CWE-706

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-35337"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-706"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-07-01T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Sourcecodester Phone Shop Sales Managements System 1.0 is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). Any attacker will be able to see the invoices of different users by changing the id parameter.",
  "id": "GHSA-qr79-4qwm-2cwc",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:06:42Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:06:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-35337"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/50050"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.8.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "directus"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.8.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-27295"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-706"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-03-01T16:58:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-03-01T16:15:46Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Password reset vulnerable to accent confusion\n\nThe password reset mechanism of the Directus backend is implemented in a way where combined with (specific, need to double check if i can work around) configuration in MySQL or MariaDB. As such, it allows attackers to receive a password reset email of a victim user, specifically having it arrive at a similar email address as the victim with a one or more characters changed to use accents. \n\nThis is due to the fact that by default MySQL/MariaDB are configured for accent-insenstive and case-insensitve comparisons.\n\nMySQL weak comparison:\n```sql\nselect 1 from directus_users where \u0027julian@cure53.de\u0027 = \u0027julian@c\u00fcre53.de\u0027;\n```\n\nThis is exploitable due to an error in the API using the supplied email address for sending the reset password mail instead of using the email from the database.\n\n### Steps to reproduce:\n\n1. If the attacker knows the email address of the victim user, i.e., `julian@cure53.de`. (possibly just the domain could be enough for an educated guess)\n2. A off-by-one accented domain `c\u00fcre53.de` can be registered to be able to receive emails.\n3. With this email the attacker can request a password reset for `julian@c\u00fcre53.de`. \n```http\nPOST /auth/password/request HTTP/1.1\nHost: example.com\n[...]\n{\"email\":\"julian@c\u00fcre53.de\"}\n```\n4. The supplied email (julian@c\u00fcre53.de) gets checked against the database and will match the non-accented email `julian@cure53.de` and will continue to email the password reset link to the provided email address instead of the saved email address.\n5. With this email the attacker can log into the target account and use it for nefarious things\n\n### Workarounds\nShould be possible with collations but haven\u0027t been able to confirm this. \n\n### References\n- https://www.monolune.com/articles/what-is-the-utf8mb4_0900_ai_ci-collation/\n- https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/8.0/en/charset-unicode-sets.html\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-qw9g-7549-7wg5",
  "modified": "2024-03-01T18:58:40Z",
  "published": "2024-03-01T16:58:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-qw9g-7549-7wg5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27295"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/commit/a8ef790ea2d28b1727f9027d99bd360920d57919"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/8.0/en/charset-unicode-sets.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/directus/directus"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.monolune.com/articles/what-is-the-utf8mb4_0900_ai_ci-collation"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Directus has MySQL accent insensitive email matching"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-10574"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-706"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-03-14T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in Janus through 0.9.1. janus.c tries to use a string that doesn\u0026#39;t actually exist during a \u0026quot;query_logger\u0026quot; Admin API request, because of a typo in the JSON validation.",
  "id": "GHSA-r7hq-qm3m-7mxv",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T02:49:23Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:11:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10574"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/meetecho/janus-gateway/pull/1989"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-47276"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-706"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-21T15:15:15Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nftrace: Do not blindly read the ip address in ftrace_bug()\n\nIt was reported that a bug on arm64 caused a bad ip address to be used for\nupdating into a nop in ftrace_init(), but the error path (rightfully)\nreturned -EINVAL and not -EFAULT, as the bug caused more than one error to\noccur. But because -EINVAL was returned, the ftrace_bug() tried to report\nwhat was at the location of the ip address, and read it directly. This\ncaused the machine to panic, as the ip was not pointing to a valid memory\naddress.\n\nInstead, read the ip address with copy_from_kernel_nofault() to safely\naccess the memory, and if it faults, report that the address faulted,\notherwise report what was in that location.",
  "id": "GHSA-rgj4-j68m-986v",
  "modified": "2025-04-30T15:30:44Z",
  "published": "2024-05-21T15:31:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47276"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0bc62e398bbd9e600959e610def5109957437b28"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3e4ddeb68751fb4fb657199aed9cfd5d02796875"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4aedc2bc2b32c93555f47c95610efb89cc1ec09b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c14133d2d3f768e0a35128faac8aa6ed4815051"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e4e824b109f1d41ccf223fbb0565d877d6223a2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/862dcc14f2803c556bdd73b43c27b023fafce2fb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97524384762c1fb9b3ded931498dd2047bd0de81"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/acf671ba79c1feccc3ec7cfdcffead4efcec49e7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-27778"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-706"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-06-02T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A use of incorrectly resolved name vulnerability fixed in 7.83.1 might remove the wrong file when `--no-clobber` is used together with `--remove-on-error`.",
  "id": "GHSA-rh8g-j53h-g8xf",
  "modified": "2024-03-27T15:30:35Z",
  "published": "2022-06-03T00:01:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-27778"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/1553598"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20220609-0009"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20220729-0004"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2022.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-jwt"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35039"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289",
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-706"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T04:07:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T17:17:13Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "_NOTE_: While the library exposes a mechanism which could introduce the vulnerability, this issue is created by developer-supplied code and not by the library itself. We will add a warning and some education for users around the possible issues however since the defaults work we will not be updating the library beyond that for this advisory.\n\n## Impact\n\nSetting up a custom cacheKeyBuilder method which does not properly create unique keys for different tokens can lead to cache collisions. This could cause tokens to be mis-identified during the verification process leading to:\n\n- Valid tokens returning claims from different valid tokens\n- Users being mis-identified as other users based on the wrong token\n\nThis could result in:\n- User impersonation - UserB receives UserA\u0027s identity and permissions\n- Privilege escalation - Low-privilege users inherit admin-level access\n- Cross-tenant data access - Users gain access to other tenants\u0027 resources\n- Authorization bypass - Security decisions made on wrong user identity\n\n## Affected Configurations\n\nThis vulnerability ONLY affects applications that BOTH:\n\n1. Enable caching using the cache option\n2. Use custom cacheKeyBuilder functions that can produce collisions\n\nVULNERABLE examples:\n```\n// Collision-prone: same audience = same cache key\ncacheKeyBuilder: (token) =\u003e {\n  const { aud } = parseToken(token)\n  return `aud=${aud}`\n}\n\n// Collision-prone: grouping by user type\ncacheKeyBuilder: (token) =\u003e {\n  const { aud } = parseToken(token)\n  return aud.includes(\u0027admin\u0027) ? \u0027admin-users\u0027 : \u0027regular-users\u0027\n}\n\n// Collision-prone: tenant + service grouping\ncacheKeyBuilder: (token) =\u003e {\n  const { iss, aud } = parseToken(token)\n  return `${iss}-${aud}`\n}\n```\n\nSAFE examples:\n```\n// Default hash-based (recommended)\ncreateVerifier({ cache: true })  // Uses secure default\n\n// Include unique user identifier\ncacheKeyBuilder: (token) =\u003e {\n  const { sub, aud, iat } = parseToken(token)\n  return `${sub}-${aud}-${iat}`\n}\n\n// No caching (always safe)\ncreateVerifier({ cache: false })\n```\n### Not Affected\n\n- Applications using **default caching**\n- Applications with **caching disabled**\n \n## Assessment Guide\n\nTo determine if you\u0027re affected:\n\n1. Check if caching is enabled: Look for cache: true or cache: \u003cnumber\u003e in verifier configuration\n2. Check for custom cache key builders: Look for cacheKeyBuilder function in configuration\n3. Analyze collision potential: Review if your cacheKeyBuilder can produce identical keys for different users/tokens\n4. If no custom cacheKeyBuilder: You are NOT affected (default is safe)\n\n## Mitigations\n\nMitigations include:\n\n- Ensure uniqueness of keys produced in cacheKeyBuilder\n- Remove custom cacheKeyBuilder method\n- Disable caching\n\n---\n\nfast-jwt allows enabling a verification cache through the cache option.\nThe cache key is derived from the token via cacheKeyBuilder.\n\nWhen a custom cacheKeyBuilder produces collisions between different tokens, the verifier may return the cached payload of a previous token instead of validating and returning the payload of the current token.\n\nThis results in cross-token payload reuse and identity confusion.\n\nTwo distinct valid JWTs can be verified successfully but mapped to the same cached entry, causing the verifier to return claims belonging to a different token.\n\nThis affects authentication and authorization decisions when applications trust the returned payload.\n\nAffected component\n\nsrc/verifier.js\n\nRelevant logic:\n\ncache enabled via createCache\n\ncache population via cacheSet\n\nlookup based on cacheKeyBuilder(token)\n\ncached payload returned without re-verification\n\nImpact\n\nIdentity / authorization confusion via cache collision.\n\nIf two tokens generate the same cache key:\n\ntoken A is verified \u2192 payload stored in cache\n\ntoken B is verified \u2192 cache hit occurs\n\nverifier returns payload from token A instead of B\n\nObserved effect:\n\nsubject mismatch\n\nclaim mismatch\n\nauthorization decision performed on wrong identity\n\nPotential real-world consequences:\n\nuser impersonation (logical)\n\nprivilege confusion\n\nincorrect RBAC evaluation\n\ngateway / middleware auth inconsistencies\n\nThis is especially dangerous when:\n\ncache is enabled (recommended for performance)\n\ncustom cacheKeyBuilder is used\n\nidentity claims (sub / aud / iss) drive authorization\n\nRoot cause\n\nThe verifier assumes the cache key uniquely identifies the token and its claims.\n\nHowever:\n\ncacheKeyBuilder is user-controlled\n\ncollisions are not detected\n\ncache entries store decoded payload\n\ncached payload is returned without binding validation\n\nThis creates a trust boundary break between:\n\ntoken \u2192 cache key \u2192 cached payload\n\nProof of concept\n\nEnvironment:\n\nfast-jwt: 6.1.0\n\nNode.js: v24.13.1\n\nPoC:\n\nconst { createSigner, createVerifier } = require(\u0027fast-jwt\u0027)\n\nconst sign = createSigner({ key: \u0027secret\u0027 })\n\n// Two distinct tokens\nconst t1 = sign({ sub: \u0027userA\u0027, aud: \u0027admin\u0027 })\nconst t2 = sign({ sub: \u0027userB\u0027, aud: \u0027admin\u0027 })\n\n// Deliberately unsafe cache key builder (collision)\nconst verify = createVerifier({\n  key: \u0027secret\u0027,\n  cache: true,\n  cacheKeyBuilder: () =\u003e \u0027static-key\u0027\n})\n\nconsole.log(\u0027verify t1\u0027)\nconst p1 = verify(t1)\nconsole.log(\u0027t1 PASS sub=\u0027, p1.sub)\n\nconsole.log(\u0027verify t2\u0027)\nconst p2 = verify(t2)\nconsole.log(\u0027t2 PASS sub=\u0027, p2.sub)\n\nconsole.log(\u0027verify t2 again\u0027)\nconst p3 = verify(t2)\nconsole.log(\u0027t2-again PASS sub=\u0027, p3.sub)\n\nconsole.log(\u0027verify t1 again\u0027)\nconst p4 = verify(t1)\nconsole.log(\u0027t1-again PASS sub=\u0027, p4.sub)\n\nObserved output:\n\nverify t1\nt1 PASS sub= userA\n\nverify t2\nt2 PASS sub= userA\n\nverify t2 again\nt2-again PASS sub= userA\n\nverify t1 again\nt1-again PASS sub= userA\n\nThe verifier returns payload from userA when verifying userB.\n\nExpected behavior\n\nCache must not allow returning claims from a different token.\n\nVerification must remain bound to the actual token being validated.\n\nEven if cache collisions occur, the verifier should:\n\nrevalidate signature\n\nre-decode payload\n\nor invalidate cache entry\n\nWhy this is not \u201cjust misuse\u201d\n\nThis is not merely a user mistake.\n\nReasons:\n\nfast-jwt explicitly exposes cacheKeyBuilder as an extension point.\n\nThe documentation suggests performance tuning via custom key builders.\n\nNo safeguards exist against collisions.\n\nNo verification binding is performed between:\n\ncached payload\n\noriginal token\n\nThe verifier trusts cache output as authoritative identity.\n\nThis creates a security-sensitive invariant:\n\n\"cache key uniqueness\"\n\nwhich is neither enforced nor validated.\n\nSecurity-critical libraries must assume extension hooks can be misused and implement defensive checks, especially when identity decisions are derived from cached values.\n\nSecurity classification\n\nlogical authorization flaw\n\ncache confusion vulnerability\n\nidentity boundary break\n\nClosest CWE:\n\nCWE-440 \u2014 Expected Behavior Violation\n\nSuggested fix (minimal and safe)\n\nBind cache entries to token integrity.\n\nOption A \u2014 safest:\n\nStore token hash along with payload and verify match before returning cache.\n\nConceptual patch:\n\nconst tokenHash = hashToken(token)\n\ncache.set(key, { tokenHash, payload })\n\n...\n\nconst entry = cache.get(key)\n\nif (entry \u0026\u0026 entry.tokenHash === hashToken(token)) {\n  return entry.payload\n}\n\nOption B \u2014 simpler:\n\nDisable cache usage when custom cacheKeyBuilder is provided.\n\nOption C \u2014 defensive:\n\nAlways re-validate signature when cache hit occurs.\n\nNotes\n\nDefault cacheKeyBuilder is safe (hash-based).\n\nIssue appears when custom builders are used \u2014 a documented and supported feature.\n\nImpact increases in:\n\nAPI gateways\n\nauth middleware\n\nRBAC layers relying on payload.sub / payload.aud\n\nThis vulnerability is independent from:\n\nRegExp statefulness issue\n\nReDoS claim validation issue\n\nIt is a separate flaw in cache design and trust model.\n\nPoC did on my computer:\n\u0027use strict\u0027\n\nconst fs = require(\u0027node:fs\u0027)\nconst path = require(\u0027node:path\u0027)\nconst { createSigner, createVerifier } = require(\u0027./src\u0027)\n\nfunction nowSec() {\n  return Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)\n}\n\nconst sign = createSigner({ key: \u0027secret\u0027 })\nconst t1 = sign({ sub: \u0027userA\u0027, aud: \u0027admin\u0027, iat: nowSec() })\nconst t2 = sign({ sub: \u0027userB\u0027, aud: \u0027admin\u0027, iat: nowSec() })\n\nfunction badKeyBuilder() {\n  return \u0027aud=admin\u0027\n}\n\nconst verify = createVerifier({\n  key: \u0027secret\u0027,\n  cache: true,\n  cacheTTL: 60000,\n  cacheKeyBuilder: badKeyBuilder\n})\n\nfunction run(tok) {\n  try {\n    const out = verify(tok)\n    return { ok: true, sub: out.sub, aud: out.aud }\n  } catch (e) {\n    return { ok: false, code: e.code || String(e), message: e.message }\n  }\n}\n\nconst results = []\nresults.push({ step: \u0027verify(t1)\u0027, token: \u0027t1\u0027, result: run(t1) })\nresults.push({ step: \u0027verify(t2)\u0027, token: \u0027t2\u0027, result: run(t2) })\nresults.push({ step: \u0027verify(t2) again\u0027, token: \u0027t2\u0027, result: run(t2) })\nresults.push({ step: \u0027verify(t1) again\u0027, token: \u0027t1\u0027, result: run(t1) })\n\nconst evidence = {\n  title: \u0027fast-jwt cache confusion when cacheKeyBuilder collisions occur\u0027,\n  environment: {\n    node: process.version,\n    fastJwt: require(\u0027./package.json\u0027).version\n  },\n  config: {\n    cache: true,\n    cacheTTL: 60000,\n    cacheKeyBuilder: \"returns constant key \u0027aud=admin\u0027 (realistic collision pattern)\"\n  },\n  tokens: {\n    t1: { claims: { sub: \u0027userA\u0027, aud: \u0027admin\u0027 }, jwt: t1 },\n    t2: { claims: { sub: \u0027userB\u0027, aud: \u0027admin\u0027 }, jwt: t2 }\n  },\n  observed: results\n}\n\nconst outPath = path.join(process.cwd(), \u0027evidence-cache-keybuilder-confusion.json\u0027)\nfs.writeFileSync(outPath, JSON.stringify(evidence, null, 2))\nconsole.log(\u0027Wrote evidence to:\u0027, outPath)\n\nfor (const r of results) {\n  console.log(r.step, \u0027=\u003e\u0027, r.result.ok ? `PASS sub=${r.result.sub}` : `FAIL ${r.result.code}`)\n}\n\nOutput:\nPS C:\\Users\\Franciny Rojas\\Desktop\\crypto-research\\fast-jwt\u003e node poc_cache_keybuilder_confusion_evidence.js\nWrote evidence to: C:\\Users\\Franciny Rojas\\Desktop\\crypto-research\\fast-jwt\\evidence-cache-keybuilder-confusion.json\nverify(t1) =\u003e PASS sub=userA\nverify(t2) =\u003e PASS sub=userA\nverify(t2) again =\u003e PASS sub=userA\nverify(t1) again =\u003e PASS sub=userA\nPS C:\\Users\\Franciny Rojas\\Desktop\\crypto-research\\fast-jwt\u003e",
  "id": "GHSA-rp9m-7r4c-75qg",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T11:54:56Z",
  "published": "2026-04-03T04:07:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/security/advisories/GHSA-rp9m-7r4c-75qg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35039"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/commit/de121056c6415b58770c60640881eaec67ac4ceb"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "fast-jwt: Cache Confusion via cacheKeyBuilder Collisions Can Return Claims From a Different Token (Identity/Authorization Mixup)"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "gix-path"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.10.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-45305"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-706"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-09-03T20:21:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-09-02T18:15:36Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`gix-path` executes `git` to find the path of a configuration file that belongs to the `git` installation itself, but mistakenly treats the local repository\u0027s configuration as system-wide if no higher scoped configuration is found. In rare cases, this causes a less trusted repository to be treated as more trusted, or leaks sensitive information from one repository to another, such as sending credentials to another repository\u0027s remote.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `gix_path::env`, the underlying implementation of the `installation_config` and `installation_config_prefix` functions calls `git config -l --show-origin` and parses the first line of the output to extract the path to the configuration file holding the configuration variable of highest [scope](https://git-scm.com/docs/git-config#SCOPES):\n\nhttps://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/blob/12251eb052df30105538fa831e641eea557f13d8/gix-path/src/env/git/mod.rs#L91\n\nhttps://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/blob/12251eb052df30105538fa831e641eea557f13d8/gix-path/src/env/git/mod.rs#L112\n\nWhile the configuration variable of highest scope is not usually in the local scope, there are practical situations where this occurs:\n\n- A configuration file truly associated with the installation is not present on all systems and can occasionally be empty. Likewise, there may be no variables in the global scope.\n- Configuration files associated with those higher scopes may be deliberately skipped by setting the `GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM` and `GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL` environment variables to `/dev/null` (or to `NUL` on Windows). This prevents `gix-path` from finding the path of configuration files for those scopes, while not preventing downstream components such as the function in `gix-config` from reporting a local path as being associated with the installation.\n- The `GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM` environment variable can be used to disable configuration associated with the installation. (`GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM=1` is more powerful than `GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/dev/null` on systems where an additional \"unknown\" scope is associated with the installation, as occurs on macOS with Apple Git.) This will cause the local scope to be the highest nonempty scope under even more situations, though in practice it is less dangerous because most, though possibly not all, downstream components would disregard the value.\n\nA user may use either or both of the latter two techniques to turn off an undesired configuration or to create a more replicable environment. Such a user would expect that this results in a more controlled configuration.\n\nOften, when located inside one repository, a user performs operations on that repository or that are not specific to any repository. In such use, local configuration is typically desired or at least acceptable, and mistaking it as coming from another scope is not typically harmful.\n\nHowever, sometimes a user is in one repository and operates on another repository. A major case where this occurs is cloning one repository while located in another. This can be done in an ad-hoc fashion, including when cloning the repository outside of the one we are inside. It may also potentially be automated by an application for purposes such as submodule handling. Two kinds of problems are anticipated:\n\n- A less secure configuration may be set for a specific repository where it is judged acceptable, even though it would not be wanted for other repositories, such as to enable a protocol or set up debugging.\n- More likely, a configuration that supplies secrets for use in one repository\u0027s remote can be used to send those secrets to another repository\u0027s remote.\n\n### PoC\n\nIn this example, we send mock `Authorization: Basic ...` credentials meant for one repository\u0027s remote to another remote, by running `gix` while inside the first repository to clone the second repository.\n\nThese instructions are written for a Unix shell, but they will work in other shells, including in PowerShell on Windows if the method of setting environment variables is adapted and `/dev/null` is replaced with `NUL`. This procedure is likely to demonstrate the problem on all systems *except* macOS. This is due to the high-scoped \"unknown\" configuration that usually accompanies Apple Git, and reflects that gix-path is in practice much less vulnerable on macOS (though still potentially vulnerable).\n\n1. Install [`dummyhttp`](https://crates.io/crates/dummyhttp) to serve as a local HTTP server for the demonstration.\n\n2. Obtain a build of `gitoxide` with the `max` feature set enabled. While this vulnerability affects other builds, this example requires `max` for `http.extraHeader` support.\n\n   Running `cargo install gitoxide` will install such a build though it may build against a patched version of `gix-path`. Cloning the repository (12251eb052df30105538fa831e641eea557f13d8 and earlier are affected) and building with `cargo build` or `cargo install --path .` are also sufficient. In contrast, installing from published binaries with `binstall` or `quickinstall` does not provide the `max` feature, as of this writing.\n\n3. Run: `dummyhttp -i 127.0.0.1 -c 403 -v`\n\n4. In a separate terminal, create a new local repository and set up a mock remote and `http.extraHeader` configuration:\n\n   ```sh\n   git init myrepo\n   cd myrepo\n   git remote add origin http://127.0.0.1:8080/mygit.git\n   git config --local http.extraHeader \u0027Authorization: Basic abcde\u0027\n   ```\n\n5. Make sure the testing setup is working by running `gix fetch` in the repository and checking that it fails in the expected way. In the terminal where that is run, a message should be shown indicating an HTTP 403 error. The more interesting output is in the terminal where `dummyhttp` is running, which should look like this:\n\n   ```text\n   2024-30-30 03:30:16 127.0.0.1:55689 GET /myrepo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack HTTP/1.1\n   \u250c\u2500Incoming request\n   \u2502 GET /myrepo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack HTTP/1.1\n   \u2502 Accept: */*\n   \u2502 Authorization: Basic abcde\n   \u2502 Git-Protocol: version=2\n   \u2502 Host: 127.0.0.1:8080\n   \u2502 User-Agent: git/oxide-0.42.2\n   \u250c\u2500Outgoing response\n   \u2502 HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\n   \u2502 Content-Length: 9\n   \u2502 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\n   \u2502 Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2024 03:30:16 -0400\n   ```\n\n   Some details may differ, especially dates and times. But `Authorization: Basic abcde` should be shown.\n\n6. Now, in the terminal where you ran `gix fetch`, try cloning a separate repository:\n\n   ```sh\n   gix clone http://127.0.0.1:8080/other.git\n   ```\n\n   Check the output appended in the terminal where `dummyhttp` is running. This is to observe that `Authorization: Basic abcde` was rightly *not* sent.\n\n   Alternatively, if it *does* appear, then your system may be in one of the uncommon configurations that is vulnerable without further action.\n\n7. Now rerun that command, but with a modified environment, to cause `gix-path` to wrongly treat configuration from the local scope as being associated with the `git` installation:\n\n   ```sh\n   env GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/dev/null GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=/dev/null gix clone http://127.0.0.1:8080/other.git\n   ```\n\n   Check the output appended in the terminal where `dummyhttp` is running. Observe that `Authorization: Basic abcde` was wrongly sent.\n\nWhile this procedure uses the same remote host for both repositories, this is not a required element. If the second repository had a different, untrusted host, the extra header would still be sent.\n\n### Impact\n\nIt is believed to be very difficult to exploit this vulnerability deliberately, due to the need either to anticipate a situation in which higher-scoped configuration variables would be absent, or to arrange for this to happen. Although any operating system may be affected, users running Apple Git on macOS are much less likely to be affected.\n\nIn the example shown above, more secure general practices would avoid it: using a credential manager, or even using `http.\u003curl\u003e.extraHeader` with as specific a `\u003curl\u003e` as possible, rather than the more general `http.extraHeader`. Many scenarios are analogous: if each repository\u0027s configuration is as secure as possible for how the repository is used, and secrets are stored securely and separately, then the circumstances under which an unacceptably unsecure configuration is used, or under which a leak of credentials would occur, become unlikely.",
  "id": "GHSA-v26r-4c9c-h3j6",
  "modified": "2024-09-04T17:18:40Z",
  "published": "2024-09-03T20:21:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/security/advisories/GHSA-v26r-4c9c-h3j6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45305"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git-scm.com/docs/git-config#SCOPES"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/blob/12251eb052df30105538fa831e641eea557f13d8/gix-path/src/env/git/mod.rs#L112"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/blob/12251eb052df30105538fa831e641eea557f13d8/gix-path/src/env/git/mod.rs#L91"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2024-0367.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "gix-path uses local config across repos when it is the highest scope"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "nuxt"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.4.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.12.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-34344"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-706",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-08-05T19:49:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-05T21:15:38Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nDue to the insufficient validation of the `path` parameter in the NuxtTestComponentWrapper, an attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript on the server side, which allows them to execute arbitrary commands.\n\n### Details\nWhile running the test, a special component named `NuxtTestComponentWrapper` is available.\nhttps://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/blob/4779f5906fa4d3c784c2e2d6fe5a5c5f181faaec/packages/nuxt/src/app/components/nuxt-root.vue#L42-L43\n\nThis component loads the specified path as a component and renders it.\n\nhttps://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/blob/4779f5906fa4d3c784c2e2d6fe5a5c5f181faaec/packages/nuxt/src/app/components/test-component-wrapper.ts#L9-L27\n\nThere is a validation for the `path` parameter to check whether the path traversal is performed, but this check is not sufficient.\n\nhttps://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/blob/4779f5906fa4d3c784c2e2d6fe5a5c5f181faaec/packages/nuxt/src/app/components/test-component-wrapper.ts#L15-L19\n\nSince `import(...)` uses `query.path` instead of the normalized `path`, a non-normalized URL can reach the `import(...)` function.\nFor example, passing something like `./components/test` normalizes `path` to `/root/directory/components/test`, but `import(...)` still receives `./components/test`.\n\nBy using this behavior, it\u0027s possible to load arbitrary JavaScript by using the path like the following:\n```\ndata:text/javascript;base64,Y29uc29sZS5sb2coMSk\n```\n\nSince `resolve(...)` resolves the filesystem path, not the URI, the above URI is treated as a relative path, but `import(...)` sees it as an absolute URI, and loads it as a JavaScript.\n\n### PoC\n1. Create a nuxt project and run it in the test mode:\n```\nnpx nuxi@latest init test\ncd test\nTEST=true npm run dev\n```\n2. Open the following URL:\n```\nhttp://localhost:3000/__nuxt_component_test__/?path=data%3Atext%2Fjavascript%3Bbase64%2CKGF3YWl0IGltcG9ydCgnZnMnKSkud3JpdGVGaWxlU3luYygnL3RtcC90ZXN0JywgKGF3YWl0IGltcG9ydCgnY2hpbGRfcHJvY2VzcycpKS5zcGF3blN5bmMoIndob2FtaSIpLnN0ZG91dCwgJ3V0Zi04Jyk\n```\n3. Confirm that the output of `whoami` is written to `/tmp/test`\n\nDemonstration video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FI6mN8WbcE4\n\n### Impact\nUsers who open a malicious web page in the browser while running the test locally are affected by this vulnerability, which results in the remote code execution from the malicious web page.\nSince web pages can send requests to arbitrary addresses, a malicious web page can repeatedly try to exploit this vulnerability, which then triggers the exploit when the test server starts.",
  "id": "GHSA-v784-fjjh-f8r4",
  "modified": "2024-11-18T16:27:00Z",
  "published": "2024-08-05T19:49:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-v784-fjjh-f8r4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34344"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/blob/4779f5906fa4d3c784c2e2d6fe5a5c5f181faaec/packages/nuxt/src/app/components/test-component-wrapper.ts#L15-L19"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/blob/4779f5906fa4d3c784c2e2d6fe5a5c5f181faaec/packages/nuxt/src/app/components/test-component-wrapper.ts#L9-L27"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nuxt vulnerable to remote code execution via the browser when running the test locally"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-57785"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-706"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-16T23:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Zenitel AlphaWeb XE v11.2.3.10 was discovered to contain a local file inclusion vulnerability via the component amc_uploads.php.",
  "id": "GHSA-vcf9-g536-773c",
  "modified": "2025-02-04T15:31:35Z",
  "published": "2025-01-17T00:30:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57785"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gist.github.com/s4fv4n/56c326450dcb3ab808b5ce8242a11e30"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/opencontainers/runc"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0-rc95"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-27561"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-706"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-03-03T22:43:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-03T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "runc 1.0.0-rc95 through 1.1.4 has Incorrect Access Control leading to Escalation of Privileges, related to `libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go`. To exploit this, an attacker must be able to spawn two containers with custom volume-mount configurations, and be able to run custom images. NOTE: this issue exists because of a CVE-2019-19921 regression.",
  "id": "GHSA-vpvm-3wq2-2wvm",
  "modified": "2024-12-06T15:31:17Z",
  "published": "2023-03-03T21:30:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27561"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/issues/2197#issuecomment-1437617334"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/issues/3751"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/3785"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20241206-0004"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/I6BF24VCZRFTYBTT3T7HDZUOTKOTNPLZ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/FYVE3GB4OG3BNT5DLQHYO4M5SXX33AQ5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/FNB2UEDIIJCRQW4WJLZOPQJZXCVSXMLD"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/DHGVGGMKGZSJ7YO67TGGPFEHBYMS63VF"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ANUGDBJ7NBUMSUFZUSKU3ZMQYZ2Z3STN"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/I6BF24VCZRFTYBTT3T7HDZUOTKOTNPLZ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/FYVE3GB4OG3BNT5DLQHYO4M5SXX33AQ5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/FNB2UEDIIJCRQW4WJLZOPQJZXCVSXMLD"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/DHGVGGMKGZSJ7YO67TGGPFEHBYMS63VF"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ANUGDBJ7NBUMSUFZUSKU3ZMQYZ2Z3STN"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/03/msg00023.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/releases/tag/v1.1.5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/opencontainers/runc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gist.github.com/LiveOverflow/c937820b688922eb127fb760ce06dab9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Opencontainers runc Incorrect Authorization vulnerability"
}