Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-863

Allowed-with-Review

Incorrect Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

5678 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-J8VF-QMCJ-WV9F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-22 18:32 – Updated: 2024-10-22 18:32
VLAI
Details

Archer Platform 2024.03 before version 2024.08 is affected by an authorization bypass vulnerability related to supporting application files. A remote unprivileged attacker could potentially exploit this vulnerability to elevate their privileges and delete system icons.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-49208"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-22T17:15:04Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Archer Platform 2024.03 before version 2024.08 is affected by an authorization bypass vulnerability related to supporting application files. A remote unprivileged attacker could potentially exploit this vulnerability to elevate their privileges and delete system icons.",
  "id": "GHSA-j8vf-qmcj-wv9f",
  "modified": "2024-10-22T18:32:12Z",
  "published": "2024-10-22T18:32:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49208"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.archerirm.community/t5/platform-announcements/archer-update-for-multiple-vulnerabilities/ta-p/747545"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.archerirm.community/t5/platform-announcements/tkb-p/product-advisories-tkb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J8W3-HXM2-CW7F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-19 06:30 – Updated: 2025-07-19 06:30
VLAI
Details

An incorrect authorisation check in the the 'plant transfer' function of the Growatt cloud service allowed a malicous attacker with a valid account to transfer any plant into his/her account.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-29757"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-19T06:15:23Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An incorrect authorisation check in the the\u00a0\u0027plant transfer\u0027 function of the Growatt cloud service allowed a malicous attacker with a valid account to transfer any plant into his/her account.",
  "id": "GHSA-j8w3-hxm2-cw7f",
  "modified": "2025-07-19T06:30:57Z",
  "published": "2025-07-19T06:30:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-29757"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://csirt.divd.nl/CVE-2025-29757"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://csirt.divd.nl/DIVD-2025-00011"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://oss.growatt.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://server.growatt.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:P/AU:X/R:X/V:C/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J94J-PQHQ-QR6H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-10 21:30 – Updated: 2025-07-25 18:30
VLAI
Details

A non-admin user can cause short-term disruption in Target VM availability in Citrix Provisioning

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-6150"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-10T21:15:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A non-admin user can cause short-term disruption in Target VM availability\u00a0in\u00a0Citrix Provisioning",
  "id": "GHSA-j94j-pqhq-qr6h",
  "modified": "2025-07-25T18:30:33Z",
  "published": "2024-07-10T21:30:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6150"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX678025"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J97V-VVWP-6WX4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:10 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:10
VLAI
Details

In setBluetoothTethering of PanService.java, there is a possible permission bypass due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege to activate tethering with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-10Android ID: A-134487438

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-0085"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-03-10T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In setBluetoothTethering of PanService.java, there is a possible permission bypass due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege to activate tethering with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-10Android ID: A-134487438",
  "id": "GHSA-j97v-vvwp-6wx4",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:10:42Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:10:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0085"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/pixel/2020-03-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-J98H-2C2J-4X2P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-14 09:31 – Updated: 2026-04-08 21:33
VLAI
Details

The Float Payment Gateway plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to improper error handling in the verifyFloatResponse() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.9. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to mark any WooCommerce order as failed.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-15513"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-14T07:16:14Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Float Payment Gateway plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to improper error handling in the verifyFloatResponse() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.9. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to mark any WooCommerce order as failed.",
  "id": "GHSA-j98h-2c2j-4x2p",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T21:33:10Z",
  "published": "2026-01-14T09:31:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-15513"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/float-gateway/tags/1.1.9/index.php#L477"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3444078%40float-gateway\u0026new=3444078%40float-gateway\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/b2c7fb39-d128-4285-8bc3-1e192e1e1196?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J997-WPHJ-QRJ9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-20 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:01
VLAI
Details

Allwinner R818 SoC Android Q SDK V1.0 is affected by an incorrect access control vulnerability that does not check the caller's permission, in which a third-party app could change system settings.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-38789"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-01-19T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Allwinner R818 SoC Android Q SDK V1.0 is affected by an incorrect access control vulnerability that does not check the caller\u0027s permission, in which a third-party app could change system settings.",
  "id": "GHSA-j997-wphj-qrj9",
  "modified": "2022-07-13T00:01:35Z",
  "published": "2022-01-20T00:00:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38789"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pokerfacett/MY_CVE_CREDIT/blob/master/Allwinner%20R818%20SoC%EF%BC%9Aaw_display%20service%20has%20EoP%20Vulnerability.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vul.wangan.com/a/CNVD-2021-46927"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.allwinnertech.com/index.php?c=product\u0026a=index\u0026id=92"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cnvd.org.cn/flaw/show/CNVD-2021-46927"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J9CG-V2V5-9P35

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-27 00:00 – Updated: 2025-05-22 15:34
VLAI
Details

Inappropriate implementation in Site Isolation in Google Chrome prior to 105.0.5195.52 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-3044"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-09-26T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Inappropriate implementation in Site Isolation in Google Chrome prior to 105.0.5195.52 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page.",
  "id": "GHSA-j9cg-v2v5-9p35",
  "modified": "2025-05-22T15:34:42Z",
  "published": "2022-09-27T00:00:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3044"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2022/08/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_30.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://crbug.com/1051198"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/40051481"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/T4NMJURTG5RO3TGD7ZMIQ6Z4ZZ3SAVYE"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/T4NMJURTG5RO3TGD7ZMIQ6Z4ZZ3SAVYE"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202209-23"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J9FC-W3MR-X6MV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 21:12 – Updated: 2026-07-24 21:12
VLAI
Summary
Budibase: Privilege escalation via public role assignment API missing app-level authorization
Details

Summary

Budibase 3.39.19 (commit 03fbabae4) is affected by a privilege-escalation / missing-authorization flaw in the public role-assignment API. An app-scoped builder (a user who builds only specific apps — user.builder.apps = [appA], not a global builder or admin) can grant themselves builder access to ANY other app in the tenant, or assign themselves/any user an arbitrary data-plane role (e.g. ADMIN) in any app, by calling POST /api/public/v1/roles/assign. The endpoint only authorizes the two global flags (admin, builder); the per-app appBuilder and role:{appId,roleId} grant vectors are passed to the backend without any authorization check that the caller controls the target app. Reproduced in a local authorized lab using the verbatim authorization-gate and SDK logic.

This is an incomplete fix of the role-assignment hardening in commit d63d1d9054 ("Inline public user global role validation"), which only ever validated the global flags.

Details

The issue is caused by authorization being implemented as a flag-level allowlist (admin/builder) instead of validating the scope the caller is granting.

Relevant code paths:

  • packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/globalRoleValidation.tsvalidateGlobalRoleUpdate(ctx, roleUpdate) only checks roleUpdate.admin (requires isAdmin) and roleUpdate.builder (requires isGlobalBuilder). The GlobalRoleUpdate interface declares only { builder?, admin? }; appBuilder and role are not referenced.
  • packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/roles.tsassign() does const { userIds, ...assignmentProps } = ctx.request.body; validateGlobalRoleUpdate(ctx, assignmentProps); await sdk.publicApi.roles.assign(userIds, assignmentProps). The appBuilder/role props pass through unvalidated.
  • packages/pro/src/sdk/publicApi/roles.tsassign(): for opts.appBuilder it sets user.builder = { apps: existing.concat([getProdWorkspaceID(opts.appBuilder.appId)]) }; for opts.role it sets user.roles[getProdWorkspaceID(opts.role.appId)] = opts.role.roleId. No check that the caller builds the target app, and userIds is an arbitrary list (bulkGet). The only gate is the isExpandedPublicApiEnabled() license check.
  • packages/server/src/api/routes/public/index.tsapplyAdminRoutes(roleEndpoints) attaches only middleware.builderOrAdmin (no publicApi, no authorized(PermissionType.USER, …)).
  • packages/backend-core/src/middleware/builderOrAdmin.ts — with a workspaceId present, it only requires isBuilder(ctx.user, workspaceId). The attacker sets x-budibase-app-id to their own app (appA), so the gate passes.
  • packages/backend-core/src/middleware/builderOnly.ts — on the worker, POST /api/global/self/api_key only requires hasBuilderPermissions(ctx.user), which is true for app-scoped builders, so the attacker can self-issue a public API key.
  • packages/shared-core/src/sdk/documents/users.tsisGlobalBuilder is false for app-scoped builders (so the global builder flag is correctly blocked), while isBuilder(user, appA) and hasBuilderPermissions(user) are true.

Attack flow:

  1. Attacker is an app-scoped builder of appA only (no global builder/admin).
  2. POST /api/global/self/api_key (worker) — passes builderOnly via hasBuilderPermissions → attacker obtains a public API key.
  3. POST /api/public/v1/roles/assign with header x-budibase-app-id: <appA prod id> and body {"userIds":["<self>"],"appBuilder":{"appId":"<appB>"}}builderOrAdmin passes (isBuilder(user, appA)), validateGlobalRoleUpdate ignores appBuilder, the SDK pushes appB into user.builder.apps.
  4. Attacker is now a builder of appB (and, via the role vector, can set any data-role such as ADMIN in any app).

Security boundary crossed:

  • Before: builder of appA only.
  • After: builder of appB (and any other app) → read/modify all rows, read datasource configs and exfiltrate stored datasource credentials, edit automations (including the bash/executeScript/executeQuery steps); plus arbitrary data-role assignment in any app.
  • Why disallowed: the per-app builder model is meant to isolate builders to their assigned apps; a builder of one app must not gain authority over apps they were never granted.

PoC

Environment:

  • Budibase version: 3.39.19, commit 03fbabae4
  • Deployment: Business/Enterprise license required (isExpandedPublicApiEnabled)
  • Attacker role: app-scoped builder (user.builder.apps=[appA]), not global builder/admin
  • Mock services: none needed for the unit-level proof; HTTP PoC script provided for a licensed lab

Steps (unit-level proof, no license needed — verbatim auth-gate + SDK logic):

  1. Run the verification harness:
cd D:/CVE-Hunting/budibase-audit-output/lab
node harness/verify-privesc-authz.cjs
  1. Observed result (evidence: evidence/lab-privesc-authz.log):
[PASS-VALIDATION] appBuilder:{appId:APP_B}          -> NOT rejected
[PASS-VALIDATION] role:{appId:APP_B, roleId:'ADMIN'}-> NOT rejected
[BLOCKED 403]      builder:true (global)            -> Only global builders or admins ...
[BLOCKED 403]      admin:true (global)              -> Only global admins ...
after : builder={"apps":["app_A...","app_B..."]} roles={"app_B...":"ADMIN"}
isBuilder(attacker, APP_B) now = true   <-- escalated to builder of APP_B

Steps (HTTP PoC for a licensed lab — poc/privesc-roles-assign.sh):

# 1) self-issue API key
curl -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/global/self/api_key -H "Cookie: <attacker session>" -d '{}'
# 2) escalate: grant self builder of appB
curl -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/public/v1/roles/assign \
  -H "x-budibase-api-key: <KEY>" -H "x-budibase-app-id: <appA prod id>" \
  -H "content-type: application/json" \
  -d '{"userIds":["<self global id>"],"appBuilder":{"appId":"<appB>"}}'
  1. Expected result:
The request should be rejected (403) — an app-scoped builder must not be able to grant
itself builder/role access to an app it does not control. Instead it returns 200 and the
grant is applied.

Evidence files:

  • evidence/lab-privesc-authz.log
  • poc/verify-privesc-authz.cjs, poc/privesc-roles-assign.sh

Runtime limitation: full HTTP end-to-end requires a Business/Enterprise license (isExpandedPublicApiEnabled); no license was cracked. The authorization defect is proven at unit level with the verbatim validation + SDK logic, and the route→validation→SDK call chain was independently verified by source review.

Source PoC

Budibase-GHSA-Reports.zip

Impact

An attacker holding an app-scoped builder role on a single app in a licensed (Business/Enterprise) tenant can:

  • escalate to builder of every other app in the tenant (cross-app/workspace isolation bypass);
  • read and modify all rows in those apps;
  • read those apps' datasource configurations and exfiltrate stored datasource credentials;
  • edit automations in those apps, including server-side execution steps;
  • assign arbitrary data-plane roles (e.g. ADMIN) in any app to any user, including themselves.

It does not grant the global admin/builder flags (those are validated), so it is not a direct global-admin takeover; but cross-app builder is effectively a tenant-wide app/data-plane compromise. No real secrets were accessed during testing; the lab used canary-only data.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@budibase/server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "3.38.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-862",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T21:12:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nBudibase `3.39.19` (commit `03fbabae4`) is affected by a privilege-escalation / missing-authorization flaw in the public role-assignment API. An **app-scoped builder** (a user who builds only specific apps \u2014 `user.builder.apps = [appA]`, not a global builder or admin) can grant **themselves builder access to ANY other app in the tenant**, or assign themselves/any user an arbitrary data-plane role (e.g. `ADMIN`) in any app, by calling `POST /api/public/v1/roles/assign`. The endpoint only authorizes the two *global* flags (`admin`, `builder`); the per-app `appBuilder` and `role:{appId,roleId}` grant vectors are passed to the backend **without any authorization check that the caller controls the target app**. Reproduced in a local authorized lab using the verbatim authorization-gate and SDK logic.\n\nThis is an incomplete fix of the role-assignment hardening in commit `d63d1d9054` (\"Inline public user global role validation\"), which only ever validated the global flags.\n\n### Details\n\nThe issue is caused by authorization being implemented as a **flag-level allowlist** (`admin`/`builder`) instead of validating the *scope* the caller is granting.\n\nRelevant code paths:\n\n- `packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/globalRoleValidation.ts` \u2014 `validateGlobalRoleUpdate(ctx, roleUpdate)` only checks `roleUpdate.admin` (requires `isAdmin`) and `roleUpdate.builder` (requires `isGlobalBuilder`). The `GlobalRoleUpdate` interface declares only `{ builder?, admin? }`; `appBuilder` and `role` are not referenced.\n- `packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/roles.ts` \u2014 `assign()` does `const { userIds, ...assignmentProps } = ctx.request.body; validateGlobalRoleUpdate(ctx, assignmentProps); await sdk.publicApi.roles.assign(userIds, assignmentProps)`. The `appBuilder`/`role` props pass through unvalidated.\n- `packages/pro/src/sdk/publicApi/roles.ts` \u2014 `assign()`: for `opts.appBuilder` it sets `user.builder = { apps: existing.concat([getProdWorkspaceID(opts.appBuilder.appId)]) }`; for `opts.role` it sets `user.roles[getProdWorkspaceID(opts.role.appId)] = opts.role.roleId`. No check that the caller builds the target app, and `userIds` is an arbitrary list (`bulkGet`). The only gate is the `isExpandedPublicApiEnabled()` license check.\n- `packages/server/src/api/routes/public/index.ts` \u2014 `applyAdminRoutes(roleEndpoints)` attaches **only** `middleware.builderOrAdmin` (no `publicApi`, no `authorized(PermissionType.USER, \u2026)`).\n- `packages/backend-core/src/middleware/builderOrAdmin.ts` \u2014 with a `workspaceId` present, it only requires `isBuilder(ctx.user, workspaceId)`. The attacker sets `x-budibase-app-id` to **their own** app (appA), so the gate passes.\n- `packages/backend-core/src/middleware/builderOnly.ts` \u2014 on the worker, `POST /api/global/self/api_key` only requires `hasBuilderPermissions(ctx.user)`, which is true for app-scoped builders, so the attacker can self-issue a public API key.\n- `packages/shared-core/src/sdk/documents/users.ts` \u2014 `isGlobalBuilder` is false for app-scoped builders (so the global `builder` flag is correctly blocked), while `isBuilder(user, appA)` and `hasBuilderPermissions(user)` are true.\n\nAttack flow:\n\n1. Attacker is an app-scoped builder of `appA` only (no global builder/admin).\n2. `POST /api/global/self/api_key` (worker) \u2014 passes `builderOnly` via `hasBuilderPermissions` \u2192 attacker obtains a public API key.\n3. `POST /api/public/v1/roles/assign` with header `x-budibase-app-id: \u003cappA prod id\u003e` and body `{\"userIds\":[\"\u003cself\u003e\"],\"appBuilder\":{\"appId\":\"\u003cappB\u003e\"}}` \u2014 `builderOrAdmin` passes (`isBuilder(user, appA)`), `validateGlobalRoleUpdate` ignores `appBuilder`, the SDK pushes `appB` into `user.builder.apps`.\n4. Attacker is now a builder of `appB` (and, via the `role` vector, can set any data-role such as `ADMIN` in any app).\n\nSecurity boundary crossed:\n\n- **Before:** builder of `appA` only.\n- **After:** builder of `appB` (and any other app) \u2192 read/modify all rows, read datasource configs and exfiltrate stored datasource credentials, edit automations (including the `bash`/`executeScript`/`executeQuery` steps); plus arbitrary data-role assignment in any app.\n- **Why disallowed:** the per-app builder model is meant to isolate builders to their assigned apps; a builder of one app must not gain authority over apps they were never granted.\n\n### PoC\n\nEnvironment:\n\n- Budibase version: `3.39.19`, commit `03fbabae4`\n- Deployment: Business/Enterprise license required (`isExpandedPublicApiEnabled`)\n- Attacker role: app-scoped builder (`user.builder.apps=[appA]`), not global builder/admin\n- Mock services: none needed for the unit-level proof; HTTP PoC script provided for a licensed lab\n\nSteps (unit-level proof, no license needed \u2014 verbatim auth-gate + SDK logic):\n\n1. Run the verification harness:\n\n```bash\ncd D:/CVE-Hunting/budibase-audit-output/lab\nnode harness/verify-privesc-authz.cjs\n```\n\n2. Observed result (evidence: `evidence/lab-privesc-authz.log`):\n\n```text\n[PASS-VALIDATION] appBuilder:{appId:APP_B}          -\u003e NOT rejected\n[PASS-VALIDATION] role:{appId:APP_B, roleId:\u0027ADMIN\u0027}-\u003e NOT rejected\n[BLOCKED 403]      builder:true (global)            -\u003e Only global builders or admins ...\n[BLOCKED 403]      admin:true (global)              -\u003e Only global admins ...\nafter : builder={\"apps\":[\"app_A...\",\"app_B...\"]} roles={\"app_B...\":\"ADMIN\"}\nisBuilder(attacker, APP_B) now = true   \u003c-- escalated to builder of APP_B\n```\n\nSteps (HTTP PoC for a licensed lab \u2014 `poc/privesc-roles-assign.sh`):\n\n```bash\n# 1) self-issue API key\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/global/self/api_key -H \"Cookie: \u003cattacker session\u003e\" -d \u0027{}\u0027\n# 2) escalate: grant self builder of appB\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/public/v1/roles/assign \\\n  -H \"x-budibase-api-key: \u003cKEY\u003e\" -H \"x-budibase-app-id: \u003cappA prod id\u003e\" \\\n  -H \"content-type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"userIds\":[\"\u003cself global id\u003e\"],\"appBuilder\":{\"appId\":\"\u003cappB\u003e\"}}\u0027\n```\n\n3. Expected result:\n\n```text\nThe request should be rejected (403) \u2014 an app-scoped builder must not be able to grant\nitself builder/role access to an app it does not control. Instead it returns 200 and the\ngrant is applied.\n```\n\nEvidence files:\n\n- `evidence/lab-privesc-authz.log`\n- `poc/verify-privesc-authz.cjs`, `poc/privesc-roles-assign.sh`\n\n**Runtime limitation:** full HTTP end-to-end requires a Business/Enterprise license (`isExpandedPublicApiEnabled`); no license was cracked. The authorization defect is proven at unit level with the verbatim validation + SDK logic, and the route\u2192validation\u2192SDK call chain was independently verified by source review.\n\n### Source PoC\n\n[Budibase-GHSA-Reports.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29161435/Budibase-GHSA-Reports.zip)\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker holding an **app-scoped builder** role on a single app in a licensed (Business/Enterprise) tenant can:\n\n* escalate to builder of **every other app** in the tenant (cross-app/workspace isolation bypass);\n* read and modify all rows in those apps;\n* read those apps\u0027 datasource configurations and **exfiltrate stored datasource credentials**;\n* edit automations in those apps, including server-side execution steps;\n* assign arbitrary data-plane roles (e.g. `ADMIN`) in any app to any user, including themselves.\n\nIt does **not** grant the global `admin`/`builder` flags (those are validated), so it is not a direct global-admin takeover; but cross-app builder is effectively a tenant-wide app/data-plane compromise. No real secrets were accessed during testing; the lab used canary-only data.",
  "id": "GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv",
  "modified": "2026-07-24T21:12:40Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T21:12:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.40.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": " Budibase: Privilege escalation via public role assignment API missing app-level authorization"
}

GHSA-J9JX-HP4C-GHHH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-12 21:53 – Updated: 2026-07-21 14:43
VLAI
Summary
File Browser has incorrect access control for public directory shares via rule path rebasing
Details

Summary

File Browser's public share handlers rebase the share owner's filesystem root to the shared directory and then evaluate descendant paths against the owner's global and per-user rules using the rebased relative path instead of the original path relative to the owner's scope.

As a result, an attacker who knows a public directory share URL can access files and subdirectories that the owner explicitly blocked with rules, as long as those blocked paths are located underneath the shared directory. In the simplest case this is an unauthenticated information disclosure through GET /api/public/share/* and GET /api/public/dl/*.

Details

The public share flow first resolves the original shared path under the owner's filesystem, but then switches d.user.Fs to a new BasePathFs rooted at the shared directory. The follow-up authorization check is still performed by d.Check, which compares the request path to rule strings using prefix matching.

When the share target is a directory, the path passed to d.Check becomes relative to the shared directory, while the rules remain relative to the owner's original scope. A deny rule such as /projects/private therefore no longer matches a public share request for /private/secret.txt, even though the rebased filesystem resolves that request to the real path /projects/private/secret.txt.

Core vulnerable code path:

// http/public.go
if file.IsDir {
    basePath = filepath.Clean(link.Path)
    filePath = ifPath
}

d.user.Fs = afero.NewBasePathFs(d.user.Fs, basePath)

file, err = files.NewFileInfo(&files.FileOptions{
    Fs:      d.user.Fs,
    Path:    filePath,
    Expand:  true,
    Checker: d,
})
// http/data.go and rules/rules.go
func (d *data) Check(path string) bool {
    allow := true
    for _, rule := range d.settings.Rules {
        if rule.Matches(path) {
            allow = rule.Allow
        }
    }
    for _, rule := range d.user.Rules {
        if rule.Matches(path) {
            allow = rule.Allow
        }
    }
    return allow
}

func (r *Rule) Matches(path string) bool {
    if path == r.Path {
        return true
    }
    prefix := r.Path
    if prefix != "/" && !strings.HasSuffix(prefix, "/") {
        prefix += "/"
    }
    return strings.HasPrefix(path, prefix)
}

The issue is reachable from the public endpoints registered in http/http.go for /api/public/share/* and /api/public/dl/*.

PoC

The attacker only needs a directory share URL. No authenticated session is required if the share is not password protected.

Reproduction flow:

  1. Prepare a directory owned by a normal user, for example /projects/.
  2. Inside it, create a sensitive child path such as /projects/private/secret.txt.
  3. Configure a deny rule for the share owner that blocks /projects/private.
  4. Have the owner create a public share for /projects/.
  5. Request the blocked child path through the public share endpoints.

PoC:

# owner creates a public share for /projects/
curl -s -X POST 'http://HOST/api/share/projects/' \
  -H 'X-Auth: <OWNER_JWT>' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{}'

The response contains a share hash such as:

{"hash":"<HASH>","path":"/projects/","userID":2,"expire":0}

The attacker can then access a rule-blocked file below the shared directory:

curl -i 'http://HOST/api/public/dl/<HASH>/private/secret.txt'

A blocked subdirectory can also be listed directly:

curl -i 'http://HOST/api/public/share/<HASH>/private/'

the server returns 200 OK and serves the file content or directory listing, even though the share owner's rules should have made that path inaccessible.

Impact

This flaw allows public share recipients to read files and browse directories that the share owner explicitly intended to block with File Browser rules. Because the vulnerable path is the public share feature, the exposure can be unauthenticated and internet-reachable whenever a share link is exposed.

In practical deployments, this can disclose secrets, configuration files, backup material, private project directories, or any other content that administrators or users attempted to hide beneath a shared parent directory using the built-in rule system.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.63.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.63.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54091"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-12T21:53:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T19:16:41Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nFile Browser\u0027s public share handlers rebase the share owner\u0027s filesystem root to the shared directory and then evaluate descendant paths against the owner\u0027s global and per-user rules using the rebased relative path instead of the original path relative to the owner\u0027s scope.\n\nAs a result, an attacker who knows a public directory share URL can access files and subdirectories that the owner explicitly blocked with rules, as long as those blocked paths are located underneath the shared directory. In the simplest case this is an unauthenticated information disclosure through `GET /api/public/share/*` and `GET /api/public/dl/*`.\n\n### Details\nThe public share flow first resolves the original shared path under the owner\u0027s filesystem, but then switches `d.user.Fs` to a new `BasePathFs` rooted at the shared directory. The follow-up authorization check is still performed by `d.Check`, which compares the request path to rule strings using prefix matching.\n\nWhen the share target is a directory, the path passed to `d.Check` becomes relative to the shared directory, while the rules remain relative to the owner\u0027s original scope. A deny rule such as `/projects/private` therefore no longer matches a public share request for `/private/secret.txt`, even though the rebased filesystem resolves that request to the real path `/projects/private/secret.txt`.\n\nCore vulnerable code path:\n\n```go\n// http/public.go\nif file.IsDir {\n    basePath = filepath.Clean(link.Path)\n    filePath = ifPath\n}\n\nd.user.Fs = afero.NewBasePathFs(d.user.Fs, basePath)\n\nfile, err = files.NewFileInfo(\u0026files.FileOptions{\n    Fs:      d.user.Fs,\n    Path:    filePath,\n    Expand:  true,\n    Checker: d,\n})\n```\n\n```go\n// http/data.go and rules/rules.go\nfunc (d *data) Check(path string) bool {\n    allow := true\n    for _, rule := range d.settings.Rules {\n        if rule.Matches(path) {\n            allow = rule.Allow\n        }\n    }\n    for _, rule := range d.user.Rules {\n        if rule.Matches(path) {\n            allow = rule.Allow\n        }\n    }\n    return allow\n}\n\nfunc (r *Rule) Matches(path string) bool {\n    if path == r.Path {\n        return true\n    }\n    prefix := r.Path\n    if prefix != \"/\" \u0026\u0026 !strings.HasSuffix(prefix, \"/\") {\n        prefix += \"/\"\n    }\n    return strings.HasPrefix(path, prefix)\n}\n```\n\nThe issue is reachable from the public endpoints registered in `http/http.go` for `/api/public/share/*` and `/api/public/dl/*`.\n\n### PoC\nThe attacker only needs a directory share URL. No authenticated session is required if the share is not password protected.\n\nReproduction flow:\n\n1. Prepare a directory owned by a normal user, for example `/projects/`.\n2. Inside it, create a sensitive child path such as `/projects/private/secret.txt`.\n3. Configure a deny rule for the share owner that blocks `/projects/private`.\n4. Have the owner create a public share for `/projects/`.\n5. Request the blocked child path through the public share endpoints.\n\nPoC:\n\n```bash\n# owner creates a public share for /projects/\ncurl -s -X POST \u0027http://HOST/api/share/projects/\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027X-Auth: \u003cOWNER_JWT\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{}\u0027\n```\n\nThe response contains a share hash such as:\n\n```text\n{\"hash\":\"\u003cHASH\u003e\",\"path\":\"/projects/\",\"userID\":2,\"expire\":0}\n```\n\nThe attacker can then access a rule-blocked file below the shared directory:\n\n```bash\ncurl -i \u0027http://HOST/api/public/dl/\u003cHASH\u003e/private/secret.txt\u0027\n```\n\nA blocked subdirectory can also be listed directly:\n\n```bash\ncurl -i \u0027http://HOST/api/public/share/\u003cHASH\u003e/private/\u0027\n```\n\nthe server returns `200 OK` and serves the file content or directory listing, even though the share owner\u0027s rules should have made that path inaccessible.\n\n### Impact\nThis flaw allows public share recipients to read files and browse directories that the share owner explicitly intended to block with File Browser rules. Because the vulnerable path is the public share feature, the exposure can be unauthenticated and internet-reachable whenever a share link is exposed.\n\nIn practical deployments, this can disclose secrets, configuration files, backup material, private project directories, or any other content that administrators or users attempted to hide beneath a shared parent directory using the built-in rule system.",
  "id": "GHSA-j9jx-hp4c-ghhh",
  "modified": "2026-07-21T14:43:25Z",
  "published": "2026-06-12T21:53:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-j9jx-hp4c-ghhh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54091"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/commit/e07c59df0b850f5924d5b1683e8609661ddcf534"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/releases/tag/v2.63.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "File Browser has incorrect access control for public directory shares via rule path rebasing"
}

GHSA-J9PJ-FF73-Q8XM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:10 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:10
VLAI
Details

ntermittent authorization failure in aaa tacacs+ with Brocade Fabric OS versions before Brocade Fabric OS v9.0.1b and after 9.0.0, also in Brocade Fabric OS before Brocade Fabric OS v8.2.3a and after v8.2.0 could cause a user with a valid account to be unable to log into the switch.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-27793"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-08-12T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "ntermittent authorization failure in aaa tacacs+ with Brocade Fabric OS versions before Brocade Fabric OS v9.0.1b and after 9.0.0, also in Brocade Fabric OS before Brocade Fabric OS v8.2.3a and after v8.2.0 could cause a user with a valid account to be unable to log into the switch.",
  "id": "GHSA-j9pj-ff73-q8xm",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:10:57Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:10:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27793"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20210819-0001"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.broadcom.com/support/fibre-channel-networking/security-advisories/brocade-security-advisory-2021-1553"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.